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Latin America in Flux: Recent Anti-Corruption Developments

latinamerica

Today’s post is from Debevoise attorneys Andrew Levine, Matthew French, and Nestor Almeida. (See here for a version of this post with footnotes).

In recent years – and notwithstanding encouraging windows of progress – economic difficulties, political shifts, and the pandemic’s lingering effects have undercut anti-corruption efforts in Latin America. The fourth annual Capacity to Combat Corruption Index (“CCC Index”), published in June 2022, reflects these recent challenges. Most countries in Latin America experienced declines in their assessed anti-corruption capabilities, with only a few demonstrating stability or improvement.

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No U.S. Nexus, No Problem As U.S. Brings $30.5 Million FCPA Enforcement Action Against Chilean Company In Relation To Its Conduct With Chilean Officials

SQM

Last week the DOJ and SEC announced (here and here) a $30.5 million Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Sociedad Quimica y Minera de Chile S.A. (SQM), a chemical and mining company based in Chile, in relation to its conduct with Chilean officials.

The enforcement action is rife with policy issues including the proper scope of FCPA enforcement given that there is no U.S. nexus alleged other than SQM having Series B shares, a form of American Depository Shares, listed on the New York Stock Exchange and thus being required to file periodic reports with the SEC.

The enforcement action included: (i) a DOJ criminal information charging SQM with violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions that was resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement in which the company agreed to pay a $15.5 million criminal penalty; and (ii) an SEC administrative order finding FCPA books and records and internal violations in which the company agreed to pay $15 million civil penalty.

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Closing Out The 70’s

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]

Previous posts (here and here) detailed FCPA enforcement actions from the 1970’s against:  (i) Page Airways, Inc. (and six officers and/or directors of the company); and (ii) Kenny International Corporation and Finbar Kenny (Chairman of the Board, President and majority shareholder of Kenny International).

The 1970’s also witnessed:  (i) a SEC civil complaint against Katy Industries, Inc. and its executives Wallace Carroll and Melvan Jones; and (ii) a DOJ civil complaint against Roy Carver and R. Eugene Holley; and (iii) a SEC civil complaint against International Systems & Controls Corporation and its executives J. Thomas Kenneally, Herman Frietsch, Raymond Hofker, Albert Angulo and Harlan Stein.

These enforcement actions are summarized below.

Katy Industries, Wallace Carroll and Melvan Jacobs

In August 1978, the SEC alleged in a civil complaint for permanent injunction that Katy Industries, Inc. (“Katy”), Wallace Carroll (Chairman of the Board and CEO of Katy) and Melvan Jacobs (Director and Member of Katy’s Executive Committee and also an attorney who acted as counsel to Katy as to the conduct at issue)  “have engaged, are engaged and are about to engage in acts and practices” which constitute violations of various securities law provisions including the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

According to the SEC complaint, Katy was interested in obtaining an oil exploration concession in Indonesia and retained a consultant who was a “close personal friend of a high level Indonesian government official.”  The complaint alleges that Katy representatives and the consultant met with the official and his representative and during the meeting “the official agreed to assist Katy in obtaining an oil production sharing contract.”  Katy agreed to compensate the consultant if it received the contract and the SEC alleged that Katy representatives were “told that the consultant would give a portion of such compensation to the official and the official’s representative.”  According to the SEC, Katy entered into various agreements with the consultant and the official’s representative and thereafter “Katy entered into a thirty year Production Sharing Contract with Pertamina, the Indonesian Government-owned oil and gas enterprise.”  The SEC alleged that “Katy, Carroll and Jacobs knew or had reason to know that the official and the official’s representative would directly or indirectly share in the payments to the consultant for the duration of the thirty year Contract.”  In addition, the SEC alleged that Katy’s books and records did not reflect the true nature and purpose of the payments and that a “substantial portion” of the money paid by Katy to the consultant and the official’s representative “was expected by Katy to be given by the recipient to the official.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Katy, Carroll and Jacobs consented to entry of final judgment of permanent injunction prohibiting future violations.  Katy also agreed to establish a Special Committee of its Board “to review the matters alleged in the complaint and to conduct such further investigation as it deems appropriate into these and other similar matters” and to file the Special Committee’s findings publicly with the SEC.

See here for original source documents.

Roy Carver and R. Eugene Holley

In April 1979, the DOJ alleged in a civil complaint for permanent injunction that Roy Carver (Chairman of the Board and President of Holcar Oil Corporation) and R. Eugene Holley (Vice President of Holcar Oil Corporation) “have engaged, are engaged and are about to engage in acts and practices which constitute violations” of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  The complaint alleges that on a trip to Doha, Qatar, Carver and Holley learned of “the possibility of engaging in the business of petroleum exploration in that country” if a “substantial payment of money were to be made to Ali Jaidah [an official of the government of Qatar – specifically the Director of Petroleum Affairs) for his official approval of a concession agreement.”

According to the complaint, the defendants agreed to proceed with the project by forming Holcar in the Cayman Islands “as a vehicle for the purpose of exploiting the concession.”  The complaint alleges that the defendants further agreed “that an appropriate payment would be paid to Ali Jaidah to secure the necessary approval of the Government of Qatar.”  During a subsequent meeting in Doha, the complaint alleges that Carver and Holley met with Ali Jaidah who requested a $1.5 million payment “into the account of his brother, Kasim Jaidah, at the Swiss Credit Bank of Geneva, Switzerland.”  The complaint alleges that the defendants made the payment “knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of such funds would be transferred to Ali Jaidah.”  According to the complaint, thereafter, “as a result of the cooperation, influence and approval of Ali Jaidah, the government of Qatar entered into an oil drilling concession agreement with Holcar.”  In addition, the complaint alleges that the defendants were willing to make additional payments to a new Director of Petroleum Affairs (Abdullah Sallat) when Holcar’s original concession agreement was under threat of termination given the company’s financing difficulties.  However, the complaint asserts that “neither Director Sallat nor any other official of the government of Qatar has directly or indirectly received or solicited or been offered any payment in connection with renewal of Holcar’s oil concession.”  Based on the above conduct, the DOJ charged that defendants “violated and may continue to violate” the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Both Carver and Holley consented to the entry of a final judgment of permanent injunction enjoining future FCPA violations.  See here for original source documents.

International Systems & Controls Corp., J. Thomas Kenneally, Herman Frietsch, Raymond Hofker, Albert Angulo and Harlan Stein

In July 1979, the SEC filed a complaint against International Systems & Controls Corporation (“ISC”) and J. Thomas Kenneally (a director of ISC and its fomer CEO and Chairman of the Board), Herman Frietsch (Senior Vice President), Raymond Hofker (former General Counsel), Albert Angulo (former Treasurer) and Harlan Stein (Chief Engineer).  The complaint alleged, among other things, that ISC “paid more than $23 million through one or more subsidiaries to certain foreign persons and entities in order to assist the company in securing certain contracts.”  The complaint alleged that “in furtherance of this scheme, ISC disguised such payments on its books and records as consulting fees, consulting services, agent’s fees and commissions.”  The complaint also alleged that “ISC violated the internal accounting controls provisions by failing to devise an adequate system of internal controls because it failed to require vouchers, expense statements, or similar documentation for the activities or services for which certain expenditures were made.”

According to various media reports, the payments at issue were made to government officials and members of ruling families in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nicaragua, Ivory Coast, Algeria, Chile and Iraq in connection with contracts for engineering and construction projects.

The SEC’s complaint charged violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions, as well as antifraud, proxy, and reporting violations.  In December 1979, ISC, Kenneally and Frietsch, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations,  consented to the entry of a final order enjoining future violations.   In addition, the final order directed ISC to, among other things, “appoint a special agent … who shall investigate and report on certain specific transactions.”  Furthermore,  Kenneally and Frietsch (for periods of four and two years respectively) agreed to be employed as an officer or director of an issuer only if that company “has a committee with duties and functions to those required of the ISC Audit Committee” as required by the consent degree.

See here for original source documents plus this packet of materials sent to me by a loyal reader.

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What are the take-away points from FCPA enforcement in the 1970’s?  Clearly, the enforcement agencies were getting their feet wet enforcing an infant statute and, in many of the enforcement actions, the agencies were confronted with conduct that actually pre-dated enactment of the FCPA in December 1977.  Thus, little can – or should be – taken away from the actual charging decisions in these early FCPA cases.

However, one meaningful take-away point is this.  While one can question how the enforcement agencies held company employees accountable (i.e. criminal v. civil charges), one can not question that the enforcement agencies did hold company employees accountable.  All five FCPA enforcement actions from the 1970’s involved company employees – a figure that stands in stark contrast to 2010 FCPA enforcement in which approximately 70% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions have not resulted (at least yet) in any DOJ charges against company employees.  See here for the prior post.

Compliance Certificates

In relation to the U.K. Bribery Act’s so-called adequate procedures defense, how does a company know whether it has adopted adequate procedures so that it can avail itself of the defense should its conduct come under scrutiny?  It is a darn good question.

Last week,  thebriberyact.com (see here) had a post regarding an adequate procedures certificate.  The post profiled a recent speech by Richard Alderman (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) on the issue of a lawyer’s certificate for adequate procedures.  As detailed in the post, Alderman stated as follows.  “We know, for example, that some companies believe that all they need is a certificate from a firm of lawyers that they have adequate procedures. We hear about this. We hear as well that the company is not prepared to pay very much for this and expects a certificate of adequate procedures for its worldwide enterprise under say £25,000. This will not impress us very much. This does not mean that we expect companies to spend millions of pounds on this. What we do expect though is a proportionate approach by companies focussing on the key risks and on what they are doing in order to be able to combat those risks. This is what companies should be doing anyway. Indeed some companies have told us that this is a valuable exercise for them for all sorts of reasons that they should have carried out before.  A company that does this but which finds problems will receive very sympathetic treatment at the SFO. A company that closes its mind to the issues while perhaps having some veneer of paper procedures will receive different treatment.”

One of the FCPA reform proposals under consideration – and a reform proposal I support (see here and here for prior posts) – is creation of a compliance defense. If enacted, the same issue will arise as under the U.K. Bribery Act – how does a company know whether it has adopted sufficient measures so that it can avail itself of the defense should its conduct come under scrutiny?

Is a compliance certificate the answer?

In Chile, the answer is yes.  As detailed in this prior “Compliance Defense Around the World” post, Chile is one of several OECD Anti-Bribery Convention countries to incorporate compliance defense principles into its “FCPA-like” law.

Under Chilean law:  in order for a legal person to be held responsible for a foreign bribery offence, the following “three cumulative requirements” must be satisfied: (1) the offence must be committed by a person acting as a representative, director or manager, a person exercising powers of administration or supervision, or a person under the “direction or supervision” of one of the aforementioned persons; (2) the offence must be committed for the direct and immediate benefit or interest of the legal entity. No offence is committed where the natural person commits the offence exclusively in his/her own interest or in the interest of a third party; and (3) the offence must have been made possible as a consequence of a failure of the legal entity to comply with its duties of management and supervision. An entity will have failed to comply with its duties if it violates the obligation to implement a model for the prevention of offences, or when having implemented the model, it was insufficient.”

As to the final element, the OECD report states as follows. “The final cumulative requirement for responsibility stresses that the offence must have been made possible as a consequence of the failure of the legal person to comply with its duties of administration and supervision. The entity will have failed to comply with its duties if it violated the obligation to implement a model for the prevention of offences, or when having implemented the model, the latter was insufficient. It shall be considered that the functions of direction and supervision have been met if, before the commission of the offense, the legal person had adopted and implemented organization, administration and supervision models, pursuant to the following article, to prevent such offenses as the one committed.”

The minimum features of a prevention system under the law are as follows: identify the different activities or processes of the entity, whether habitual or sporadic, in whose context the risk of commission of the offences emerges or increases; establish protocols, rules and procedures that permit persons involved in above-mentioned activities or processes to program and implement their tasks or functions in a manner that prevents the commission of the indicated offences; identify procedures for the administration and auditing that allow the entity to impede their use in the listed offences; establish internal administrative sanctions, as well as procedures for reporting or pursuing pecuniary responsibility against persons who violate the prevention system; introduce the above-mentioned duties, prohibitions and sanctions into the internal regulations of the legal person, and ensure that they are known by all persons bound to apply it (workers, employees, and service providers).

The OECD report states – as to the minimum requirements as follows. “It also aims to introduce a system of self-regulation by companies. Having a code of conduct on paper will not be sufficient to avoid responsibility. If prosecutors can prove that the code does not meet the minimum requirements of or that it is not implemented, the company can be responsible for the offence.”  Under Chilean law, “the failure to comply with duties of management and supervision is an element of the offence rather than a defence. Therefore the burden of proof lies on prosecutors, i.e. it will be up to prosecutors to prove that the entity failed to comply with its duties of management and supervision.”  The OECD report notes as follows. “This will require prosecutors to prove that the company failed in the design and/or implementation of the offense prevention model including why, in the circumstances, the prevention model was insufficient. This would appear to also require the prosecutor to establish that this failure made perpetration of the offence possible.”

Chilean law sets forth a detailed process by which legal persons are able to undergo a certification process on the existence and relevance of their organizational model.  The OECD report states as follows.  “Certification will confirm that the offence-prevention model complies with the minimum requirements [set forth above], taking into account the characteristics of the legal person. The certification is valid as long as the situation of the company does not change. Certification will be carried out by private institutions which have been authorised by public agencies to undertake this role. Two points should be noted. The first is that certification will not, by itself, avoid responsibility, since it will remain possible to convict a legal person if it can be proved that, notwithstanding the certification, the preventive model did not meet the minimum requirements [set forth above]; and/or that the model was not implemented. The second point to note is that, pursuant to [the Chilean law], private institutions carrying our certification will be carrying out public functions, which means that they will be criminally responsible in the event of a failure to act properly in the execution of those functions. The sole function of public agencies will be to authorise institutions to carry out these functions, and to keep record of certifications.”

What do you think?  Is the Chilean certification process the answer?  What are the pros and cons of such an approach?  If anyone can direct me to Chilean counsel knowledgeable about this certification process or the “private institutions” authorized to issue such certifications, please send me an e-mail so that I can inquire and report back any findings.

If the FCPA were amended to include a compliance defense, would Chile’s certification approach work here in the U.S.?

For starters, it is useful to observe that the DOJ is already handing out compliance certificates in at least two respects – even if  not formally called compliance certificates.

First, the FCPA’s Opinion Release Procedure results in the DOJ issuing – for all practical purposes – a compliance certificate in that the DOJ opines whether a proposed course of conduct, based on the requestor’s disclosed information and various representations, complies with the FCPA.  Pursuant to the governing regulations (see here), “there shall be a rebuttable presumption that a requestor’s conduct, which is specified in a request, and for which the Attorney General has issued an opinion that such conduct is in conformity with the Department’s present enforcement policy, is in compliance with those provisions of the FCPA.”

Second, every NPA or DPA contains a clause stating that the DOJ will not bring an enforcement action if the company complies with the undertakings set forth in the agreement – including an appendix which sets forth various compliance obligations.  (See here for the recent Armor Holdings NPA). As with the FCPA Release Procedure, the term compliance certificate is lacking, but in substance that is likewise the end result.

That the DOJ is already issuing “compliance certificates” makes the DOJ’s firm opposition to an FCPA compliance defense (see here for more)  all the more curious – and all the more contradictory.

The Compliance Defense Around The World

As highlighted in this prior post, numerous FCPA reform bills in the 1980’s included a specific defense which stated a company would not be held vicariously liable for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by its employees or agents, who were not an officer or director, if the company established procedures reasonably designed to prevent and detect FCPA violations by employees and agents. An FCPA reform bill containing such a provision did pass the U.S. House, but was not enacted into law.

Amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense is one of the U.S. Chamber’s FCPA reform proposals (see here). In November 2010, Andrew Weissman, on behalf of the Chamber, testified in favor of a compliance defense (and other reform proposals) during the Senate’s FCPA hearing (see here for the prior post) and during the House hearing earlier this month (see here for the prior post), former Attorney General Michael Mukasey, on behalf of the Chamber, also testified in favor of a compliance defense (and other reform proposals).

During the House hearing, there appeared to be bi-partisan support for consideration of an FCPA compliance defense.

Even so, Greg Andres, testifying on behalf of the DOJ, stated that a potential FCPA compliance defense was “novel and risky” and that the “time is not right to consider it.”

Public debate on a potential compliance defense has thus far focused, from a comparative standpoint, on the United Kingdom and Italy.

The purpose of this post is to further inform the public debate on a potential compliance defense by highlighting various compliance-like defenses around the world in other countries that are signatories (like the U.S.) to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

This post is further to my work in progress – Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense – and represents hours of research analyzing 38 OECD Country Reports.

The post provides an overview of compliance-like defenses in the following OECD Convention signatory countries: Australia, Chile, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Korea, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland. [The U.K. Bribery Act, set to go live on July 1st, also contains a compliance-like defense in Section 7].

A first reaction might be – only 12 of the 38 OECD member countries have a compliance-like defense.

However, this number must be viewed against the backdrop of the following dynamics: (i) in many OECD Convention signatory countries, the concept of legal person criminal liability (as opposed to natural person criminal liability) is non-existent; and (ii) in many OECD Convention signatory countries that do have legal person criminal liability, such legal person liability can only result from the actions of high-level executive personnel or other so-called “controlling minds” of the legal person.

Obviously if a foreign country does not provide for legal person liability, there is no need for a compliance defense, and the rationale for a compliance defense is less compelling if legal exposure can result only from the conduct of high-level executive personnel or other “controlling minds.”

When properly viewed against these dynamics, a compliance-like defense (whether specifically part of a foreign country’s “FCPA-like” law or otherwise generally part of a foreign country’s legal principles) is far from a “novel” idea, but rather common among OECD Anti-Bribery Convention signatory countries that – like the U.S. – have legal person criminal liability that can attach based on the conduct of non-executive officers or other “controlling minds.”

[The below information is based strictly on OECD country reports and is subject to the qualification that in many instances the most recent information concerning a particular country may be several years old. If anyone has more recent information concerning any particular country, how the compliance defense in a particular country has worked in practice, or any other relevant information, please leave a comment on this site or contact me at mjkoehle@butler.edu]

*****

Australia

Australian law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on December 18, 1999.

Thereafter, a section of the Criminal Code on corporate criminal liability came into full force establishing an organizational model for the liability of legal persons. “Bodies corporate” are liable for offences committed by “an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment, or within his or her actual or apparent authority” where the body corporate “expressly, tacitly, or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence”.

Pursuant to the Criminal Code, authorisation or permission by the body corporate may be established in the following ways: (1) the board of directors intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out the conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted it to occur; (2) a high managerial agent intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out the conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted it to occur; (3) a corporate culture existed that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to the offence; or (4) the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant provision.

However, under the Criminal Code, “if a high managerial agent is directly or indirectly involved in the conduct, no offence is committed where the body corporate proves that it “exercised due diligence to prevent the conduct, or the authorisation or permission.”

Chile

Chilean law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on October 8, 2002.

In December 2009, a separate Chilean law entered into force establishing criminal responsibility of legal persons for a limited list of offences including bribery of foreign public officials.

In order for a legal person to be held responsible for a foreign bribery offence, the following “three cumulative requirements” must be satisfied: (1) the offence must be committed by a person acting as a representative, director or manager, a person exercising powers of administration or supervision, or a person under the “direction or supervision” of one of the aforementioned persons; (2) the offence must be committed for the direct and immediate benefit or interest of the legal entity. No offence is committed where the natural person commits the offence exclusively in his/her own interest or in the interest of a third party; and (3) the offence must have been made possible as a consequence of a failure of the legal entity to comply with its duties of management and supervision. An entity will have failed to comply with its duties if it violates the obligation to implement a model for the prevention of offences, or when having implemented the model, it was insufficient.”

As to the final element, the OECD report states as follows. “The final cumulative requirement for responsibility stresses that the offence must have been made possible as a consequence of the failure of the legal person to comply with its duties of administration and supervision. The entity will have failed to comply with its duties if it violated the obligation to implement a model for the prevention of offences, or when having implemented the model, the latter was insufficient. It shall be considered that the functions of direction and supervision have been met if, before the commission of the offense, the legal person had adopted and implemented organization, administration and supervision models, pursuant to the following article, to prevent such offenses as the one committed.”

The minimum features of a prevention system under the law are as follows: identify the different activities or processes of the entity, whether habitual or sporadic, in whose context the risk of commission of the offences emerges or increases; establish protocols, rules and procedures that permit persons involved in above-mentioned activities or processes to program and implement their tasks or functions in a manner that prevents the commission of the indicated offences; identify procedures for the administration and auditing that allow the entity to impede their use in the listed offences; establish internal administrative sanctions, as well as procedures for reporting or pursuing pecuniary responsibility against persons who violate the prevention system; introduce the above-mentioned duties, prohibitions and sanctions into the internal regulations of the legal person, and ensure that they are known by all persons bound to apply it (workers, employees, and service providers).

The OECD report states – as to the minimum requirements as follows. “It also aims to introduce a system of self-regulation by companies. Having a code of conduct on paper will not be sufficient to avoid responsibility. If prosecutors can prove that the code does not meet the minimum requirements of or that it is not implemented, the company can be responsible for the offence.”

Under Chilean law, “the failure to comply with duties of management and supervision is an element of the offence rather than a defence. Therefore the burden of proof lies on prosecutors, i.e. it will be up to prosecutors to prove that the entity failed to comply with its duties of management and supervision.”

The OECD report notes as follows. “This will require prosecutors to prove that the company failed in the design and/or implementation of the offense prevention model including why, in the circumstances, the prevention model was insufficient. This would appear to also require the prosecutor to establish that this failure made perpetration of the offence possible.”

As noted in the OECD report, the Chilean “standard of liability is inspired from the Italian system of liability of legal persons” (discussed below).

Germany

German law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on February 15, 1999.

German law establishes the liability of legal persons, including liability for the foreign bribery offence, under an administrative (i.e. non-criminal form) act.

Pursuant to the administrative act, “the liability of legal persons is triggered where any “responsible person” (which includes a broad range of senior managerial stakeholders and not only an authorised representative or manager), acting for the management of the entity commits i) a criminal offence including bribery; or ii) an administrative offence including a violation of supervisory duties which either violates duties of the legal entity, or by which the legal entity gained or was supposed to gain a “profit”.”

As noted in the OECD report, “in other words, Germany enables corporations to be imputed with offences i) by senior managers, and, somewhat indirectly, ii) with offences by lower level personnel which result from a failure by a senior corporate figure to faithfully discharge his/her duties of supervision.”

The OECD report states that the “standards for a violation of supervisory duties include consideration of factors such as whether the company has in place a monitoring system or in-house regulations for employees.”

Hungary

Hungarian law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on March 1, 1999.

In 2004, a separate law was enacted specifying the individuals whose actions can trigger the liability of the legal person.

The OECD report states as follows. “The specific persons and additional conditions for liability are defined as follows: (i) the bribery is committed by one of the members or officers [of the legal entity] entitled to manage or represent it, or a supervisory board member and/or their representatives acting within the legal scope of activity of the legal person ; (ii) the bribery is committed by one of the members of the legal entity or an employee acting within the legal scope of activity of the legal person provided the bribery could have been prevented by the chief executive fulfilling his supervisory or control obligations; and (iii) the bribery is committed by a third party individual, provided that the legal entity’s member or officer entitled to manage or represent the it had knowledge of the facts.”

According to the OECD report, the relevant law does not provide any guidance as to the necessary degree of supervision to avoid liability for bribery.

Italy

Italian law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on October 26, 2000.

Under Italian law, “criminal liability cannot be attributed to legal persons” however, “administrative liability may be attributed to legal persons for certain criminal offences (including foreign bribery) committed by a natural person.

The relevant administrative decree provides a “defence of organisational models” to a body which makes reasonable efforts to prevent the commission of an offence.

The OECD report states as follows. “… [A] body is not liable for offences committed by persons in senior positions if it proves the following. First, before the offence was committed, the body’s management had adopted and effectively implemented an appropriate organisational and management model to prevent offences of the kind that has occurred. Second, the body had set up an autonomous organ to supervise, enforce and update the model. Third, this autonomous organ had sufficiently supervised the operation of the model. Fourth, the perpetrator committed the offence by fraudulently evading the operation of the model.” The defence of organisation models operates as a full defence which completely exculpates a legal person.

The relevant administrative decree stipulates the essential elements of an acceptable organisational model described in the OECD report as follows. “First, the model must identify activities which may give rise to offences. Second, the model must define procedures through which the body makes and implements decisions relating to the offences to be prevented. It must also prescribe procedures for managing financial resources to prevent offences from being committed. Third, the model must oblige the internal organ responsible for supervision and enforcement to provide information to the body. Finally, the model must include a disciplinary system for non-compliance.”

Japan

Japanese law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on February 15, 1999 .

“Under Japanese law, criminal responsibility of a legal person is based on the principle that the company did not exercise due care in the supervision, selection, etc. of an officer or employee to prevent the culpable act.

The burden rests on the legal person to prove that due care was exercised. Where a legal person raises the defence, a person must be identified as having exercised due care, etc., and the court must determine whether it was exercised properly having regard to the nature of the legal person and the circumstances of the case.”

Korea

Korean law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on February 15, 1999.

Korean law establishes the criminal responsibility of legal persons for the bribery of a foreign public official, however, a legal person is exempt from liability where it has paid “due attention” or exercised “proper supervision” to prevent the offence.

The statute itself does not provide information about what constitutes “due attention” or “proper supervision.” A representative of the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office informed the OECD that “the exemption is triggered when a director or ‘superior person’ exercises due attention.” The Explanatory Manual published by the Ministry of Justice states that “it is difficult to standardize the extent of attention or supervision in deciding whether a legal person can be exempted from criminal punishment.” The Explanatory Manual further states that whether the exemption applies depends upon “general circumstances such as the motive and background that led to the bribery, intervention of exclusive members of the legal person, whether it was informed earlier, and how much effort was usually made by the corporation to prevent bribery, etc.” and that companies involved in international business must prevent violations of the law by all employees and executives of the company “through sufficient necessary management”.

Poland

Polish law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on February 4, 2001.

Polish law provides “a noncriminal form of responsibility for collective entities.” Among the requirements for liability is the offence was committed “in the effect of at least absence of due diligence in electing the natural person [committing the act] or of at least the absence of due supervision over this person by an authority or a representative of the collective entity.”

According to the relevant Polish legislative history, “the perpetration of a prohibited act by a natural person will trigger liability of the
collective entity where the act occurred as a result of negligence on the part of the authority or representative of the collective entity.”

Portugal

Portuguese law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on June 9, 2001.

Under Portuguese law relevant to corruption in international business transactions, legal persons can be liable for conduct committed “on their behalf and in the collective interest by natural persons occupying a leadership position within the legal person structure” or by “whoever acts under the authority” of such natural persons.

However, “[t]he liability of legal persons and equivalent entities is excluded when the actor has acted against the orders or express instructions of the person responsible.”

Sweden

Swedish law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on July 1, 1999.

Under Swedish Law, only natural persons can commit crimes. However, pursuant to the Swedish Penal Code, a “kind of quasi-criminal liability is applied to an ‘entrepreneur’ (a general term meaning “any natural or legal person that professionally runs a business of an economic nature) for a ‘crime committed in the exercise of business activities.’”

However, one requirement under the Penal Code is that “the entrepreneur has not done what could reasonable be required of him for prevention of the crime.”

Switzerland

Swiss law implementing the OECD Convention entered into force on May 1, 2000.

Article 100quater of the Swiss Criminal Code requires “defective organisation as a condition for corporate criminal liability.”

In order to incur criminal liability, “the enterprise must not have taken all reasonable and necessary organisational measures to prevent the individual from committing the offence.”

Under Swiss law, the burden is on the prosecutor to furnish proof of defective organization and according to Swiss authorities contacted by the OECD “steps should be taken to assess whether employees have been sufficiently informed, supervised and controlled” and “the fact that an enterprise is organised in compliance with international management standards will not be sufficient to rule out all liability on its part; it will be one element to take into consideration among others …”. In the view of Swiss authorities, “ shifting the burden of proof in criminal cases would contravene Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”

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