Friday Roundup
Hits and misses, does it really need to cost this much, the Wal-Mart effect, survey says, Senate hearing quotable, while they’re at it, checking in on Hollywood and Goldman too, spot on, and some refreshing words. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Hits and Misses
I read pretty much everything churned out by FCPA Inc., including the flood of recent client alerts concerning the Straub and Steffen decisions. (See here and here for previous posts summarizing the decisions). Many of these alerts are good and informative (for instance, see here from Debevoise & Plimpton). However, some of these alerts are just plain wrong.
The headline of one alert was “District Court Decision Limits the Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA.” The headline of another alert was “Court Sets Limits on Extraterritorial FCPA Reach; Dismisses Case Against Foreign Siemens Executive.”
Neither the Straub nor Steffen decisions concerned extraterritorial application of the FCPA. In fact, there is no extraterritorial reach of the FCPA as to foreign actors. Yes, the FCPA was amended in 1998 to provide for alternative “nationality” jurisdiction (i.e. extraterritorial jurisdiction) over U.S. persons (both legal and natural), however, 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) are strictly limited to U.S. persons.
Rather, the Straub decision concerned the scope of territorial jurisdiction under 78dd-1(a), specifically the meaning of “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce …”.
The Steffen decision did not even reach this issue as the judge found the initial threshold issue of personal jurisdiction lacking.
Wal-Mart’s FCPA Scrutiny Expenses Mount
During the media feeding frenzy after the New York Times April 2012 Wal-Mart article (see here for the prior post), I had the pleasure to appear on Eliot Spitzer’s Viewpoint program on Current TV. At the end of the segment, after the substantive issues were discussed, Spitzer offered that he has several contacts in the FCPA bar and that, regardless of the substantive issues involved in Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny or the ultimate outcome, lots of lawyers were poised to make lots of money.
Spitzer of course was right.
Wal-Mart recently stated (here) that it has incurred “$157 million of professional fees and expenses related to the ongoing” FCPA matter during its last fiscal year and that it expect to incur an additional “$40 to $45 million for the first quarter of fiscal 2014.” During Wal-Mart’s recent earnings conference call, a company executive stated as follows. “On FCPA, we continue to work closely with anticorruption compliance experts to review and to assess our programs and help us implement concrete steps for each particular market. In the various markets, these experts have spent tens of thousands of hours on anti-corruption support and training. We remain committed to follow all laws and regulations in the markets where we operate.”
The $157 million Wal-Mart spent in the last FY equates to approximately $604,000 in professional fees and expenses per working day.
I observed in this March 2011 articles as follows.
“This new era of enforcement has resulted in wasteful overcompliance, companies viewing every foreign business partner with irrational suspicion, and companies deploying teams of lawyers and specialists around the world spending millions to uncover every potential questionable or unethical $100 corporate payment. This new era of enforcement has proven lucrative to many segments of the legal, accounting, and compliance industries and the status quo would, from their perspective, seem desirable.”
The question again ought to be asked – does it really need to cost this much or has FCPA scrutiny turned into a boondoggle for many involved? For more on this issue, see my article “Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a New Era.”
While minor compared to Wal-Mart’s FCPA professional fees and expenses, Beam Inc. recently disclosed here that in 2012 the company spent approximately $4.2 million for “legal, forensic accounting, and other fees related to our internal investigation into Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance in our India operations.”
Wal-Mart Effect
Switching gears, but sticking with Wal-Mart related issues, this May 2012 post highlighted a potential “Wal-Mart effect.” In short, the point was that Wal-Mart is clearly not the only company subject to the FCPA that needs licenses, permits and the like when doing business in Mexico. I predicted that Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure would cause sleepless nights for many company executives doing business in Mexico and the general region. The post then discussed statements made during a Kimco Realty Corporation earnings call in May 2012 concerning its properties in Mexico.
Earlier this week, Kimco Realty stated in an SEC filing as follows.
“On January 28, 2013, the Company received a subpoena from the Enforcement Division of the SEC in connection with an investigation, In the Matter of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (FW-3678), that the SEC Staff is currently conducting with respect to possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company is responding to the subpoena and intends to cooperate fully with the SEC in this matter. The Company has also been notified that the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is conducting a parallel investigation, and the Company expects that it will cooperate with the DOJ investigation. At this point, we are unable to predict the duration, scope or result of the SEC or DOJ investigation.”
Survey Says
The annual Litigation Trends and Survey report by Fulbright & Jaworski is always a good read. This year’s report (see here to download) surveyed 392 “senior corporate counsel” (275 in the U.S., 100 in the U.K. and 17 in other jurisdictions) on a wide-range of litigation and related matters. The following were FCPA or related survey results.
“Companies that have retained outside counsel to assist with a corruption or bribery investigation in the past 12 months (including, but not limited to, FCPA in U.S. and equivalent in U.K.”
- 9% of U.S. respondents answered “yes”; 18% of U.K. respondents answered “yes.” As noted, “U.S. figures [2010-2012] have remained relatively stable.”
“Companies that have engaged in due diligence for bribery or corruption (including FCPA matters) relating to a merger, acquisition or other business transactions with a foreign country in the past 12 months.”
- 18% of U.S. respondents answered “yes”; 26% of U.K. respondents answered “yes.” As noted, “more companies this year have engaged outside counsel in due diligence for corruption or bribery investigations due to business transactions with entities based in a foreign country.”
As to the due diligence figures, in the abstract these figures do not mean much, unless one knows how many responding companies actually engaged in foreign acquisitions or other business combinations.
The last survey result in the report perhaps speaks best to the over-hyped nature of the U.K. Bribery Act.
“Has your company changed the way it operates due to the emergence of anti-bribery legislation outside the U.S., such as U.K. Bribery Act 2010?”
- 78% of U.S. respondents answered “no” and 63% of U.K. respondents answered “no.”
Senate Hearing Quotable
Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) had some quotable moments (here) during a recent Senate Banking hearing. The hearing concerned financial regulation, not the FCPA. Nevertheless, some of the issues have some overlap to FCPA enforcement – including how settlement policies in regulatory enforcement actions create conditions in which there is “not much incentive to follow the law” and how “too big to fail” perhaps means “too big for trial.”
Disclosure Issues
This recent Wall Street Journal CFO Journal post notes as follows.
“Securities and Exchange Commissioner Troy Paredes called for a complete review of the information companies disclose to investors, amid concerns that investors suffer from “disclosure overload” that could hamper their ability to gauge the importance of the data. “What we need is a top-to-bottom review of our disclosure regime,” Mr. Paredes said at the Practising Law Institute’s annual “SEC Speaks” conference in Washington, D.C. on Friday.”
While they’re at it, the SEC should take a look at its absurd position that all payments in violation of the FCPA, no matter how small the payment and no matter how large the company, are “qualitatively material.” For instance, as noted in this previous post concerning comments made by enforcement officials at a conference I chaired, an SEC official suggested that the concept of materiality itself has two “sub-concepts”: (i) quantitative materiality (something that impacts a company’s financial statements) and (ii) qualitative materiality. While conceding that very few improper payments are “quantitatively material” and while recognizing that “qualitative materiality” is a “complicated gray area,” the SEC officials nevertheless said that all bribes can be considered qualitatively material because they may “automatically trigger a books and records violation.” For formal SEC guidance on this issue, see here.
Checking In
Hollywood Industry Sweep
From the New York Times regarding the on-going scrutiny of Hollywood movie studios in China.
“Last March, word reached several studios of a confidential inquiry by the Securities and Exchange Commissionand the Justice Department into possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by people or companies involved in the China film trade. Since then, executives and their advisers have been waiting for some public sign of the scope or focus of the government’s interest. So far, there has been none. But official silence has not kept the investigation from casting a chill over dealings between Hollywood and China.”
Goldman
From the Wall Street Journal regarding the on-going scrutiny of Goldman’s dealings with Libya’s sovereign wealth fund.
“Libya’s sovereign-wealth fund said it is cooperating with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in its ongoing investigation into Goldman Sachs Group Inc. over the securities firm’s dealings with the fund when Col. Moammar Gadhafi was in power. […] People close to the Libyan investment fund said officials have authorized some former fund executives to give testimony to the SEC. The officials also agreed to provide documents and other data to U.S. regulators about the fund’s ties to Goldman, these people said.”
Spot On
Two recent Q&A’s on Law360 caught my eye. The question was “what is an important issue or case relevant to your practice area and why.”
Neil Eggleston (Kirkland & Ellis) stated as follows.
“We are beginning to see the development of case law in the FCPA area, which I believe is good for the process. Most of these cases have been settled. When that occurs, defendants have little incentive to refuse to agree to novel Department of Justice theories of prosecution or jurisdiction, so long as the penalty is acceptable. The department then cites its prior settlement as precedent when settling later ones. But no court approved the earlier settlement, and the prior settlement should have no precedential value in favor of the DOJ in later settlements. As the DOJ increases its prosecution of individuals, we will see many more trials, which will give rise to courts, not the DOJ, interpreting the statute.”
For more on these issues, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” and this previous guest post on “prosecutorial common law.”
Richard Marmaro (Skadden) answered the same question as follows.
“An issue of importance in the white collar area is the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, and appropriate remedies for prosecutors who intentionally conceal evidence, intimidate witnesses, or otherwise compromise or impact a defendant’s right to a fair trial. I have seen firsthand in several of my cases shocking misconduct, which has gone undisciplined by the U.S. Department of Justice. I have been fortunate enough to expose this misconduct, and have had cases dismissed as a result. Indeed, over the last decade, there have been several dismissals nationwide at trial or reversals on appeal based on willful misconduct by government lawyers. Despite these judicial findings, however, the Justice Department’s record of disciplining misbehaving prosecutors is shockingly inadequate. I don’t know of any prosecutor that has been terminated based on a judicial finding of intentional misconduct. In addition, I believe that only two prosecutors have received any discipline at all (both in the Stevens case). In my view, the failure to sanction prosecutors who have been found by judges to have committed misconduct sends the wrong signal to defendants, the public and the vast majority of prosecutors who do their jobs honestly every day.”
For more, see this previous post titled “Should There Be A Difference?”
Refreshing Words
Every now and then it is refreshing to read some common sense words about FCPA compliance and risk assessment. Such as this recent post from the Trace blog.
“Remember, perfection is neither possible nor necessary. When devising a compliance plan, it’s important to remind oneself of the big picture. A company need not break the bank to have a compliance program that follows accepted best practices. As discussed below, there are various ways that good compliance can be affordable. And companies are not responsible for developing full-proof compliance programs; they only need to develop programs proportionate to the risk they face, with the understanding that no program will completely eliminate all risk from the equation. Unlike in other areas of business, when it comes to compliance, being in the middle of the pack is okay.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
Friday Roundup
The latest double standard installment, a Rocky Mountain Rakoff, interesting tidbits, save the date, and just in case you were wondering. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Double Standard
A pharmaceutical company faces pending government restraints that could negatively affect its business. The company turns to its lobbyists that include the former chiefs of staff to various current government officials on a key government committee. Also, in recent years the company indirectly gave thousands of dollars to the current government officials and otherwise made large donations to groups favored by the current government officials. The government officials insert a paragraph into a massive spending bill that, while not specifically mentioning the company, strongly favors one of the company’s drugs. The effect of the paragraph in the bill gives the company two additional years to sell the drug without government price controls.
Having read the recent Eli Lilly FCPA enforcement action (see here for the prior post) and otherwise being an astute FCPA observer, your FCPA antennas are going off.
But wait.
The government officials were not “foreign officials” – they were U.S. government officials!
See here for the recent New York Times story on Amgen’s courting of various members of the Senate Finance Committee.
Scrap those internal investigation plans, forget about voluntary disclosure, and slim chance there will be an enforcement action. Nobody said our system was perfect, but that is just how the system works some will say.
But why should corporate interaction with a “foreign official” be subject to greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than corporate interaction with a U.S. official? After all, there is a U.S. domestic bribery statute (18 USC 201) with elements very similar to the FCPA. Why do we reflexively label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value” from private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind eye when it happens here at home?
As you contemplate these questions, just remember, as soon to be former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently declared (see here), “we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.”
For numerous prior posts concerning the double standard, see here.
A Rocky Mountain Rakoff
We celebrate Mary Jo White’s appointment to be the next Chair of the SEC by focusing on yet another federal court judge calling into question the SEC’s signature neither admit nor deny settlement policy. For more on that policy and how it contributes to a facade of enforcement, see numerous prior posts here, here, here, and here – focusing mostly on Judge Jed Rakoff’s (S.D.N.Y.) disdain of the policy.
In August 2012, the SEC brought a complaint (see here) against Colorado-based Bridge Premium Finance LLC and certain of its executives for allegedly perpetrating a Ponzi scheme. The SEC and defendants agreed to resolve the matter and, as typical and as is frequently the case in SEC FCPA matters, the defendants did so without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.
Enter U.S. Senior District Court Judge John Kane (D. Co.) who pulled a Rocky Mountain Rakoff. In a January 17th order, Judge Kane stated as follows.
“I refuse to approve penalties against a defendant who remains defiantly mute as to the veracity of the allegations against him. A defendant’s options in this regard are binary: he may admit the allegation or he may go to trial. I also object to the language in the consents and the proposed final judgments whereby the defendants waive their rights to the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to FRCP 52 and their rights to appeal. These findings are important to inform the public and the appellate courts. I will not endorse any final judgments including such provisions.”
Returning to Judge Rakoff, you may recall (see here for the prior post) that his disdain for the SEC’s settlement policy is currently before the Second Circuit in SEC v. Citigroup. As Professor Barbara Black notes on her Securities Law Prof blog, oral arguments on the merits is scheduled for February 8th.
Interesting Tidbits
Alexandra Wrage (President of Trace International) writes in a recent Forbes column (here) as follows.
“Whether they’re stating it expressly or acting on it quietly, governments are using corporations as their primary tool to reduce international bribery. They alarm companies with vast fines and terrify individuals with substantial prison sentences with the hope of ending the payment of bribes because they cannot, in most cases, do much of anything about those demanding them. This is not inappropriate. Companies are regulated, subject to laws and answerable to shareholders. The worst offenders demanding bribes, on the other hand, do so with impunity, hiding behind sovereign immunity and, often, their own, complicit local law enforcement. Abacha. Suharto. Marcos. Duvalier. It’s a longstanding tradition, still thriving in many countries today. US and some European law enforcement agencies have been extraordinarily successful, with fines in the United States now counted in the billions of dollars and other jurisdictions promising to catch up soon. While these efforts have done more than anything else to reduce bribery, they have yet to convince us that companies are both the sole source and solution of all international corruption — and that’s insupportable. […] The simple reality is that there are just some things that companies can’t do about corruption.”
Spot-on.
Wrage’s comments remind me a similar spot-on observation made during the middle of the FCPA’s legislative history. See here for the prior post regarding Milton Gwirtzman’s dandy article published by the New York Times Magazine in October 1975 in which he observes as follows – “it would be unwise, as well as unfair, simply to write off bribery abroad to corporate lust – it is a symbol of far deeper issues …”.
As to those deeper issues, an issue I frequently write about is why do FCPA violations occur? Do companies subject to the law have bribery as a business strategy? Or do companies subject to the law encounter difficult and opaque business conditions abroad? To be sure, FCPA enforcement actions have been based on both scenarios, but my opinion (as well as that of the former chief of the DOJ’s FCPA unit – see here for his previous guest post) is that the later scenario is the more common reason for FCPA exposure.
For instance, a recent post on the China Law Blog by Dan Harris (here) begins as follows.
“Got a call the other day from an American company wanting to sell its food products into China. And fast. The problem this company is facing is that one cannot “just” sell food into China immediately. To sell food legally into China, Foreign companies must first pass certification before China’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, better known as AQSIQ. The food company told me that its research had revealed that it typically takes around a year to secure this certification, but that someone in China was promising they could do it in “around six to eight weeks.”
Also on the list of FCPA exposure risks, I would add various trade distortions and barriers, such as central government procurement policies. For this reason, I found this recent Sidley & Austin alert interesting. It concern a new China “regulation that subjects certain high-value medical devices to a centralized procurement regime.”
Save the Date
D.C. area readers may be interested in a February 12th event hosted by American University Washington College of Law and presented by the American University International Law Review. Titled “Bribes Without Borders: The Challenges of Fighting Corruption in the Global Context,” the symposium will feature panels of academics, practitioners, and civil society representatives and will touch upon a variety of bribery and corruption topics including the FCPA. I will be participating on an afternoon panel and will be speaking on FCPA enforcement and the rule of law. Robert Leventhal (Director, Anti-Corruption and Governance Initiatives, U.S. State Department) will deliver a keynote luncheon address. The symposium is free, but registration is requested.
Just in Case
Just in case you were wondering about the U.K. SFO’s position on facilitation payments (see here for a prior post), the Bribery Library site shines light on a December 6, 2012 “to whom it may concern” letter (here) from SFO Director David Green in which he states that “facilitation payments are illegal under the Bribery Act 2010 regardless of their size or frequency.”
You can now head into the weekend confident in your knowledge of the U.K.’s position.
*****
A good weekend to all.
Friday Roundup
An on-point editorial, the former DOJ Fraud Chief on voluntary disclosures, and for the reading stack.
On-Point Editorial
“Government enforcers always need to be watched, especially when their business targets are politically unpopular. Then the feds think they can get away with anything.” So begins a recent Wall Street Journal editorial (here) on the Supreme Court’s recent oral arguments in Gabelli v. SEC – a case in which the five year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2462 is squarely before the court (see here for SCOTUS Blog coverage). Gabelli is a case to watch given that the limitations period in most SEC FCPA enforcement actions would seemed to be stretched.
Former DOJ Fraud Chief on Voluntary Disclosures
Recently the online news site Main Justice interviewed former DOJ Fraud Section chief Steven Tyrrell (see here for the video). Much of the interview was about voluntary disclosures. Tyrrell stated that he is “certain” there have been so-called declinations that are “simply not public” where companies did not voluntary disclose, but had extensive remediation and cooperation. In the interview Tyrrell also agreed that the declination examples in the recent FCPA Guidance – all of which had voluntary disclosure as an apparent factor – was likely an enforcement agency attempt to encourage more voluntary disclosures. Tyrrell stated that voluntary disclosure “should not be the be all and end all” in any case.
Once again, selective government information as to FCPA enforcement designed to achieve policy objectives of the enforcement agencies.
For The Reading Stack
Some recommended reading on FCPA jurisdictional issues, Chinese SOEs, and an additional year in review.
Jurisdictional Issues
The current edition of the ABA International Law News has a great article by Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys Sean Hecker and Margot Laporte titled “Should FCPA ‘Territorial’ Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial Proportions?”
As to FCPA enforcement actions against foreign entities and individuals for conduct that occurred overseas with only minimal U.S. contacts, the authors ask “whether the United States is the appropriate authority to prosecute such cases, where the evidence, witnesses, and conduct are located overseas and where alternative jurisdictions often have an even greater interest in enforcement.”
As to Judge Leon’s rejection of the DOJ’s expansive jurisdictional theory in the Africa Sting prosecution of Pankesh Patel (see here for the prior post), the authors state as follows. “This decision, which suggests a requirement of physical presence in the United States in connection with an allegedly corrupt act, call into question much of the DOJ and SEC’s expansive construction of territorial jurisdiction over foreign entities and individuals under the FCPA. Until additional courts speak to the issue, however, the DOJ and SEC are unlikely to back off their more expansive views of jurisdiction.”
As alluded to in the article, additional courts are poised to speak on jurisdictional issues as to foreign actors. (See here for general discussion of motions to dismiss pending in SEC enforcement actions against former Maygar Telekom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai and former Siemens executive Herbert Steffen).
Chinese SOEs
Interested in Chinese SOEs? How can you not be if your interested in FCPA issues. If so, see here for a recent Wall Street Journal article titled “China’s Investments Prompt Call for New Rules.” The article details investments by Chinese companies, including SOEs, in the U.S. over the past several years and states as follows – “according to a U.S. congressional commission, state-owned companies accounted for 90% of the value of Chinese investments in the U.S. industrial-machinery, aerospace, automobile and logistics industries between 2007 and the third quarter of 2011.” The article also notes as follows. “Even figuring out which Chinese operations qualify as state-controlled can be tough.”
Year in Review
Miller & Chevalier recently published (here) its FCPA Winter Review 2013. The review highlights developments from Q4 of 2012, reviews 2012 enforcement trends, and looks forward to 2013. [Note, Miller & Chevalier keeps its FCPA statistics differently from the “core” approach described here].
*****
A good weekend to all.
Next Up – Eli Lilly
First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011). Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012). Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012). Then it was Pfizer / Wyeth (see here – $60 million in combined fines and penalties in August 2012).
Next up is Eli Lilly in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action announced last week by the SEC. This post goes long and deep as to the SEC’s allegations which resulted in a $29 million settlement.
In summary, the SEC alleges in a civil complaint (here) as follows.
“Eli Lilly and Company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the activities of its subsidiaries in China, Brazil, Poland, and Russia. Between 2006 and 2009, employees of Lilly’s China subsidiary falsified expense reports in order to provide improper gifts and cash payments to government-employed physicians. In 2007, a pharmaceutical distributor hired by Lilly in Brazil paid bribes to government health officials in a Brazilian state in order to assure sales of a Lilly product to state government institutions. In Poland, between 2000 and 2003, Lilly’s subsidiary made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to a small charitable foundation that was founded and administered by the head of one of the regional government health authorities at the same time that the subsidiary was seeking the official’s support for placing Lilly drugs on the government reimbursement list. Finally, Lilly’s subsidiary in Russia paid millions of dollars to off-shore entities for alleged “services” beginning as early as 1994 and continuing through 2005 in order for pharmaceutical distributors and government entities to purchase Lilly’s drugs. In some instances, the off-shore entities appear to have been used to funnel money to government officials or others with influence in the government in order to obtain business for the subsidiary. These off-shore entities rarely provided the contracted-for services. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008, contemporaneous with requests to government officials to support the government’s purchase or reimbursement of Lilly’s products, the subsidiary in Russia made proposals to government officials about how the company could donate to, or otherwise support, various initiatives that were affiliated with, or important to, the government officials. As a result of this conduct, Lilly violated [the FCPA’s internal controls provisions] by failing to have an adequate internal controls system in place to detect and prevent illicit payments. Lilly violated [the FCPA’s books and records provisions] by improperly recording each of those payments in its accounting books and records. Lilly also violated the [FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions] in connection with certain activities of its subsidiary in Russia.”
As indicated by the above paragraph, conduct in Poland, China, and Brazil gave rise to FCPA books and records and internal controls violations only.
Poland
The SEC’s allegations relating to Poland are substantively identical to allegations made against Schering-Plough in this 2004 FCPA enforcement action.
In pertinent part, the SEC alleges in its complaint against Eli Lilly as follows.
“During 2000 through 2003, Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Poland (“Lilly- Poland”) made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to the Chudow Castle Foundation (“Chudow Foundation”), a small charitable foundation in Poland that was founded and administered by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund (“Director”). The Director established the Chudow Foundation in 1995 to restore the Chudow Castle in the town of Chudow and other historic sites in the Silesian region of Poland.
The Silesian Health Fund (“Health Fund”) was one of sixteen regional government health authorities in Poland during the period. Among other things, the Health Fund reimbursed hospitals and healthcare providers for the purchase of certain approved products. The Health Fund, through the allocation of public money, exercised considerable influence over which pharmaceutical products local hospitals and other healthcare providers in the region purchased.
Beginning in early 2000 and into 2002, Lilly-Poland was in negotiations with the Health Fund over, among other things, the Heath Fund’s financing of the purchase of Gemzar, one of Lilly’s cancer drugs, by public hospitals and other healthcare providers. Those negotiations occurred primarily between a team manager at Lilly-Poland (“Lilly Manager”) and the Director. Continuing at intervals throughout these negotiations, the Director asked that Lilly Poland contribute to the Chudow Foundation. The initial request came directly from the Director and the subsequent requests came from the Chudow Foundation.
The Lilly-Poland Manager knew that the Director had established the Chudow Foundation and that it was a project to which he was devoted and lent much effort. The Manager requested the approval of payments to the Chudow Foundation. The Manager falsely described the first payment as being for the purchase of computers for the Chudow Foundation. The second Lilly-Poland payment request falsely characterized the proposed payment as “[t]o support foundation in its goal to develop activities in [Chudow Castle].” That request documentation also noted that the “value of the request” was “[i]ndirect support of educational efforts of foundation settled by Silesia [Health Fund].” Similarly, the remaining payments were mischaracterized as monies paid by Lilly-Poland to secure the use of the Chudow Castle for conferences after its renovation. No such conferences took place.
Lilly-Poland eventually made a total of eight payments to the Chudow Foundation, starting in June 2000 and ending in January 2003. […] The Manager requested the approval of the payments to the Chudow Foundation with the intent of inducing the Health-Fund Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and other health care providers in the Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing Gemzar.
China
As to China, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.
“Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary through which it does business in China (“Lilly- China”) employs more than one-thousand sales representatives whose main focus is on marketing Lilly products to government-employed health-care providers. During the relevant period, the sales representatives worked from regional offices and traveled throughout the country, interacting with the health-care providers in order to convince them to prescribe Lilly products. The sales representatives were directly supervised by District Sales Managers who, in tum, were supervised by Regional Managers. Sales representatives paid out-of-pocket for their travel expenses and submitted receipts and other documentation to the company for reimbursement.
Between 2006 and 2009, various sales representatives and their supervisors abused the system by submitting, or instructing subordinates to submit, false expense reports. In some instances, Lilly-China personnel used reimbursements from those false reports to purchase gifts and entertainment for government-employed physicians in order to encourage the physicians to look favorably upon Lilly and prescribe Lilly products.
In one sales area, in 2006 and 2007, a District Sales Manager for Lilly’s diabetes products instructed subordinates to submit false expenses reports and provide the reimbursement money to her. She then used the reimbursements to purchase gifts, such as wine, specialty foods and a jade bracelet, for government-employed physicians. At least five sales representatives in the oncology sales group submitted false expense reports and then used those reimbursements to provide meals, visits to bath houses, and card games to government-employed physicians.
Similarly, in three other provinces, three sales representatives submitted false expense reports and then used the reimbursements to provide government-employed physicians with visits to bath houses and karaoke bars. In another city, five sales representatives submitted false reimbursements and then their Regional Manager used the money to provide door prizes and publication fees to government-employed physicians. In another city, seven sales representatives and the District Sales Manager for the diabetes sales team used reimbursements to buy meals and cosmetics for government-employed physicians.
Between 2008 and 2009, members of Lilly-China’s “Access Group,” which was responsible for expanding access to Lilly products in China by, among other things, convincing government officials to list Lilly products on government reimbursement lists, engaged in similar misconduct. At least six members of the sixteen-member Access Group, including two associate access directors, falsified expense reports and used the proceeds to provide gifts and entertainment to government officials in China. The gifts included: spa treatments, meals, and cigarettes.
Although the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were wide-spread throughout the subsidiary. Lilly has terminated, or otherwise disciplined, the various employees who submitted false expense reports and/or used the proceeds to provide gifts and services to government officials.”
Brazil
As to Brazil, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.
“Between 2007 and 2009, Lilly-Brazil distributed drugs in Brazil through third party distributors who then resold those products to both private and government entities. As a general rule, Lilly-Brazil sold the drugs to the distributors at a discount; the distributors then resold the drugs to the end users at a higher price and took the discount as their compensation. Lilly-Brazil negotiated the amount of the discount with the distributor based on the distributor’s anticipated sale. The discount to the distributors generally ranged between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount.
In early 2007, at the request of one of Lilly-Brazil’s sales and marketing managers at the time, Lilly-Brazil granted a nationwide pharmaceutical distributor, unusually large discounts of 17% and 19% for two of the distributor’s purchases of a Lilly drug, which the distributor then sold to the government of one of the Brazilian states. Lilly-Brazil’s pricing committee approved the discounts without further inquiry. The policies and procedures in place to flag unusual distributor discounts were deficient. They relied on the representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transactions. In May 2007, Lilly sold 3,200 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state; in August 2007, Lilly-Brazil sold 13,500 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state. Together the sales were valued at approximately $1.2 million.
The distributor used approximately 6% of the purchase price (approximately $70,000) to bribe government officials from the Brazilian state so that the state would purchase the Lilly product. The Lilly-Brazil sales and marketing manager who requested the discount knew about this arrangement.”
Russia
As to Russia, in pertinent part, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.
“From 1994 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lilly, sold pharmaceutical products either directly to government entities in the former Soviet Union or through various distributors, often selected by the government, who would then resell the products to the government entities. Along with the underlying purchase contract with the government entity or distributor, Lilly-Vostok sometimes entered into another agreement with a third-party selected by a government official or by the government-chosen pharmaceutical distributor. Generally, these third-parties, which had addresses and bank accounts located outside of Russia, were paid a flat fee or a percentage of the sale. These agreements were referred to as “marketing” or “service” agreements. In total, Lilly-Vostok entered into over 96 such agreements with over 42 third-party entities between 1994 and 2004.
Lilly-Vostok had little information about these third-party entities, beyond their addresses and bank accounts. Rarely did Lilly-Vostok know who owned them or whether the entities were actual businesses that could provide legitimate services. Senior management employees in Lilly-Vostok’s Moscow branch assisted in the negotiation of these agreements. The contracts themselves were derived from a Lilly-Vostok-created template and enumerated various broadly-defined services, such as ensuring “immediate customs clearance” or “immediate delivery” of the products; or assisting Lilly-Vostok in “obtaining payment for the sales transaction,” “the promotion of the products,” and “marketing research.”
Contrary to what was recorded in the company’s books and records, there is little evidence that any services were actually provided under any of these third-party agreements. Indeed, in many instances, the “services” identified in the contract were already being provided by the distributor, a third-party handler (such as an international shipping handler) or Lilly itself. To the extent services such as expedited customs clearance or other services requiring interaction with government officials were provided, Lilly-Vostok did not know or inquire how the third party intended to perform their services.
Contemporaneous documents reflect that Lilly-Vostok employees viewed the payments as necessary to obtain the business from the distributor or government entity, and not as payment for legitimate services.
The SEC also alleges that in 1997 and in 1999 Lilly conducted a business review of Lilly-Vostok. According to the SEC, the reports raised concerns about Lilly-Vostok’s business practices and the reports “recommended that Lilly-Vostok modify its internal controls to ensure that [certain third-party] services were documented” and to “assure itself that [certain third-party] agreements accurately and fairly reflect the services to be provided.”
However, the SEC alleged as follows.
“Lilly did not curtail the use of marketing agreements by its subsidiary or make any meaningful efforts to ensure that the marketing agreements were not being used as a method to funnel money to government officials, despite recognition that the marketing agreements were being used to “create sales potential” or “to ‘support’ activities leading to agreement-signing” with government entities. In fact, during the 2000-2004 period — after the above-described reports, but prior to the company ending use of the agreements– Lilly-Vostok entered into the three most expensive of these arrangements.”
The three arrangements are as follows.
First, the SEC alleged that in response to a 2002 Russian Ministry of Health tender, the ministry selected a “large Russian pharmaceutical distributor” for which to purchase the products and the distributor in turn negotiated with Lilly-Vostok for the purchase of diabetes products. According to the SEC, the distributor required Lilly-Vostok, “as a condition of their agreement” to enter into various agreements with an entity incorporated in Cyprus.
According to the SEC.
“Lilly’s due diligence regarding the entity in Cyprus was limited to ordering a Dun and Bradstreet report and conducting a search using an internet service to scan publicly available information. Neither the Dun and Bradstreet report nor the internet search revealed the Cyprus entity’s beneficial owner or anything about its business. Nonetheless, pursuant to the terms of its arrangement with the distributor, Lilly-Vostok paid the entity in Cyprus over $3.8 million in early 2003.
The Cyprus entity was, in fact, owned by the Russian businessman who was the owner of the distributor. There is no evidence of services provided to Lilly-Vostok by the Cyprus entity in consideration for Lilly-Vostok’s $3.8 million in payments. Lilly’s books and records improperly reflected these payments as payments for services.”
Second, the SEC alleges “at least two instances” involving foreign government officials and alleges as follows.
“Between 2000 and 2005, Lilly-Vostok sold significant amounts of pharmaceutical products to a major Russian pharmaceutical distributor for resale to the Russian Ministry of Health. The pharmaceutical distributor was owned and controlled by an individual who, at the beginning of the distributor’s relationship with Lilly-Vostok, was a close adviser to a member of Russia’s Parliament. In 2003, this official became a member of the upper house of Russia’s Parliament. Throughout the period, this official exercised considerable influence over government decisions relating to the pharmaceutical industry in Russia.
As part of most of the sales arrangements with the distributor, the official demanded that Lilly-Vostok enter into separate “marketing” agreements with entities with addresses and bank accounts in Cyprus. Under the arrangement, Lilly-Vostok paid the Cypriot entities up to thirty percent of the sales price of the underlying sales contracts in return for the Cypriot entities entering into an agreement “to offer all assistance necessary” in various areas like storage, importation and payment.
In conjunction with outside counsel, Lilly-Vostok conducted limited due diligence on these third-parties. However, the due diligence did not identify the beneficial owners of these third-parties or determine whether the third-parties were able to provide the contracted-for assistance. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok concluded that it could proceed with the transactions and paid the Cypriot entities over $5.2 million. In fact, the Cypriot entities were owned by an individual associated with the distributor controlled by the member of the upper house of Russia Parliament. The Cypriot entity transferred the payments from Lilly-Vostok to other off-shore entities.”
Third, the SEC alleges “in connection another series of contracts, from 2000 through 2004, Lilly-Vostok sold products to a distributor, headquartered in Moscow, which was wholly-owned by a Russian government entity.
The SEC alleged as follows.
“The purchase agreements were signed on the government-owned distributor’s behalf by its General Director. As part of the arrangement, the government-owned distributor selected a third-party entity with an address in the British Virgin Islands (“the BVI entity”) with which Lilly-Vostok entered into agreements for the broadly defined “services” enumerated in the Lilly-Vostok template (see above). Under the terms of the agreements between Lilly-Vostok and the BVI entity, Lilly-Vostok was to pay the BVI entity up to 15% of the price of the product purchased by the government-owned distributor. Accordingly, from 2000 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok made approximately 65 payments to the BVI entity totaling approximately $2 million.
There is no evidence that the BVI entity performed any of the services listed in its agreement with Lilly-Vostok. There is also no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry as to whether the BVI entity was able or did perform the contracted-for services. Lastly, there is no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry into the identity of the beneficial owner of the BVI entity. In fact, the beneficial owner of the BVI entity was the General Director of the government-owned distributor, and he ultimately received the payments from the BVI entity.”
As to these various arrangements, the SEC alleges as follows. “Lilly did not direct Lilly-Vostok to cease entering into these third-party agreements until 2004. However, Lilly permitted the subsidiary to continue making payments under already existing third-party contracts as late as 2005.”
As to the above Russian conduct, the complaint charges violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. Of note, the complaints specifically pleads as follows regarding knowledge. “When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances, unless the person actually believes that the circumstance does not exist.”
The SEC complaint also contains the following allegation.
“From 2005 through 2008, Lilly-Vostok made various proposals to government officials in Russia regarding how Lilly-Vostok could donate to or otherwise support various initiatives that were affiliated with public or private institutions headed by the government officials or otherwise important to the government officials. Examples included their personal participation or the participation of people from their institutions in clinical trials and international and regional conferences and the support of charities and educational events associated with the institutes. At times, these proposals to government officials were made in a communication that also included a request for assistance in getting a product reimbursed or purchased by the government. Generally, Lilly-Vostok personnel believed these proposals were proper because of their relevance to public health issues and many of the proposals were reviewed by counsel. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok did not have in place internal controls through which such proposals were vetted to ascertain whether Lilly-Vostok was offering something of value to a government official for a purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business.”
As to Lilly’s books and records, the SEC alleges as follows.
“[S]ubsidiaries of Eli Lilly made numerous payments that were incorrectly described in the company’s books and records. In China, payments were falsely described as reimbursement of expenses when, in fact, the money was used to provide gifts to government-employed physicians. In Brazil, money that was described in company records as a “discount” for a pharmaceutical distributor was, in actuality, a bribe for government officials. In Poland, payments classified as charitable donations were not intended for a genuine charitable purpose but rather to induce a government official to assent to the purchase of a Lilly product. Finally, in Russia, millions of dollars in payments, described in the company’s books and records as for various services, were actually payments to assure that Lilly was able to conduct business with certain pharmaceutical distributors.”
As to Lilly’s internal controls, the SEC alleges as follows.
“During the relevant period, Lilly and its subsidiaries failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the company maintained accountability for its assets and transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authorization. Particularly, Lilly did not adequately verify that intermediaries with which the company was doing government-related business would not provide a benefit to a government official on Lilly’s behalf in order to obtain or retain business. Lilly and its subsidiaries primarily relied on assurances and information provided in the paperwork by these intermediaries or by Lilly personnel rather than engaging in adequate verification and analyzing the surrounding circumstances of the transaction. Lilly and its subsidiaries’ employees considered and offered benefits to government officials at the same time they were asking those government officials to assist with the reimbursement or purchase of Lilly’s products with inadequate safeguards to assure that its employees were not offering items of values to a government official with a purpose to assist Lilly in retaining or obtaining business.
Moreover, despite an understanding that certain emerging markets were most vulnerable to FCPA violations, Lilly’s audit department, based out of Indianapolis, had no procedures specifically designed to assess the FCPA or bribery risks of sales and purchases. Accordingly, transactions with off-shore entities or with government-affiliated entities did not receive specialized or closer review for possible FCPA violations. In assessing these transactions, the auditors relied upon the standard accounting controls which primarily assured the soundness of the paperwork. There was little done to assess whether, despite the existence of facially acceptable paperwork, the surrounding circumstances or terms of a transaction suggested the possibility of an FCPA violation or bribery.
As to Lilly’s remedial efforts, the SEC complaint states as follows.
“Since the time of the conduct noted in this Complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anticorruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”
As noted in this SEC release, Lilly, without admitting or denying the allegations, agreed to pay disgorgement of $13,955,196, prejudgment interest of $6,743,538, and a penalty of $8.7 million for a total payment of $29,398,734. The release also notes that “Lilly also agreed to comply with certain undertakings including the retention of an independent consultant to review and make recommendations about its foreign corruption policies and procedures.”
In Lilly’s release (below) the retention period of the consultant is identified as 60 days and in the SEC’s proposed final judgement, the consultant is identified as FTI Consulting which has been assisting Lilly in connection with a previous Corporate Integrity Agreement.
The case has been assigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia).
William Baker III (Latham & Watkins) represented Lilly.
In the SEC’s release, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit) stated as follows. “Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries possessed a ‘check the box’ mentality when it came to third-party due diligence. Companies can’t simply rely on paper-thin assurances by employees, distributors, or customers. They need to look at the surrounding circumstances of any payment to adequately assess whether it could wind up in a government official’s pocket.” In the same release, Antonia Chion (Associate Director in the SEC Enforcement Division) stated as follows. “When a parent company learns tell-tale signs of a bribery scheme involving a subsidiary, it must take immediate action to assure that the FCPA is not being violated. We strongly caution company officials from averting their eyes from what they do not wish to see.”
This Lilly release quotes Anne Nobles (Lilly’s Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and Senior VP of Enterprise Risk Management) as follows. “Lilly requires our employees to act with integrity with all external parties and in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations. Since ours is a business based on trust, we strive to conduct ourselves in an ethical way that is beyond reproach. We have cooperated with the U.S. government throughout this investigation and have strengthened our internal controls and compliance program globally, including significant investment in our global anti-corruption program.” The Lilly release further states as follows. “The SEC noted that since the time of the conduct alleged in its complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anti-corruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.” The release further notes that “Lilly was first notified of the investigation in August 2003” and describes the independent compliance consultant as conducting a “60-day review of the company’s internal controls and compliance program related to the FCPA.”
Friday Roundup
Better late than never, Judge Leon pulls a Judge Rakoff, Edmonds sentenced, it’s official, whistleblower statistics, it ought to stop marketing, China related issues, ICE melted quickly, and a U.K. enforcement action. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope
Academic publishing is seldom quick. Yet before the calendar flips into another year, I am pleased to share my article concerning 2011 FCPA enforcement. The abstract of “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under The Microscope” (see here to download) recently published in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law is as follows. Information in the article is current as of January 16, 2012.
For most of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s history, key decisions concerning its scope and enforcement were made behind closed doors around conference room tables in Washington, D.C. The FCPA took on a life of its own and, in many instances, the statute came to mean whatever the DOJ or SEC could get putative corporate FCPA defendants (mindful of the consequences of actual prosecuted charges) to agree to behind those closed doors. However, as the enforcement agencies continued to push the envelope on enforcement theories and practices, and as the DOJ brought more individual FCPA enforcement actions, including through manufactured sting operations, business entities and individuals alike began to openly fight back. While many FCPA enforcement decisions and procedures remain opaque, 2011 witnessed the most intense year of public scrutiny in the FCPA’s history. This Article (i) provides an overview of 2011 FCPA enforcement and discusses certain problematic enforcement trends, and (ii) highlights how in 2011 the FCPA was subjected to the most meaningful public scrutiny in its history. FCPA enforcement trends and scrutiny demonstrate that as the FCPA nears its thirty-fifth year, basic legal and policy questions remain as to the purpose, scope, and effectiveness of the FCPA.
Start your collection of FCPA Year in Reviews. For my 2011 (short version), see here. For 2010, see here (short version), here (long version). For 2009, see here (long version).
Judge Leon Pulls a Judge Rakoff
My post concerning the SEC’s March 2011 enforcement action against IBM was titled “Questions Abound in IBM Enforcement Action.” (See here). Among the issues I discussed were the following. That in December 2000, IBM resolved an FCPA enforcement action and consented, as part of the settlement, to the entry of an Order that requires IBM to cease and desist from committing or causing any future violation of [the FCPA’s books and records provisions]. I noted that because the March 2011 enforcement action alleged FCPA books and records charges, that IBM was thus in clear violation of the 2000 court order.
The case was assigned to Judge Richard Leon (of Africa Sting fame) and lingered for a long time. This Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post and this Bloomberg article report that Judge Leon has refused to approve the settlement.
As stated by Bloomberg – “The heart of the dispute is that Leon, who has had the case under review for 22 months, wants reporting on a broader range of possible wrongdoing than the company is willing to turn over. Leon, who spoke loudly and angrily, asked why the regulator would agree to limit such requirements for a company with a history of books-and-records violations. […] “I guess you want that $10 million judgment on your list of achievements this year,” Leon told [the SEC lawyer]. “Well, it’s not going to happen.” He scheduled a hearing for Feb. 4.”
As stated by Wall Street Journal Corruption Current – “Leon also questioned broader SEC settlement policies and warned that he was among “a growing number of district judges who are increasingly concerned” by those policies.”
In not “rubber stamping” the SEC – IBM settlement, Judge Leon pulled a Judge Rakoff. Judge Rakoff of the S.D. of N.Y. has been a frequent focus on this site – see here, here, here and here. See also, the discussion of Judge Rakoff in my 2010 article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”
Edmonds Sentence
This past June, David Edmonds, a defendant in the long-running “Carson” enforcement action involving former employees of Control Components Inc., agreed to plead guilty on the eve of trial to substantially reduced charges. (See here for the prior post). Earlier this week, Judge James Selna sentenced Edmonds to four months in prison and four months of home confinement. (See here for Judge Selna’s sentencing memo). As noted in the DOJ’s sentencing memo (here), the DOJ sought a 14 month prison sentence.
Other defendants previously sentenced in the case are Stuart Carson (4 months in prison followed by 8 months of home detention), Hong Carson (3 years probation to include 6 months of home detention) and Paul Cosgrove (13 months home detention).
It’s Official
Imagine a foreign country in which the president is actively seeking and accepting corporate money to fund inaugural festivities. All sorts of red flags right?
But wait, this describes the United States and President Obama’s upcoming inauguration. As detailed in this prior post, President Obama’s fundraising advisers “have urged the White House to accept corporate donations for his January 2013 inaugural celebration rather than rely exclusively on weary donors who underwrote his $1 billion re-election effort.”
It’s now official. As noted by this recent New York Times article “President Obama’s finance team is offering corporations and other institutions that contribute $1 million exclusive access to an array of inaugural festivities.” As noted in the article, Obama’s finance team is offering four different packages “with differing levels of access depending on the level of contribution.”
Our FCPA enforcement agencies are bringing enforcement actions against companies for conduct that includes providing $600 bottles of wine, Cartier watches, cameras, kitchen appliances, business suits, and executive education classes to individuals employed by foreign companies that are allegedly state-owned or state-controlled. (These are all allegations found in recent FCPA enforcement actions).
But remember, as Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently declared (see here), “we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption.”
Whistleblower Statistics
The Dodd-Frank Act enacted in July 2010 contained whistleblower provisions applicable to all securities law violations including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In this prior post from July 2010, I predicted that the new whistleblower provisions would have a negligible impact on FCPA enforcement. As noted in this prior post, my prediction was an outlier (so it seemed) compared to the flurry of law firm client alerts that predicted that the whistleblower provisions would have a significant impact on FCPA enforcement.
So far, there have not been any whistleblower awards in connection with FCPA enforcement actions. Given that enforcement actions (from point of first disclosure to resolution) typically take between 2-4 years, it still may be too early to effectively analyze the impact of the whistleblower provisions on FCPA enforcement.
Whatever your view, I previously noted that the best part of the new whistleblower provisions were that its impact on FCPA enforcement can be monitored and analyzed because the SEC is required to submit annual reports to Congress. Last month, the SEC released (here) its annual report for FY2012.
Of the 3,001 whisteblower tips received by the SEC in FY2012, 3.8% (115) related to the FCPA. As noted in this similar post from last year, in FY2011 (a partial reporting year) 3.9% of the 334 tips received by the SEC related to the FCPA.
It Ought to Stop Marketing
In this previous post titled “It Ought to Stop” I focused on the FCPA conference industry and how conference firms drive attendance to their events by touting the public servants who will speak at the event.
Here is how conference firm C5 touts its upcoming conference in a press release (here).
Ask the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC directly how your company can remain compliant
Hear the latest on the newly released FCPA guidance. Along with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission’s, Charles E. Cain, the Deputy Chief of the FCPA Unit, Enforcement Division, we will have Matthew S. Queler, from the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice, presenting comprehensive, insightful and practical details of the U.S. government’s interpretation of the guidance, and highlight recent examples designed to help prevent future violations. Their session at 14:00 on Day 1, will help you navigate the ever evolving markets and recognize the current enforcement trends; giving you the tools to reanalyse risk profiles and minimize areas of exposure. Finally, to top off the hour you will be given an exclusive opportunity to have your FCPA questions answered. The only way to obtain answers directly from the U.S. DOJ and U.S. SEC is to register for this forum!
The event, depending when you register and which package you select, costs between €4341 – €1795.
It ought to stop.
China Related Issues
An occassional topic of discussion on this site is Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and how such companies are frequently doing business outside its borders, including here in the U.S. (See here, here, and here for prior posts).
Wall Street Journal Columnist Dennis Berman “hit the nail on the head” in his recent column when he noted that one of “the most intriguing business stories of the past month has been taking place in San Francisco, where a group of U.S. developers is planning the biggest real-estate expansion there since the 1906 earthquake. The group—which includes Lennar Corp., Ross Perot Jr. and others —isn’t getting financing from an American bank or pension fund. No, the money, some $1.7 billion of it, is coming from the China Development Bank, a policy arm of the Chinese state. As Berman further notes, a financing contingency is that China Railway Construction Corp. – a state-owned infrastructure builder with roots in the People’s Liberation Army—take part in the projects, which will develop up to 20,000 new homes.
Another occasional topic of discussion on this site is how Chinese companies are listing shares on U.S. exchanges and thus becoming “issuers” for purposes of the FCPA. (See here for a prior post). A core FCPA enforcement action of a Chinese issues has never occurred, but I predict it will some day – diplomatic and foreign policy issues aside. Only now, the universe of potential targets is shrinking. As noted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, several Chinese companies have delisted from U.S. exchanges. The article provides the following information. “At the peak, at year-end 2010, 167 Chinese companies were listed on Nasdaq and 99 on the NYSE. That compares with 84 China-based companies on NYSE and 129 on Nasdaq as of Nov. 30, 2012, according to the exchanges.” For more, see this recent article from the New York Times.
ICE Melted Quickly
This recent post highlighted the cert petition of Instituto Constarricense de Electricidad of Costa Rica (“ICE”) to the Supreme Court related to victim issues in connection with the December 2010 Alcatel-Lucent FCPA enforcement action. After several unsuccessful 11th Circuit appeals, ICE petitioned the Supreme Court to hears it case (see here). The question presented for review is as follows. “Whether a crime victim who is denied rights conferred by the federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act has a right to directly appeal the denial of those rights.”
The ice melted quickly as recently the Supreme Court denied ICE’s petition.
U.K. Enforcement Action
Earlier this week, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced (here) charges against former employees of Swift Group (an oil and gas services provider) following “a two-year investigation into allegations of corruption in relation to the tax affairs of Swift Technical Energy Solutions Ltd, a Nigerian subsidiary of the Swift Group of companies.” According to the SFO release, “the value of the bribes alleged to have been paid is approximately£180,000.”
The SFO release notes that Paul Jacobs (the former Chief Financial Officer of Swift), Bharat Sodha (the former Tax Manager of Swift), Nidhi Vyas (the former Financial Controller of Swift), and Trevor Bruce (the former Area Director for Nigeria of Swift) were charged in relation to “bribes to tax officials to avoid, reduce or delay paying tax on behalf of workers placed by Swift. The charges relate to payments said to have been made to agents of the Rivers State Board of Internal Revenue and the Lagos State Board of Internal Revenue, both in Nigeria. The payments were made in 2008 and 2009.”
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A happy holiday season to all.