December 11, 2017
The Department of Justice has long wanted companies to voluntarily disclose conduct that implicates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The latest attempt to achieve this policy goal of course was the DOJ’s November 29th announcement of a new “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.” (This post rounds up all previous posts on this topic).
Why then, literally a few hours after announcing its latest attempt to motivate companies to voluntarily disclose, did the DOJ in announcing the SBM Offshore enforcement action (see here and here for prior posts) once again (see here and here for prior similar posts) shot itself in the foot by making decisions that should result in any board member, audit committee member, or general counsel informed of current events not making the decision to voluntarily disclose?
December 9, 2017
FCPA Professor has been the place to be for the most comprehensive, candid and real-time information concerning the DOJ’s announcement on November 29th of a new “FCPA Corporate Compliance Policy” aimed, in the words of the DOJ, “at providing additional benefits to companies based on their corporate behavior once they learn of misconduct.”
If you missed the eleven separate posts, no worries as this post collects in one place all posts related to the “FCPA Corporate Compliance Policy.”
December 8, 2017
In running this website, I often have to “roll up my sleeves” and “get to work” to provide you comprehensive information about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Whether it’s reading hundreds of pages relevant to an FCPA enforcement action (vs. summarizing a DOJ/SEC press as other FCPA websites do) or in this case analyzing over 40 law firm publications about the DOJ’s new “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy,” it’s what I do and I hope you gain value from it.
December 7, 2017
I seriously question whether certain FCPA commentators who hold themselves out as experts have even read and/or understand the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act statute.
For instance, presumptions are not new to the FCPA space. Indeed, as highlighted below the FCPA (the actual statute – not mere non-binding DOJ policy such as announced last week in the form of the DOJ’s “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy) already has some presumptions.
Ten Reasons Why The Corporate Community Should Take The DOJ’s “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy” With A Grain Of Salt
December 7, 2017
Numerous prior posts have highlighted various aspects of the DOJ’s “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy” announced last week.
To be clear, this post does not advocate or even imply that the corporate community should ignore the “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy.” After all, the DOJ has extreme leverage over business organizations subject to FCPA scrutiny and it is always wise to at least be cognizant of what an adversary possessing a big and sharp stick is saying.
Nevertheless, absent limited circumstances not often present in instances of FCPA scrutiny, how to respond to internal breaches of FCPA compliance policies is a business decision entrusted to those charged with managing the business organization. In exercising this business judgment, the corporate community should take the “FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy” with a grain of salt for at least ten reasons.