Three years ago this week, the New York Times ran a major story (here) titled “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle.”
The conduct at issue in the Times article related to Wal-Mart’s largest foreign subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico (“Wal-Mart Mexico), and suggested that Wal-Mart Mexico “orchestrated a campaign of bribery to win market dominance” and that the entity “paid bribes to obtain permits in virtually every corner” of Mexico. The April 2012 NY Times article resulted in intense world-wide media scrutiny of Wal-Mart.
However, it was known months before the NY Times article that Wal-Mart was under FCPA scrutiny. (See here for the December 2011 post highlighting Wal-Mart’s FCPA disclosure). Thus, this week is a false three year anniversary of Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny, but a meaningful anniversary nevertheless.
Three years ago this week, in response to the NY Times article, Wal-Mart’s stock dropped approximately 8%. For instance, the last trading day before the NY Times April article, Wal-Mart stock closed at $62.45. A few days later, Wal-Mart stock closed at $57.36.
However, savvy investors should have recognized the NY Times induced dip as a buying opportunity because the market often overreacts (perhaps because of the plethora of suspect FCPA enforcement information in the public domain). Indeed, on the one year anniversary of the article, Wal-Mart stock closed at $78.29, on the two year anniversary of the article Wal-Mart stock closed at $77.66, and yesterday Wal-Mart stock closed at $78.14.
A December 2012 front-page NY Times article (see here for the prior post) added additional details to the previous April 2012 article, but did not change much from an FCPA perspective.
In the three years since the original NY Times article, Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny has followed a fairly typical pattern. Wal-Mart’s internal review has expanded beyond Mexico, civil shareholder suits and derivative claims have been filed, Wal-Mart has engaged in various remedial measures, and the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have skyrocketed.
As highlighted in this recent post, in the aggregate Wal-Mart has disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses as follows.
FY 2013 = $157 million.
FY 2014 = $282 million.
FY 2015 = $173 million.
FY 2016 = $160 – $180 million (projected)
The above expenditures include compliance enhancements Wal-Mart has made (see here for the prior post).
As highlighted here, some are aghast at the mere mention of Wal-Mart’s high pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. The response of some has been that Wal-Mart is a big company and “will survive its FCPA spending spree” plus it is “playing catch up for a decade of what appears to be FCPA neglect.”
Such statement wholly ignores other aspects of the New York Times reporting.
Indeed, the conduct described in the NY Times articles was unremarkable from a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act perspective – a view I have consistently held since April 2012 (see here for a prior post and here for my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement As Seen Through Wal-Mart’s Potential Exposure.”).
The unremarkable portion of the NY Times articles is that a foreign subsidiary of a major multi-national company operating in an FCPA high-risk jurisdiction allegedly made payments to “foreign officials” to facilitate or grease the issuance of certain licenses or permits. Even according to the NY Times, Wal-Mart’s subsidiary in Mexico “had taken steps to conceal [the payments] from Wal-Mart’s headquarters in Bentonville, Ark.” and Wal-Mart Mexico’s chief auditor altered reports sent to Bentonville discussing various problematic payments.
A November 2012 NY Times article (here) by David Barstow (the same author as the April 2012 and December 2012 articles) rightly noted that Wal-Mart’s investigation “was uncovering the kinds of problems and oversights that plague many global corporations.” It was perhaps the most insightful thing the NY Times has said about Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny, yet the November 2012 article received scant attention compared to the other two articles.
It is also interesting to ponder the salient question of whether the payments at issue in Wal-Mart, which are outside the context of procurement, actually violate the FCPA (and here, as in many cases, there is an important distinction between the law Congress passed and DOJ/SEC enforcement theories). For instance, as noted in this prior post and in my above article, the government has an overall losing record in non-procurement type cases when actually put to its burden of proof. However, as we all know, this will matter very little when it comes to any resolution of Wal-Mart’s scrutiny.
For all of the above reasons, I do not believe that Wal-Mart’s scrutiny “will test FCPA enforcement in new ways” as some have suggested.
Nor should it.
FCPA enforcement ought not be influenced merely by the fact that a talented journalist at a leading newspaper has devoted time and effort to cover an instance of FCPA scrutiny. If Barstow and the NY Times would have focused on BizJet, the reaction likely would have been, and with good reason, more negative. But then again, there probably would not have been any reaction at all because BizJet is obviously no Wal-Mart. Insert [here] many other recent FCPA enforcement actions. If Barstow and the NY Times would have focused on [that] instance of FCPA scrutiny, the story would have largely read the same.
Nor do I believe that Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny will likely end up in the Top 5 FCPA enforcement actions of all time in terms of settlement amount.
All of the cases in the Top 5 are procurement cases, not cases focused on licenses, permits and the like.
If Wal-Mart does indeed crack the Top 5 (and with the seeming “just because” escalation of FCPA fine and penalty amounts – see here – it is likely only a matter of time before a license, permit case does crack the Top 5), it will likely be for reasons unrelated to substantive FCPA issues, but rather an increase in the company’s so-called culpability score under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines based on its alleged handling of the potential FCPA issues in 2005.
But even here, the seldom-discussed November 2012 NY Times article, added additional relevant details. It suggests that Wal-Mart’s December 2011 FCPA disclosure was motivated by Wal-Mart’s desire to pro-actively understand its FCPA risk (notwithstanding whatever may have occurred within the company in 2005 upon learning of potentially problematic payments in Mexico). According to the article, Wal-Mart’s internal review began in Spring 2011 when Jeffrey Gearhart (Wal-Mart’s general counsel) learned of an FCPA enforcement action against Tyson Foods (like Wal-Mart, a company headquartered in Arkansas – see here for the prior post discussing the Tyson enforcement action). According to the NY Times article, “the audit began in Mexico, China and Brazil, the countries Wal-Mart executives considered the most likely source of problems” and Wal-Mart hired KPMG and Greenberg Traurig to conduct the audit.
Throughout Wal-Mart three-plus years of FCPA scrutiny certain commentators have predicted that the Wal-Mart derivative actions would set a new standard for director liability. They were once again proven wrong. As highlighted here, the document request dispute in connection with a Wal-Mart derivative action in Delaware was much to do about nothing. More importantly, as highlighted here, last month a federal court judge dismissed eight Wal-Mart shareholder FCPA-related derivative claims that were consolidated into one action.
FCPA scrutiny tends to last, on average, 2-4 years from the point of disclosure to any eventual enforcement action. Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny is thus now in the middle of this range. However, it is not uncommon for FCPA scrutiny to last 5-8 years, thus it may be several more years before Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny and its eventually outcome are know.