Larry Thompson has experience with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act from a number of vantage points few can claim: DOJ Deputy Attorney General, a lawyer in private practice, and a general counsel of a major multinational company.
For this reason, you should read Thompson’s new article -“In-Sourcing Corporate Responsibility for Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” 51 American Criminal Law Review 199 (Winter 2014).
In the article, you will find an informed and candid critique of many current aspects of FCPA enforcement.
Thompson laments the uncertainty of the FCPA and states:
“The uncertainty of precisely what the FCPA forbids and allows harbors frightening potential for prosecutorial abuse and over-criminalization – topics that have preoccupied me, both as a private attorney and as Deputy Attorney General of the United States, for many years. This uncertainty in the FCPA is particularly troubling when one is dealing not just with individuals, who have control over all their own actions, but also with large corporations – artificial ‘persons’ consisting of hundreds, or thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of individuals for whom the corporation can be held accountable.”
Referencing FCPA congressional hearings in 2010 and 2011, Thompson observes:
“DOJ was unperturbed by the uncertainty surrounding FCPA enforcement. Indeed, one could be forgiven for suspecting that at least some federal prosecutors favor that uncertainty. But we must never forget that uncertainty in the law is the antitheses of the rule of law. There is reason that the Latin word for ‘uncertainty’ is arbitrarius. That some FCPA enforcement attorneys might relish and exploit the arbitrary enforcement of a federal criminal statute is not merely unseemly – it is illegitimate.”
In short, you can add Thompson’s observation to my own (see here ) in countering commentator suggestions that the FCPA is anything other than clear.
On the topic of the 2012 FCPA Guidance, Thompson cites my article “Grading the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Guidance ” and states:
“Its 130 pages appear impressive at first glance, but about two-thirds of that is routine recitation of background information: the introduction and table of contents consume thirty-five pages, the reprinting of the statute itself accounts for another thirty pages, and a summary of previously issued (and by definition inadequate) guidance and discussion of other statutes fleshes out yet another twenty pages.”
On the general topic of guidance and commenting on NPAs and DPAs used to resolve FCPA enforcement actions, Thompson cites my Congressional testimony  and observes:
“The FCPA guidance … offered by the Justice Department [in NPAs and DPAs] is less helpful because it may include coerced settlements that record instances where even DOJ itself was not sure that a violation of the FCPA actually occurred.”
Thompson’s observation in this regard is similar to former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s observation as highlighted in this  previous post.
The majority of Thompson’s article renews calls for an FCPA compliance defense.
I first highlighted Thompson’s call (along with several other former higher ranking DOJ officials) for a compliance defense in my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense ” and in this  previous post I further highlighted Thompson’s call for compliance defense at an FCPA symposium.
In short, a hard-to-ignore reality of the current compliance defense debate – against the backdrop of DOJ’s strong institutional opposition to compliance defense concepts – is the chorus of former DOJ officials who support compliance defense concepts.
In his new article, Thompson writes:
“[W]e must create an incentive structure that drives corporations to establish internal compliance programs and to root out foreign corruption within their own organizations. Only those businesses themselves have the resources to conduct the global investigations that the FCPA requires. To accomplish this end, I believe that we need to do two things: first, we must give businesses clear and predictable guidance on what sort of compliance programs they must establish; second, we must give them powerful incentives to engage in self-investigation and self-reporting of the bribery they uncover or suspect. The incentives I suggest are two: (1) businesses must be assured that a strong compliance program and prompt and full self-disclosure will ensure that the company itself will not be subject to criminal prosecution under the FCPA; and (2) such self-disclosure will also prevent the company from being debarred from doing business with the federal government or being denied government permits or licenses necessary for the company’s operations.”
Adopting a similar “baby carrot” / “real carrot” analogy I used in “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense “, Thompson writes:
“I propose two carrots. First, if a corporation establishes a comprehensive, fully funded, adequately staffed and trained FCPA compliance program, then the rogue employee who circumvents it and violates the FCPA – and is caught and turned over to authorities by his employer – should be deemed to be acting outside the realm of his corporate responsibilities and the self-reporting corporation should not be held criminally liable for his conduct. This would be an instance of a blameless corporation. For this incentive to work, of course, the carrot must be large and appetizing – hence the absolute necessity for transparency and predictability in FCPA enforcement. The second carrot is that a genuinely cooperative, self-reporting company with a proper compliance program must be assured that it will not be debarred from contracting with the United States government or receiving the government permits required to run its operations.”
In my “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense” article and elsewhere (see prior posts here , here  and here ) I have articulated – like Thompson – reasons why the DOJ should be in support of – not opposed to – a compliance defense. A compliance defense is not a race to the bottom – as government officials have suggested – it is a race to the top. Like Thompson, I have argued that a compliance defense will better facilitate DOJ’s prosecution of culpable individuals and advance the objectives of the FCPA.
I agree with Thompson when he says that the DOJ and SEC have an “almost wooden attitude” when it comes to the FCPA. Reflecting on the enforcement agencies sense of confidence and the billions of dollars collected in enforcement actions, Thompson states:
“But this supposedly shining vision of FCPA enforcement prowess is a Potemkin village, because without corporations’ own internal policing and self-reporting, the FCPA can accomplish little.”
I sincerely hope that Thompson’s article can renew a substantive – not rhetorical – discussion of a compliance defense and how it can help advance the laudable purpose of the FCPA. To learn more about my proposal, and how it differs slightly from Thompson’s, see here .
Can the DOJ and SEC soften its “wooden attitude”? Is the DOJ and SEC capable of diverting attention from enforcement statistics, settlement amounts, and political statements filled with empty rhetoric?
As I wrote in my most recent post  about a compliance defense, the FCPA has witnessed courageous moments before and a courageous moment is once again presented..