FCPA Professor was the place to visit in January for in-depth Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement statistics from 2014 as well as comparisons to historical statistics.
If you missed the daily posts, no worries, this post consolidates in one place the statistics published on FCPA Professor in January.
This  post highlighted SEC enforcement of the FCPA in 2014. Take-away points: (i) of the 7 corporate enforcement actions from 2014, 6 enforcement actions (all but the Avon action) were administrative actions; and (ii) of the 7 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions from 2014, 0 (0%) have thus far resulted in related SEC charges against company employees.
This  post highlighted DOJ enforcement of the FCPA in 2014. Take-away points: (i) in the 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2014, the DOJ collected approximately $1.25 billion in criminal fines, an all-time record in terms of yearly FCPA settlement amounts; and (ii) of the 7 corporate DOJ enforcement actions in 2014, 1 (14%) has thus far resulted in related DOJ prosecutions of company employees.
This  post compared corporate FCPA enforcement in 2014 to prior years. Take-away point: while settlement amounts the DOJ and SEC collected in 2014 (approximately $1.6 billion set an all-time high), the number of core corporate enforcement actions in 2014 was below historical averages. (Note: many FCPA Inc. participants are calling 2014 settlement amounts the second-highest of all-time behind 2010. Not true, as such 2010 figures include the $400 million BAE settlement, an enforcement action in which the company was not even charged with FCPA violations).
This  post highlighted the alleged “foreign officials” in 2014 corporate enforcement actions. Take-away point: 60% of enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities (ranging from power and electric companies, hospitals and labs, an oil and gas company, and an aluminium smelter).
This  post highlighted certain facts and figures concerning the DOJ’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2014 and historically. Take-away points: (i) 75% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions since 2008 have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees; and (ii) since 2008, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action is approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity DOJ FCPA enforcement action.
This  post explored why so few corporate DOJ enforcement actions result in related DOJ prosecutions of company employees. Take-away point: (i) the reason may be the quality of the corporate enforcement action as there is only a 9% chance (since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in 2004) that a corporate enforcement action resolved solely with an NPA or DPA will result in related criminal charges of company employees compared to a 71% chance of related criminal charges of company employees if the corporate enforcement action was the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.
Finally as it relates to DOJ prosecution of individuals, this  post highlighted how approximately 90% of criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions between 1977 and 2004 resulted in related charges against company employees compared to this new era of FCPA enforcement when approximately 75% of DOJ criminal corporate FCPA enforcement actions have not resulted (at least yet) in related charges against company employees.
This  post highlighted certain facts and figures concerning the SEC’s prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses in 2014 and historically. Take-away points: (i) since 2008, 83% of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees; (ii) compare that statistic to the following: between 1977 and 2004, 61% of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in related charges against company employees.