As highlighted in this prior post, in July, Julian Aires (an individual associated with a joint venture partner of AAR Corp. – a U.S. based aviation services company) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions in connection with business dealings with South Africa Airways (SAA) as well as a contract involving Swissport and SAA.
As highlighted in this prior post, in August, Deepak Sharma (an agent of AAR and the former President of Integrated Solutions at AAR) pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions in connection with a bribery scheme involving Nepal Airlines Corporation.
Yesterday, it was AAR’s turn as the DOJ and SEC announced (here and here) an FCPA enforcement action against the company based on the same core conduct.
The enforcement action involved a DOJ component (net $26.4 million) and an SEC component ($29.2 million).
DOJ
The DOJ matter was resolved through this 18 month non-prosecution agreement.
According to the NPA’s “Statement of Facts,” “between in or around 2015 and 2020, AAR, through Sharma, Aires, and others, conspired to pay bribes to government officials to obtain and retain business with state-owned airlines in Nepal and South Africa, obtaining profits of approximately $23.9 million as a result.”
Regarding Nepal, the NPA states in pertinent part:
“In or around and between November 2015 and at least August 2018, AAR, through Sharma, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with others to corruptly offer and pay bribes to, and for the benefit of, government officials in Nepal, including Nepal Official [a Nepali citizen who served as a high-level official at Nepal Airlines Corporation – NAC] from at least approximately 2015 through 2019], to secure improper advantages in order to assist AAR in obtaining and retaining business from NAC, namely to win a bid to sell two Airbus A330-200 aircraft to NAC (“NAC Transaction”)
As a result of the bribe scheme, AAR obtained profits of approximately $6 million in connection with the NAC Transaction.
In or around November 2015, Sharma attended a meeting in Nepal with Nepal Intermediary [a Nepali citizen] and Nepal Official, during which the potential NAC Transaction was discussed. Nepal Official proposed that Sharma, on behalf of the AAR subsidiary, engage Nepal Intermediary as a lobbyist for the potential NAC Transaction, via a company affiliated with, and nominated by, Nepal Intermediary.
Before NAC publicly issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) for the NAC Transaction, Nepal Official sent confidential, non-public drafts of the RFP document to Sharma, which Sharma used to propose changes to benefit AAR in the bidding process.
[…]
On or about November 1, 2016, the AAR subsidiary entered into a Foreign Representative Agreement with Intermediary Company 1 [a Hong Kong incorporated company used by Nepal Intermediary], pursuant to which Intermediary Company 1 would represent the AAR subsidiary on the NAC Transaction, in exchange for a commission payment of 7% of the final sale price.
On or about November 8, 2016, the AAR subsidiary and Germany Company [an aircraft leasing and trading company] entered into an agreement to prepare a joint bid for the NAC Transaction.
[…]
On or about May 8, 2017, after the contract for the NAC Transaction was signed, Sharma and Nepal Intermediary facilitated the signing of an agreement between Germany Company and Intermediary Company 1 (“Project Cooperation Agreement”), which was backdated to October 2016 (a date prior to the NAC Transaction bid submission). The agreement provided that Intermediary Company 1 would assist Germany Company with preparing the bid for the NAC Transaction and in its negotiations with NAC, among other responsibilities, in exchange for which Germany Company would pay Intermediary Company 1 $8,000,000. Intermediary Company 1 did not provide any such services.
On or about July 10, 2017, Sharma and Nepal Intermediary facilitated transferring the Project Cooperation Agreement from Germany Company to Ireland SPV, pursuant to which Ireland SPV would pay Intermediary Company 1 $8,000,000, of which $500,000 would be paid as an advance payment, related to the NAC Transaction.
[…]
In or around January 2018, after Intermediary Company 1’s bank in Hong Kong blocked the attempted wire transfer to Intermediary Company 1 […] Sharma and Nepal Intermediary facilitated transferring the Project Cooperation Agreement again, such that Ireland SPV would pay Intermediary Company 2 instead of Intermediary Company 1. Sharma facilitated transferring the Project Cooperation Agreement in order to ensure payments could be made for the benefit of Nepal Intermediary and Nepali officials, including Nepal Official.
[…]
In or around July and August 2018, after the two Airbus A330-200 aircraft involved in the NAC Transaction were delivered to NAC, Ireland SPV wired two commission payments of $3,000,000 each to AAR’s bank account in the United States, for AAR’s role in the NAC Transaction.
[…]
On or about August 10, 2018 … Individual 1 and others caused two wire transfers of approximately $1,000,000 each from Ireland SPV’s bank account in Ireland to Intermediary Company 2’s bank account in the United Arab Emirates. Sharma understood that a portion of this payment would be used to make bribe payments to Nepali officials, including Nepal Official.
In total, in or around and between May and August 2018, Ireland SPV paid Intermediary Company 2 the equivalent of approximately $2,500,000 in connection with the NAC Transaction, a portion of which Sharma understood would be used to make bribe payments to Nepali officials, including Nepal Official.”
Regarding South Africa, the NPA states in pertinent part:
“In or around and between January 2016 and at least January 2020, AAR, through its agents, including Aires, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with others to corruptly offer and pay bribes to, and for the benefit of, government officials in South Africa, including South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3, to secure improper advantages in order to assist AAR in obtaining and retaining business from SAAT [South African Airways Technical – a wholly owned subsidiary of South African Airways – that provided technical services for SAA and other airlines], namely the award of a five-year aircraft component support contract (“SAAT Contract”) and disbursement of payments by SAAT pursuant to that contract.
As a result of the bribe scheme, AAR obtained profits of approximately $17.9 million in connection with the SAAT Contract.
In or around January 2016, Aires attended a meeting in South Africa with South Africa Individual 1, South Africa Individual 2, and South Africa Official 1, during which it was discussed and agreed that South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3 were to receive a share of the revenue of the SAAT Contract in exchange for helping AAR and JV Partner [an aircraft component services company based in South Africa] obtain the SAAT Contract. Aires understood South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3 had authority over the award of the SAAT Contract and that bribes were necessary to win the SAAT Contract.
On or about January 18, 2016, an AAR subsidiary entered into a joint venture agreement with JV Partner (the “JV Agreement”) for purposes of preparing a joint bid for the SAAT Contract. Under the JV Agreement, the AAR subsidiary was to receive 95% of all revenues received under the JV Agreement and JV Partner was to receive 5% of all revenues received under the JV Agreement. JV Partner acted as the AAR subsidiary’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (“B-BBEE”) partner for the SAAT Contract bid, which the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner submitted on or about January 18, 2016.
Pursuant to the JV Agreement, the AAR subsidiary’s contributions were to include, among others, providing the capital and resources, paying the expenses of the joint venture, and providing the services required by SAAT, including component repairs, inventory, warehousing, and analysis. JV Partner’s contributions were to include, among others, “provid[ing] support” and “industry specific know-how,” “assist[ing] the Joint Venture to understand the local government procurement rules and guidelines,” supplying employees to carry out the business, and performing business development. JV Partner facilitated the AAR subsidiary’s business with SAAT, but did not make operative decisions in the performance of the SAAT Contract. At the AAR subsidiary’s direction, JV Partner engaged with SAAT to pursue contractual payments owed by SAAT to the AAR subsidiary, approximately five percent of which were shared with JV Partner.”
Also on or about January 18, 2016, following a telephone conversation among Aires, Sharma, an AAR executive, and South Africa Individual 1, the AAR subsidiary agreed to pay JV Partner an additional success fee on the SAAT Contract and to make a one-time advance payment to JV Partner. Aires understood that the additional success fee and one-time advance payment were necessary and would be used to make bribe payments to South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3 in order for the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner to win the SAAT Contract.
During the bidding process, contrary to the bid procurement rules, Aires met several times with South Africa Official 1 and obtained confidential information to assist the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner in winning the bid.
[…]
On or about July 7, 2016, after winning the SAAT bidding process for the SAAT Contract, the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner, through their joint venture, entered into a five-year Component Support Agreement with SAAT.
[…]
Over the course of the SAAT Contract, Aires and a Company 1 employee maintained records, which they emailed to South Africa Individual 1 and South Africa Individual 2, tracking the bribe payments due to South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3. To disguise the bribes, Aires, South Africa Individual 1, and South Africa Individual 2 referred to the payments as “consulting fees” and referred to the foreign officials by “Cuz” (South Africa Official 1), “Sisi” or “Sissy” (South Africa Official 2), and “Boetie” (South Africa Official 3). Proceeds from the SAAT Contract were then divided between Aires, South Africa Individual 1, South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3.
During the course of the SAAT Contract, Aires frequently traveled from the United States to South Africa with cash. Aires gave the cash to South Africa Individual 1 in South Africa, a portion of which was to be paid by South Africa Individual 1 as bribes to South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3 in exchange for SAAT awarding the SAAT Contract to the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner.
During the course of the SAAT Contract, between in or around 2016 and 2020, SAAT paid AAR approximately $79.6 million.
In turn, between in or around 2016 and 2020, the AAR subsidiary paid Company 1 [ and JV Partner approximately $5,397,677 in commissions, success fees, and advance payments in connection with the SAAT Contract, a portion of which was then paid as bribes to South Africa Official 1, South Africa Official 2, and South Africa Official 3. The payments from the AAR subsidiary to Company 1 and JV Partner were made to four bank accounts as directed by JV Partner, including bank accounts in the United States under the name of Company 1 and JV Partner.
Aires knew and Sharma understood that a portion of the approximately $5,397,677 paid by AAR to Company 1 and JV Partner was used to pay bribes to the SAA and SAAT officials involved in awarding the contract to the AAR subsidiary and JV Partner.
The NPA highlights the following circumstances.
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offense conduct, as described in the Statement of Facts, including bribery schemes to obtain business in Nepal and South Africa;
(b) the Company self-reported to the Offices conduct that forms, in part, the basis for this Agreement; however, the Company’s self-report did not constitute a “voluntary self-disclosure” as defined in the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy. Prior to the self-report, several English-language articles had been published in media outlets in Nepal and South Africa that described potential irregularities in the relevant contracts in both countries, including that an AAR subsidiary had been summoned by a Nepalese agency investigating irregularities and corruption in connection with the procurement of aircraft. Moreover, twelve days before the Company’s self-report, an independent source reported the allegations regarding the Nepal conduct to the Offices. Although the Company did not receive voluntary disclosure credit pursuant to the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy or the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Sentencing Guidelines”) § 8C2.5(g)(1), the Offices gave significant weight in evaluating the appropriate disposition of this matter—including the appropriate form of the resolution, the reduction in the penalty amount based on cooperation and remediation credit, and the length of the Term—to the Company’s self-report of the misconduct before the Company was aware the conduct had already come to the attention of the Offices;
(c) the Company received credit for its cooperation with the Offices’ investigation pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2) because it cooperated with their investigation and demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct; the Company also received credit for its substantial cooperation and extensive and timely remediation pursuant to the Criminal Division Corporate
Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, by, among other things: (i) self-reporting the conduct that forms, at least in part, the basis for this Agreement before the Company was aware the conduct had come to the attention of the Offices; (ii) promptly providing information obtained through its internal investigation, which allowed the government to preserve and obtain evidence as part of its own independent investigation; (iii) proactively preserving, imaging, and conducting extensive forensic analysis of key electronic evidence, which included imaging mobile devices, recovering deleted documents, forensically recreating attachments from log files, and decrypting recovered chat messages; (iv) making regular and detailed presentations to the Offices; (v) promptly collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous information, including complex financial information; (vi) meeting the Offices’ requests promptly; (vii) voluntarily making employees, including foreign-based employees, available for interviews; (viii) collecting and producing voluminous relevant documents and translations to the Offices, including documents located outside the United States; and (ix) producing documents to the Offices from foreign countries in ways that did not implicate foreign data privacy laws;(d) the Company provided to the Offices all relevant facts known to it, including information about the individuals involved in the conduct described in the Statement of Facts … and conduct disclosed to the Offices prior to the Agreement;
(e) the Company also received credit pursuant to the Criminal Division Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy because it engaged in extensive and timely remedial measures, including: (i) conducting an enterprise-wide review of all existing high-risk third-party representatives and reducing its use of international sales agents; (ii) enhancing protocols regarding onboarding and vetting of third-party engagements, including heightened diligence and senior-level approvals; (iii) taking employment actions, including promptly separating one employee involved in the relevant conduct and disciplining other employees with oversight responsibilities; (iv) strengthening its anti-corruption compliance program by investing in compliance resources and expanding its compliance function with experienced and qualified personnel, including appointing a Chief Ethics & Compliance Officer and hiring a compliance monitoring manager; (v) implementing a compliance risk assessment program which has enabled the Company to proactively identify new areas of risk; (vi) enhancing public bidding policies and monitoring implementation of those enhancements; (vii) beginning to roll out a messaging application retention tool; (viii) implementing compliance auditing and periodic anti-corruption site reviews; and (ix) engaging in continuous testing, monitoring, and improvement of its compliance program;
(f) the Company has enhanced and has committed to continuing to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C to [the NPA];
(g) the Company has no criminal history and a limited history of prior civil and regulatory actions, including an approximately $11 million settlement in 2021 to resolve a civil investigation by the Department of Justice and a related qui tam lawsuit brought by a former AAR subsidiary employee regarding False Claims Act allegations in connection with aircraft maintenance services performed by its
subsidiary and a separate Federal Aviation Administration matter citing deficiencies in the AAR subsidiary’s helicopter maintenance;(h) the Company’s agreement to resolve concurrently an investigation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) relating to the conduct described in the … Statement of Facts and agreement to pay $29,236,624 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest;
(i) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Offices in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, business partners, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA; and
(j) based on the Company’s remediation and the state of its compliance program, and the Company’s agreement to report to the Offices as set forth in Attachment D to [the NPA], the Offices determined that an independent compliance monitor is unnecessary.”
The NPA then states:
“[The DOJ] has determined that the appropriate resolution of this case is a non-prosecution agreement with the Company with an 18-month term; payment by the Company in the amount of a $26,363,029 criminal monetary penalty, which reflects a discount of 45 percent off the applicable Guidelines sentence, and $18,568,713 in forfeiture, which … will be credited against disgorgement of ill-gotten profits that the Company pays to the SEC in a concurrent resolution.”
In the DOJ’s release, Chief Counselor Brent Wible of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division stated:
“AAR bribed high-level government officials to obtain business with state-owned airlines in Nepal and South Africa and reaped nearly $24 million in illicit profits as a result. The Justice Department continues to hold companies and individuals accountable for engaging in international corruption. Today’s resolution also demonstrates how companies that proactively report misconduct, extensively cooperate, and timely and appropriately remediate will receive credit under the Criminal Division’s Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy, including in the form of the agreement, the amount of cooperation and remediation credit, and the length of the term.”
U.S. Attorney Matthew Graves for the District of Columbia stated:
“Companies competing on a fair and level playing field is a core value that we expect any U.S. company or anyone doing business in the United States to embrace. Bribery schemes, whether based inside or outside the United States, harm consumers and companies that are trying to lawfully run their businesses. That is why this office, along with our law enforcement partners, will continue to diligently pursue any individual or company that seeks to profit through corrupt or illegal means.”
Special Agent in Charge William S. Walker of the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) New York Field Office stated:
“AAR, through its bribery of government officials in Nepal and South Africa, violated U.S. law enacted to ensure that U.S. businesses do not engage in foreign corruption. [This] outcome reflects HSI’s steadfast commitment to enforcing accountability within global commerce. HSI New York will continue to pursue all necessary measures to ensure that those who engage in corrupt practices, regardless of their location or position, are held fully accountable under the law.”
SEC
The SEC matter was based on the same core conduct and this administrative order finds in summary fashion:
This matter concerns violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA by AAR, a provider of aviation products and services, arising from two separate bribery schemes. One scheme was in connection with the sale of two Airbus A330 aircraft to Nepal Airlines Corporation (“Nepal Airlines”), a government-owned airline, and the second was in connection with the sale of aftermarket aviation services to SAA Technical (SOC) Ltd. (“South African Airways Technical”), a subsidiary of South African Airways (SOC) Ltd (“South African Airways”), a government-owned airline.
The improper payments were in the form of sham commissions and fees payable to government officials through the use of a third-party agent and joint venture partner. The misconduct also involved a now-former high-level employee of an AAR subsidiary, Deepak Sharma. The payments were in violation of AAR policies and were falsely recorded on the company’s books and records as legitimate expenses.
Regarding the third-party agent used to facilitate the Nepal scheme, the order finds:
“Third-Party Agent A, based in Hong Kong and purportedly a telecommunications business, was engaged by an AAR subsidiary despite red flags raised during due diligence including: (1) its lack of any aviation industry experience; (2) limited and vague descriptions of the services it would provide; (3) that two customer references provided by Third-Party Agent A involved sales of cellphones and electronics; and (4) a higher than normal commission rate.
[…]
On or around December 1, 2016, AAR executives learned from Sharma that money going to Third-Party Agent A would be used to make donations to political parties in Nepal as part of the Nepal Airlines transaction. On December 4, 2016, AAR received an anonymous email alleging bribery related to the Nepal Airlines transaction. As a result of learning from Sharma that Third-Party Agent A would be making these payments, AAR terminated Third-Party Agent A on December 9, 2016. On January 16, 2017, Nepal Airlines notified AAR that its board had approved the AAR Consortium’s bid.
[…]
While the payment to Third-Party Agent A was part of the bribery scheme and the AAR subsidiary lacked documentary evidence reflecting any legitimate services actually performed by Third-Party Agent A, the $250,000 commission payment was recorded by the AAR subsidiary as a legitimate commission expense.
AAR failed to devise and maintain internal accounting controls related to vendor management and accounts payable sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that AAR personnel were adhering to AAR’s Global Anti-Corruption Policy and its procedures regarding the retention of and payments to third-party agents.
As a result of this misconduct, AAR was unjustly enriched by $6,000,000.”
Regarding the JV Partner used to facilitate the South Africa scheme, the order finds:
“Throughout the contract term, Joint Venture Party continued to request more money from AAR and continued to seek its originally requested 3% success fee. While Sharma and a now former AAR executive together tried to find ways to increase Joint Venture Party’s compensation through a rate increase, the success fee itself was not changed. Moreover, by December 2019, South African Airways was in financial straits and could no longer assist in the funding of South African Airways Technical. Thereafter, South African Airways Technical suffered severe financial distress and was in turn unable to meet its payment obligations to AAR.
When AAR asked Joint Venture Party to address reports of its potential corrupt conduct made in certain testimony before a public commission in South Africa, including an illicit payment made by Principal 2 to Government Official 2 in an unrelated, sham real estate transaction not involving AAR, Joint Venture Party tendered false documents to AAR. As a result, AAR terminated the Component Services Agreement and asked for an audit of Joint Venture Party, which Joint Venture Party declined. Shortly after February 14, 2020, AAR terminated the relationship with Joint Venture Party. In total, over the term of the Component Support Agreement with South African Airways Technical AAR paid $1.24 million in success fees and $4.16 million in commission payments to Joint Venture Party, for a total of $5.4 million.
As a result of this misconduct, AAR was unjustly enriched by $17,451,100.”
Based on the above findings, the order finds that AAR violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions.
As to the books and records provisions, the order states:
“AAR’s books and records inaccurately characterized commission payments and success fees to the third-party agent and joint venture partner in connection with the Nepal and South Africa transactions. AAR failed to properly record the true nature of these payments and falsely recorded the payments as legitimate expenses or contra revenue.”
As to the internal controls provisions, the order states:
“AAR had insufficient internal accounting controls over vendor management and accounts payable to provide reasonable assurances that the AAR personnel were adhering to AAR’s Global Anti-Corruption Policy and procedures regarding the retention of and payments to agents.”
Under the heading “Cooperation and Remediation,” the order states:
“[AAR’s] cooperation included, among other things, proactively preserving, imaging, and conducting forensic analysis of key electronic evidence, providing translations of certain relevant documents, making current and former employees available to the Commission staff (including witnesses located overseas), and timely and voluntarily providing the details of facts developed during its internal investigation, including the sharing of forensic accounting analysis, relevant emails and company documents, and information pertaining to current and former employees.
[AAR’s] remediation included separating from employees responsible for the misconduct or who inadequately responded to red flags, initiating improvements to its internal audit and compliance programs by enhancing its compliance resources and hiring personnel such as a new Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer, applying controls improvements to acquired entities, amending public bidding policies and implementing monitoring processes including a messaging application retention tool and periodic anti-corruption site reviews. Respondent also increased training on anti-bribery issues. [AAR’s] has also undertaken an analysis of its compliance program and continues to make improvements utilizing anticorruption risk assessments, data analytics, internal audits, and internal accounting controls related to third-party management.”
In the SEC’s release, Charles Cain (Chief of the SEC’s FCPA Unit) stated:
“Here, the bribes schemes took place in both Nepal and South Africa, reflecting that a deficient control environment creates fertile ground for mischief that can cross borders. This matter serves as another reminder that companies must have robust compliance and accounting controls that are commensurate with the FCPA risks they face, including with respect to their work with third parties across their business operations.”
This separate administrative order against Sharma states in summary fashion:
“This matter concerns violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA by AAR, a provider of aviation products and services, arising from two separate bribery schemes. One scheme was in connection with the sale of two Airbus A330 aircraft to Nepal Airlines Corporation (“Nepal Airlines”), a government-owned airline, and the second was in connection with the sale of aftermarket aviation services to SAA Technical (SOC) Ltd. (“South African Airways Technical”), a subsidiary of South African Airways (SOC) Ltd (“South African Airways”), a government-owned airline.
The improper payments were in the form of sham commissions and fees payable to government officials through the use of a third-party agent and joint venture partner. The misconduct also involved a now-former high-level employee of an AAR subsidiary, Deepak Sharma. The payments were in violation of AAR policies and were falsely recorded on the company’s books and records as legitimate expenses.”
As noted in the SEC’s release Sharma consented to an SEC order finding that he violated the anti-bribery, recordkeeping, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA and ordering him to pay $184,597 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest, $130,835 of which is deemed satisfied by a forfeiture order in a prior agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice.
This release from AAR states:
“After self-reporting the potential violations to the DOJ and SEC in 2019, and cooperating with both agencies in a multi-year investigation, AAR has entered a Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”) with the DOJ, and the SEC has accepted the Company’s Offer of Settlement and issued a cease-and-desist order (the “SEC Order”). The resolutions with both the DOJ and SEC make clear that the relevant conduct was principally carried out by a former employee of a Company subsidiary and former third-party agents.
The total amount payable by AAR under the NPA and SEC Order is $55,599,653, inclusive of penalties, forfeiture, and prejudgment interest, which will be reflected as a one-time charge in the Company’s consolidated financial statements for fiscal year 2025 second quarter ended November 30, 2024. The Company expects to fund these payments using a combination of cash on hand and borrowings under its revolving credit facility.
“We are pleased to resolve these matters with the DOJ and SEC,” said John M. Holmes, AAR’s Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer. “We thank the DOJ and SEC for their collaboration and their recognition of the Company’s substantial cooperation. AAR remains committed to transparency and accountability and operating in an ethical and compliant manner as we deliver innovative, value-driven solutions to meet the ever-evolving needs of our customers worldwide.”
Since self-reporting the potential violations to the DOJ and SEC in 2019, the Company has taken extensive steps to enhance its global compliance program. AAR’s remedial actions, along with the significant effort it made to cooperate with the investigations, were acknowledged by the DOJ and the SEC as part of the resolutions.”
Davis Polk attorneys Daniel Kahn (Former Chief of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit) and Mari Grace represented AAR.
