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FCPA Flash – A Conversation With Judy Krieg Regarding The U.K.’s DPA Regime – Is It Really A Better Mousetrap?

FCPA Flash

The FCPA Flash podcast provides in an audio format the same fresh, candid, and informed commentary about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related topics as readers have come to expect from written posts on FCPA Professor.

This FCPA Flash episode is a conversation with Judy Krieg (a U.S. educated lawyer in the U.K. offices of Shepherd and Wedderburn). Krieg recently authored a post titled “UK DPAs – Have We Really Built a Better Mousetrap?” that caught my eye and in the podcast Krieg: discusses the U.K.’s emerging DPA regime; answers the above question; explains why certain recent UK DPAs “have had their accuracy and factual underpinnings questioned;” and opines whether DPAs in the U.K. going forward will be the rule rather than the exception.

FCPA Flash is sponsored by Kroll. Kroll is trusted by companies and compliance officers worldwide to help prevent, detect, and remediate FCPA challenges with scalable, end-to-end compliance solutions: from high-volume third party screening and automated monitoring, to risk-based due diligence, to complex investigations and monitorships.

Across The Pond, Rolls-Royce Also Resolves A $625 Million U.K. Enforcement Action

Rolls

This recent post went in-depth into the $170 million Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Rolls-Royce. As mentioned in the post, the FCPA enforcement action against Rolls-Royce was part of a broader $800 million global resolution that also included a U.K. Serious Fraud Office component as well as Brazil law enforcement action.

The approximate $625 million U.K. enforcement action comprised the bulk of $800 million global resolution (that would seem to make sense, Rolls-Royce is after all a U.K. company) and is summarized below including the several failure to prevent bribery counts under the Bribery Act.

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FCPA Flash – A Conversation With Matthew Wagstaff (Joint Head of Bribery and Corruption at the U.K. Serious Fraud Office)

FCPA Flash

The FCPA Flash podcast provides in an audio format the same fresh, candid, and informed commentary about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related topics as readers have come to expect from the written posts on FCPA Professor.

This FCPA Flash episode is a conversation with Matthew Wagstaff, Joint Head of Bribery and Corruption at the U.K. Serious Fraud Office. In the episode, Wagstaff discusses: (i) whether the Bribery Act’s so-called adequate procedures defense has motivated corporates to adopt best practices compliance policies and procedures to a greater extent than prior to the Bribery Act; (ii) the U.K. deferred prosecution agreement regime including a response to criticism that the regime is actually a step backwards in terms of motivating corporate self-reports; and (iii) the meaning of “success” of an anti-corruption law.

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FCPA Flash – A Conversation With Jonathan Pickworth Regarding The 5th Anniversary Of The U.K. Bribery Act

FCPA Flash

The FCPA Flash podcast provides in an audio format the same fresh, candid, and informed commentary about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related topics as readers have come to expect from the written posts on FCPA Professor.

This FCPA Flash episode is a conversation with Jonathan Pickworth, a lawyer in the London office of White & Case. Pickworth and his colleagues at White & Case recently published a series titled “UK Bribery Act – 5 Lessons in 5 Years.

In the episode, Pickworth discusses various aspects of the Bribery Act including the still lack of clarity regarding the so-called “failure to prevent bribery” offense as well as the “adequate procedures” defense. Pickworth also opines that the U.K.’s recently adopted deferred prosecution agreement regime is a step backwards in terms of motivating corporate self-reports.

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The U.K.’s Second DPA Is Much Different Than Its First

SFO

Deferred prosecution agreements (not to mention non-prosecution agreements) are problematic across various points on a spectrum.

As U.S. use of such agreements has demonstrated (see here), alternative resolution agreements allow egregious instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly without adequate sanctions and without achieving maximum deterrence (“under prosecution”) while at the same time, because of the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving corporate criminal liability, facilitate the “over-prosecution” of business conduct in instances in which it is an open question whether a legal violation actually occurred.

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