Here is what Wal-Mart said in its recent 3Q FY 2015 earnings call .
“FCPA and compliance-related costs were approximately $41 million, which represents approximately $30 million for the ongoing inquiries and investigations and approximately $11 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements. Last year, FCPA and compliance-related costs were $69 million for the third quarter. Through the third quarter of this year, we have spent $137 million on FCPA and compliance-related costs, versus our guidance of between $200 and $240 million. We expect to be near the low end of the guidance for the full year.”
Doing the math, that is approximately $640,000 in FCPA-related expenses per working day.
Over the past approximate two years, I have tracked Wal-Mart’s quarterly disclosed pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. While some pundits have ridiculed me  for doing so, such figures are notable because, as has been noted in prior posts and in my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples ,” settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from corporate FCPA scrutiny. Pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the largest (in many cases to a degree of 3, 5, 10 or higher than settlement amounts) financial hit to a company under FCPA scrutiny.
While $640,000 per working day remains eye-popping, Wal-Mart’s recent figure suggests that the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have crested as the figures for the past four quarters have been approximately $662,000, $855,000, $1.1 million and $1.3 million per working day.
In the aggregate, Wal-Mart’s disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses are as follows.
FY 2013 = $157 million.
FY 2014 = $282 million.
FY 2015 (first three quarters) = $137 million.
Another ripple of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement highlighted in “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples ” is shareholder litigation in connection with FCPA scrutiny.
On that score, plaintiffs firm Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP recently sued the SEC in federal court seeking certain documents in the SEC’s possession concerning Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny. In the complaint , Robbins Geller alleges that the SEC has improperly denied its Freedom of Information Act document requests. The complaint alleges that the SEC’s reliance on a FOIA exemption concerning documents “compiled for law enforcement purposes” does not apply because the documents sought “were provided by and retained by Walmart, the subject of the SEC investigation, and therefore not “compiled for law enforcement purposes.”
India’s Economic Times reports:
“The Indian arm of American retail giant Walmart has terminated a mid-level manager amid investigations into alleged violations of U.S. anti-bribery laws in the country. Two years ago, when the company was known as Bharti Wal-Mart, it had sacked its chief financial officer and the entire legal team in connection with the same probe. The mid-level manager, who received a termination notice last week, is also required to be available for questioning by the U.S. Department of Justice in the next five years.”
Petrobras , an oil and gas company in Brazil, has been the focus of much recent news.
Recently, the Financial Times reported  that the DOJ and SEC have opened investigations into the company and reported that “U.S. authorities are looking into whether Petrobras or its employees, middlemen, or contractors, violated the FCPA.” It was reported that there is also an open investigation in Brazil and the Financial Times noted that “prosecutors in Brazil allege that Petrobras and its contractors overinflated the cost of capital expenditure projects and acquisitions by hundreds of millions of dollars and paid part of the proceeds to politicians from the ruling Workers’ Party coalition.” According to the Financial Times, the “ruling coalition politicians received 3 percent of all contracts.”
The apparent FCPA scrutiny of Petrobras is interesting on many levels.
For starters, certain  FCPA enforcement actions have involved Petrobras employees – not as a payor of alleged improper payments – but as the recipient of alleged improper payments. The enforcement theory of course is that the company making the alleged improper payments violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions because Petrobras was an alleged “instrumentality” of the Brazilian government and thus Petrobras employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA.
On the flip side of course is the fact that Petrobras has ADRs listed on a U.S. exchange and thus would be considered by the enforcement agencies to be an “issuer” subject to the FCPA.
In short, the enforcement theory that employees of SOEs are “foreign officials” results in an interesting paradox of sorts should there be an FCPA enforcement action against Petrobras as Petrobras employees would have been on “both sides” of the FCPA – an occurrence that has likely never happened before. Taking the enforcement theory to its logical conclusion also means that the U.S. government is apparently investigating whether the Brazilian government has engaged in corruption. A host of legal and policy issues would seem to arise.
Another interesting issue to ponder from Petrobras’s apparent FCPA scrutiny is whether any alleged improper payments by Petrobras – either directly or indirectly through others – to Brazilian officials would truly represent payments to ‘foreign officials.”
As highlighted in this  prior post concerning the first FCPA enforcement action against a foreign issuer (albeit not charging violations of the anti-bribery provisions), according to a knowledgeable source at the SEC at the time, there was a belief that there were no “foreign” officials involved because Montedison, an Italian company, allegedly bribed Italian officials.
This dynamic has not been present in other foreign issuer FCPA enforcement actions (for instance Siemens did not allegedly bribe German “officials,” Technip did not allegedly bribe French “officials”, etc.) but would be present in any FCPA enforcement action against Petrobras.
Regarding the potential FCPA scrutiny of Petrobras, it appears that the subject of inquiry concerns potential payments made by third parties on behalf of Petrobras or at least with the knowledge of Petrobras employees. As I indicated to the Wall Street Journal in this  story:
“The vast majority of FCPA enforcement actions are indeed based upon indirect payments. If Petrobras paid an inflated amount to a contractor, the questions will be why, were they aware it was inflated, and what steps did they take to remedy the situation, or did they just accept the inflated amount with an inkling or suspicion that it would go somewhere else?”
More recently, the story continues to evolve and as highlighted in this  recent Wall Street Journal article:
“Federal police [in Brazil last week] arrested 18 people, including Renato Duque, former director of engineering and services at Petrobras. Authorities allege he and others were part of a bribery and money-laundering scheme that has siphoned hundreds of millions of dollars from the state-owned oil firm into the pockets of employees, contractors and politicians. Police also served dozens of search warrants and raided the offices of 11 companies they suspect of participating in a scam. The companies, which include Brazilian multinationals Odebrecht SA, Camargo Corrêa SA, Construtora OAS SA and others, are suspected of colluding to inflate the costs of work performed for Petrobras. Prosecutors allege some of the resulting profits were funneled to Petrobras executives and high-level politicians, including some members of the president’s ruling Workers’ Party, a charge the party has repeatedly denied.”
As a result of the controversy swirling about the company, Petrobras recently announced  that it was “unable to release its third quarter 2014 financial statements at this time.”
Separately, Reuters reported :
“Petrobras said on Monday it had received a subpoena from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission asking for documents relating to an investigation it is pursuing. […] Petrobras did not provide details as to what documents the SEC had requested. The company is also under investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, according to a person familiar with the matter who was not authorized to speak publicly about the matter. […] The U.S. investigation, conducted by both the SEC and the DOJ, is “broad” in nature and has been ongoing since at least the start of 2014, the person said.”
In short, the apparent FCPA scrutiny of Petrobras raises several interesting issues worthy of pondering. Should there be an enforcement action against the company for violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, it would be historic for the reasons discussed above.
The Dodd-Frank Act enacted in July 2010 contained whistleblower provisions applicable to all securities law violations including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In this  prior post from July 2010, I predicted that the new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA enforcement. As noted in this  prior post, my prediction was an outlier (so it seemed) compared to the flurry of law firm client alerts that predicted that the whistleblower provisions would have a significant impact on FCPA enforcement. So anxious was FCPA Inc. for a marketing opportunity to sell its compliance services, some even called the generic whistleblower provision the FCPA’s “new” whistleblower provisions.
So far, there has not been any whistleblower award in connection with an FCPA enforcement action. Given that enforcement actions (from point of first disclosure to resolution) typically take between 2-4 years, it still may be too early to effectively analyze the impact of the whistleblower provisions on FCPA enforcement.
Whatever your view, I previously noted that the best part of the new whistleblower provisions were that its impact on FCPA enforcement can be monitored and analyzed because the SEC is required to submit annual reports to Congress. Recently, the SEC released (here ) its annual report for FY2014.
Of the 3620 whistleblower tips received by the SEC in FY2014, 4.4% (159) related to the FCPA. As noted in this  similar post from last year, of the 3,238 whistleblower tips received by the SEC in FY2013, 4.6% (149) related to the FCPA. As noted in this  similar post from 2012, of the 3,001 whistleblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the FCPA. In FY2011 (a partial reporting year) 3.9% of the 334 tips received by the SEC related to the FCPA.
Yes, in the future there will be a whistleblower award made in the context of an FCPA enforcement action. Yes, there will be much ink spilled on this occasion and wild predictions about this “new trend.” Yet, I stand by my prediction – now 4.5 years old, that Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions will have a negligible impact on FCPA enforcement.