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U.S. Bonny Island Bribery Bounty Grows

Few question the U.S. foreign bribery surplus, but it should be asked:  is the US Treasury the best place for fines and penalties when a foreign company bribes a foreign official?

In April 2011, JGC Corp. of Japan formally joined the Bonny Island (Nigeria) bribery club – see here for the prior post.  Some predicted this was the end of the Bonny Island enforcement actions, but I ended the post as follows.  “This may not be the last we hear of Bonny Island bribery. Consulting Company B (based in Japan) was a key participant in the bribery scheme. Does anyone know anything about Consulting Company B and whether it might be next to resolve its Bonny Island exposure? If so, please share.”

Yesterday, the DOJ shared as it announced (here) that Marubeni Corporation (a Japanese trading company headquartered in Tokyo) resolved an FCPA enforcement action  by agreeing to pay a $54.6 million criminal penalty.

As the DOJ trumpets in the headline of its release, the U.S. Bonny Island bribery intake now stands at $1.7 billion.  Previous enforcement actions were brought against the four TSKJ joint venture partners:  Kellogg Brown & Root LLC / Halliburton Co. / KBR Inc.  ($579 million in combined DOJ/SEC fines and penalties); Technip S.A. ($338 million in combined DOJ/SEC fines and penalties); Snamprogetti Netherlands BV / ENI S.p.A. ($365 million in combined DOJ/SEC fines and penalties); and JGC Corp. of Japan ($219 million in DOJ fines). In addition, as the DOJ notes in its release, is Jeffrey Tesler’s $149 million forfeiture, Wojciech Chodan’s $700,000 forfeiture, and Albert Jack Stanley’s guilty plea.

This post summarizes the Marubeni enforcement action, the first FCPA enforcement action of 2012.

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Marubeni Corporation resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here)

Criminal Information

The information focuses on the same Bonny Island (Nigeria) conduct at issue in the above referenced enforcement actions.  According to the information, Marubeni is a “major Japanese trading company headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, with operations around the world, including in Nigeria.”  The company’s shares are listed in Japan and the U.K.

According to the information, the TSKJ joint venture, in addition to hiring Jeffrey Tesler, “also hired Marubeni to help it obtain and retain business in Nigeria, including by offering to pay and paying bribes to Nigerian government officials.”  The information further states as follows.  “By the time TSKJ had stopped paying Marubeni in June 2005, TSKJ had paid Marubeni $51 million in part for use in bribing Nigerian government officials.  Marubeni was an agent within the meaning of the FCPA of TSKJ and of each of the joint venture companies, including KBR and Technip.  Thus, Marubeni was an agent of a “domestic concern” within the meaning of the FCPA and an agent of an “issuer” within the meaning of the FCPA.”

Based on the above allegations, the information charges one count of conspiracy and one count of aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery provisions.  The information contains the following  U.S. jurisdictional allegations.  (1) “Marubeni met with Stanley and others in Houston, Texas to discuss Marubeni’s contracts with TSKJ and its fees;” (2) “Marubeni’s co-conspirators caused wire transfers totaling approximately $132 million to be sent from Maderia Company’s 3’s bank account in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, to bank accounts in New York, New York, to be further credited to bank accounts in Switzerland and Monaco controlled by Tesler for Tesler to use to bribe Nigerian government officials;” (3) “on or about April 7, 1999 Marubeni faxed a letter to Stanley in Houston, Texas, regarding Marubeni’s fee for Train 3.”  The aiding and abetting charge is based on the following allegation:  “Marubeni aided and abetted KBR in causing the following corrupt payments to be wire transferred from Madeira Company 3’s bank account in Amsterdam, The Netherlands, to Marunbeni’s bank accounts in Japan intending for Marubeni to use such funds in part to bribe Nigerian government officials:  $17 million in payments between August 2002 and June 2004 “payments to Marubeni pursuant to Agreement for Trains 4 & 5.”

As in prior Bonny Island bribery enforcement actions, the “foreign officials” identified were Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) officers and employees,  NLNG is majority owned by multinational oil companies and Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) owns 49% of NLNG and “through the NLNG board members appointed by NNPC, among other means, the Nigerian government exercised control over NLNG, including but not limited to the ability to block the award of EPC contracts.”  In addition, the Marubeni enforcement action (like the prior enforcement actions) generically refer to the other Nigerian government officials.

Deferred Prosecution Agreement

The DOJ’s charges against Marubeni were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement.  Pursuant to the DPA, Marubeni admitted, accepted, and acknowledged “that it is responsible under U.S. law for acts of its employees and agents” as set forth in the information.

The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based “on the individual facts and circumstances presented by this case” and that “among the facts considered were that Marubeni has agreed to undertake remedial measures as contemplated by [the DPA], and the impact on Marubeni, including collateral consequences, of a guilty plea or criminal conviction.”  When the DOJ cites the facts considered in resolving a matter via a DPA or NPA typically the facts are much more extensive than above.

As detailed in the DPA, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for the charges at issue was $54.6 million – $109.2 million.  Pursuant to the DPA, Marubeni agreed to pay $54.6 million – a rare instance in which the fine amount is within the guidelines range.

Pursuant to the DPA, Marubeni represented that it “has implemented and will continue to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA, the anti-corruption provisions of Japanese law, and other applicable anti-corruption laws throughout its operations …”.  The specifics of such a program are set forth in an attachment to the DPA.  In the DPA, Marubeni agreed to annual reporting obligations to the DOJ regarding its compliance program and internal controls.  In addition, Marubeni also agreed to engage a “corporate compliance consultant” for a two-year period.

As is common in FCPA DPA’s Marubeni expressly agreed that it shall not, directly or indirectly, “make any public statement … contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by Marubeni” set forth in the DPA.

In the DOJ’s release, Mythili Raman (Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) stated as follows.  “With today’s resolution, the department has held accountable all five of the corporations that participated in the massive, decade-long scheme to bribe Nigerian government officials in connection with the so-called Bonny Island project.  As a result of this extensive investigation, the department and our partners have obtained more than $1.7 billion in penalties and forfeiture orders from the joint venture partners, their agents and individuals who sought illegally to obtain the Bonny Island contracts. Several individuals also have pleaded guilty for their roles in the scheme. Our FCPA enforcement efforts are an essential part of our comprehensive approach to rooting out corruption across the globe.”

In this company release, Marubeni said that the effects of the enforcement action on its business forecasts “will not be material.”  One interesting aside is that Marubeni states in its most recent annual report (here) as follows.  “FTSE4Good Global Index:  The FTSE4Good Global Index is a stock price indicator developed and established by the Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE), a joint venture between the Financial Times Ltd. of the U.K. and the London Stock Exchange. Companies are evaluated on their environmental sustainability efforts, relationships with stakeholders, protection of human rights, safeguarding of labor standards in their supply chains, and commitment to preventing corruption. Marubeni has been consistently selected for inclusion in the index since 2001, when the index was initially established.” (emphasis added).

Derek Adler (here) and Marc Weinstein (here) of Hughes Hubbard & Reed LLP represented Marubeni.

Bridgestone Corporation Resolves FCPA (and Antitrust) Enforcement Action

The DOJ announced yesterday (here) that “Bridgestone Corporation [a Japanese company that is the world’s largest manufacturer of tires and rubber products] has agreed to plead guilty and to pay a $28 million criminal fine for its role in conspiracies to rig bids and to make corrupt payments to foreign government officials in Latin America related to the sale of marine hose and other industrial products manufactured by the company.” 

Part conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act and part conspiracy to violate the FCPA, the FCPA portion of the criminal information (see here) alleges that Bridgestone conspired with others to “obtain and retain for Bridgestone’s IEPD [International Engineered Products Department] business million of dollars of sales of marine hose and other industrial products by making corrupt payments to foreign government officials in Latin America and elsewhere.”  Among other things, the DOJ alleged that Bridgestone: (i) “contracted with local sales agents in many of the Latin American countries where Bridgestone sought IEPD sales;” (ii) developed relationships with employees of the state-owned entities [PEMEX in Mexico is specifically mentioned] with which Bridgestone sought to do business;” (iii) “negotiated with employees of state-owned entities who were ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA, in Mexico and other Lartin American countries, to make corrupt payments to those foreign officials to secure business for Bridgestone and BIPA [Bridgestone Industrial Products of America Inc. – Bridgestone’s U.S. subsidiary];” (iv) “approved the making of corrupt payments to the foreign officials through the local sales agents to secure business for Bridgestone and BIPA;” (v) paid local sales agents commissions within which BIPA included corrupt payments to be paid to the foreign officials; (vi) “coordinated these corrupt payments in Latin America through Bridgestone’s agents in the United States located in BIPA’s offices, including in Houston, Texas; and (vii) “took steps to conceal these payments, including, in some instances writing ‘Read and Destroy’ on facsimiles that contained information related to the corrupt payments and, in other instances using verbal communication rather than written communication to avoid creating written record.”

As to jurisdiction against Bridgestone, the DOJ asserts 78dd-3 and merely alleges that e-mails or faxes were sent to or from Japan to the U.S. in connection with bribery scheme.  Interestingly, in the Africa Sting case, Judge Leon – in the first judicial test of 78dd-3 jurisdiction – seemed to reject the notion that such conduct, in and of itself, satisfied 78dd-3’s “while in the territory of the U.S.” requirement.  See here for the prior post.

According to this filing, it would appear that approximately 80% of the $28 million fine is for the FCPA conduct.  The guidelines range for the antitrust conduct was $6.7 million – $13.4 million.  The guidelines range for the FCPA conduct was $40 million – $80 million. 

In other respects, the DOJ release states as follows.  “Under the plea agreement, the department recognized Bridgestone’s cooperation with the investigations, including conducting a worldwide internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing and providing to the department voluminous evidence and information.  In addition, the plea agreement acknowledges Bridgestone’s extensive remediation, including restructuring the relevant part of its business, terminating many of its third-party agents and taking remedial actions with respect to employees responsible for many of the corrupt payments.  Under the terms of the plea agreement, Bridgestone has committed to continuing to enhance its compliance program and internal controls.  As a result of these mitigating factors, the department agreed to recommend a substantially reduced fine.”

In a press release (here), Bridgestone [BSJ] noted as follows.  “Since May 2007, the DOJ has been investigating BSJ’s involvement in international cartel activities relating to the sale of marine hose. The DOJ has also investigated improper payments to government officials through local sales agents focusing primarily on Latin America in connection with certain industrial products. BSJ has cooperated fully in this matter.  The DOJ has agreed that BSJ’s cooperation has been ‘extraordinary’.  The DOJ has also acknowledged that BSJ has engaged in extensive remediation including dismantling the International Engineered Products Department, closing its Houston office of Bridgestone Industrial Products of America, Inc., terminating many of its third party agents, and taking remedial actions with respect to its employees. BSJ has also decided to withdraw from the marine hose business.”  The release further notes that the $28 million fine is a “significant reduction from the applicable sentencing guidelines due to BSJ’s cooperation and remediation efforts.”

Ordinarily, extraordinary cooperation, remediation, etc. allow a company to settle an FCPA enforcement action via a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement.  Yet, the two-crime nature of the Bridgestone enforcement action may have prompted the DOJ to insist on a plea agreement to actual criminal charges.

As noted in the DOJ release, in 2008 Misao Hioki, the former general manager of Bridgestone’s international engineered products department, pleaded guilty to antitrust and FCPA conspiracy charges.  See here for that prior enforcement action.

Since April, Japanese companies have contributed approximately $248 million to the U.S. Treasury for violating the FCPA (recognizing that the Bridgestone action also contains an antitrust component).  See here for the prior JGC Corporation enforcement action.  Another Japanese company, Sojitz Corporation, is also reportedly the subject of an FCPA investigation in relation to conduct in Bahrain.  See here for the prior post. 

You ask, doesn’t Japan have its own “FCPA-like” law?  Yes, it does; however there is no criminal liability for corporations under the law.  To learn more see here.

Finally, the FCPA Blog reports (here) that Bridgestone has ADRs traded in the U.S. over the counter in the pink sheets.  In the past, the SEC has asserted FCPA books and records and internal controls jurisdiction over a company based on such a listing.  Given that DOJ and SEC enforcement actions are typically announced on the same day, and given nothing was announced yesterday by the SEC, it is further interesting that the SEC has apparently chosen to sit out the Bridgestone matter.

JGC of Japan Formally Joins the Bonny Island Bribery Club

In an enforcement action anticipated for months (see here for the prior post), JGC Corporation on Japan last week became the fourth joint venture partner to resolve its FCPA exposure in connection with the Bonny Island, Nigeria project.
Other joint venture partners in the so-called TSKJ consortium to previously resolve Bonny Island bribery probes were KBR / Halliburton (see here), Technip (see here) and Snamprogetti (see here). In addition, M.W. Kellogg Ltd., the entity that originally formed the TSKJ consortium resolved a U.K. Serious Fraud Office enforcement action (see here). In terms of individual prosecutions, Albert Jack Stanley pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here); Wojciech Chodan pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here); and Jeffrey Tesler recently pleaded guilty and awaits sentencing (see here).

The JGC enforcement action involved only a DOJ component. Total settlement amount was $218.8 million and the criminal charges (see here for the information) were resolved via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement (here).

Criminal Information

The substance of the criminal allegations are the same as in the prior KBR, Technip, and Snamprogetti enforcement actions. That is, the TSKJ consortium, of which JGC was a member, was formed for purposes of bidding on and performing a series of engineering, procurement, and construction (“EPC”) contracts to design and build a liquefied natural gas plant on Bonny Island, Nigeria.

Tesler was hired by TSKJ to “help it obtain business in Nigeria, including by offering to pay and paying bribes to high-level Nigerian government officials” and Tesler “was an agent of TSKJ and of each of the joint venture companies.”

According to the information, TSKJ also hired “Consulting Company B” – a “global trading company headquartered in Tokyo” to help it “obtain business in Nigeria, including by offering to pay and paying bribes to Nigerian government officials” and “Consulting Company B was an agent of TSKJ and of each of the joint venture companies.”

Most of the allegations in the information focus on the conduct of the JGC’s alleged co-conspirators such as Stanley, Tesler, and Tesler’s corporate entity, Tri-Star Investments Ltd. As to U.S. nexus, the information alleges money flowing through U.S. based accounts “to bribe Nigerian government officials” and co-conspirators faxing or e-mailing information into the U.S. in furtherance of the bribery scheme.

Based on the above conduct, the information charges conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations.

DPA

The DOJ’s charges against JGC were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement.

Pursuant to the DPA, JGC admitted, accepted and acknowledged “that it is responsible for the acts of its employees, subsidiaries, and agents” as set forth above. As is typical in FCPA DPAs, JGC expressly agreed not to make any statements, directly or indirectly, “contradicting” the facts alleged.

The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors.

“(a) after initially declining to cooperate with the Department based on jurisdictional arguments, JGC began to cooperate, and has agreed to continue to cooperate, with the Department in its ongoing investigation of the conduct of JGC and its present and former employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and others relating to violations of the FCPA;

(b) JGC has undertaken remedial measures, including evaluating and enhancing its compliance program, and has agreed to undertake further remedial measures as contemplated by this Agreement; and

(c) the impact of JGC, including collateral consequences, of a guilty plea or criminal conviction.”

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $312.6 million to $625.2 million. Pursuant to the DPA, JGC agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $218.8 million (30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines). DPAs frequently then state why such a below-guidelines fine amount is “appropriate,” however the JGC DPA is silent as to this issue. Interesting also is that the conduct at issue took place between 1995 and 2004. Yet, the 2010 sentencing guidelines were used in calculating the fine rather than the 2003 guidelines that were used in the prior KBR, Technip, and Snamprogetti enforcement actions.

Pursuant to the DPA, JGC agreed to “engage a corporate compliance consultant.”

The DOJ release (here) states as follows. “With [the JGC] resolution, each of the four companies in the TSKJ joint venture, the former chairman of the U.S. joint venture partner, and several other individuals have now been held accountable for a massive conspiracy to bribe Nigerian government officials to obtain lucrative construction contracts.” “The approximately $1.5 billion in criminal and civil penalties that have been imposed on the members of the joint venture far exceed their profits from the scheme. Foreign bribery is a serious crime, and as this case makes clear, we are investigating and prosecuting it vigorously.”

Manny Abascal (Latham & Watkins – see here – a former DOJ enforcement attorney) represented JGC.

This may not be the last we hear of Bonny Island bribery. Consulting Company B (based in Japan) was a key participant in the bribery scheme. Does anyone know anything about Consulting Company B and whether it might be next to resolve its Bonny Island exposure? If so, please share.

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer On ….

Earlier this week, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer spoke at the 3rd Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States Summit on Anti-Corruption. See here for his remarks.

Breuer’s remarks touched upon a number of topics including the following as excerpted below.

On Corruption Generally

“Corruption affects countries rich and poor, large and small, and it has particularly harmful effects on emerging economies. When a developing country’s public officials routinely abuse their power for personal gain, its people suffer. Roads are not built, schools lie in ruin, and basic public services go unprovided. And when corruption takes hold in any nation, its political institutions tend to lose legitimacy, threatening democratic stability and the rule of law. Corruption undermines the health of international markets, stifling competition and repelling foreign investment. Moreover, corruption is a ‘gateway crime, allowing money laundering, gang violence, terrorism and other crimes to thrive.”

On the FCPA’s Legislative History

“The FCPA was the first effort of any nation to specifically criminalize the act of bribing foreign officials. The statute was enacted in the wake of the “Watergate” scandal in the United States, which led to the resignation of President Richard Nixon in 1974 and resulted in a dramatic plunge in Americans’ overall trust in government. In 1976, following certain prosecutions for illegal use of corporate funds arising out of the Watergate scandal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, or S.E.C., which regulates the securities industry in the United States, issued a “Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices.” In its report, the S.E.C. determined that foreign bribery by U.S. corporations was “serious and sufficiently widespread to be a cause for deep concern.” S.E.C. investigations revealed that hundreds of U.S. companies had made corrupt foreign payments involving hundreds of millions of dollars. With this background, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee concluded that there was a strong need for anti-bribery legislation in the United States. “Corporate bribery is bad business,” the committee said in its Report. “In our free market system it is basic that the sale of products should take place on the basis of price, quality, and service. Corporate bribery is fundamentally destructive of this basic tenet.””

“As the U.S. House of Representatives’ Report on the FCPA put it, a strong anti-bribery law can “help U.S. corporations resist corrupt demands.” In the words of the former chairman of a major oil company, quoted in the report, “If we could cite our law which says we just may not do it, we would be in a better position to resist” the pressure that sometimes comes from foreign officials. That was true in 1977, and it’s true now.”

On FCPA Enforcement

“The passage of the FCPA was a milestone. But the Act did not become a strong enforcement mechanism overnight. Indeed, in the first decades immediately following the law’s enactment, many saw the FCPA as a slumbering statute. That is no longer the case. In recent years, the Criminal Division has dramatically increased its FCPA enforcement efforts. To give you a sense: in 2004, we charged two individuals under the FCPA and collected around $11 million in criminal fines. In 2005, we charged five individuals and collected around $16.5 million. By contrast, in 2009 and 2010 combined, we charged over 50 individuals and collected nearly $2 billion.”

“The FCPA is a strong enforcement mechanism, and we are not shy about using it.”

On Holding Non-U.S. Actors Accountable

“We have traditionally also pursued foreign executives who work for U.S. corporations or for foreign corporations that trade on U.S. exchanges, as well as the foreign corporations themselves. For example, in 2007, Christian Sapsizian, a French citizen and former executive at Alcatel, pleaded guilty to two counts of violating the FCPA, and in 2008 he was sentenced to 30 months in prison on those charges. In addition, we recently resolved a wide-ranging investigation against the Swiss-based freight-forwarding company Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., its U.S. subsidiary, and several foreign and domestic oil and gas service providers. Thus, as the Sapsizian and Panalpina cases show, any Russian citizen working for an American company in Russia or for a Russian company that trades on an American exchange, as well as any Russian company that trades on such an exchange, are also within our reach.”

“We have on more than one occasion brought charges against foreign officials under U.S. money laundering statutes, alleging that those officials laundered the proceeds of foreign bribery through U.S. financial institutions. In 2009, for example, we indicted two former Haitian government officials on money laundering charges for their alleged roles in a scheme to bribe officials of Haiti’s state-owned national telecommunications company. Thus, as the Haiti Teleco case shows, Russian officials who launder the proceeds of foreign bribes through U.S. financial institutions could also be liable for FCPA-related offenses.”

On the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative

“… Last year our Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section initiated a Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, which is designed to target and recover the proceeds of foreign official corruption that have been laundered into or through the United States. In November of 2009, at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity, in Qatar, Attorney General Holder pledged to redouble the United States’ commitment to recovering foreign corruption proceeds. The Kleptocracy Initiative represents a concrete step toward fulfilling that commitment; and once the initiative is fully implemented, it will allow the Justice Department to recover assets on behalf of countries victimized by high-level corruption.”

Bonny Island Bribery Developments

As reported elsewhere earlier this week (see here among other places), JGC Corporation of Japan (here) is close to resolving an FCPA enforcement action. JGC is the fourth joint venture partner along with KBR, Technip and Snamprogetti in the TSKJ consortium (a consortium originally formed by M.W. Kellogg) involved in the Bonny Island, Nigeria project.

In a disclosure earlier this week (here) the company stated:

“JGC and DOJ have been engaged in discussions about a potential resolution of the investigation relating to JGC. It was confirmed at the meeting of JGC’s board of directors held on January 31, 2011 that the Board has approved a potential resolution of the investigation. Based on this approval, JGC recognized a provision for the cost estimated for such a resolution, which will be appropriated as a financial loss in the 3rd Quarter Financial Result. The amount of such loss is 17.8 billion Japanese yen [approximately $218 million]”.

The expected JGC settlement would thus fall in the Top Ten FCPA enforcement actions of all time (see here for the FCPA Blog’s current list) and would bump the total amount of corporate fines and penalties U.S. authorities have collected in Bonny Island bribery cases to approximately $1.52 billion.

See here for my current Bonny Island bribery statistics.

How will JGC’s expected settlement affect KBR (a company, along with its current or former affiliated entities, that has already paid $579 million in U.S. fines and penalties in connection with Bonny Island)?

In early January, KBR announced (here) that it “completed the acquisition of the 44.94 percent share interest in M.W. Kellogg Limited (MWKL) previously held by JGC Corporation. With the completion of the transaction, MWKL, which was previously an affiliate of both companies since 1992, is again a wholly-owned KBR subsidiary.”

During a January 13th earnings call, Sue Carter (KBR – Senior VP and CFO) stated as follows:

“Also in regards to MWKL, included in the transaction is an estimate of JGC’s share of the ongoing [Serious Fraud Office] investigation. Any potential liabilities at this point are only estimated. Therefore any financial impact pending an actual outcome in the investigation will be trued up positive or negative.”

During the Q&A, William Utt (KBR – Chairman, President and CEO) was asked “can you tell us what kind of risks are structured in the MWKL deal? I mean, you have indemnification clauses for FCPA from Halliburton on your original stake. Do you have a similar clause with JGC?” He responded as follows: “Well I think the indemnification from Halliburton goes towards any financial penalties associated with the SFO investigation and as Sue commented, we’ve already factored that into the purchase price with JGC subject to a true-up.”

As Halliburton disclosed in its Oct. 22, 2010 10-Q filing, its indemnification obligations to KBR in connection with the SFO investigation “is limited to 55% of such penalties, which is KBR’s beneficial ownership interest in MWKL.”

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