Olympus Latin America Pays $22.8 Million In Latest FCPA Enforcement Action To Allege That Health Care Professionals Are “Foreign Officials”
Earlier this week, the DOJ announced (as part of a much larger enforcement action) a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act action against Olympus Latin American Inc. (OLA), a Miami-headquartered company that distributes medical imaging equipment in the Caribbean, Central America, and South America for Olympus Corporation (a Japanese company).
This post highlights the OLA enforcement action (the latest FCPA enforcement based on the theory that certain health care professionals are “foreign officials” under the FCPA) in which the DOJ charged the company in this criminal complaint with conspiring to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. The charges were resolved via this deferred prosecution agreement in which OLA agreed to pay $22.8 million.
According to the charging documents, from 2006 to 2011 OLA provided approximately $3 million in “hundreds of unlawful payments” to publicly employed healthcare professionals in Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica to “induce the purchase of Olympus products, influence public tenders, or prevent public institutions from purchasing or converting to the technology of competitors.” According to the charging documents, OLA recognized approximately $7.5 million in profits as a result of the alleged unlawful payments.
Current CEO Of LAN Airlines Resolves SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Based On A Payment He Authorized 10 Years Ago In Connection With A Labor Dispute
Last week was busy for SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement.
First, there was the $3.9 million enforcement action against SAP (see here).
Then, there was the $12.8 million enforcement action against SciClone Pharmaceuticals (see here).
And then, as highlighted in this post, there was an individual action against Ignacio Cueto Plaza, the current CEO of LAN Airlines (pictured at left).
The Cueto enforcement action was noteworthy in at least five respects.
- First, it was a rare SEC individual FCPA enforcement action (the Cueto action represents only the fourth core individual action since April 2012).
- Second, it was an FCPA enforcement action against a CEO (rarely do individual FCPA enforcement actions involve an executive officer).
- Third, it was an FCPA enforcement action against an existing CEO (most individual FCPA enforcement involve former employees because the company, as part of its remedial measures, terminates the employee found to be in violation of the FCPA).
- Fourth, even though most FCPA enforcement actions are based on “old” conduct, a 2016 enforcement action based on 2006 conduct stretches the credibility of the SEC’s enforcement program to a new level, coupled with the fact that a U.S. law enforcement agency brought an enforcement action against a Chilean citizen based on alleged improper conduct in Argentina.
- Fifth, most FCPA enforcement actions, even those that “only” charge or find FCPA books and records and internal controls violations, are still based on the alleged “foreign officials.” In this regard, the Cueto enforcement action is vague whether the SEC viewed the Argentine “union officials” to be “foreign officials” under the FCPA. If the SEC did view the “union officials” as such, it stretches the definition of “foreign official” even further. If the SEC did not view the “union officials” as foreign officials, the Cueto action represents a rare enforcement action concerning improper booking and insufficient internal controls concerning an instance of commercial bribery.
In this administrative action, the SEC found as follows.
“In 2006 and 2007, Ignacio Cueto Plaza (“Cueto”), the CEO of LAN Airlines S.A. (“LAN”), authorized $1.15 million in improper payments to a third party consultant in Argentina in connection with LAN’s attempts to settle disputes on wages and other work conditions between LAN Argentina S.A. (“LAN Argentina”), a subsidiary of LAN, and its employees. At the time, Cueto understood that it was possible the consultant would pass some portion of the $1.15 million to union officials in Argentina. The payments were made pursuant to an unsigned consulting agreement that purported to provide services that Cueto understood would not occur. Cueto authorized subordinates to make the payments that were improperly booked in the Company’s books and records, which circumvented LAN’s internal accounting controls.”
Cueto is described as follows.
” [A] Chilean citizen and, since 2012, has been CEO of LAN. From 1995 to 1998, Cueto served as President of LAN Cargo, a LAN subsidiary located in Miami, Florida. He served on the Board of Directors of LAN from 1995 to 1997. From 1999 to 2005, Cueto was CEO of LAN’s passenger airline business. In 2005, Cueto became President and COO of LAN Airlines S.A. He remained in that position until June of 2012, when LAN merged with Brazilian Airline TAM, S.A. (“TAM”) and became LATAM Airlines Group S.A. (“LATAM”). Cueto remains CEO of LAN, which is now part of LATAM.”
The enforcement action focuses the “obstacles that LAN might face in trying to enter the Argentine airline market.” Under the heading “LAN Faces Major Issues Upon Entering the Argentine Market,” the order states:
“Upon entering the Argentine passenger airline market LAN immediately faced several major issues impacting its viability and began losing money. First, it needed to meet demands from labor unions representing the employees acquired from LAFSA and Southern Winds. Second, LAN needed majority ownership of its Argentine subsidiary, and therefore had to persuade the Argentine government to change its existing law on foreign ownership of domestic airlines and to increase caps on airfares. Third, LAN needed regulatory authorization to operate various flight routes, both domestically and internationally, in Argentina. Since the Argentine passenger airline market was heavily regulated by the government, particularly officials within the Department of Transportation who had close ties to the unions, LAN sought help from the government officials with each of these issues.
In early 2006, the consultant again contacted the Vice President of Business Development and offered to assist LAN in Argentina. By this time, the consultant was a government official in the Ministry of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services, Department of Transportation. On January 31, 2005, the Secretary of Transportation appointed the consultant as a Cabinet Advisor “ad-honorem.”
LAN executives, including Cueto, knew that for LAN Argentina to become profitable it would need an infusion of cash. LAN asked Argentine government officials to liberalize the laws on foreign ownership so that LAN could own a majority share of LAN Argentina and sought government authorization to raise regulated airfares. On or about August 8, 2006, the President of Argentina signed a Decree that enabled LAN to become a majority owner of LAN Argentina and allowed LAN to raise airfares by 20%. LAN Argentina was also awarded critical additional flight routes by the Transportation Secretary.”
Under the heading “LAN Encounters Problems with the Unions in Argentina,” the order states:
“As part of the deal that LAN reached with the Argentine government in March 2005, LAN was required to hire between six and eight hundred employees from the defunct LAFSA and Southern Winds airlines. LAN was bound by the existing bargaining agreements between LAFSA, Southern Winds and the labor unions.
There were five unions representing airline employees in Argentina. They included the grounds crew union, the Asociación del Personal Aeronáutico (APA), the pilots’ union, the Asociación de Pilotos de Lineas Aereas (APLA), the mechanics’ union, Asociacion del Personal Técnico Aeronáutico (APTA), the flight attendants’ union, Asociación de Tripulantes de Cabina de Pasajeros de Empresas Aerocomerciales (ATCPEA), and the supervisors’ union, Unión del Personal Superior y Profesional de Empresas Aerocomerciales (UPSA).
All of the unions were powerful and unafraid to make demands on LAN. They sought wage increases and additional benefits, and used the terms of their respective Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”) as leverage. These labor agreements contained provisions that LAN believed were unfavorable, such as restrictions on the hours employees could work and their work locations.
The mechanics’ union, the flight attendants’ union and the supervisors’ union each had a single-function rule contained in their CBAs. The single-function rule was a provision that limited workers from performing more than one work function at a time for LAN. The single-function rule was loosely interpreted and for the most part not enforced by the unions. Had it been enforced, the single-function rule would have required LAN to double its work force and would have seriously imperiled LAN’s ability to continue its operations in Argentina.
Around 2006 the unions began campaigning for wage increases. The unions threatened to enforce the single-function rule unless LAN Argentina agreed to a substantial wage increase. LAN’s management, including Cueto, attempted to negotiate on the wage issues but made no progress and things worsened over time. Eventually there were work stoppages and slowdowns on the part of the workforce, including strikes involving the pilots’ and the mechanics’ unions.”
Under the heading “Cueto Approves Improper Payments,” the order states:
“Beginning in the summer of 2006, the consultant supplied LAN executives with information on how to deal with specific union members and the unions in general. Eventually, the consultant offered to negotiate directly with the unions on LAN’s behalf, making it clear that he would expect compensation for such negotiations, and that payments would be made to third parties who had influence over the unions. After his staff informed Cueto that the consultant was well connected with the unions and could effectively negotiate an agreement with union officials, Cueto approved the retention of the consultant.
During the summer of 2006, Cueto approved payments totaling $1,150,000 to the consultant in connection with LAN’s attempts to settle disputes on wages and other work conditions with the unions. At the time, Cueto understood that it was possible the consultant would pass some portion of the $1.15 million to union officials in Argentina. Cueto approved the payments to get the unions to abandon their threats to enforce the single-function rule and to get them to accept a wage increase lower than the amount asked for in negotiations. LAN and the consultant agreed that LAN would make the payment to a company controlled by the consultant in Argentina. In 2006, LAN did not have a policy requiring that due diligence be performed on consultants, and neither Cueto nor LAN conducted any due diligence on the consultant or any of his related entities.
Around August 2006, Cueto’s staff informed him that the consultant had reached an oral agreement to settle the wage dispute with the mechanics’ union on LAN’s behalf. Although the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement with the mechanics’ union would remain unchanged, Cueto understood that the union would orally agree not to seek enforcement of the single-function rule for a period of four years in exchange for a wage increase of approximately 6 15% of salary. The wage increase of approximately 15% was lower than the amount originally sought by the mechanics’ union.
Around August 2006, the flight attendants’ and supervisors’ unions both agreed to accept wage increases of approximately 15% and 10% respectively of salaries. The amounts were lower than the amounts originally sought by each union.”
Under the heading, “Cueto Authorized Improper Payments That Were Not Accurately and Fairly Feflected on LAN’s Books and Records,” the order states:
“Cueto directed subordinates to make the improper payments. The improper payments authorized by Cueto were improperly described in the books and records as “other debtors” costs in a LAN subsidiary that had no role in LAN’s argentine business.”
Under the heading, “Cueto Caused LAN’s Internal Accounting Control Failure,” the order states:
“As President and Chief Operating Officer of LAN, Cueto, along with others, was responsible for devising and maintaining compliance with internal accounting controls at LAN. Cueto did not follow the company’s existing internal accounting controls when he authorized the payment of $1,150,000 to the consultant’s company and failed to prevent the payment of $58,000 to another company owned by consultant’s son and wife. Cueto received and approved the sham contract for the consultant’s company to provide consulting services to LAN, knowing that such services would never be provided. Cueto also authorized payment of invoices from the consultant’s company that contained a description of services listed on the invoices that was false.”
Based on the above findings, the order finds that Cueto caused books and records and internal controls violations by LAN and that Cueto also knowingly circumvented or knowingly failed to implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsified book, record or account and that Cueto also violated falsified or cause to be falsified, a book, record, or account.
Under the heading “Remedial Actions and Undertakings,” the order states:
“As the CEO of LAN, which is now a division of LATAM, Cueto is subject to LATAM’s enhanced compliance structure and internal accounting controls. Cueto is required to certify compliance with LATAM’s new Code of Conduct that was adopted in 2013, as well as other internal corporate policies, including an Anti-Corruption Guide, a Gifts, Travel, Hospitality and Entertainment Policy, an Escalation Policy, and Procurement and Payment policies.
Cueto has attended the Corporate Governance Training provided by the LATAM Chief Compliance Officer and has provided a certification confirming acknowledgement of the Code of Conduct, the relevant applicable regulations, as well as the Company policies. Cueto has also executed an amendment to his employment agreement whereby Respondent acknowledges having been informed regarding the LATAM Manual for the Prevention of Corruption, among other matters, and his responsibilities to perform his duties with the highest ethical standards, in compliance with all Company Policies and Procedures.
[…]
Cueto also undertakes to attend all anti-corruption training sessions required for senior executives at LAN. These sessions will include, but are not limited to, both live and online anti-corruption trainings to be completed on at least an annual basis and according to LAN’s Compliance Department’s training schedule. These sessions will include, in addition to anticorruption laws and regulations, such as the FCPA, training on anti-trust laws, the Company’s Code of Conduct and all other applicable policies that each LAN employee must follow. After the conclusion of each session Cueto will sign the appropriate documentation that acknowledges his attendance and understanding of the topics presented. Should LAN modify the schedule of such training sessions for any reason, Cueto will, so long as he is a senior executive of LAN, attend a comparable anti-corruption session on an annual basis and complete appropriate documentation attesting to his attendance and the session’s contents.”
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings, Cueto agreed to cease and desist from future legal violations and agreed to pay a $75,000 civil penalty.
Cueto was represented by Richard Grime (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher – a former Assistant Director of Enforcement at the SEC heavily involved in FCPA enforcement). Commenting generally on the SEC’s evolving and expansive FCPA enforcement theories, Grime recently stated:
“It’s not that you couldn’t intellectually [conceive of] the violation. It’s that the government is sort of probing every area where there is an interaction with government officials and then working backwards from there to see if there is a violation, as opposed to starting out with the statute … and what it prohibits.”
Dallas Airmotive Inc. The Latest Aircraft Maintenance Company To Resolve An FCPA Enforcement Action
First it was Oklahoma-based BizJet International in 2012 (see here). Then it was Oklahoma-based The NORDAM Group in 2012 (see here). The latest aircraft maintenance company to resolve a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action is Texas-based Dallas Airmotive.
Earlier this week, the DOJ announced that “Dallas Airmotive Inc., a provider of aircraft engine maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services based in Grapevine, Texas, has admitted to violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and agreed to pay a $14 million criminal penalty to resolve charges that it bribed Latin American government officials in order to secure lucrative government contracts.”
As highlighted in this post discussing unsealed documents in connection with individual FCPA prosecutions of BizJet executives, all three enforcement actions seemed to be casually related.
Criminal Information
The Dallas Airmotive criminal information focuses on the conduct of Dallas Airmotive do Brasil (DAB), a corporate affiliate under the direction and control of Dallas Airmotive Inc. (DAI), and the information states that DAB’s employees were supervised and managed by directors and managers of DAI. According to the information, DAB assisted DAI in providing MRO engine services to customers in Latin America, including to governmental and other customers. The information states that DAB also bid on and secured engine service contracts with Brazilian government and commercial customers, the work for which was often done in part by DAI.
According to the information, DAI conspired with a DAI Sales Director (an individual responsible for overseeing DAI’s sales efforts in Latin America), a DAI Sales Agent (an individual responsible for obtaining and retaining MRO business for DAI and DAB in Latin America, including with commercial and government customers), a DAI Sales Manager (an individual responsible for obtaining and retaining MRO business for DAI and DAB in Latin America, including with commercial and government customers), DAB Manager A (an individual responsible for obtaining and retaining MRO business for DAI and DAB in Latin America, including with commercial and government customers), DAB Manager B (an individual responsible for obtaining and retaining MRO business for DAI and DAB in Latin America, including with government customers), Official 1 (a Sub-Officer in the Brazilian Air Force – BAF), Official 2 (a Sergeant in the BAF), Official 3 (a Captain for the Governor of the Brazilian state of Roraima), Front Company A (a Brazil-based sales and logistics services company that was affiliated with Official 1), Front Company B (a Brazil-based sales and logistics services company that was beneficially owned by Official 1), and a Intermediary Company (a Brazil-based company that was used to make payments for the benefit of Official 3), and others to make improper payments to the foreign officials to assist DAI in obtaining and retaining business.
According to the information, the purpose of the conspiracy was to obtain and retain engine MRO service business for DAI and DAB from foreign government customers in Latin America, including the BAF, the Peruvian Air Force, the Office of the Governor of the Brazilian State of Roraima, and the Office of the Governor of the Argentinean State of San Juan, by paying bribes to foreign officials employed by such customers.
According to the information, DAI, through its employees and agents, including employees of DAB, discussed in person and via e-mail making bribe payments – which they called “commissions” or “consulting fees” – and granting other benefits to employees of customers, including foreign government customers, in order to obtain and retain for DAI and DAB business to perform engine MRO services. According to the information, certain bribe payments were wired from DAI’s bank account in New York and DAB’s bank account in Brazil to bank accounts of Front Company A, Front Company B, and Intermediary Company in Brazil.
The information also alleges that DAI/ DAB paid for a vacation for Official 2 and his spouse in exchange for Official 2’s assistance in securing MRO business.
As to Peru and Argentina, the information alleges that payments were made to a bank account of a third party commercial representative in Florida and Argentina (respectively) while knowing that the funds, at least in part, would be passed on to officials of the Peruvian Air Force and the office of the Governor of the Argentinean State of San Juan.
In addition to the conspiracy charge, DAI was also charged with one substantive violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement
The above charges were resolved via this DPA in which DAI admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts alleged in the information. The 3 year DPA states, under relevant considerations, as follows.
“The DOJ enters into this Agreement based on the individual facts and circumstances presented by this case and the Company. Among the factors considered were the following: (a) the Company’s substantial cooperation, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the DOJ; (b) the Company’s improvements to date to its compliance program and internal controls, as well as its commitment to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in the DPA; (c) the nature and scope of the offense conduct; and (d) the Company’s agreement to continue to cooperate with the DOJ in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, and agents relating to possible violations under investigation by the DOJ.”
As highlighted in the DPA, the advisory guidelines fine range was $17.5 million to $35 million. The DPA states as follows.
“The Company agrees to pay a monetary penalty in the amount of $14,000,000 to the United States Treasury within ten (10) days of the filing of the Information. The Company and the Office agree that this fine is appropriate given the facts and circumstances of this case, including the cooperation in this matter and the nature and scope of the offense conduct.”
As common in FCPA DPAs, DAI “expressly agree[d] that it shall not, through present or future attorneys, officers, directors, employees, agents or any other person authorized to speak for the Company, make any public statement, in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by the Company set forth [in the DPA and Information].”
Karen Seymour (Sullivan & Cromwell) represented Dallas Airmotive.
This Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance post notes:
“A spokeswoman for the company said the U.S. Justice Department acknowledged the firm’s cooperation and the improvements it made to its compliance program. She said the company upholds high standards articulated in its code of business ethics, but it regrets that “those standards were breached by a limited number of third-party agents and employees of Dallas Airmotive’s business in South America” from 2008 through 2012. “These individuals are no longer with the company, and Dallas Airmotive do Brasil and our South American sales team are operating under new leadership,” the spokeswoman said in an email.”
Next Up – Stryker
First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011). Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012). Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012). Then it was Pfizer / Wyeth (see here – $60 million in combined fines and penalties in August 2012). Then it was Eli Lilly (see here – $29 million in combined fines and penalties in December 2012).
Next up, in the recent sweep of pharmaceutical / healthcare and medical device companies is Stryker Corporation.
Yesterday, the SEC announced that Stryker agreed to pay $13.2 million to resolve an SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action via an administrative cease and desist order in which the company neither admitted or denied the SEC’s allegations.
The conduct at issue focused on various Stryker subsidiaries. There is no allegation in the SEC’s order concerning Stryker Corp. itself other than the following.
“The financial results of all of the Stryker subsidiaries discussed herein were consolidated into Stryker’s financial statements. Stryker’s foreign subsidiaries were organized in a decentralized, country-based structure, wherein a manager of a particular country’s operations had primary responsibility for all business within a given country. During the relevant period, each of Stryker’s foreign subsidiaries operated pursuant to individual policies and directives implemented by country or regional management. Stryker had corporate policies addressing anti-corruption, but these policies were inadequate and insufficiently implemented on the regional and country level. Accordingly, Stryker failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the company maintained accountability for its assets and that transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authorization.”
In summary fashion, the SEC order states:
“From approximately August 2003 to February 2008 (the “relevant period”), Stryker made approximately $2.2 million in unlawful payments to various government employees including public health care professionals (collectively, the “foreign officials”) in Mexico, Poland, Romania, Argentina, and Greece. Stryker incorrectly described these expenses in the company’s books and records as legitimate consulting and service contracts, travel expenses, charitable donations, or commissions, when in fact the payments were improperly made by Stryker to obtain or retain business. Stryker earned approximately $7.5 million in illicit profits as a result of these payments. During the relevant period, Stryker incorrectly described unlawful payments to foreign officials in its accounting books and records in violation of [the FCPA’s books and records provisions] and failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls in violation [of the FCPA’s internal controls provisions.]”
Under the heading “Unlawful Payments In Mexico,” the order states:
Between March 2004 and January 2007, Stryker’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Mexico (“Stryker Mexico) made three payments totaling more than $76,000 to foreign officials employed by a Mexican governmental agency (the “Mexican Agency”) responsible for providing social security for government employees. Stryker made these payments to win bids to sell its medical products to certain public hospitals in Mexico. Stryker Mexico earned more than $2.1 million in profits as a result of these illicit payments. These payments were made at the direction of Stryker Mexico employees, including country level management, and paid to the foreign officials through third party agents. For example, in January 2006, Stryker Mexico learned that the Mexican Agency was threatening to revoke a contract that Stryker Mexico had won to provide knee and hip products to certain public hospitals unless Stryker Mexico paid an employee of the Mexican Agency. As a result of the demand by the employee of the Mexican Agency, Stryker Mexico directed its outside counsel in Mexico (the “Mexican Law Firm”) to make payment to the employee, on Stryker Mexico’s behalf, in order for Stryker to keep the winning bid. At Stryker Mexico’s direction, the Mexican Law Firm paid the foreign official approximately $46,000 on behalf of Stryker Mexico and, as a result of this payment, the Mexican Agency did not revoke Stryker Mexico’s status as the winning bidder. The Mexican Law Firm then invoiced Stryker Mexico for $46,000 for purported legal services rendered, even though no such services were provided. Stryker Mexico recorded these improper payments as legitimate legal expenses in its books and records. Stryker Mexico earned over $1.1 million in illicit profits on this contract alone. Stryker Mexico made two additional payments through intermediaries during the relevant period in much the same fashion, with the purpose of retaining or obtaining business from public hospitals. The additional payments were in excess of $34,000 and earned Stryker illicit profits of nearly $1 million.”
Under the heading “Improper Payments in Poland,” the order states:
“Between August 2003 and November 2006, Stryker’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Poland (“Stryker Poland”) made 32 improper payments to foreign officials in Poland for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business at public hospitals. In total, Stryker Poland made approximately $460,000 in unlawful payments resulting in more than $2.4 million of illicit profits. These improper payments were recorded in Stryker’s books and records as legitimate expenses, including reimbursement for business travel, consulting and service contract payments, and charitable donations. For example, in May 2004, Stryker Poland paid for a foreign official then employed as the director of a public hospital in Poland, and her husband, to travel to New York City and Aruba. Although the official purpose of the trip was for the foreign official to attend a single-day tour of Stryker’s manufacturing and research facility in Mahwah, New Jersey, Stryker paid for the couple’s six-night stay at a hotel in New York City, attendance at two Broadway shows, and a five-day trip to Aruba before their return flight to Poland. According to Stryker Poland’s records, expenses for the trip, including airfare, accommodations, and entertainment, totaled approximately $7,000, all of which Stryker Poland recorded as legitimate travel expenses. Stryker Poland’s internal documents confirm a quid pro quo arrangement between Stryker Poland and the foreign official. For example, the form containing the schedule for the foreign official’s facility tour states that the purpose of the visit was to “strengthen [the public doctor’s] conviction that Stryker products are the best solution for her hospital,” and notes that “we won a big tender for [one product] (about $350,000) and in this year they are going to buy our products for $500,000.” Stryker Poland also made additional improper travel payments, payments under purported consulting agreements totaling approximately $47,000, and gifts and donations of nearly $400,000, each of which was made to a state-employed healthcare professional for the purpose of Stryker Poland’s obtaining or retaining the business of public hospitals.”
Under the heading “Improper Payments in Romania,” the order states:
“From at least 2003 through July 2007, Stryker’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Romania (“Stryker Romania”) made 192 improper payments to foreign officials totaling approximately $500,000 in order to obtain or retain business with affiliated public hospitals. Stryker Romania recorded these payments as legitimate sponsorships of foreign officials’ attendance, travel and lodging at conferences, and medical events, when in reality they were illicit payments made to obtain or retain business. As a result of these payments, Stryker Romania earned more than $1.7 million in illicit profits. For example, in April 2004, a Stryker Romania salesperson submitted a form to sponsor a foreign official’s lodging abroad to attend a conference. The form stated that a “business benefit[]” from the sponsorship was that, in return, Stryker Romania would receive a contract for the sale of a particular medical device. In addition, Stryker Romania internally discussed that the foreign official in question was “waiting to be confirmed as chief physician” at a public hospital, “thus becoming important” for an upcoming bid for a contract. Stryker Romania recorded the payment as a legitimate business travel expense even though its own internal documents demonstrated that the payment was made with the purpose of obtaining future business.”
Under the heading “Unlawful Payments in Argentina,” the order states:
“Between 2005 and 2008, Stryker’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Argentina (“Stryker Argentina”) made 392 commission payments, or “honoraria,” to physicians employed in the public healthcare system in order to obtain or retain business with affiliated public hospitals. Unlike traditional honorarium payments that are made in exchange for the provision of a service (such as making a speech), these honoraria were commissions that were calculated as a percentage of a total sale to a particular hospital and then paid to the public doctor associated with the sale. Stryker Argentina routinely made these payments by check to doctors at rates between 20% and 25% of the related sale. In total, Stryker Argentina made more than $966,500 in improper honoraria payments during the relevant period, causing Stryker Argentina to earn more than $1.04 million in profits from the public hospitals with which the doctors were associated. Stryker Argentina booked these payments as commission expenses in an account entitled “Honorarios Medicos,” when in fact they were unlawful payments made to compensate doctors for purchasing Stryker products.”
Under the heading “Unlawful Payments in Greece,” the order states:
“In 2007, Stryker’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Greece (“Stryker Greece”) made a sizeable and atypical donation of $197,055 to a public university (the “Greek University”) to fund a laboratory that was then being established by a foreign official who served as a prominent professor at the Greek University, and was the director of medical clinics at two public hospitals affiliated with the Greek University. As a result of this donation, Stryker Greece earned a total of $183,000 in illicit profits. The donation was made pursuant to a quid pro quo arrangement with the foreign official, pursuant to which Stryker Greece understood it would obtain and retain business from the public hospitals with which the foreign official was affiliated, in exchange for making the donation to the foreign official’s pet project. In an email from the country manager of Stryker Greece to the regional manager, the country manager emphasized that she believed the donation to the Greek University was necessary to secure future sales for Stryker Greece. The country manager wrote: “I think that anything below 30K will leave [the foreign official] disappointed. He did promise that he would direct his young assistants into using our trauma and sports medicine products. [The foreign official] is . . . difficult to get as a ‘friend’ and really tough to have as a disappointed customer.” The regional manager asked, “What do we get for the sponsorship – or is it just a gift?” The country manager confirmed the quid pro quo, stating, “For the sponsorship we get the Spine business and a promise for more products in his Department. . .” At a later date, another country manager stated, “I am willing to support what [the foreign official] is asking for in order to secure the sales he is bringing in.” The regional manager then approved the request. Soon thereafter, the country manager said of his meeting with the foreign official: “Things went well (how couldn’t they—I offered him the amount he is asking for . . .). . . . My impression is that we will sta rt business again.” Stryker Greece made the donation to the Greek University in three installments, each of which was improperly booked as a legitimate marketing expense in an account entitled “Donations and Grants.”
Based on the above allegations, the SEC found that Stryker violated the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions.
In the SEC release, Andrew Calamari (Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office) stated:
“Stryker’s misconduct involved hundreds of improper payments over a number of years during which the company’s internal controls were fatally flawed. Companies that allow corruption to occur by failing to implement robust compliance programs will not be allowed to profit from their misconduct.”
As noted in the SEC’s release, the administrative order “requires Stryker to pay disgorgement of $7,502,635, prejudgment interest of $2,280,888, and a penalty of $3.5 million. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Stryker agreed to cease and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions.
The Stryker action is yet another example of the SEC obtaining a disgorgement remedy without finding or charging violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. (See here for a prior post on no-charged bribery disgorgement).
The SEC order also contains a separate section titled “Stryker’s Remedial Efforts” and states:
“In response to the Commission’s investigation, Stryker retained outside counsel to assist Stryker in conducting an internal investigation into Stryker’s compliance with the FCPA in the jurisdictions that were the subject of the staff’s inquiry, as well as in jurisdictions where issues arose through Stryker’s audit and hotline processes. Stryker voluntarily produced reports and other materials to the Commission staff summarizing the findings of its internal investigation. In total, Stryker produced over 800,000 pages of documents at Stryker’s expense, including courtesy translations of numerous key documents. Since the time of the conduct detailed above, Stryker implemented a company wide anti-corruption compliance program, which includes: (a) enhanced corporate policies and standard operating procedures setting forth specific due diligence and documentation requirements for relationships with foreign officials, health care professionals, consultants, and distributors; (b) compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anticorruption, including the hiring of a chief compliance officer and a sizeable full-time dedicated staff in both its internal audit and compliance functions to ensure FCPA compliance and the implementation of periodic self-assessments; (c) enhanced financial controls and governance; (d) expanded anti-corruption training to all Stryker employees; and (e) the maintenance of an Ethics Hotline which serves as a mechanism for employees to report any actual or suspected illegal or unethical behavior. In addition to its internal anti-corruption enhancements, from 2007 through the present, Stryker engaged a third-party consultant to perform FCPA compliance assessments and compile written reports for Stryker’s operations in dozens of foreign jurisdictions across the world at least annually. Stryker voluntarily produced documents that permitted the Commission staff to assess how Stryker’s internal audit and compliance functions used the results of each of the assessments to implement additional enhancements to its infrastructure, to target jurisdictions for future assessments, and to create management action plans in collaboration with local management. Based on the improvements described above, Stryker has demonstrated a commitment to designing and funding a meaningful compliance program in order to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA and other applicable anti-bribery laws.”
In this Wall Street Journal Risk and Compliance post, a Stryker spokesperson stated that the company “was advised that the Justice Department closed its investigation.”
Matthew Kipp (Skadden) represented Stryker.
Stryker’s November 2007 quarterly filing stated:
“In October 2007, the Company disclosed that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission has made an informal inquiry of the Company regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the sale of medical devices in certain foreign countries.”
Thus, the time period from first instance of public disclosure of FCPA scrutiny to actual settlement was 6 years.
Yesterday Stryker’s stock was up approximately .07%.
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A few upcoming events that may be of interest to East Coast readers.
On Wednesday, October 30th, Brooklyn Law School will host a panel discussion of practitioners, in-house counsel, and professors titled “New Developments in FCPA Enforcement” (see here for more information).
On Saturday, Nov. 10th, I will be participating in a panel titled “Anti-Corruption Initiatives in the Arab World” as part of Harvard’s Arab Weekend. (To learn more about the event and the other panelists, see here).
Ralph Lauren Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Via Double NPAs Based On Subsidiary Conduct In Argentina
Yesterday, the DOJ and SEC announced (here) and (here) a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against apparel company Ralph Lauren Corporation (“RLC”). The conduct at issue focused on Argentina custom issues and the actions were resolved via a DOJ NPA (here) and an SEC NPA (here).
Although the DOJ frequently uses NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context, this is only the second instance the SEC has used an alternative resolution vehicle to resolve an FCPA enforcement action. As noted in this previous post, in May 2011 the SEC used a DPA to resolve an FCPA enforcement action against Tenaris. For more on the SEC’s use of alternative resolution vehicles, see prior posts here and here.
RLC agreed to pay $1.6 million to resolve its FCPA scrutiny – $882,000 pursuant to the DOJ NPA and $700,000 pursuant to the SEC NPA ($593,000 in disgorgement and $141,845 in prejudgment interest).
The gist of the enforcement action is as follows.
RLC has approximately 95 foreign subsidiaries. One subsidiary, PRL S.R.L, an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary of RLC headquartered and incorporated in Argentina, had a General Manager who conspired with a customs clearance agency to make improper payments “to assist in improperly obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid inspection.”
There is no allegation or suggestion that RLC was aware of, or participated in, the alleged conduct. The resolution documents merely say that “in the five years that General Manager A, Agent 1, and others at PRL S.R.L carried out this scheme, RLC did not have an anti-corruption program and did not provide any anti-corruption training or oversight with respect to PRL S.R.L.”
The simplistic inference would seem to be that General Manager A would not have engaged in the improper conduct had RLC had an anti-corruption program and provided anti-corruption training. However, this notion would seem to be undermined by reference to RLC’s worldwide FCPA compliance review which “identified no further violations.”
DOJ NPA
The NPA states that the DOJ “will not criminally prosecute RLC … related to violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA … arising from and related to improper payments in Argentina …”.
The NPA next states as follows. “The DOJ enters into this Non-Prosecution Agreement based, in part, on the following factors:
(a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct;
(b) the Company’s extensive, thorough, and real-time cooperation with the Department, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, making voluntary document disclosures, conducting a world-wide risk assessment, and making multiple presentations to the Department on the status and findings of the internal investigation and the risk assessment;
(c) the Company’s early and extensive remedial efforts already undertaken – including conducting extensive FCPA training for employees world-wide, enhancing the Company’s existing FCPA policy, implementing an enhanced gift policy as well as other enhanced compliance, control and anti-corruption policies and procedures, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents, terminating culpable employees and a third-party agent, instituting a whistleblower hotline, and hiring a designated corporate compliance attorney – and to be undertaken, including enhancements to its compliance program as described in [the compliance features of the NPA); and
(d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures, as described in [the compliance features of the NPA).
In the NPA, which has a term of two years, RLC admitted, accepted and acknowledged responsibility for the conduct set forth in the statement of facts contained in the NPA, and further agreed to a “muzzle” clause in connection with the conduct at issue (see here for the prior post describing such a clause).
The conduct at issue focused on PRL S.R.L “an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of RLC headquartered and incorporated in Argentina.” According to the NPA, “PRL S.R.L. marketed and sold RLC merchandise, including merchandise that was shipped from outside Argentina.” According to RLC’s most recent annual report PRL S.R.L. is one RLC’s approximate 95 subsidiaries.
More specifically, the conduct at issue focused on “General Manager A” described as a “dual U.S. and Argentine citizen … hired by RLC to manage the business of PRL S.R.L. from 2003 until 2009” and “Agent 1” described as a “customs clearance agency that was retained by PRL S.R.L. to assist with customs clearance issues in Argentina.”
According to the NPA, from 2004 to 2009 “PRL S.R.L. and its employees, including General Manager A, together with Agent 1 and others, conspired to make unlawful payments to foreign officials to use the officials’ influence with foreign government agencies and instrumentalities in order to assist PRL S.R.L. in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business to PRL S.R.L.”
According to the NPA, the improper payments were “to assist in improperly obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid inspection.” The NPA states that “these payments were not for routine government action.”
According to the NPA, the improper payments were “disguised” by “having Agent 1 include the payments in Agent 1’s invoice as ‘Loading and Delivery Expenses’ and ‘stamp tax/label tax.” The NPA states that “General Manager A and others at PRL S.R.L. knew of the true purpose of these expenses and nonetheless approved reimbursement to Agent 1.”
The NPA next states as follows.
“In the five years that General Manager A, Agent 1, and others at PRL S.R.L carried out this scheme, RLC did not have an anti-corruption program and did not provide any anti-corruption training or oversight with respect to PRL S.R.L.”
The approximate three-page NPA concludes as follows. “In total, General Manager A and PRL S.R.L. paid roughly $580,000 to Agent 1 for the purpose of paying bribes to customs officials in order to obtain improper customs clearance of merchandise.”
Pursuant to the NPA and based on the above statement of facts, RLC agreed to pay a penalty of $882,000. There is no indication in the NPA as to how this figure was calculated or what it is based on.
SEC NPA
The SEC’s NPA is based on the core set of conduct set forth in the DOJ’s NPA.
The short 2.5 page document does however contain the following additional paragraph.
“In addition to paying bribes to Argentina customs officials, RLC Argentina’s general manager directly provided or authorized several gifts to be made to Argentine government officials to improperly secure the importation of RLC’s products into Argentina. The gifts provided to three different government officials between approximately 2005 through approximately 2009 included perfume, dresses and handbags value at between $400 and$14,000 each.”
[As to this “statement of fact,” I noted in”Grading the FCPA Guidance” that one of the utilities of the FCPA Guidance issued in November 2012 would be to serve as a useful measuring stick for future FCPA enforcement activity. As noted in this prior post, this is yet again another FCPA enforcement action based, in part, on such items as perfume, dresses and handbags – in the RLC action – allegedly paid by one employee at one of RLC’s approximate 95 subsidiaries.]
Under the heading “RLC’s Inadequate Internal Controls and Inaccurate Books and Records,” the NPA states as follows.
“As evidenced by the improper payments to Argentine customs officials and gifts to other government officials, the failure to ensure that proper and effective due diligence was conducted on the customs broker and Customs Broker A, and the failure of the review process for authorization or approval of reimbursement payments to Customs Broker A to detect a single improper payment, between 2005 and 2009, RLC failed to devise and maintain a system of internal controls at RLC Argentina sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that (i) transactions were executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions were recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements; (iii) transactions were recorded as necessary to maintain accountability for assets; and (iv) that access to assets was permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization. RLC’s policies, procedures and training related to anticorruption and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) compliance in place at that time of the misconduct warranted further strengthening to ensure effective compliance with the related laws.
Between 2005 and 2009, certain RLC Argentina employees and agents paid bribes which were inaccurately recorded in RLC Argentina’s books, records and accounts, which were consolidated into the books and records of RLC.”
Under the heading “RLC’s Self Report,” the NPA states as follows.
“In or about February 201 0, RLC’ s Board of Directors adopted a new FCPA policy and shortly thereafter the policy was disseminated through RLC’s intranet site. In approximately Spring or Summer 2010 RLC Argentina employees reviewed the FCPA policy and raised concerns about the company’s customs broker in Argentina. As a result, RLC conducted an internal investigation of the allegations and discovered the improper payments to the customs officials and gifts to Argentine government officials. Within two weeks of uncovering the payments and gifts, RLC self-reported its preliminary findings to the both the SEC and the Department of Justice.”
Under the heading “Remedial Measures and Cooperation,” the NPA states as follows.
“Upon discovering the bribes, RLC took steps to end the misconduct, including terminating its customs broker. RLC also thoroughly reviewed its pre-existing compliance program and undertook steps to further update and enhance its compliance program, and successfully implemented those new enhancements. These steps included, in part, adoption of: (1) an amended anticorruption policy and translation of the policy into eight languages, (2) enhanced due diligence procedures for third parties, (3) an enhanced commissions policy, (4) an amended gift policy, and (5) in-person anticorruption training for certain employees. RLC also ceased retail operations in Argentina and is in the process of formally winding down all operations there.
RLC provided extensive, thorough, real-time cooperation with the staff of the Division and the Department of Justice, including: voluntary and complete production of documents and disclosure of information to the staff, including the facts described above; voluntarily providing accurate translations of documents; voluntarily making witnesses available for interviews; and conducting a risk assessment of certain other world-wide operations of the company. The worldwide review included its operations in Italy, Hong Kong and Japan, and identified no further violations. In fact, the revised compliance policies appear to be working, as the world-wide review identified one instance of a bribe solicitation being rejected by the company’s employees after adoption of the company’s revised FCPA policy in 2010.”
Without admitting or denying liability, RLC agreed to enter into the NPA. At the same time, the NPA states as follows. “This agreement should not … be deemed exoneration of RLC or to be construed as a finding by the Commission that no violations of the federal securities laws have occurred.” At the same time, the NPA states that the “facts set forth are made pursuant to settlement negotiations and are not binding against RLC or its directors, officers or employees, or any other person or entity in any other legal proceeding.”
Like the DOJ NPA, the SEC NPA also contains a “muzzle” clause.
The SEC’s release (here) states as follows.
“The SEC has determined not to charge Ralph Lauren Corporation with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) due to the company’s prompt reporting of the violations on its own initiative, the completeness of the information it provided, and its extensive, thorough, and real-time cooperation with the SEC’s investigation. Ralph Lauren Corporation’s cooperation saved the agency substantial time and resources ordinarily consumed in investigations of comparable conduct.”
Of course, these are not distinguishing factors.
Many SEC FCPA enforcement actions are the result of corporate voluntary disclosures where companies are likewise commended on the information and cooperation provided. In the Tenaris DPA action, the SEC (see here) said substantively the same thing. In the recent Philips SEC enforcement action, the SEC (see here) said substantively the same thing.
The SEC release further states as follows.
“According to the NPA, Ralph Lauren Corporation’s cooperation included:
- Reporting preliminary findings of its internal investigation to the staff within two weeks of discovering the illegal payments and gifts.
- Voluntarily and expeditiously producing documents.
- Providing English language translations of documents to the staff.
- Summarizing witness interviews that the company’s investigators conducted overseas.
- Making overseas witnesses available for staff interviews and bringing witnesses to the U.S
“The SEC took into account the significant remedial measures undertaken by Ralph Lauren Corporation, including a comprehensive new compliance program throughout its operations. Among Ralph Lauren Corporation’s remedial measures have been new compliance training, termination of employment and business arrangements with all individuals involved in the wrongdoing, and strengthening its internal controls and its procedures for third party due diligence. Ralph Lauren Corporation also conducted a risk assessment of its major operations worldwide to identify any other compliance problems. Ralph Lauren Corporation has ceased operations in Argentina.”
Thomas Hanusik (Crowell & Moring – and a former DOJ and SEC enforcement official) represented RLC.
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Should conduct at one of RLC’s approximate 95 foreign subsidiaries (which per the government’s own allegations appears to have been isolated in scope) have led to a world-wide risk assessment by RLC? (See here for the prior post on the “Where Else” question).
Should conduct at one of RLC’s approximate 95 foreign subsidiaries (which per the government’s own allegations appears to have been isolated in scope) have lead to RLC having a reporting obligation to the DOJ and SEC during the two-year term of the NPA? (See here for the prior post “A Government Mandated Transfer of Shareholder Wealth to FCPA Inc.?)
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It is tempting, based on the SEC’s statements that “Ralph Lauren Corporation has ceased operations in Argentina” and “is in the process of formally winding down all operations there” to make the causal inference that RLC did this because of the FCPA enforcement action and/or risk associated with the FCPA.
However, that would appear to be wrong conclusion. As noted here and here, when RLC made the decision in August 2012 to suspend and wind-down its Argentine operations, the decision appeared to be based on import controls put on foreign companies and associated foreign currency controls intended to control one of highest rates of inflation in the world. As noted in the above-linked CNN article, the economic measures caused tourism in Argentina to drop. Indeed, RLC was one of several luxury brands – such as Ermenegildo Zegna, Escada, Calvin Klein Underwear, Cartier, Yves Saint Laurent, Hermes, and Louis Vuitton – to have abandoned or are considering leaving Argentina.
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The RLC enforcement action is just the latest to involve customs and related issues in Argentina.
See here for the Ball Corp. enforcement action, here for the Helmerich & Payne enforcement action, here for the BJ Services enforcement action.
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The RLC enforcement action was a rare instance of an issuer not previously disclosing its FCPA scrutiny. Subject to materiality thresholds (which are rarely triggered in cases of FCPA scrutiny), there is no disclosure obligation, yet most issuers choose to disclose FCPA scrutiny. Thus, yesterday appeared to be the first instance of public disclosure of RLC’s scrutiny. The company’s stock closed at $165.93, down 1.9%.