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Friday Roundup


More on the Yates Memo, scrutiny alerts, survey says, and FCPA reform.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

More on the Yates Memo

Once again a private company has marketed a public official to drive attendance to its paid event.

Earlier this week, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell delivered this speech reiterating various aspects of the “Yates Memo.” Caldwell stated:

“[O]ur focus on individuals stems from the reality that corporations act through human beings, and that justice usually requires identifying those responsible for criminal conduct and holding them personally accountable.  Prosecuting the corporate entity, and imposing a fine and other impersonal conditions, simply is not enough – in most instances – to fully punish and, more importantly, deter corporate misconduct.”

Regarding the cooperation credit aspects of the “Yates Memo,” Caldwell stated:

“We recognize, however, that a company cannot provide what it does not have.  And we understand that some investigations – despite their thoroughness – will not bear fruit.  Where a company truly is unable to identify the culpable individuals following an appropriately tailored and thorough investigation, but provides the government with the relevant facts and otherwise assists us in obtaining evidence, the company will be eligible for cooperation credit.  We will make efforts to credit, not penalize, diligent investigations.  On the flip side, we will carefully scrutinize and test a company’s claims that it could not identify or uncover evidence regarding the culpable individuals, particularly if we are able to do so ourselves.

As I have said before, it is not our intent to outsource our investigation of corporate wrongdoing to companies and their outside advisors.  As in the past, we will not sit idle, waiting for a company to conduct or complete its investigation.  Regardless of a company’s cooperation, federal agents and prosecutors will conduct thorough investigations.  If, through this process, we are able to identify the culpable individuals when the company itself did not do so, as well as evidence that would support the charging and prosecution of those individuals, we will assess whether that evidence truly was unavailable to the company.

We, of course, recognize that we sometimes can obtain evidence that a company cannot.  We often can obtain from third parties evidence that is not available to the company.  Also, we know that a company may not be able to interview former employees who refuse to cooperate in a company investigation.  Those same employees may provide information to us, whether voluntarily or through compulsory process.  Likewise, there are times when, for strategic reasons, we may ask that the company stand down from pursing a particular line of inquiry.  If so, the company will not be penalized for failing to identify facts subsequently discovered by government investigators.”

Caldwell also answered questions after the speech.  It appears that this Q&A was recorded and the same private company put the Q&A behind its paywall.

It’s just plain wrong that a private company is selling the words of public officials. It ought to stop.

Scrutiny Alerts


As highlighted here, in 2010 as part of the CustomsGate enforcement actions, Transocean resolved a $20.7 million FCPA enforcement action (involving a DOJ and SEC component) concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.

Bloomberg reports:

“Transocean Ltd., the world’s largest offshore rig contractor, is being linked for the first time to the corruption probe of Petroleo Brasileiro SA, the state-owned energy giant at the center of Brazil’s biggest corporate scandal. A former executive at Brazil’s state-run oil company has testified to receiving what he says were payments made by someone claiming to be a Transocean agent in exchange for a rig-operation contract from Petrobras.”


This CBCNews report goes in-depth regarding new allegations in a civil suit concerning SNC-Lavalin. According to the article:

“Top executives for years endorsed bribes and lavish gifts — including a yacht and even prostitutes — to win contracts from Libya’s Gadhafi regime.”

To cement ties, [the complaint] alleges specific SNC executives signed off on or approved numerous favours to help Gadhafi, including:

  • providing SNC staff and hiring university professor as tutors;
  • helping to obtain a Canadian visa;
  • considering appointing Saadi Gadhafi an SNC vice-president;
  • officially sponsoring his Italian Serie A professional soccer team.

One of the largest expenses included the purchase of a Palmer Johnson yacht worth $38 million for Saadi Gadhafi “organized and validated by CFO Laramée and approved by the then CEO Lamarre.” Saadi Gadhafi visited Canada in 2008, and SNC Lavalin picked up the bill — more than $2 million.”

Survey Says

KPMG recently conducted a worldwide online survey of corporate risk leaders to find out the strengths and weaknesses of their companies’ programs to combat bribery and corruption.  According to the survey responses:

“There is a sharp increase in the proportion of respondents who say they are highly challenged by the issue of Anti-Bribery Compliance (ABC) compared with a survey KPMG conducted four years earlier.

As companies continue to globalize, management of third parties poses the greatest challenge in executing ABC programs.

Despite the difficulty of monitoring their business dealings with third parties, more than one third of the respondents do not formally identify high-risk third parties. More than half of those respondents with right to-audit clauses over third parties have not exercised the right.

ABC considerations are accorded too low a priority by companies preparing to acquire, or merge with, other corporations across borders.

Respondents complain they lack the resources to manage ABC risk.

A top-down risk assessment would help companies set priorities, but executives admit that an ABC risk assessment is one of their companies’ top challenges.

Data analytics is an increasingly important and cost-effective tool to assess ABC controls. Yet only a quarter of respondents use data analysis to identify violations and, of those that do so, less than half continuously monitor data to spot potential violations.”

FCPA Reform

The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently released this document outlining its policy priorities. Included in the lengthy document was the following:  “work to reform the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by supporting changes to enforcement practices.”


A good weekend to all.


Chamber Of Commerce Recommends Changes To SEC Enforcement Practices


Yesterday, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness released this report titled “Examining U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Enforcement: Recommendations on Current Processes and Practices.”

Based on a yearlong effort that included surveys and interviews of a diverse group of in-house counsels, securities lawyers, and former SEC staff, the report “looks at the enforcement practices of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and provides recommendations on how to improve the process for all participants.” (See here for the Chamber press release).

Other than a few survey responses, there is nothing in the report specific to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  However, there is much in the report that is relevant to FCPA enforcement.

For instance, as highlighted in this 2014 FCPA year in review article, of the seven SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2014, six (86%) were resolved through SEC administrative orders.

Regarding the problematic surge in SEC administrative actions, the Chamber report states that “the fundamental problem in the use of an administrative forum to break new ground is the inherent risk of an unchecked expansion of existing legal policy that is not adequately overseen by a truly impartial third-party judicial forum.”

Against this backdrop, the report makes a number of recommendations relevant to SEC administrative actions that, at their core, propose “that the Commission adopt a policy to refrain from using its administrative forum as an avenue to adopt new interpretations of the federal securities laws or to apply existing interpretations to new or unique factual circumstances.”

Another recommendation in the report that caught my eye was the following: “The Commission should take a leadership role among regulatory bodies at the federal, state, and international levels to reduce or eliminate duplicative and overlapping investigations and duplicative enforcement actions for the same conduct.”

As stated in the report:

“When companies respond to allegations of improper activities, management’s focus is necessarily diverted from the day-to-day running of its business. That is an ineluctable attribute of doing business in a regulated society. But, there should be some understanding on government’s part that, in the current era, firms are frequently subject to multiple domestic and foreign regulators. Responding to multiple regulators with respect to the same conduct or transaction is not, and should not be allowed to become, a regular attribute of doing business. It is counterproductive—and damaging to shareholders—to subject firms and individuals serially to multiple SEC inquiries or multiple regulators and self regulators for the same alleged misconduct.”

A good place to eliminate duplicative regulation is to have the SEC stop enforcing the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

As I’ve previously stated, should this reform occur, it could be called “granting the wish” because as highlighted in the article “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” the SEC never wanted any role in enforcing the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. However, congressional leaders at the time of the FCPA’s enactment had a high level of distrust with the Justice Department and insisted, against the SEC’s objections both when the FCPA was enacted in 1977 and when it was first amended in 1988, that it play a role in enforcing the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

For additional reading on divesting the SEC of its authority to enforce the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, see here from former DOJ FCPA enforcement attorney Philip Urofsky and here from Professor Barbara Black.

“Without Law or Limits: The Continued Growth Of The Shadow Regulatory State”


James Copeland and others at the Manhattan Institute have written some good pieces about the DOJ’s use of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.

See here for the 2012 post discussing “The Shadow Regulatory State:  The Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements.”

See here for the 2014 post discussing “The Shadow Lengthens:  The Continuing Threat of Regulation by Prosecution.”

If you are interested in NPAs and DPAs (and you should be if you follow the FCPA given that since 2010 approximately 85% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have involved either an NPA or DPA), you should check out Copeland’s latest titled “Without Law or Limits: The Continued Growth of the Shadow Regulatory State.

The introduction states:

This report focuses on DPAs and NPAs reached between the U.S. government and businesses or individuals in 2014. […]

Through specific case studies, this report explores three key issues that arise under the shadow regulatory state:

  1. Enforcement efforts can undermine compliance. As shown through a plea agreement, a DPA, an NPA, and a cease-and-desist settlement entered into between the U.S. government and Hewlett-Packard [see prior posts here and here] and its foreign subsidiaries, federal prosecutors often punish companies notwithstanding extensive compliance programs, even when the companies self-report offenses and even when “rogue” employees go to extraordinary lengths to hide misconduct from their employers. Such a “strict liability” enforcement strategy may deter companies from developing effective compliance regimes.
  2. The DPA-NPA process lacks definite terms and judicial oversight. As shown through the federal government’s decision to extend a two-year DPA with Standard Chartered Bank for an additional three-year term, without any proffered evidence of additional wrongdoing, federal prosecutors’ authority in the DPA-NPA process is supreme. These agreements typically grant prosecutors the sole authority to determine whether an agreement has been breached. Indeed, the Department of Justice argues that federal judges have no authority over DPAs, beyond ensuring that such agreements comply with the terms of the Speedy Trial Act. [For prior posts examining this issue, see here and here].
  3. The DPA-NPA process is ill-suited for application to individuals. One concern about the increased use of DPAs and NPAs by the federal government is that they give prosecutors broad powers over businesses, notwithstanding that, more often than not, no individual is ever prosecuted for any underlying offense alleged in the agreement. [For prior post containing FCPA-specifics on this issue, see here and here]. The recent decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission to apply DPAs and NPAs to individuals—acquiring significant authority over people’s lives and retaining the ability to prosecute, essentially at prosecutors’ discretion—is a troubling new application of this power. The NPA reached with an unnamed individual in a 2014 insider-trading investigation exemplifies these concerns, as the alleged misconduct itself most likely does not constitute insider trading under current law.

Notwithstanding the lack of judicial oversight in the shadow regulatory state, two judges asserted new authority over this process in 2014—continuing a trend observed in 2013. Ultimately, however, reforming the shadow regulatory state requires legislative action. Part IV of this report discusses one proposed solution, the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, sponsored by U.S. Representative Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D-N.J.). Although this proposed legislation does not go far enough to address some of the serious problems with DPAs and NPAs, the legislation would add substantial clarity, transparency, and oversight, as compared with current practice, and is a great starting point for much-needed reform.”

Numerous posts have highlighted the problems of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context. (See here for example.  For a more comprehensive analysis see “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement“).

My long-standing, two-fold FCPA reform proposal is to amend the FCPA to include compliance defense and couple this with abolishing NPA and DPAs.  (Among other prior posts, see here).

Should this occur, the resulting enforcement landscape would look as follows.

If a payment is made in violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions within a business organization, two issues will be relevant.

First, if the payment was made, authorized or condoned by a director or executive officer, the business organization will not be able to avail itself of an FCPA compliance defense.  Second, if the payment was made by any employee or agent in the absence of pre-existing FCPA compliance policies consistent with the best practices, the business organization will not be able to avail itself of an FCPA compliance defense.  In these scenarios involving corrupt directors or executive officers or business organizations without a commitment to FCPA compliance, the enforcement agencies will have two choices:  do not prosecute or prosecute the business organization for violating the FCPA.  This is a just and reasonable result and the third option of an NPA or DPA is not needed in such a scenario. As even the DOJ has acknowledged and empirical research has demonstrated, it is extremely unlikely that actual criminal prosecution of such a business organization will result in its demise.

Conversely, if the payment at issue is made by a non-executive employee or agent contrary to the business organization’s pre-existing FCPA compliance policies, the organization will be able to avail itself of an FCPA compliance defense.  Thus, as a matter of law, no FCPA prosecution of the organization will be able to proceed.  This too is a just and reasonable result and aligns FCPA enforcement with enforcement regimes in several other peer countries.

The above FCPA reforms will take courage, both by Congress in amending the FCPA and by the enforcement agencies in abolishing the resolution vehicles they created.  The reform proposals may indeed result in less hard FCPA enforcement actions as certain business organizations will be able to avail itself of the compliance defense and as enforcement agencies are once again mindful of their burdens of proof in prosecuting alleged FCPA violations.

However, more FCPA enforcement is not necessarily an inherent good and ought not be the singular goal of the FCPA.  The goal ought to be constructing an enforcement regime that best promotes compliance, reduces improper conduct, best advances the FCPA’s objective of reducing bribery, increases transparency and better aligns FCPA enforcement with rule of law principles.

The above two-fold FCPA reform proposal will accomplish these goals as well as increase public confidence in FCPA enforcement.  The proposals will also allow the enforcement agencies to better allocate limited prosecutorial resources to cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engage in the improper conduct. (See here for the prior post).

Fighting Foreign Corrupt Practices – How Current DOJ and SEC Revenue Generation is Unproductive


Today’s post is from Peter Manda. Manda is a former international in-house counsel and has worked on a variety of international in-house investigations and FCPA matters.


In the early days of FCPA enforcement, courts and the DOJ alike made every effort to ascertain the source of the violation and to deal with that violation on the local level.  Prosecutions were limited to local employees; and fines and penalties on issuers were limited in scope.

Over time, as issuers were found to have intentionally and knowingly violated the FCPA, disgorgement of profits and high fines and penalties became more common. Nevertheless, collected fines and penalties (while volatile) increased (at most) at an average rate of $100M a year. This all changed in 2012 with the adoption by the SEC and DOJ of the FCPA Guidelines which purport to outline the compliance steps that must be undertaken in order to prevent an FCPA violation or to reduce or mitigate potential fines and penalties through voluntary disclosure and cooperation.

In describing liability for acts conducted in or by subsidiaries, the Guide articulates a strict liability respondeat superior standard that compels issuers to disgorge any revenue that is arguably derived from an alleged violation. The results have sent shock waves through the international business community. Fines and penalties collected have increased at a clip pace of $500M a year. Issuers now face the difficult choice of voluntarily reporting and potentially paying impressively high fines or hedging a bet that the SEC or DOJ won’t find the violation for a while and then paying a lesser fine by cooperating in the investigation. Worse, it is pretty clear from recent official statements that the SEC and DOJ assume issuers are companies that go out into the world with the intent of breaking all the rules, paying bribes, and being corrupt.

Yet, a review of recent FCPA enforcement actions does not show how bad US issuers are. Rather, they often point to local employees in far-distant countries committing FCPA violations — violations that are often only apparent in hindsight after the controls implemented by the issuer detect the wrong-doing. In most cases, those employees are individuals who operate culturally under different assumptions and who don’t seem to have received the memo that US companies don’t tolerate bribery and corrupt practices. This is especially the case where an issuer acquires a foreign company and then finds that employees in the acquired company had been engaging in corrupt practices.

The outcry from issuers and from those who think about the FCPA and its scope is justified. In effect the government has converted what should be an anti-corruption measure into a revenue generating measure. By having widened the standards to allow prosecutors to coerce settlements that disgorge from the consolidated global earnings of issuers, the DOJ and SEC have opened the revenue stream pipeline and the money is flowing at a clip pace of $500M a year. Naturally there is pushback from this overreach, pushback that has included Congressional hearings. The negative result of this pushback could be a watering down of the effort to fight corruption abroad. Not only would that be unfortunate, it would violate OECD objectives and commitments.

In an article I wrote – recently published by the International In-House Counsel Journal – I suggest that the DOJ and SEC should adopt an intermediate standard that allows for limitation of liability (including fines and penalties) to the foreign subsidiary (that is, no disgorgement of consolidated global earnings) where (a) the issuer parent voluntarily discloses immediately upon the discovery of a violation, (b) the issuer parent’s compliance controls are effective and were the reason for the discovery, and (c) the violations were engaged in by employees or agents who knew of the issuer’s commitment to FCPA compliance but chose to ignore them regardless; or (d) where an issuer acquires a foreign subsidiary and finds a violation after the fact despite due diligence conducted according to generally accepted auditing principles.

I believe the result of adopting an intermediate standard would encourage more cooperation between the government and issuers. An intermediate standard would make issuers allies with the DOJ and SEC in the fight against corruption — rather than adversaries fighting a calculus of revenue generation and earnings reduction. Equally important, by focusing on the subsidiary rather than the parent issuer, the DOJ and SEC could engage the issuer to interact with local authorities to prosecute the violators and to implement effective informational campaigns that could have a wider, more permanent, effect in the fight against corruption. Disgorgement of consolidated earnings punishes the parent issuer, it does nothing to help reduce foreign corrupt practices. It’s time the SEC and DOJ turned their attention from generating revenue from issuers to making them allies in the fight against foreign corrupt practices.

Senate Remains Interested In FCPA Issues


Granted it has been approximately four years since the Senate held its Foreign Corrupt Practices hearing in November 2010.  (The House followed-up with an FCPA hearing in June 2011).

FCPA reform legislation was never introduced (for potential reasons why – see this article), yet the Senate very much remains interested in FCPA issues.

The Senate Judiciary Committee recently released this document which contains Attorney General Nominee Loretta Lynch’s responses to various Senator questions.

The remainder of this post excerpts all FCPA related questions and Lynch’s answers.

As highlighted below, the Q&A’s cover the following topics:  DOJ guidance, DOJ declinations, “FCPA abuses” (as stated in a series of questions), Andrew Weissman’s FCPA reform positions prior to recently re-joining the DOJ (see here for the prior post), international cooperation, FCPA reform (including a compliance defense), and the time it takes to resolve FCPA investigations.



Q: In 2012, the Department of Justice and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) issued joint guidance detailing Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement information and the agencies’ enforcement priorities. While the guidance clarified portions of the law and some of the agencies’ enforcement theories, many companies and individuals seeking to comply with the FCPA have asked for further, and continued, clarification. This request was expressed to Attorney General Eric Holder and Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell during previous Committee hearings.

a. If confirmed, will you commit to working with companies and individuals to further improve the Guidance?

RESPONSE: If I am confirmed as Attorney General, I look forward to continuing the outreach efforts that the Department has been making with the private sector to understand their needs and concerns and, if necessary, update and/or improve the Guide.

b. Will you commit to updating the Guidance, when necessary, to reflect changes in DOJ enforcement practices?

RESPONSE: If I am confirmed as Attorney General, I look forward to continuing efforts that the Department has been making to provide meaningful guidance in the FCPA context where necessary and appropriate.

In the area of FCPA enforcement, there is little guiding case law available for compliance practitioners to rely on. However, the FCPA Guidance that was issued in 2012 took an important first step in helping practitioners understand how the enforcement agencies’ interpret the statute. The Guidance includes six anonymized examples of declinations— instances where the DOJ and SEC declined to bring FCPA-related enforcement actions in recognition of the companies’ timely voluntary disclosures, meaningful cooperation, and sophisticated compliance policies and controls. The continued publication of FCPA declinations would foster greater FCPA compliance by providing practitioners with a better understanding of how the FCPA is interpreted. If confirmed, would you support increasing DOJ transparency regarding declination decisions?

RESPONSE: As you know, the United States Attorney’s Manual provides a mechanism to allow for notification to an individual (or entity), where appropriate, that an investigation as to that individual (or entity) is being closed. If I am confirmed as Attorney General, I look forward to continuing the Department’s practice of providing meaningful guidance in the FCPA context (such as procedures to respond to opinion requests) and of actively pursuing and implementing means by which declinations and other information about the decision to prosecute, or not, can be responsibly and appropriately shared.


DOJ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Abuses

In much the same way as civil forfeiture, critics of the FCPA note that the Department of Justice collects and retains for use (without further congressional approval or disbursal from the Treasury) fines paid in settlement of federal FCPA investigations. This ability to retain FCPA fines incentivizes not only a vigorous application of the FCPA, but also “creative” legal theories (which can lead to investigations of companies for potentially innocuous behavior). Critics of the FCPA, and the Department’s pursuit of FCPA investigations, point out that the combination of investigation and potential litigation expenses frequently drive what may be innocent companies to settle, which both cements the revenue source for the Department and prevents federal judges from having opportunities to interpret provisions of the FCPA.

Do you agree or disagree with the claim that the ability of the Department of Justice to keep and use FCPA settlement fines incentivizes application of the FCPA? If you disagree with this claim, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: I disagree with this claim, which I believe is built on a faulty premise regarding the process by which criminal fines and other financial penalties are paid and subsequently put to use. Fines for FCPA violations are not “kept” or “used” by the Department, and no such use incentivizes application of the FCPA. Rather, as with all cases, the Department considers the strength of the evidence and other long-standing policy considerations (see, e.g., United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM) 9-28.300) in determining whether to bring an FCPA prosecution.

A company convicted of an FCPA violation pays any accompanying fine not to the Department but to the relevant U.S. district court clerk’s office. Those funds are then directed to the Crime Victim Fund, which is a U.S. Treasury fund created pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 10601. Funds paid into the U.S. Treasury are not available for use by the Department except through the appropriations process or by statute.

A company that settles an FCPA investigation through a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement pays any accompanying financial penalty not to the Department but to the U.S. Treasury. Pursuant to Congressional authorization and strict Departmental oversight, a small percentage of these funds may be made available to the Department. More specifically, in 1993 Congress authorized the creation of a 3% working capital fund (“3% Fund”) for the Department. See Public Law 113-234, 28 C.F.R. Section 527. Three percent of penalties associated with certain financial recoveries, including through non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, are paid into the 3% working capital fund. After rigorous review by the Collection Resources Allocation Board, overseen by the Justice Management Division, the Department may award funds from the 3% Fund to support certain litigation, data administration, and personnel costs.

Has your office actually tried any FCPA cases to a verdict in federal court? If the answer is yes, please provide details about these cases.

RESPONSE: The Eastern District of New York has participated in a number of significant FCPA investigations with the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department, and it continues to do so. To date, these investigations have resulted in two corporate resolutions: (1) In re Ralph Lauren, NPA, $882,000 penalty, press release at:; and (2) In re Comverse Technology, Inc., NPA, $1.2 million penalty, press release: million-penalty-resolve-violations-foreign-corrupt); and one guilty plea by Garth Peterson of Morgan Stanley (and a declination against Morgan Stanley) (press release: While the Department has conducted FCPA trials in many districts, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York has not had an FCPA trial to date.

As you know, the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section is charged with investigating and enforcing the criminal provisions of the FCPA. Recently, Andrew Weissmann was selected to be the Chief of the Fraud Section. Mr. Weissmann is a former prosecutor and FBI general counsel. In private practice, however, Mr. Weissmann has been an outspoken critic of DOJ’s FCPA program. Specifically, in a report36 Mr. Weissmann drafted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Legal Reform, he has recommended that: (1) a compliance defense to the FCPA should be added; (2) a company’s liability should be limited for the prior actions of a company it has acquired; (3) a “willfulness” element should be added for corporate criminal liability; (4) a company’s liability should be limited for the actions of a subsidiary; and (5) the definition of “foreign official” under the FCPA should be changed.

Do you agree with any, some, or all of Weissmann’s proposals for reforming the FCPA?

RESPONSE: It is my understanding that Mr. Weissmann made these comments while in private practice and in connection with his representation of the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform (“Chamber”). It is also my understanding that, in the intervening time period, the Department has met with the Chamber, as well as other stakeholders, to engage in a healthy and productive dialogue regarding the Department’s interpretation and application of the FCPA. If confirmed as Attorney General, I would continue to foster dialogue with the Chamber and other stakeholders regarding our FCPA program.

Which of these changes (if any) do you think could be done administratively, as opposed to legislatively?

RESPONSE: I do not support the proposed changes. Several of them would be a significant departure from general principles of corporate criminal law, effectively creating unique exceptions for FCPA cases that are unwarranted, are contrary to Congress’s intent in enacting the FCPA, and would impose often insurmountable obstacles to effective enforcement of the FCPA.

In 2004, then-Deputy Attorney General (and current director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) James Comey stated that “[the Department of Justice wants] real time enforcement, so that the public and potential white collar criminals see that misdeeds are swiftly punished.” Despite this statement, the 2014 OECD Foreign Bribery Report noted that “the average time taken (in years) to conclude foreign bribery cases has steadily increased over time, [from an average of 1.3 years in 2004] peaking at an average of 7.3 years taken to conclude the 42 cases in 2013.” Lengthy federal investigations not only place a tremendous financial burden on the targeted corporations and their shareholders, but also on taxpayers who shoulder the agency’s expenses for conducting the investigation.

Do you agree or disagree with Director Comey’s statement regarding the value of real-time law enforcement? If you disagree with this statement, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: I agree that law enforcement must move swiftly and responsibly in investigating both white collar and other criminal activity. I also agree that, for deterrence purposes, it is important to move quickly and bring charges against those individuals and companies that have engaged in criminal behavior. While the Department has been working diligently to find meaningful and reasonable ways to reduce the time white collar FCPA investigations take, the question’s reliance on the OECD Foreign Bribery Report is misplaced. As I understand it, the referenced statistic is based on an aggregate of all the OECD Working Group members’ cases, rather than isolating the time taken by the United States in its cases. Also, this statistic does not measure the length of the criminal investigation. Rather, it measures the time between the last criminal act and the sanction, increasing substantially the time measured, since the Department (or foreign law enforcement) might not learn about a potential violation until years after the last criminal act has occurred.

Given that the FCPA Unit within the Department’s Fraud Section has expanded its personnel from 2004 to today, and given that the Department receives even more international cooperation today than it did in 2004, do you agree or disagree that the Department should be witnessing reduced investigative timelines for FCPA investigations rather than increased timelines? If you disagree with this statement, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: Additional resources and cooperation are greatly appreciated and can often be key factors in expediting criminal investigations. However, they are only two of many factors that can influence the time it takes to conduct a successful investigation of any kind. Compared to other white collar investigations, the challenges associated with FCPA investigations can be much greater. Because of the nature of the offense, most of the evidence in these cases is typically located overseas. While international cooperation efforts have expanded significantly over the past ten years, the process for obtaining evidence from overseas is still time-consuming.

Before you are confirmed to serve as the next Attorney General, will you or will you not commit to dramatically reducing the timeline of FCPA-related Fraud Unit investigations, in order to reduce the financial burden on potentially innocent corporations and reduce investigation-related taxpayer expenses? If you will not commit to reducing these investigative timelines, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: Under my leadership, the Eastern District of New York has been committed to increasing the speed of its white collar investigations, including its FCPA investigations. As a result of the particular challenges of corporate and overseas investigations, however, the investigations can take a significant amount of time. While improvements in this area can be made, irresponsibly or artificially expediting an investigation solely for the sake of speed can harm the investigation and the pursuit of justice, as well as create greater harms to the targets, subjects, and witnesses in our investigations. If I am confirmed as Attorney General, you can be assured that the Department will continue to review each case on its merits and will move as expeditiously and responsibly as possible.

Often, many of the countries with corrupt officials are the same countries that harbor terrorists, that seek to undermine U.S. foreign policy, and that have rampant bid rigging and illegal cartel conduct. On the opposite side of the equation, there are an increasing number of countries that have passed new anti-bribery statutes in the hope of curbing their own internal corruption problems and spurring legitimate economic growth.

How will you marshal the criminal justice resources of the Department of Justice to enforce the FCPA in a way that helps in the fight against terrorism, cartel conduct, and international money laundering? Please provide a detailed explanation, based on your current experience as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, of how you intend to tackle the problem.

RESPONSE: As the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, I am well aware of the link between corruption, corrupt regimes, and transnational crime, including economic crime, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and even terrorism. In addition to prosecuting foreign corruption, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism cases, the Department works closely with its counterparts throughout the U.S. government to devise and implement robust anticorruption strategies. For example, my Office has worked closely with the intelligence community on terrorism and corruption-related matters. The Department further participates, along with colleagues in other agencies in the U.S. government, in developing anticorruption policies through various international organizations and anticorruption conventions, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Working Group on Bribery, the G-7, the G-20, and the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. The Department also consults with civil society organizations involved in the battle against corruption. If confirmed as the Attorney General, I would continue to ensure that fighting corruption overseas, as well as domestically, remains a top priority for the Department. I would ensure that resources are appropriately directed to enforcing U.S. laws targeting foreign corruption, recovery of assets stolen by kleptocrats, and corrupt regimes.

Given that more and more countries are enacting and enforcing anti-bribery statutes, would you agree or disagree that the FCPA ought to be amended to restrict FCPA jurisdiction to countries that do not have a prima facie anticorruption infrastructure? If you disagree with this statement, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: Such an exception would be unique under federal law. I disagree with this approach, as I believe it would do harm to the Department’s anticorruption efforts. The Department works closely with countries that are developing their own anticorruption infrastructures, and we are well aware that it can take years of persistent effort to create an effective and holistic response to corruption of domestic and foreign officials.

As a recent OECD Report on Foreign Bribery noted, enforcement of existing anticorruption statutes, particularly those targeting foreign bribery, is improving but has a long way to go to see consistent and effective enforcement even among top economies in the world.

The Department of Justice generally emphasizes the benefit of voluntary self-disclosure to, and voluntary cooperation with, FCPA investigations. Corporations are increasingly questioning the benefit, however, of rushing toward self-disclosure without demonstration of some sort of legal or cost benefit for doing so. To address this, some practitioners have suggested that the FCPA should contain a “safe harbor” from criminal prosecution for corporations that (1) have robust compliance programs, (2) self-disclose potential FCPA violations, and (3) cooperate fully with the Department’s investigation, akin to what the Antitrust Division has for cartel enforcement. (The Department would, of course, be able to continue to obtain non-criminal penalties for violations.)

Do you agree or disagree with the statement that there should be an FCPA “safe harbor provision” to help corporations that are trying to do the right thing? If you disagree with this statement, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: I do not believe a “safe harbor provision” is necessary or desirable. Both the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Department of Justice already provide significant benefits for companies that have robust compliance programs, self-disclose potential FCPA violations, and cooperate fully with the Department’s investigation. Indeed, in a recent FCPA matter, the Criminal Division and the Eastern District of New York declined to prosecute Morgan Stanley based on many of those factors, among others, despite the fact that one of its Managing Directors bribed a foreign official to obtain business for and on behalf of Morgan Stanley.

If you agree with the concept of an FCPA safe harbor provision, please describe what the structure or contours of such a safe harbor provision should be, and how you would implement that provision. Please provide a detailed explanation, based on your current experience as United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, of how you would write and implement such a provision.

RESPONSE: The factors outlined in your question are important considerations in all FCPA cases, but I do not believe that a “safe harbor provision” is necessary or desirable.

Members of the business community, practitioners, commentators, and even members of Congress have expressed frustration with the Department of Justice’s failure to publicize declined FCPA prosecutions, even where there is public knowledge that a particular corporation is under investigation. This practice may have several negative effects, including preventing corporations from having clarity about what type of conduct is considered acceptable. Given the Department’s financial incentive to ensure robust application of the FCPA, there is concern that this refusal to publish decline-to-prosecute information is intended to protect the FCPA fine-based revenue source for the Department.

Would you agree or disagree with the statement that FCPA decline-to-prosecute decisions should be made available to the public? If you disagree with this statement, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: I agree that the Department should continue to explore ways by which it can responsibly share information while protecting the many sensitive interests that federal, criminal investigations implicate. The Department has a longstanding general practice of refraining from discussing non-public information on matters it has declined to prosecute. This practice is designed to protect ongoing investigations, privacy rights and other interests of uncharged parties, and sensitive, internal law enforcement deliberations. This practice and these considerations apply across the enforcement of all federal criminal laws.

Nevertheless, I must emphasize that the Department does pursue means by which declinations and other information about the decision to prosecute can be responsibly shared with entities or individuals under investigation, the business community, practitioners, commentators, and members of Congress. The United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM) describes situations in which a United States Attorney can exercise discretion to provide notice that an investigation is being closed. See USAM § 9-11.155. Further, in the last two years, the Department has made great efforts to provide more information and transparency in the area of the FCPA, including the publication of A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “Resource Guide”). The Resource Guide, which was written by the Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), provides the public with extensive information about the Department’s FCPA enforcement approach and priorities. It contains a section on declinations and sets out criteria prosecutors consider in declining to bring a prosecution under the FCPA. In addition, the Department responds to opinion requests concerning its enforcement intent about actions that may be perceived as violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. See Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-l(e) and 78dd-2(f). These opinion letters provide significant additional insight into the Department’s enforcement views, as well as transparency for companies, individuals, and practitioners as to what is acceptable or not.

Before you are confirmed to serve as the next Attorney General, will you or will you not commit to publishing information about the FCPA cases that the Department has decided not to pursue or prosecute? If you will not commit to publishing this information, please provide a detailed explanation as to why.

RESPONSE: I will commit to continuing the Department’s practice of actively pursuing and implementing means by which declinations and other information about the decision to prosecute, or not, can be responsibly and appropriately shared. As detailed in my answer to the preceding question, the United States Attorney’s Manual already provides a mechanism to provide notice that an investigation is being closed. I also commit to continuing the Department’s recent efforts to provide more information and transparency, as it did by publishing the Resource Guide.

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