A “foreign official.” Without one, there can be no FCPA anti-bribery violation (civil or criminal). Who were the “foreign officials” of 2011 (at least from an enforcement perspective – recognizing of course that the meaning of this key FCPA element is the subject of much on-going dispute).
This post, describes the “foreign officials” from 2011 corporate FCPA enforcement actions. There were 16 core corporate enforcement actions in 2011. Of the 16 enforcement actions, 13 (81%) involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises or entities (“SOEs”). These enterprises and entities ranged from manufacturing companies, oil and gas companies, telecommunications companies, health-care entities, engineering firms / design institutes, liquor stores, and insurance companies.
In 2010, 60% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here at pages 108-119). In 2009, 66% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs (see here  at pages 410-44).
As to whether Congress intended employees of SOEs to be “foreign officials” under the FCPA, see here  for my “foreign official” declaration in the Carson case and this  prior post which includes links to all judicial decisions on this key FCPA element.
Not only did SOE employees comprise the bulk of “foreign officials” in 2011, but so too did individuals with apparent ministerial or clerical duties (see Tyson Foods, IBM, Ball Corp., and Diageo).
As noted in the 2010 “foreign official” post (here ), this is noteworthy for the following reason.
The FCPA’s original definition of “foreign official” was as follows. “… any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such government or department, agency or instrumentality. Such terms do not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.”
This last sentence was the FCPA’s original (albeit indirect) facilitating payment or grease exception. The relevant House Report states in pertinent part as follows: “… a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs document would not be reached by this bill. Nor would it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must be performed in any event.”
When Congress amended the FCPA in 1988 it, among other things, amended the definition of foreign official by removing this indirect facilitating payment exception from the “foreign official” definition by creating a stand-alone facilitating payment exception currently found in the statute.
The relevant House Report indicates that Congress did not seek to disturb Congress’s original intent. “The policy adopted by Congress in 1977 remains valid, in terms of both U.S. law enforcement and foreign relations considerations. Any prohibition under U.S. law against this type of petty corruption would be exceedingly difficult to enforce, not only by U.S. prosecutors but by company officials themselves. Thus while such payments should not be condoned, they may appropriately be excluded from the reach of the FCPA. U.S. enforcement resources should be devoted to activities have much greater impact on foreign policy.”
In sum, of the 16 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 1011, 15 (94%) involved, in whole or in part, SOE employees and/or “foreign officials” with apparent ministerial or clerical duties. The one exception is Armor Holdings which involved payments to a United Nations procurement official, an employee of a “public international organization” a term inserted into the FCPA’s “foreign official” definition by way of the 1998 amendments.
The remainder of this post describes (as per DOJ/SEC allegations) the “foreign officials” of 2011. As is apparent from the specific descriptions below, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other instances with virtually no specificity.
[Note: certain of the enforcement actions below technically only involved FCPA books and records and internal control charges. As most readers know, actual charges in most FCPA enforcement actions hinge on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other non-legal issues. Thus, even if an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without FCPA anti-bribery charges, the actions remain very much about the “foreign officials” involved. As I’ve said before, if an employee of a U.S. company consistently entertains his brother-in-law in the corporate suite and seeks reimbursement for “client entertainment” you will not be reading about this FCPA books and records and internal controls enforcement action]
“Pinggao Group Co. Ltd. (formerly Pingdingshan High Voltage Switchgear Works (“Pinggao Group”) was a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Henan Province China.”
“New Northeast Electric Shenygan HV Switchgear Co. Ltd. (“Shenygang HV”) was a state-owned manufacturer of electric-utility infrastructure in Liaoning Province China.”
“Xi-an XD High Voltage Apparatus Co., Ltd. a/k/a Xi-an Shinky High Voltage Electric Co. Ltd. (“Xi-an XD”) was a state-owned manufacturer of electric utility infrastructure in Shaanxi Province China.”
“… payments conveyed to officials of foreign governments employed by state-owned entities, including Pinggao Group, Shenyang HV, and Xi-an XD …”
Presumably the same as above, although the SEC complaint merely refers to “officials at state-owned entities in China.”
“The Government of Mexico administers an inspection program, Tipo Inspeccion Federal (“TIF”), for meat-processing facilities. […]. The inspection program at each facility is supervised by an on-site veterinarian who is a government employee (“TIF veterinarian”) paid by the state, who ensures that all exports are in conformity with Mexican health and safety laws. Therefore, TIF veterinarians are foreign officials as defined by the FCPA …”.
“Wives of the TIF veterinarians.”
Same as above.
“government officials in South Korea and China”
“the foreign government officials involved worked for sixteen South Korean government entities (“SKGE”)”; “Chief Operations for the Electronic Operations Division of SKGE 1”; “manager of the government controlled SKGE 2”; “SKGE 3’s Director of Planning”; “SKGE 4 was a state-owned agency of the South Korea government – an employee of SKGE 4 responsible for reviewing personal computer procurement bids”; “Director of SKGE 5’s information technology department”; “government officials of SKGE 6”; “key decision makers at ten other SKGE’s;”
“Chinese government officials”; employees of “government-owned or controlled customers in China”
“employees of the Argentine government to secure the importation of prohibited use machinery and the exportation of raw materials at reduced tariffs” “government customs officials”
“The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (“NNPC”) was a Nigerian government-owned company charged with development of Nigeria’s oil and gas wealth and regulation of the country’s oil and gas industry. NNPC was a shareholder in certain joint ventures with multinational oil companies. NNPC was an entity and instrumentality of the Government of Nigeria and its officers and employees were ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”
“Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) was created by the Nigerian government to develop the Bonny Island Project and was the entity that awarded the related […] contracts. The largest shareholder of NLNG was NNPC, which owned 40% of NLNG. The other owners of NLNG were multinational oil companies. Through the NLNG board members appointed by NNPC, among other means, the Nigerian government exercised control over NLNG, including but not limited to the ability to block the award of […] contracts. NLNG was an entity and instrumentality of the Government of Nigeria and its officers and employees were ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”
Bribes to “officials of the executive branch of the Government of Nigeria, officials of NNPC, officials of NLNG, and others.”
“Individuals connected to OTE, including employees of OTE’s subsidiaries Cosmote, Cosmofon, and Cosmorom, in order to obtain purchase orders from those companies for Comverse Ltd. products and services, resulting in approximately $1.25 million in adjusted operating income;” OTE is “Hellenic Telecommunications Organization S.A. – a telecommunications provider controlled and partially owned by the Greek Government – the Greek Government was OTE’s largest single shareholder and maintained an interest in over one-third of OTE’s issued share capital.”
As detailed in this  prior post, during the relevant time period, the Greek Government owned between 33-38% of OTE, thus establishing a new foreign official “limbo low.”
Same as above
Johnson & Johnson
“Greece has a national healthcare system wherein most Greek hospitals are publicly owned and operated. Health care providers who work at publicly-owned hospitals (“HCPs”) are government employees, providing health care services in their official capacities. Therefore, such HCPs in Greece are “foreign officials” as that term is defined in the FCPA.”
“Poland has a national healthcare system. Most Polish hospitals are owned and operated by the government and most Polish HCPs [health care providers] are government employees providing health care services in their official capacities. Therefore, most HCPs in Poland are “foreign officials” as defined by the FCPA.”
“The national healthcare system in Romania is almost entirely state-run. The healthcare system is funded by the National Health Care Insurance Fund (“CNAS”), to which employers and employees make mandatory contributions. Most Romanian hospitals are owned and operated by the government and most HCPs in Romania are government employees. Therefore, most HCPs in Romania are “foreign officials” as defined by the FCPA.”
Same as above.
Employees of OJSC O’ztashqineftgaz (“OAO”) “a wholly owned subsidiary of Uzbekneftegaz, the state holding company of Uzbekistan’s oil and gas industry.”
Employees of Uzbekekspertiza JSC, “an Uzbekistani government agency.”
Same as above.
Employees of Chinese Design Institutes “which were typically state-owned enterprises that provided design engineering and technical integration services that can influence contract awards by end-user state-owned customers” and employees of “other state-owned companies.”
“Procurement official of the United Nations”
Same as above.
“Telecommunications D’Haiti (“Haiti Teleco”) was the Republic of Haiti’s state-owned national telecommunications company. Haiti Teleco was the only provider of non-celluar telephone service to and from Haiti. […] Patrick Joseph was the Director General of Haiti Teleco. […] During his tenure at Haiti Teleco, Patrick Joseph was a ‘foreign official’ as that term is defined in the FCPA.” “Jean Rene Duperval was the Director of International Relations of Haiti Teleco. […] During his tenure at Haiti Teleco, Duperval was a ‘foreign official’ as that term is defined in the FCPA.” “Official VJ was the Governor of the Banque de la Republique d’Haiti (“Bank of Haiti”), the state-owned and state-controlled central bank of Haiti. […] During his tenure at the Bank of Haiti, Official VJ was a ‘foreign official’ as that term is defined in the FCPA.”
“Foreign government officials in Latin America and elsewhere;” “employees of state-owned entities in Mexico and other Latin American countries;” employee at Petroleos Mexicanos (“PEMEX”).
“Various government officials in India, Thailand, and South Korea”
“Hundreds of Indian officials responsible for purchasing or authorizing the sale of beverages”; “employees of government liquor stores in and around New Delhi”; “government employees of the Indian military’s Canteen Stores Department”; “government officials in the North Region of India and in the State of Assam for the purpose of securing label registrations”; “Excise officials to secure import permits and other administrative approvals.”
A “Thai government and political party official”; “At various times the Thai Official served as Deputy Secretary to the Prime Minister, Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister, and Advisor to the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. The Thai Official also served on a committee of the ruling Thai Rak Thai political party, and as a member and/or advisor to several state-owned or state-controlled industrial and utility boards.”
South Korean “customs official”; “other South Korean government officials”; “South Korean military officials”
Watts Water Technologies
Employees of certain Chinese state-owned design institutes.
“government officials in Costa Rica”; employees of “Instituto Nacional De Deguros (“INS”), Costa Rica’s state-owned insurance company”
Same as above. In addition, officials from an “Egyptian government-owned company, the Egyptian Armament Authority (“EAA”), and its U.S. arm, the Egyptian Procurement Office (“EPO”); “Vietnam Airlines, a Vietnamese government-owned entity”; “BP Migas and Pertamina, two Indonesia state-owned entities in the oil and gas industry”; “Myanmar Airways and Myanmar Insurance, two government-owned entities”; “Biman Bangladesh Airways and Sudharan Bima Corporation, two government-owned entities”; “the son of a former high-ranking government official in Bangladesh with several important political connections”
Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom
“Telekom Crne Gore A.D., n/k/a “Crnogorski Telekom,” (“TCG”) and its mobile company subsidiary were, respectively, the Montenegrin state-owned fixed line and cellular telecommunications companies. […] Before Magyar Telekom acquired TCG, it was controlled by the Government of Montenegro. Accordingly, employees of TCG were ‘foreign officials’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”
“Macedonian Political Party A and Macedonian Political Party B were political parties in the Macedonian governing coalition during 2005, among other times. Each party represented a traditional ethic group in Macedonia. As such, Macedonian Political Party A and Macedonian Political Party B were each a “foreign political party” within the meaning of the FCPA.” “Macedonian Official #1 was a high-ranking government official with responsibility related to telecommunications laws and regulations […] and a leader of Macedonian Political Party A. As such, Macedonian Official #1 was a “foreign official” and an official of a foreign political party within the meaning of the FCPA.” “Macedonian Official #2 was a high-ranking government official with responsibility for telecommunications laws and regulations […] and a leader of Macedonian Political Party B. As such, Macedonian Official #2 was a “foreign official” and an official of a foreign political party within the meaning of the FCPA.”
Same as above.