Given the importance statute of limitations have in our legal system (see here  for a recent Supreme Court decision), there is something odd in reading a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action concerning allegations from a time when I was in 8th grade. It is even more odd reading of an FCPA enforcement (not to mention the fourth largest FCPA enforcement action of all-time in terms of a settlement amount) when the alleged consultant at the center of the alleged bribery scheme was criminally charged by another law enforcement agency, put the law enforcement agency to its burden of proof at trial, and the law enforcement agency dismissed the case because there was no “realistic prospect of conviction” (see here  for the prior post concerning the U.K. enforcement action of Victor Dahdaleh).
Alcoa entities agreed to pay approximately $384 million to resolve alleged FCPA scrutiny (a criminal fine of $209 million and an administrative forfeiture of $14 million to resolve the DOJ enforcement action and $175 million in disgorgement to resolve the SEC enforcement action – of which $14 million will be satisfied by the payment of the forfeiture in the criminal action).
The $384 million settlement amount is the fourth largest in FCPA history.
This post summarizes both the DOJ and SEC enforcement actions.
Criminal Information Against Alcoa World Alumina LLC
The enforcement action centers on Consultant A (no doubt Victor Dahdaleh) and his alleged interactions on behalf of Alcoa entities with Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. (Alba), an aluminium smelter operating in Bahrain.” (See this  2010 post “What is Alba”).
The Alcoa entity charged is Alcoa World Alumina LLC, an entity that beginning in 2000 “assumed primary responsibility for all of Alcoa World Alumina and Chemicals (AWAC’s) relationships with global alumina customers, including Alba.” According to the information, Alcoa World Alumina LLC “personnel responsible for these functions reported indirectly to Alcoa personnel in New York.”
Alba is described in the information as follows.
“The state holding company of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Mumtalakat, which was controlled by the Ministry of Finance, held 77% of the shares of Alba. The Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (SABIC), which was majority-owned and controlled by the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, held a 20 percent minority stake in Alba, and three percent of Alba’s shares were held by a German investment group. The majority of profits earned by Alba belonged to the Mumtalakat, through part of the profit was permitted to be used by Alba for its operations. The Ministry of Finance had to approve any change in Alba’s capital structure and had to be consulted on any major capital projects or contracts material to Alba’s operations. Members of the Royal Family of Bahrain and representatives of the government sat on the Board of Directors of Alba, controlled its board, and had primary authority in selecting its chief executive and chief financial officer.”
The alleged “foreign officials” are described as follows.
“Official A was a member of Bahrain’s Royal Family and served as a member of the board of directors of Alba from 1982 to 1997. From 1988 to 1990, Official A was also a member of Alba’s tender committee, which was responsible in part for awarding major contracts to Alba’s suppliers, such as Alcoa entities supplying alumina to Alba.”
“Official B served on Alba’s board from at least 1986 to 2000 as a representative of SABIC. From 1988 to 1990, Official B also served on Alba’s tender committee with Official A.”
“Official C was a senior member of Bahrain’s Royal Family, a senior government official of Bahrain from at least 1995 to 2005, and served as a high-ranking officer of Alba from 1995 to 2005. As a high-ranking officer of Alba, Official C was extremely influential over the assignment of contracts to Alba’s suppliers. Official C relied on Consultant A to assist him in opening international bank accounts using various aliases or shell entities for the purpose of receiving corrupt funds from kickbacks from Alba’s suppliers.”
“Official D was a senior member of Bahrain’s Royal Family and a senior government official of Bahrain for many decades. Official C was a close associate of Official D. Official D’s office was required to be consulted before Alba could commit to a long term alumina supply contract with Alcoa.”
According to the information, “beginning in or around 1989, at the request of certain Bahraini government officials who controlled Alba’s tender process, Alcoa of Australia retained Consultant A’s shell companies as purported sales agents and paid them purported sales commissions.”
The information alleges as follows.
“In or around 1988, an Alcoa of Australia sales manager for the Alba account received a request from certain Alba officials to retain Consultant A as ‘Alcoa’s agent’ and pay him a ‘commission.’ The request was made in part at the behest of Official A, a member of Alba’s board and tender committee. The sales manager subsequently told his supervisor that Alcoa of Australia would lose the supply contract if Consultant A was not retained as its agent, and that supervisor, in turn, conveyed that information to an individual who was both an Alcoa of Australia Board member and an Alcoa employee based in Pittsburgh. The individual approved the retention of Consultant A as a agent.”
Under the heading “Consultant A Channeled Millions in Corrupt Payments to Government Officials From 1991 Through 1996,” the information alleges:
“From 1993 through 1996, Consultant A made over $1 million in corrupt payments to Official A …”.
“From 1993 through 1996, Consultant A made over $2 million in corrupt payments to Official B …”.
Under the heading “Consultant A Channeled Million in Corrupt Payments to Government Officials From 1997 Through 2001,” the information alleges:
“From 1997 through 2001, Consultant A made over $5 million in corrupt payments to Official A …”.
“From 1997 through 2001, Consultant A made approximately $2.2 million in corrupt payments to Official B …”.
“From 1999 through 2001, Consultant A made over $19 million in corrupt payments to Official C …”.
Under the heading “Consultant A Channeled Millions in Corrupt Payments to Government Officials From 2002 Through 2004,” the information alleges:
“In 2002, Consultant A made over $1 million in corrupt payments to Official B …”.
“From 2002 through 2004, Consultant A made approximately $29 million in corrupt payments to Official C …”.
Under the heading “Additional Corrupt Payments to Government Officials,” the information alleges:
“From 2005 through 2006, Consultant A made almost $13 million in corrupt payments … to accounts that were beneficially owned by Official C under client code names …”.
“On or about April 3, 2006, Consultant A transferred $17 million … to an account owned by Official D …”.
Based on the above allegations, the information charges Alcoa World Alumina LLC with one count of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and states:
“Alcoa World Alumina LLC caused Alcoa of Australia to enter into a sham distributorship agreement with Alumet and AAAC that facilitated the funneling of millions of dollars of bribes indirectly through Consultant A to senior officials of the Kingdom of Bahrain in order to obtain and retain a long-term alumina supply agreement between Alcoa of Australia and Alba.”
The above charge was resolved via a plea agreement  in which Alcoa agreed to “guarantee, secure and ensure delivery” by Alcoa World Alumina LLC “of all payments due from the Defendant under the Agremenet.” The advisory Sentencing Guidelines calculation set forth in the plea agreement based on the alleged conduct was $446 million to $892 million.
The plea agreement states that a $209 million criminal fine was an “appropriate disposition” of the case “because immediate payment of the entire fine would pose an undue burden” on Alcoa and the agreement lists the following factors:
the impact of a penalty within the guidelines range on the financial condition of Alcoa and its potential to substatially jeopardize Alcoa’s ability to compete, including, but not limited to, its ability to fund its sustaining and improving capital expenditures, its ability to invest in research and development, its ability to fund its pension obligations, and its ability to maintain necessary cash reserves to fund its operations and meet its liabilities.
The plea agreement also references:
“(b) the significant remedy being imposed on the Defendant’s majority shareholder, Alcoa, by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for Alcoa’s conduct in this matter; (c) after learning allegations of FCPA violations, Alcoa’s Board of Directors appointed a Special Committee of the Board of Directors to oversee an internal investigation by independent counsel; (d) the substantial cooperation provided to the Department by the Defendant’s majority shareholder, Alcoa, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Department; (e) the remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken by the Defendant’s majority shareholder, Alcoa, which affect both the Defendant’s operations and those of Alcoa, including the hiring of new senior legal and ethics and compliance officers and the implementation of enhanced due diligence reviews of the retention of third-party agents and consultants; and (f) Alcoa’s separate commitment to ensuring that its anti-corruption compliance program will be maintained to continue to satisfy the minimum elements” set forth in an attachment to the agreement.
In this  “Agreed Motion to Waive the Presentence Report,” the DOJ condenses the extensive allegations in the information as follws under the heading “Charged Conduct.”
“The charge is based on the Defendant’s role in 2004 in procuring a ten-year agreement to sell approximately 1.7 million metric tons of alumina to Alba from AWAC’s Australian refineries. The Defendant caused Alcoa of Australia to enter into a purported distributorship with a shell company owned by Consultant A, an international middleman who had close contacts with certain members of Bahrain’s Royal Family, rather than contract directly with Alba. The Defendant consciously disregarded that the mark-up imposed by Consultant A on sales of alumina to Alba was facilitating corrupt payments to certain Bahraini government officials who controlled Alba’s tender process.”
In the DOJ’s release , Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman stated:
“Alcoa World Alumina today admits to its involvement in a corrupt international underworld in which a middleman, secretly held offshore bank accounts, and shell companies were used to funnel bribes to government officials in order to secure business. The law does not permit companies to avoid responsibility for foreign corruption by outsourcing bribery to their agents, and, as today’s prosecution demonstrates, neither will the Department of Justice.”
David Hickton (U.S. Attorney for the W.D. of Pa) stated:
“Today’s case shows that multinational corporations cannot get away with using middlemen to structure sham business arrangements that funnel kickbacks to government officials.”
Richard Weber (Chair of the IRS Criminal Division) stated:
“This case is the result of unraveling complex financial transactions used by Alcoa World Alumina LLC’s agent to facilitate kickbacks to foreign government officials. IRS-CI will not be deterred by the use of sophisticated international financial transactions as we continue our ongoing efforts to pursue corporations and executives who use hidden offshore assets and shell companies to circumvent the law.”
Valerie Parlave (Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI’s Washington Field Office) stated:
“Corrupt kickback payments to foreign government officials to obtain business diminish public confidence in global commerce. There is no place for bribery in any business model or corporate culture. Today’s plea demonstrates the FBI and our law enforcement partners are committed to curbing corruption and will pursue all those who try to advance their businesses through bribery.”
The DOJ release further states:
“The plea agreement and related court filings acknowledge Alcoa’s current financial condition as a factor relevant to the size of the criminal fine, as well as Alcoa’s and Alcoa World Alumina’s extensive cooperation with the department, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, making proffers to the government, voluntarily making current and former employees available for interviews, and providing relevant documents to the department. Court filings also acknowledge subsequent anti-corruption remedial efforts undertaken by Alcoa. The department acknowledges and expresses its appreciation for the cooperation and assistance of the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, the Guernsey Financial Intelligence Service and Guernsey Police, the Australian Federal Police, the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office, and other law enforcement authorities in the department’s investigation of this matter.”
The SEC enforcement action is based on the same core set of facts alleged in the DOJ enforcement action and the cease and desist order states in summary fashion as follows.
“These proceedings arise from violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by Alcoa concerning alumina sales to Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. (“Alba”), an aluminum manufacturer owned primarily by the Kingdom of Bahrain.
Between 1989 and 2009, Alcoa of Australia (“AofA”) and Alcoa World Alumina LLC (“AWA”) (collectively, the “AWAC Subsidiaries”) retained a consultant to act as their middleman in connection with sales of alumina to Alba and knew or consciously disregarded the fact that the relationship with the consultant was designed to generate funds that facilitated corrupt payments to Bahraini officials. The consultant was paid a commission on sales where he acted as an agent and received a markup on sales where he acted as a purported distributor. On sales where the consultant acted as a purported distributor, no legitimate services were provided to justify the role of the consultant as a distributor. The consultant used these funds to enrich himself and pay bribes to senior government officials of Bahrain.
The commission payments to the consultant and the alumina sales to the consultant made pursuant to the distribution agreements were improperly recorded in Alcoa’s books and records as legitimate commissions or sales to a distributor and did not accurately reflect the transactions. The false entries were initially recorded by the AWAC Subsidiaries which were then consolidated into Alcoa’s books and records. During the relevant period, Alcoa also lacked sufficient internal controls to prevent and detect the improper payments.”
In pertinent part, the order states as follows.
“Despite the red flags inherent in this arrangement [between the AWAC Subsidiaries and Consultant A], AofA’s in-house counsel approved the arrangement without conducting any due diligence or otherwise determining whether there was a legitimate business purpose for the use of a third party intermediary.”
“Employees at AWA and AofA either knew or were willfully blind to the high probability that Consultant A would use his commissions and markup to pay bribes.”
“The AWAC Subsidiaries knew or consciously disregarded the fact that Consultant A was inserted into the Alba sales supply chain to generate funds to pay bribes to Bahraini officials. Ultimately, these funds facilitated at least $110 million in corrupt payments to Bahraini officials. The vast majority of those funds were generated from the markup between the price Consultant A sold to Alba and the price that AofA sold to Consultant A. Those funds were also generated from the commissions that AofA paid to Consultant A.
The recipients of the corrupt payments included a senior Bahraini official, members of the board of directors of Alba, and senior management of Alba. Examples of the corrupt payments include: In August 2003, Consultant A’s shell companies made 2 payments totaling $7 million to accounts for the benefit of a Bahraini government official who Consultant A had been retained to lobby. Two weeks later, Alcoa and Alba signed an agreement in principle to have Alcoa participate in Alba’s plant expansion. In October 2004, Consultant A’s shell company paid $1 million to an account for the benefit of that same government official. Shortly thereafter, Alba agreed in principle to Alcoa’s offer for the 2005 Alba Supply Agreement. In or around the time of the execution of the final 2005 Alba Supply Agreement, Consultant A-controlled companies paid another Bahraini government official and/or his beneficiaries $41 million in three payments.”
The order then states as follows.
“This Order contains no findings that an officer, director or employee of Alcoa knowingly engaged in the bribe scheme. As described above, Alcoa violated [the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions] by reason of its agents, including subsidiaries AWA and AofA, indirectly paying bribes to foreign officials in Bahrain in order to obtain or retain business. AWA, AofA, and their employees all acted as “agents” of Alcoa during the relevant time, and were acting within the scope of their authority when participating in the bribe scheme. As described above, Alcoa exercised control over the Alumina Segment, including the AWAC Subsidiaries. Alcoa appointed the majority of seats on the AWAC Strategic Council, and the head of the Global Primary Products group served as its chair. Alcoa and AofA transferred personnel between them, including alumina sales staff; Alcoa set the business and financial goals for AWAC and coordinated the leg al, audit, and compliance functions of AWAC; and the AWAC Subsidiaries’ employees managing the Alba alumina business reported functionally to the global head of the Alumina Segment. Alba was a significant alumina customer for Alcoa’s Alumina Segment and during the relevant period, members of Alcoa senior management met both with Alba officials and Consultant A to discuss matters related to the Alba relationship, including a proposed joint venture between Alcoa and Alba. During this time, Alcoa was aware that Consultant A was an agent and distributor with respect to AofA’s sales of alumina to Alba and that terms of related contracts were reviewed and approved by senior managers of Alcoa’s Alumina Segment in the United States.”
“Alcoa violated [the books and records provisions] by improperly recording the payments, to Consultant A, as agent commissions when the true purpose of these payments was to make corrupt payments to Bahraini officials. Alcoa violated [the books and records provisions] when Alcoa recorded the sales to Consultant A as a distributor. The false entries were initially recorded by the AWAC Subsidiaries which were then consolidated and reported by Alcoa in its consolidated financial statements. Alcoa also violated [the internal controls provisions] by failing to devise and maintain sufficient accounting controls to detect and prevent the making of improper payments to foreign officials.”
Under the heading “Alcoa’s Remedial Measures,” the order states:
“Alcoa made an initial voluntary disclosure of certain of these issues to the Commission and Department of Justice in February 2008, and thereafter Alcoa’s Board of Directors appointed a Special Committee of the Board of Directors to oversee an internal investigation by independent counsel. Alcoa’s counsel regularly reported on the results of the investigation and fully cooperated with the staff of the Commission. Alcoa also undertook extensive remedial actions including: a comprehensive compliance review of anti-corruption policies and procedures, including its relationship with intermediaries; enhancing its internal controls and compliance functions; developing and implementing enhanced FCPA compliance procedures, including the development and implementation of policies and procedures such as the due diligence and contracting procedure for intermediaries; and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”
In the SEC’s release, George Canellos (Co-Director of the SEC Enforcement Division) stated:
“As the beneficiary of a long-running bribery scheme perpetrated by a closely controlled subsidiary, Alcoa is liable and must be held responsible. It is critical that companies assess their supply chains and determine that their business relationships have legitimate purposes.”
Kara N. Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit) stated:
“The extractive industries have historically been exposed to a high risk of corruption, and those risks are as real today as when the FCPA was first enacted.”
The SEC release further states:
“The SEC appreciates the assistance of the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division at the Department of Justice as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, Australian Federal Police, Ontario Securities Commission, Guernsey Financial Services Commission, Liechtenstein Financial Market Authority, Norwegian ØKOKRIM, United Kingdom Financial Control Authority, and Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland.”
In this  release (which per the plea agreement, the company needed to consult with the DOJ before issuing), Alcoa stated as follows.
“Alcoa Inc. [has] announced the resolution of the investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regarding certain legacy alumina contracts with Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. (Alba). The settlement with the DOJ was reached with Alcoa World Alumina LLC (AWA). AWA is a company within Alcoa World Alumina and Chemicals (AWAC), the unincorporated bauxite mining and alumina refining venture between Alcoa Inc. and Alumina Limited. […] There is no allegation in the filings by the DOJ and there is no finding by the SEC that anyone at Alcoa Inc. knowingly engaged in the conduct at issue. […] Alcoa welcomes the resolution of this legacy legal matter with the U.S. Government.”
The Alcoa release also details the drawn out nature of the settlement payments (an unusual feature in an FCPA enforcement action). The release states:
“As part of the DOJ resolution […] AWA will pay a total of $223 million, including a fine of $209 million payable in five equal installments over four years. The first installment of $41.8 million, plus a one-time administrative forfeiture of $14 million, will be paid in the first quarter of 2014, and the remaining installments of $41.8 million each will be paid in the first quarters of 2015-2018.”
“Under the terms of the settlement with the SEC, Alcoa Inc. agreed to a settlement amount of $175 million, but will be given credit for the $14 million one-time forfeiture payment, which is part of the DOJ resolution, resulting in a total cash payment to the SEC of $161 million payable in five equal installments over four years. The first installment of $32.2 million will be paid to the SEC in the first quarter of 2014, and the remaining installments of $32.2 million each will be paid in the first quarters of 2015-2018.”
As to the reason for the drawn-out settlement amounts, the SEC release states:
“In light of the impact of the disgorgement payment upon Respondent’s financial condition and its potential to substantially jeopardize Alcoa’s ability to fund its sustaining and improving capital expenditures, its ability to invest in research and development, its ability to fund its pension obligations, and its ability to maintain necessary cash reserves to fund its operations and meet its liabilities, Alcoa shall pay the disgorgement in five equal payments …”.
Alcoa World Alumina was represented in the criminal matter by Jonathan R. Streeter, Robert J. Jossen and Diane Nicole Princ of Dechert LLP and Alcoa was represented in the SEC matter by Evan Chesler of Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP.
Yesterday, Alcoa’s stock price closed down approximately 1.3%.
As highlighted in this  post, in October 2012 Alcoa announced (here ) that it entered into a settlement agreement with Alba resolving a civil lawsuit that had been pending since 2008 concerning the same alleged core facts in the DOJ and SEC enforcement action.Alcoa agreed to make a cash payment to Alba of $85 million payable in two installments.