Top Menu

Friday Roundup

Out with the tide, a former DOJ Fraud Section Chief speaks on voluntary disclosure, guidance issues, will candy fall from the pinata, schooled in the FCPA, a Section 1504 development, and “Minegolia.”

Tidewater Derivative Complaint Dismissed

As highlighted in this previous post, in November 2010 Tidewater Inc. was one of several companies to resolve a “CustomsGate” case.  The conduct at issue focused on Azeri tax officials and Nigerian temporary import permits and the company resolved DOJ and SEC enforcement actions by agreeing to pay $15.7 million in fines and penalties.

As if on cue in this new era of FCPA enforcement, along came the private plaintiff firms representing shareholders who filed a derivative complaint alleging that officers and members of the Board of Directors of Tidewater breached their fiduciary duties “in that they: (1) knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that employees, representatives, agents and/or contractors were paying, had paid and/or had offered to pay bribes to Azerbaijani and Nigerian government officials to obtain favorable treatment for Tidewater; (2) caused Tidewater to pay bribes and to disguise the bribe payments as legitimate expenses in Tidewater’s books and financial disclosures; and (3) failed to maintain adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with the FCPA and Exchange Act.”

Earlier this week, the case was swept out with the tide as U.S. District Court Judge Jane Triche Milazzo dismissed the complaint – see here for the decision.  In short, Judge Milazzo found that “Plaintiff did not adequately plead demand futility.”  Judge Milazzo utilized various tests in reaching her decision such as director interest and independence and whether the board could impartially consider the merits of the demand without being influenced by improper considerations.

As to interest, Judge Milazzo stated as follows.

“This Court finds that the Complaint is completely devoid of any allegations of an interested director. There is no allegation that any director appeared on both sides of a transaction or expected to derive a personal financial benefit from it. Nowhere in the Complaint can it be found that any one of the directors, much the less a majority of them, benefitted from the bribes themselves, benefitted from failing to establish and maintain adequate internal controls, benefitted from enforcing policies and programs designed to prevent violations, benefitted from improperly recorded payment of bribes in Tidewater’s books and records or benefitted from inadequately training their employees, agents, representatives and/or contractors with respect to compliance with the FCPA.”

As to alleged director participation or knowledge , Judge Milazzo stated that the “Complaint falls woefully short of pleading facts that are sufficient to show that there was any knowledge or conscious disregard on behalf of the directors.”

As to whether the directors exhibited bad faith sufficient to overcome business judgment rule presumptions, Judge Milazzo stated as follows.  “While Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show that Tidewater was evidently violating both the FCPA and the Exchange Act, nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiff’s allegations meet the specificity to show that the Individual Defendants were acting with the intent to violate these laws.  ‘[T]he mere fact that a violation occurred does not demonstrate that the board acted in bad faith.  Alleging that ‘upon information and belief’ the ‘Headquarters’ made the decision to avoid tax assessments in violation of the FCPA falls woefully short of the pleading requirements. Nowhere can this Court find who made this decision, how this decision was made or that there was an intent to violate any law. Moreover, the Court finds it significant that Tidewater’s directors voted and voluntarily initiated an FCPA investigation and advised the federal government of their violations before the government even suspected any violations.”

Tyrell on Voluntary Disclosure

You know the talking points.  The DOJ wants companies to voluntarily disclose, not ifs, ands or buts about it.  It’s interesting though how this becomes less of a black and white issues when individuals leave the DOJ.

In this recent Q&A in The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Steven Tyrell (a former DOJ Fraud Section Chief and current partner at Weil Gotshal – here) was asked the following question – “what is the role of voluntary reporting in establishing a good relationship with the regulatory and enforcement authorities?”

He stated as follows.

In the first instance, if a company has a legal obligation to disclose – for example, government contractors are obliged to disclose fraud – then the analysis begins and ends there. Assuming there is no legal obligation that compels disclosure or no imminent threat of disclosure by an outside party, such as a newspaper, then I typically advise clients to take credible allegations of wrongdoing seriously, look into those allegations in a manner that is appropriate under the circumstances, and assess the nature and extent of the company’s exposure and the pros and cons of disclosure. Then, and only then, should a disclosure be made if it is in the best interest of the company – or, for a public company, if the securities laws require it. Of course, it often will not be in a company’s best interest to disclose if, for example, the allegations prove not to be credible or if it is unclear whether the conduct even amounts to a violation of law. Under those circumstances, a disclosure could unnecessarily embroil the company in a lengthy and costly government investigation and result in other repercussions such as triggering civil litigation and harm to a company’s reputation that could otherwise be avoided. It’s a challenging calculus. I can tell you from past experience that there are companies that have strong reputations for compliance with regulators and others that do not. However, the fact that a company doesn’t disclose a problem that ultimately comes to DOJ’s attention is not necessarily going to damage the company’s credibility with DOJ. Regulators recognize that not every allegation should be of interest to them – and, frankly, having counsel that knows when they’ll be interested and when they won’t is really important.”

Guidance Issues

As highlighted in this previous post, soon after Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer announced in November 2011 that FCPA guidance would be forthcoming in 2012, Senator Grassley sought guidance on the guidance and asked Attorney General Holder several follow-up questions for the record.  For a copy of Holder’s responses, see here.

In this previous post, among others, I commented that non-binding DOJ guidance is not the best way to accomplish real and meaningful FCPA reform.

Thus, I completely agree with former DOJ Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger and former DOJ attorney and Senate counsel Matthew Miner (both currently at White & Case, see here and here) when they state as follows in this article.

“The fact that the Justice Department recognizes the need for such guidance underscores the existence of blurry lines and fuzzy standards surrounding the FCPA. US businesses trying to compete successfully in the international commercial arena deserve better. Justice Department ‘guidance’ is neither enough, nor is it properly the role of prosecutors to be definitive interpreters of ambiguities in criminal laws. Congress writes the laws and, as the US Supreme Court has firmly established, has a responsibility to set clear standards for what is permissible and what is not. It should not stand aside in deference to the Justice Department’s plan to craft guidance, especially when that guidance will have no effect in court.”

Yara Fertilizer

It has been said before that anytime a foreign company is the subject of a corruption probe, the U.S. enforcement agencies are like children at a birthday party waiting for some candy to fall from the pinata.  Think what you will of the analogy.

The Wall Street Journal recently reported (here) that “Norwegian fertilizer producer Yara International ASA’s chief executive, Jorgen Ole Haslestad, apologized Friday to the company’s employees after an investigation uncovered millions of dollars in ‘unacceptable’ payments in India and Switzerland, as well as ‘unacceptable offers of payments’ in Libya.”  According to the article, the “unacceptable offers of payments” in Libya involve “a consultant related to the establishment of the company Libyan Norwegian Fertilizer Co., or Lifeco, in Libya, a joint venture with the Libyan National Oil Corp. and the Libyan Investment Authority.”

As noted on the company’s website here, Yara “has a sponsored Level 1 ADR program for American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), which represent ownership in shares of foreign (non-US) companies that trade on US financial markets.”  Whether foreign companies, including those with Level 1 ADR’s can become subject to the FCPA, see this excellent piece “When Does an ADR Program Give U.S. Authorities FCPA Jurisdiction Over a Foreign Issuer?”

Time will tell if the candy falls.

Checking in on Wynn Resorts

Previous posts here, here and here focused on the Wynn-Okada dispute including Wynn’s $135 million charitable contribution to the University of Macau.  On that topic, this recent Wall Street Journal article focused on the “web of political ties” between a Macau company paid by Wynn and government officials.  Regarding Wynn’s FCPA compliance in expanding in Macau, company CEO Steve Wynn stated as follows.  “This whole business of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—we were schooled in this.”

Final grade is pending.

Section 1504 Development

Several prior posts, see here for example, discussed Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the so-called Resource Extraction Disclosure Provisions and the long delay in SEC final rules.  As noted in this Corruption Current post by Samuel Rubenfeld, the SEC recently announced here that on August 22nd, “the Commission will consider whether to adopt rules regarding disclosure and reporting obligations with respect to payments to governments made by resource extraction issuers to implement the requirements of Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

“Minegolia”

There has been only one FCPA enforcement concerning, at least in part, business conduct in Mongolia (see here for the 2009 UTStarcom action).  This is hardly surprising, as few companies subject to the FCPA have traditionally engaged in business in the country.  However, as noted in this recent Al Jazerra article, Mongolia or “Minegolia” as the country is sometimes called, “is undergoing a rapid transformation, due to its incredible resource wealth in minerals such as coal, copper, and gold.” At the same time, the article notes that “Transparency International placed Mongolia 120th out of 183 nations on its corruption perception index” and that “90 percent of Mongolians believe politicians are benefitting from ‘special arrangements’ with foreign enterprises over mining rights.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Credit when credit is due, no fear despite fear based marketing, a further Section 1504 development, and individual prosecutions in Canada, it’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Credit When Credit is Due

In this previous February 2012 post, I called out the DOJ for its deficient and misleading FCPA website in that the website did not inform the public of the DOJ’s setbacks in the Africa Sting cases, the O’Shea case, the Wooh case and the Lindsey Manufacturing cases.  I ended the post by saying that the DOJ’s FCPA website ought to be improved and ought to keep citizens informed of all FCPA developments – not just those that cast the DOJ in a favorable light.

I am happy to dole out credit when credit is due and can now report that Wooh’s entry (here), O’Shea’s entry (here), the Lindsey related entry (here) and the numerous Africa Sting related entries have all been updated to reflect the final disposition of those cases.

Few Companies Concerned About the U.K. Bribery Act

Despite marketing campaigns that were often based on fear and overblown rhetoric, one year into the U.K. Bribery Act few companies have changed their compliance programs as a result and even fewer are concerned about an enforcement action being brought against their organization, according to this recent poll by Deloitte Financial Advisory Services.  Specifically 24% of respondents answered “yes” to the following question – “in July 2012, one year after the UK Bribery Act enforcement began, will your company have changed its anti-corruption program to comply” and 9% answered “yes” to the following question – “one year after UK Bribery Act enforcement began, is your company concerned about a UK action being brought against your organization.”

That is pretty much what I predicted in this January 3, 2011 post that states as follows – “I don’t see how companies already subject to the FCPA and already thinking about compliance in a pro-active manner, have much to worry about when it comes to the U.K. Bribery Act …”.

Even so, the silly marketing continues as evidenced by this post “Don’t Be Lulled by a Dearth of UK Bribery Act Convictions” which begins as follows.  “Be warned that the UK Bribery Act is considered to be the world’s most restrictive and far-reaching anti-corruption law to date. This measure differs in many key aspects from the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

A Further Section 1504 Development

This recent post provided an update on Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank, the so-called Resource Extraction Issuer Disclosure Provisions, an ill-conceived “miscellaneous provision” tucked into Dodd-Frank at the last minute that will substantially increase compliance costs and headaches for numerous companies that already have extensive FCPA compliance policies and procedures by further requiring disclosure of perfectly legal and legitimate payments to foreign governments.

In a further update, last week several House members wrote to SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro “regarding the status of the long-delayed final rule making.”  In the letter, the House members state that the Commission “has had more than enough time to consider and respond to all of the substantive comments from industry, civil society, investors and others” and that the “issue is too serious to allow further delay.”

Canada Prosecutions

Recent media articles (see here from the Globe and Mail and here from the Canadian Press) report that “two former executives of SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. have been charged with corrupting foreign officials” under Canada’s FCPA-like law, the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.  Ramesh Shah (a former Vice President) and Mohammad Ismail (a former Director of  International Projects) allegedly “offered payment to secure contracts for supervision and construction of the Padma Bridge and an elevated expressway in Dhaka, Bangladesh.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

An Update On Section 1504

Approximately two years ago, Congress passed and President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  As noted in this previous post, tacked to the end of the massive Dodd-Frank bill at the last minute was a “miscellaneous provision” titled Section 1504 “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers.”  Prior to being tucked into Dodd-Frank, the substance of Section 1504 languished in the Senate.  (See here for a prior post regarding S. 1700 introduced in the Senate in September 2009).

As I noted in the prior posts, bribery and corruption are bad, but that does not mean that every attempt to curtail bribery and corruption is good or represents sound public policy.

Case in point is Section 1504.  In short, Section 1504 will substantially increase compliance costs and headaches for numerous companies that already have extensive FCPA compliance policies and procedures by further requiring disclosure of perfectly legal and legitimate payments to foreign governments. As I’ve noted before, Section 1504 is akin to “swatting a fly with a bazooka” and is an attempt to legislate an issue that was sensibly put to rest in the mid-1970′s when Congress held extensive hearings on what would become the FCPA.

Here is some background.  The FCPA as enacted in 1977 contained (and still contains) an outright prohibition on improper payments to “foreign officials” to obtain or retain business (the anti-bribery provisions) as well as books and records and internal control provisions – but not disclosure provisions.  The original versions of what became the “FCPA” (i.e. the “Foreign Payments Disclosure Act” and other similar bills) started out with disclosure provisions, including provisions requiring all U.S. companies to disclose all payments over $1,000 to any foreign agent or consultant and any and all other payments made in connection with foreign government business.

As to these disclosure provisions, many people, including, most notably Senator Proxmire (D-WI – a Congressional leader on what would become the FCPA), were concerned that the disclosure obligations were too vague to enforce and would require the disclosure of thousands of payments that were perfectly legal and legitimate.  Proxmire said during congressional hearings, “I would think they [the corporations subject to the disclosure requirements] would want some certainty. They want to know what they have to report and what they don’t have to report. They don’t want to guess and then find themselves in deep trouble because they guessed wrong.”

The final House Report (see here) on what would become the FCPA is even more clear. It states (when discussing the various disclosure provisions previously debated, but rejected):  “Most disclosure proposals would require U.S. corporations doing business abroad to report all foreign payments including perfectly legal payments such as for promotional purposes and for sales commissions. A disclosure scheme, unlike outright prohibition, would require U.S. corporations to contend not only with an additional bureaucratic overlay but also with massive paperwork requirements.”

In this prior post, I analogized that Section 1504 is like having to report one’s speed on the highways even though there are speed limits in place.

I previously stated as follows.  “The FCPA already criminalizes improper payments made to the ‘foreign government’ recipients targeted in Section 1504 to the extent those payments are made to “obtain or retain business.”  Do we really now need a law that requires ‘Resource Extraction Issuers’ to disclose all such payments, even perfectly legitimate and legal payments?”

In passing Dodd-Frank , Congress apparently said yes to this question (although I wonder if most voting in favor of Dodd-Frank even knew the miscellaneous provision was tagged onto the bill).

Pursuant to Dodd-Frank, the SEC issued proposed rules (see here) in December 2010.

And that’s pretty much where things stand at the moment even though the SEC originally planned to adopt final rules between January – March 2011  – as noted in this previous post.  The long delay in SEC final rules implementing Section 1504 is perhaps further evidence as to the folly of this ill-conceived legislation.

A few updates to pass along regarding Section 1504.

As noted in this recent release, Oxfam America (an international relief and development organization) recently filed a complaint (here) against the SEC “for unlawfully delaying the issuance of a Final Rule implementing” Section 1504.

The release states as follows.  “Congress set a deadline of April 17, 2011, for the SEC’s promulgation of the final rule that is needed to bring Section 1504 into effect. The SEC has now missed this statutory deadline by one year and one month. Oxfam America notified the SEC on April 16, 2012 that it would file suit if the regulatory agency did not issue a final rule within 30 days. […] Unfortunately, the SEC’s pattern of delay gives no assurance that it will ever promulgate a Final rule without the involvement of this Court.” As noted in the release, “Oxfam America is represented in this matter by Baker Hostetler LLP, one of the largest law firms in the US, and EarthRights International, an organization dedicated to defending human rights and the environment through legal actions and other strategies.”

Thereafter, as noted in this story from The Hill, “oil companies are seizing on a White House executive order that promotes international regulatory harmony to seek an exemption from upcoming federal rules that would force energy producers to disclose payments to foreign governments.”  This May 18th letter to the SEC from the American Petroleum Institute, states that “if the Commission were to issue a final rule that requires reporting even when it conflicts with foreign laws, such a rule would cause exactly the type of unnecessary competitive harm that the Executive Order seeks to avoid.”

*****

Section 1504 has not been all bad.  As noted in this prior post and as relevant to the current “foreign official” debate, Section 1504 demonstrates that when Congress wants to, it knows how to pass a bill that captures state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (SOEs).   In short, Section 1504 defines “foreign government” to “include [] a department, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government or a company owned by a foreign government.”  If instrumentality can include SOEs (as the enforcement agencies maintain) why the need for the additional clause “or a company owned by a foreign government” in Section 1504?

Friday Roundup

Reader mail, an Olympic loophole, this week’s disclosure(s), the SEC speaks, and so do executives … it’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

Reader Mail

At times, even I ask myself why I spend countless hours maintaining a free website.  Then I receive an e-mail from a reader such as the one below (the reader encouraged me to share it) and I keep writing.

“I just wanted to thank you for your blog.  My son-in-law, [former Africa Sting defendant], was involved in the sting case.
After his arrest we found your website and learned alot from it.  We had never heard of the fcpa before all of this happened.  Your site was the most informative and easy for nonlawyers to understand. I would check it everyday for updates!  It was my lifeline!  Thank you again for writing so much about the case.  I’m just glad it is over and life can go back to normal.

Sincerely,

[Relative of former Africa Sting defendant]”

Olympic Loophole

A recent article in the Wall Street Journal (A Battle for Mongolia’s Copper Lode – Feb. 22nd) reminded me of a post lost in the unpublished archives.

Last August, Rio Tinto PLC, which manages the Oyu Tolgoi mine in Mongolia, announced (here) that the company “signed an agreement with the Mongolian National Olympic Committee (MNOC) to be a Gold Partner sponsor for the Mongolian National Team competing at the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.”  In the release, Rio Tinto Country Director Mongolia, David Paterson,  stated “we are sponsoring the National Olympic Team as part of our long-term commitment to Mongolia and Oyu Tolgoi.”  The release further stated as follows.  “Rio Tinto’s Olympic sponsorship is just one of many ways the company is contributing to Mongolia’s development. For example, Rio Tinto invests in numerous programmes that assist regional and local communities and young Mongolians in the areas of education and training, local procurement practices and sustainable development.”

An August 2011, Wall Street Journal article discussing Rio Tinto’s sponsorship states that Mongolia “is a key battleground for mining companies, which are vying to extract its rich mineral deposits” and that the Oyu Tolgoi project “is expected to yield 1.2 billion metric tons of copper and 650,000 ounces of gold a year in its first 10 years, as well as silver and other metals.”

For more on Rio Tinto’s involvement at Oyu Tolgoi, see here from the company’s website.

On one level, engaged corporate citizens with a committment to community welfare and development is a good thing and ought to be encouraged.

But, on another level, and FCPA jurisdictional issues aside (although Rio Tinto’s ADR’s are traded on a U.S. exchange), is a company’s sponsorship of a country’s Olympic team any less problematic than a company providing a laptop computer or an expensive bottle of wine to an employee of a state-owned or state-controlled enterprise?  What about pre-paid gifts cards (oops, getting ahead of myself, that is coming up next)?  Such instances have never been the sole basis for an FCPA enforcement action, but such allegations (or those similar) are frequently included in FCPA enforcement actions suggesting that the enforcement agencies do indeed view such conduct as problematic.

Strange as it may sound, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions are only implicated when something of value is provided, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the official in obtaining or retaining business.  The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions are not implicated when the thing of value is provided to a foreign government itself.  Even the DOJ recognizes this. See here for DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 09-01 in which the DOJ states that the  proposed course of conduct “fall[s] outside the scope of the FCPA in that the  [thing of value] will be provided to the foreign government, as opposed to  individual government officials …”.

Is this an FCPA loophole?  If so, ought it be closed?

This Week’s Disclosure(s)

Back to those pre-paid gift cards.

On Feb. 16th in this prior post, I commented (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) that every week another  company seems to be disclosing FCPA scrutiny.  So far two weeks have passed and there have been two new disclosures.  This week’s disclosure is from W.W. Grainger Inc. (consistently ranked as one of the “world’s most admired companies” by Forbes).  In a recent SEC filing, the company (a broad-line distributor of maintenance, repair and operating supplies and other related products and services) stated as follows.

“The Company is conducting an inquiry into alleged falsification of expense accounts submitted by employees in certain sales offices of Grainger China LLC, a subsidiary of the Company. In the course of the investigation the Company learned that sales employees may have provided prepaid gift cards to certain customers. The extent and value of the gift cards are subject to further inquiry. The Company’s investigation includes determining whether there were any violations of laws, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, on January 24, 2012, the Company contacted the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to voluntarily disclose that the Company was conducting an internal investigation, and agreed to fully cooperate and update the DOJ and SEC periodically on further developments. The Company has retained outside counsel to assist in its investigation of this matter. Because the investigation is on-going, the Company cannot predict at this time whether any regulatory action may be taken or any other potential consequences may result from this matter.”

Finally on the disclosure front, in August 2011, Brucker Corp. made an FCPA disclosure concerning its Brucker Optics subsidiary in China.  Recently, the company further disclosed as follows.

“As previously reported, in 2011 the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors commenced an internal investigation, with the assistance of independent outside counsel and an independent forensic consulting firm, in response to certain anonymous communications received by us alleging improper conduct in connection with the China operations of our Bruker Optics subsidiary. The Audit Committee’s investigation, which included a review of compliance by Bruker Optics and its employees in China and Hong Kong with the requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and other applicable laws and
regulations, has been completed. The investigation found evidence indicating that payments were made that improperly benefited employees or agents of government-owned enterprises in China. The investigation also has found evidence that certain employees of Bruker Optics in China and Hong Kong failed to comply with our corporate policies and standards of conduct. As a result, we have taken personnel actions, including the termination of certain individuals. We have also terminated our business relationships with certain third party agents, implemented an enhanced FCPA compliance program, and strengthened the financial controls and oversight at our subsidiaries operating in China and Hong Kong. We have also initiated a review of the China operations of our other subsidiaries, which is being conducted with the assistance of an independent audit firm.

“In the fiscal year ended December 31, 2011, $4.3 million was recorded for legal and other professional services incurred related to the internal investigation of these matters.”

As noted in Brucker’s initial filing, in 2010, the China operations of Bruker Optics accounted for less than 2.5  percent of the Company’s consolidated net sales and less than 1.0 percent of its  consolidated total assets.

SEC Speaks

The Subject to Inquiry Blog published by McGuireWoods has this post regarding the recent SEC Speaks event.  Regarding anti-corruption enforcement, the post states as follows.

The Commission now has a “cross-border group” charged with ferreting out corruption in corporations that trade on US exchanges, but are headquartered abroad.  The group is particularly interested in the accounting policies and financial disclosures of cross-border companies, many of which rely on “small US audit firms.”  As a result, the SEC is leaning on audit firms, which the SEC regards as “gatekeepers.”  To that end, the SEC issued guidance in 2010 and again in 2012, advising that they conduct risk-based analyses of their overseas clients.  According to Kara Brockmeyer, head of the SEC’s FCPA Unit, the SEC has seen a spike in Form 8-K reports of accounting irregularities, as well as a jump in Rule 10A reports.  She expects additional 10A reports to flow in through the Office of the Whistleblower.

Brockmeyer noted that the SEC is also devoting significant resources to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement.  The SEC’s FCPA Unit is focusing heavily on international cooperation, teaming with regulators around the world.  She highlights the FCPA Unit’s cooperation with Switzerland, Russia, and China, each of which recently enacted anticorruption laws.  The FCPA Unit brought 20 FCPA enforcement cases 2011, including 19 against companies and one against an individual.  Brockmeyer cautioned, however, that the 2011 numbers should not be seen as a model.  Indeed, in 2012 the SEC has already charged 14 individuals with FCPA violations, compared with only five companies charged.

From the Executive’s Mouth

Some excerpts from earnings conference calls that caught my eye.

From Bill Utt (President, CEO and Chairman of KBR Inc.) during a recent call.  “I would also like to report that in February KBR successfully concluded our three-year independent corporate monitorship related to KBR’s 2009 plea under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case. Overall, the engagement with our corporate monitor was a positive experience for KBR. We remain committed to consistently doing the right thing every time, and our commitment to compliance is a fundamental part of KBR’s culture. In fact, our compliance programs are paying off in terms of new work as we were recently awarded an international project where our compliance program was a differentiating factor in KBR securing the work.”

From Kevin Royal (Senior VP, CFO of Maxwell Technologies) during a recent call.  “Now I would like to provide an update regarding the shareholder derivatives. As we have disclosed in past public filings in 2010, two shareholders had alleged that certain of our past and current officers and directors failed to prevent us from violating the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA. It is important to note that the Company is only a nominal defendant in this suit. In December 2011 mediation was held and a proposed settlement was reached wherein $3 million would be paid to plaintiff’s counsels, with $2.7 million to be paid by our insurance carrier, and $290,000 would be paid by the Company. In addition, we would be required to insure that certain corporate governance measures are in place and in force. The agreement is subject to among other things, court approval and notice to our shareholders. Without admitting any wrongdoing, the defendants to this suit are willing to enter into this settlement in order to expedite resolution of the matter, and to relieve the defendants and the Company from further financial burden. We are pleased that this suit is near final settlement, and look forward to putting this matter behind us.”  [For a recent post on FCPA-related civil litigation titled “A Purpose or Parasitic” – see here].

From Bernard Duroc-Danner (President and CEO of Weatherford International in response to a question about the company’s FCPA inquiry) “Well, there’s not a lot to say about, that I can say, about the DOJ process. To a degree, I think it fell off the screen as it were.  For us it moves slowly, that’s all I can tell you. So, I don’t have much of an update that I can tell you. And actually even if I could, I wouldn’t have much of an update period.”

*****

On that note, a good weekend to all.

How Fast Did You Drive Today?

Yesterday  I traveled from Point A to Point B.  The route included country roads, state highways, and an interstate.  Each road had the speed limit displayed and along the route police cars were monitoring traffic and an few motorists were in fact pulled over.  During the trip, I stayed below the speed limit, but nevertheless when I arrived home last night I logged my trip (route, speed limit, purpose of trip, etc.).  In fact, I do this every day so that at the end of the year I can report my speed to a federal agency.

Sound a bit foolish to you?

If you answered yes, you should likewise conclude that Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank is foolish.  As detailed in this prior post, Section 1504 was the “Miscellaneous Provisions”  titled “Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers”  tucked into Dodd-Frank at the last minute (even though the original bill languished in Congress). 

Once the SEC issues final rules as to Section 1504, the rules are likely to substantially increase compliance costs and headaches for numerous companies that already have extensive FCPA compliance policies and procedures by further requiring disclosure of perfectly legal and legitimate payments to foreign governments.  As noted in the prior post and in this submission I made to the SEC, Section 1504 is akin to “swatting a fly with a bazooka” and it attempts to legislate an issue that was sensibly put to rest in the mid-1970′s when Congress held extensive hearings on what would become the FCPA.  In short, bribery and corruption are bad, but that does not mean that every attempt to curtail bribery and corruption is good.

I was reminded of Section 1504 last week when reading Joe Palazzolo’s article in the Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents page about how Royal Dutch Shell “is trying to curb” the reach of Section 1504’s disclosure requirements.  The article links to an August 1st letter from Shell to the SEC (here) in which Shell “provide[d] greater clarity regarding [its] expected costs associated with the Commission’s proposed rules in its release titled Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers.  (See here for the proposed rules).   In the letter, Martin ten Brink (Executive Vice President Controller) focuses on material vs. immaterial projects and states as follows.  “… [W]e wish to inform the Commission that if it were to adopt rules requiring disclosure for immaterial projects, disclosure that by definition is not important to reasonable investors, our marginal costs for this additional disclosure, with the required changes to our financial systems, needed to gather, assure and disclose the proposed information, would be in the tens of millions of dollars. However, by revising its proposed rules to limit disclosure to material projects, those projects that a reasonable investor considers important, we have estimated that the increase in our marginal costs would be reduced very significantly.”

As noted by Palazzolo, the Shell letter specifically references the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) in Business Roundtable and Chamber of Commerce vs. SEC.  In the opinion (here) a three-judge panel unanimously struck down the SEC’s so-called proxy access rule (Rule 14a-11) because “the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously for having failed once again […]  adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule.”  As noted by Palazzolo, the SEC was supposed to have Section 1504’s rules finalized by April, but the agency pushed the deadline to the end of the year.

The SEC is not to blame for Section 1504.  Congress put this issue on the SEC’s plate and said you write the rules.  With the SEC struggling mightily to write the rules implementing Section 1504, the remedy should be for Congress to revisit Section 1504 and for it to reach the sensible conclusion (a conclusion a prior Congress reached in considering legislation to address the foreign payments issues in the mid-1970’s)  that disclosure of perfectly legal and legitimate payments to foreign governments is not necessary.  

Many NGO’s and civil society organizations support Section 1504 and have been known to say that companies who do not bribe should not be bothered by Section 1504’s disclosure requirements.   That is like saying motorists who do not speed should not be bothered by the speed disclosures referenced at the beginning of this post.

Powered by WordPress. Designed by WooThemes