The 30% Commission, The Dream Seeker, The Ferrari Spyder, and Consulting Fees for Mom
According to its website (see here) Mexico’s Comision Federal de Electricidad (“CFE”) “is a decentralized government agency, duly incorporated and which controls its own assets.”
Does that make CFE’s Sub-Director of Generation and Director of Operations “foreign officials” under the FCPA?
According to the DOJ, apparently so, as it alleges in this recent indictment against Enrique Faustino Aguilar Noriega and Angela Maria Gomez Aguilar. See here for the DOJ release.
According to the indictment, “Comision Federal de Electricidad (‘CFE’) was an electric utility company owned by Mexico. During the time period relevant to this Indictment, CFE was responsibile for supplying electricity to all of Mexico othern than Mexico City. CFE contracted with Mexican and foreign companies for goods and services to help supply electricity services to its customers.”
“Company LM” according to the indictment, (a company identified as Lindsey Manufacturing in media reports – see here see here for more about Lindsey Manufacturing), is a “privately held company incorporated in California and headquartered in Azusa, California. According to the indictment, LM “manufactured emergency restoration systems and other equipment used by electrical utility companies” including “state-owned utilities, including CFE” “one of LM’s most significant customers.” According to the indictment, LM “conducted business in a number of foreign markets through sales representatives.”
According to the indictment, “Grupo Internacional De Asesores S.A. (‘Grupo’) was a company incorporated in Panama and headquartered in Mexico” with a “brokerage account in Houston, Texas at Global Financial Services, Inc.” The indictment alleges that “Grupo’s purported business was to provide sales representation services for companies like LM that had business with CFE” and that “Grupo was LM’s sales representative in Mexico and received a percentage of the revenue LM received from its contracts with CFE.” According to the indictment, Grupo was an “agent of a domestic concern” under the FCPA.
According to the indictment, Enrique Aguilar, a lawful permanent resident of the U.S. “was a Director of Grupo and was hired by LM to obtain contracts from CFE” and a “an agent of a domestic concern” under the FCPA.
According to the indictment, Angela Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico, “served as an Officer and a Director of Grupo” and “managed Grupo’s finances” and was “the sole signatory on Grupo’s Global Financial brokerage account.”
According to the indcitment, Enrique Aguilar, together with President KL (an individual identified as the President of LM), Vice President SL (an individual identified as the Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of LM), LM and others conspired to make improper payments to “foreign officials” to assist Aguilar, Grupo, President KL, Vice President SL, LM, and others in obtaining and retaining business in violation of the FCPA.
The indictment alleges that Aquilar offered to become LM’s “sales representative in Mexico in exchange for a thirty percent commission on all of the goods and services” LM sold to CFE and that President KL and Vice President SL “would agree to pay” Aquilar “a thirty percent commission into Grupo’s brokerage account at Global Financial, even though it was significantly higher than the commission LM paid to its previous sales representative in Mexico” knowing that Aquilar “had a close personal relationship with Official 1 and would use all or a portion of the thirty percent commission to pay Official 1 and others bribes in exchange for CFE awarding LM contracts.”
Among other things, the indictment alleges that: (i) Grupo’s Global Financial brokerage account was used to “pay the credit card bills for Official 1’s American Express credit card ‘in full every month, until further notice'”; (ii) Aquilar “aided Official 1 in purchasing an 82 foot yacht named the Dream Seeker for $1,800,010 …;” (iii) Aquilar caused wire transfers to Official 2’s female and male relatives for “payment for professional services advice” and Official 2’s mother and brother for a “consulting fee;” and (iv) Aquilar caused the “issuance of a check to Ferrari of Beverly Hills from Grupo’s Financial brokerage account for approximately $297,500 to purchase a 2005 Ferrari Spyder for Official 1.”
Who are Official 1 and 2?
According to the indictment:
“Official 1 was a Mexican citizen who held a senior level position at CFE. Official 1 became the Sub-Director of Generation for CFE in 2002 and the Director of Operations in 2007. Official 1’s position at CFE made him a ‘foreign official’ as that term is defined in the FCPA …”
“Official 2 was a Mexican citizen who also held a senior level position at CFE. Official 2 was the Director of Operations at CFE until that position was taken over by Official 1 in 2007. Official 2’s position at CFE made him a ‘foreign official’ as that term is defined in the FCPA …”
[For more on Official 1 and CFE – see David Luhnow, “U.S. Probe Leads to Mexico Chief,” Wall Street Journal (August 24, 2010)]
According to the indictment, Angela Aguilar assisted or otherwise caused many of the above referenced payments to be made.
Based on the above core conduct, Enrique Aquilar was charged in a seven-count indictment with conspiracy to violate the FCPA, FCPA violations, money laundering conspiracy and money laundering. Angela Aquilar was charged with money laundering conspiracy and money laundering.
As noted in the DOJ’s release “an indictment is merely an accusation, and defendants are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Michael Zweiback (here), a former DOJ prosecutor currently with Seyfarth Shaw LLP, represents both Enrique and Angela Aquilar. He stated: “we intend to vigorously defend the charges and expect the Aguiliar’s to be found not guilty.”
With Lindsey Manufacturing and certain of its top executives implicated in the alleged conduct, it is likely that the above core allegations will be repeated in future enforcement actions.
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The Aquilar indictments continue a DOJ trend of holding agents, sales representatives etc. accountable for allegedly participating in bribery schemes. (See this prior post for other such enforcement actions).
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Does CFE ring a bell?
It should because this alleged “state-owned utility company” is at the center of the enforcement actions against John Jospeh O’Shea (see here and here) and Fernando Maya Basurto (see here).
A Results Based Opinion Procedure Release?
The Department of Justice recently issued (see here) an FCPA opinion procedure release – a meaningful event in the FCPA arena given the general lack of substantive FCPA case law. [To read more about the detailed requirements of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure process (see here and here)]
Reading Opinion Procedure Release 10-02, in which a “non-profit, U.S. based microfinance institution” was the Requestor, I found myself returning to the same question – is this a results-based DOJ opinion?
The big-picture facts are as follows: to get a government-issued license, an entity subject to the FCPA is directed by a government agency to provide something of value to an institution whose board members include a sitting government official and a former government official.
According to the DOJ’s analysis, an analysis that mentions the word “humanitarian” more than once, the contemplated conduct would not cause the DOJ to take any enforcement action.
As explained below, a relevant factor in the DOJ’s opinion is the due diligence the Requestor undertook. Yet, if … say an oil and gas company … undertook similar due diligence steps would such due diligence be viewed as perfuctory or superficial?
Was the humanitarian, non-profit microfinance institution viewed a bit differently than a similarily situated for-profit company?
Was the DOJ’s mindset as to the red flags involving the non-profit along the following lines – this must be legitimate until it is proven that it isn’t?
Conversely, is the DOJ’s mindset as to red flags involving for profit companies, particularly those in high-risk industries, along the following lines – this must be illegal until it is proven that it is legal?
I don’t know the answers to these questions and by posing them I am not drawing any conclusions myself.
Merely interesting questions to ponder while reviewing the facts of Opinion Procedure Release 10-02.
The facts are as follows.
The Requestor is “in the process of converting all of its local operations to commercial entities that are licensed as financial institutions, in order to permit them to attract capital and expand their services to include offerings such as savings accounts, microinsurance and remittances.”
“One of those operations is a wholly-owned subsidiary in a country in Eurasia” which is “currently organized as a limited liability company under the laws of the Eurasian country and operates under a special non-banking financial institution license from the Central Bank of that country” and whose activities are “currently overseen by an agency of the Eurasian country (the ‘Regulating Agency’).”
“As part of its oversight of the Eurasian Subsidiary and [its] proposed transition to commercial status, the Regulating Agency has pressed the Eurasian Subsidiary to take steps to ‘localize’ its grant capital to ensure that it remains in the Eurasian country.”
“Among other things, the Regulating Agency has insisted that the European Subsidiary make a grant to a local microfinance institution [Local MFI] in an amount equal to approximately 33 percent of the Eurasian Subsidiary’s original grant capital.”
“The Regulating Agency has provided a list of Local MFI’s in the Eurasian country and has stated that the Eurasian Subsidiary could not fulfill its localization obligation unless it provided grant funding to one or more of them.”
According to the release, the Requestor “is concerned that compelled grants to an institution on a short list of institutions – without appropriate safeguards – raise red flags under the FCPA.” (emphasis added).
According to the relase, the Regulating Agency rejected the Requestor’s alternative proposals and insisted on the above described arrangement.
The thing of value demanded by the Regulating Agency is not exactly spare change.
According to the release:
“To meet the Regulating Agency’s requirements, the Eurasian Subsidiary proposes to contribute a total of $1.42 million to expand the loan and technical capacity of a Local MFI which previously has received grant funding from the foreign aid community. Of the $1.42 million, $1.07 million would be used to increase the Local MFI’s loan capital – to more than triple its current loan capital. The remaining $350,000 would be used in support of the grant: (a) $50,000 to pay for loan tracking and reporting management system software; (b) $120,000 for capacity-building services and support, including hiring six additional staff members and retaining vendors to provide training and other technical assistance; and (c) $180,000 for the engagement of two independent organizations to monitor and audit the use of the proposed grant (the “Proposed Grant”).”
As referenced above, the Requestor conducted certain due diligence in connection with the “compelled grant.”
According to the release:
“The Eurasian Subsidiary undertook a three-stage due diligence process to vet the potential grant recipients and select the proposed grantee. First, it conducted an initial screening of six potential grant recipients by obtaining publicly available information and information from third-party sources. Based on this review, it ruled out three of the six MFI candidates as generally unqualified to receive the grant funds and put them to effective use. Second, the Eurasian Subsidiary undertook further due diligence on the remaining three potential grant recipients. This due diligence was designed to learn about each organization’s ownership, management structure and operations; it involved requesting and reviewing key operating and assessment documents for each organization, as well as conducting interviews with representatives of each MFI to ask questions about each organization’s relationships with the government and to elicit information about potential corruption risk. Based on the information obtained during this second-stage review, the Eurasian Subsidiary ruled out two of the three remaining potential grant recipients: one for conflict of interest concerns, the other after the discovery of a previously undisclosed ownership change in the entity. As a third round of due diligence, the Eurasian Subsidiary undertook targeted due diligence on the remaining potential grant recipient, the Local MFI. This diligence was designed to identify any ties to specific government officials, determine whether the organization had faced any criminal prosecutions or investigations, and assess the organization’s reputation for integrity.”
The release notes that this “final round of due diligence did not identify information of potential corruption in connection with the Proposed Grant.”
However, it did “uncover that one of the board members of both the Local MFI and the Local MFI’s Parent Organization is a sitting government official in the Eurasian country and that other board members are former government officials.”
According to the release:
“The sitting government official, however, serves in a capacity that is completely unrelated to the microfinancing industry. In addition, under the law of the Eurasian country, sitting government officials may not be compensated for this type of board service, and the Local MFI confirmed that neither its own board members nor the board members of the Local MFI’s Parent Organization receive compensation for their board service. The proposed grant agreement would expressly prohibit the Local MFI from transferring any of the grant funds to the Local MFI’s Parent Organization or otherwise using the grant funds to compensate board members of either the Local MFI or the Local MFI’s Parent Organization.”
The release then mentions several “significant controls” proposed by the Requestor as to the Proposed Grant, including “the grant agreement would expressly prohibit the Local MFI from transferring any of the grant funds to the Local MFI’s Parent Organization or otherwise using the grant funds to compensate board members of either the Local MFI or the Local MFI’s Parent Organization.”
Based on these core facts, the DOJ’s analysis is:
“the Department does not intend to take any enforcement action with regard to the proposed transaction…”
The DOJ first stated that the Requestor was subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and that the Proposed Grant to the Local MFI was indeed “for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.”
The DOJ framed the question as follows:
“The issue presented is whether the Proposed Grant would amount to the corrupt giving of anything of value to any officials of that country in return for obtaining or retaining business. Based on the due diligence that has been done and with the benefit of the controls that will be put into place, it appears unlikely that the payment will result in the corrupt giving of anything of value to such officials.”
The DOJ stated:
“As an initial matter, it is important to note that the expressed motivation of the Regulating Agency here is to ensure that grant money given to the Eurasian Subsidiary for humanitarian purposes in the Eurasian country continues to be used for humanitarian purposes in that country. The Requestor was concerned, nevertheless, that without due diligence and appropriate controls, such a grant could carry a significant risk that the result might be the transfer of things of value to officials of the Eurasian country.”
The DOJ continued:
“The Department is satisfied, however, that the Requestor has done appropriate due diligence and that the controls that it plans to institute are sufficient to prevent FCPA violations. As noted above, the Requestor conducted three rounds of due diligence. The controls that the Requestor proposes would ensure with reasonable certainty that the grant money from the Eurasian Subsidiary would not be transferred to officials of the Eurasian country. As noted, these controls include the following: the staggered payment of grant funds; ongoing monitoring and auditing; the earmarking of funds for capacity-building; a prohibition on the compensation of board members; and the institution of an anti-corruption compliance program.”
The DOJ then lists three other opinion releases that deal with charitable-type grants or donations and ultimately states that the Proposed Grant “is consistent with the Department’s past approach to grant-related requests.”
This is the curious aspect of the DOJ’s analysis because the Requestor’s Proposed Grant was not charity or a donation, rather it was a “compelled grant” (a term DOJ used earlier in the release) specifically requested by the Regulating Agency as a condition to the Requestor obtaining the desired license.
Results-based opinion?
You be the judge.
For other coverage of Opinion Procedure Release 10-2, see here, here and here.
FCPA Goes Main Street
Growing up in a village of 1,054 in central Wisconsin, I was not exposed to oil and gas companies, defense contractors, or other companies that tend to have a high FCPA risk profile.
Yet one person I did have contact with on a near daily basis, because she lived around the corner, was the “Avon Lady.”
Thus, a bit of my youthful innocence was taken away upon learning last week that Avon Products Inc. (here) of all companies “suspended four executives amid an internal investigation into alleged bribery that began with the company’s China operation” and “now involves a dozen or more countries” according to the Wall Street Journal. According to the WSJ, the executives suspended include the president, chief financial officer and top government affairs executive of Avon’s China unit as well as a senior executive in New York who was Avon’s head of internal audit until the middle of last year.
According to the WSJ, Avon’s chief exectuive, Andrea Jung is a “corporate celebrity” in China and she has met frequently with “senior government officials.”
The conduct at issue involves alleged “purchase of trips to France, New York, Canada, and Hawaii for Chinese government officials with ties to Avon’s business.” However, according to the WSJ, “the scope of the investigation has since widened to regions including Latin America, where the company garners the bulk of its sales and profits.”
According to the WSJ, what sparked the investigation was “an employee who wrote a letter to Ms. Jung alleging improper spending related to travel with Chinese government officials.”
Here is what the company had to say in its 2009 Annual Report (filed in March 2010):
“As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the FCPA and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and additional countries. The internal investigation and compliance reviews, which are being conducted under the oversight of our Audit Committee, began in June 2008. We voluntarily contacted the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice to advise both agencies of our internal investigation and compliance reviews and we are, as we have done from the beginning of the internal investigation, continuing to cooperate with both agencies and have signed tolling agreements with them.
The internal investigation and compliance reviews, which started in China, are focused on reviewing certain expenses and books and records processes, including, but not limited to, travel, entertainment, gifts, and payments to third-party agents and others, in connection with our business dealings, directly or indirectly,
with foreign governments and their employees. The internal investigation and compliance reviews of these matters are ongoing. At this point we are unable to predict the duration, scope or results of the internal investigation and compliance reviews.”
Based on information that is publicly available, this potential FCPA enforcement action fits the mold of Lucent Technologies and UTStarcom (here), in that it appears focused on excessive travel and entertainment benefits to Chinese “foreign officials.”
However, looking to the prior “on-point” Lucent and UTStarcom enforcement actions may not provide much useful guidance. But you probably already knew that, this is FCPA enforcement after all, where predictabilty and transparency are not distinguishing features.
If ever two FCPA enforcement actions were carbon-copies of each other, it would be the December 2007 enforcement action against Lucent and the December 2009 enforcement action against UTStarcom (“UTS”) Both enforcement actions involved telecommunications companies, both enforcement actions principally concerned business conduct in China, both enforcement actions involved payment of excessive travel and entertainment expenses, and both enforcement actions were resolved through a DOJ NPA and an SEC settled civil complaint and consent decree. Despite these similarities the end results were significantly different.
UTS settled its matter by agreeing to pay $3 million in total fines and penalties for FCPA antibribery, books and records and internal control violations. However, Lucent settled its matter by agreeing to pay $2.5 million in total fines and penalties for merely FCPA books and records and internal controls violations – in other words no antibribery violations. This despite the fact that, per the government’s statement of facts and allegations, Lucent sponsored more trips than UTS (315 compared to 225) and spent more money on the problematic trips than UTS ($10 million compared to $7 million) to influence more foreign officials in the hopes of winning billion dollar and multi-million contracts. Also relevant is that UTS was charged with antibribery violations and paid a higher combined fine/penalty amount compared to Lucent (based on less severe allegations) despite the fact that UTS, per the DOJ’s release, voluntarily disclosed the conduct at issue – a factor noticeably absent in the DOJ’s Lucent release.
Lighthouses and Buoys – Additional Plea
The DOJ announced yesterday (here) that John Warwick pleaded guilty to a one-count criminal indictment charging him with conspiracy to pay bribes to former Panamanian officials to obtain contracts to maintain lighthouses and buoys along Panama’s waterways.
For additional posts about this case, including the prior guilty plea of Warwick’s co-conspirator Charles Jumet (see here). Warwick and Jumet are both associated with Virginia-based Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation (PECC).
The indictments against both individuals are substantively similar and involve a rather complex and convoluted way of getting the “thing of value” to the “foreign official.” According to the indictments, Warwick and Jumet designated certain corporate entities as shareholders of PECC and allowed the “foreign officials” to receive dividend payments and bearer shares from these entities.
Lighthouses and Buoys
Every so often, things sort of appear out of “left field.”
This is not the only blog which covers the FCPA and several law firms keep rolling statistics as to FCPA enforcement actions, indictments, pleas, etc.
Even so, has anyone ever heard of Charles Paul Edward Jumet or Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation?
Forget the indictment (that was apparently filed on November 10th – see here), Jumet pleaded guilty today to conspiring to violate the FCPA (among other charges). See here for the DOJ release.
Get ready to a make flow chart, because the facts are rather confusing.
The big picture, according to the indictment and plea, is that Jumet and others conspired to “pay money secretly to Panamanian government officials in return for awarding Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation (“PECC” – a company organized under the laws of Panama with an office in Virginia) contracts to maintain lighthouses and buoys along Panama’s waterways…” (see indictment p. 4). Jumet, a U.S. citizen, was the VP of PECC and later its President.
The “foreign officials” were: Government Official A (the Administrator of Panama’s National Maritime Ports Authority) (“APN”); Government Official B (a Deputy Administrator and Administrator of APN); and Government Official C (“a very high-ranking executive official of the Republic of Panama”).
According to the indictment, Jumet and others designated “Warmspell Holding Company” and “Soderville Corporation” as shareholders of PECC as a means of giving corrupt payments to the officials in the form of “dividend” payments or “bearer” shares.
According to indictment, Soderville “belonged to Government Official A” and Warmspell “corporate officers were relatives of Government Official B.”
According to the DOJ release, “[a]s part of his plea agreement, Jumet has agreed to cooperate with the Department of Justice in its ongoing investigation.”
Also out of “left-field,” since when did the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement begin to enforce the FCPA?
Para. 3 of the indictment says that “[i]nvestigation of violations of the FCPA … fall within the jurisdiction of both the [FBI] and the United States Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement.”