A Focus On Chinese Guanxi
The sentencing memos in the Garth Peterson enforcement action provide an interesting back-and-forth between Peterson and the DOJ concerning the issue of cultural context, specifically the concept of Chinese guanxi.
Peterson’s sentencing memo (here) contains a specific section titled “Cultural Context” and stated as follows (redactions in the original).
“Peterson committed an FCPA offense without stepping foot in the United States while working for a Chinese subsidiary of a United States company. Peterson’s tenuous connection with the United States, despite being a U.S. citizen, makes this case very unusual and makes Chinese cultural considerations relevant. Peterson admitted at his plea hearing that he helped the Chinese Official to invest personally in a Morgan Stanley investment at a beneficial price and that by misleading Morgan Stanley about this fact with another person, he conspired to violate the FCPA. The Chinese Official was a close friend of Peterson’s – in many ways a father figure to him – and Peterson helped him in order to repay the help that the Chinese Official had given him through his career. This type of favor is called ‘guanxi’ in China, a term that describes the exchange of gifts or favors in a professional setting. Guanxi is the traditional way that business relationships are developed in China. [Citations Omitted]. Peterson has spent much of his life living in Asia. He learned Asian cultural traditions, and they are as familiar, if not more familiar to him, than United States cultural traditions. His childhood friend […] wrote about Peterson’s ‘inexperience with the United States’ and his lack of familiarity with U.S. ‘culture, expectations, and walks of U.S. life.’ […] wrote that Peterson ‘seemed to fit in better on the other side of the Pacific’ and ‘thinks more like an Asian than an American.’ As part of Peterson’s Asian cultural understanding, he learned the Chinese business culture of gift giving, or guanxi.” […] We ask the Court to consider … the cultural context of Peterson’s crime when sentencing him.”
The DOJ responded (here) as follows.
“Peterson’s assertion that he gave Chinese Official 1 a $3 million-plus interest in Tower Two [the investment at issue in the enforcement action] as an expression of ‘guanxi’ is also demonstrably false. Peterson says that ‘guanxi’ is ‘a term that describes the exchange of gifts or favors in a professional setting.’ The source upon which Peterson relies, […] describes the parameters of guanxi, which typically involves small tokens: the ‘exchange of gifts, favors, and banquets.’ Here, Peterson stole a $7 million piece of a building and gave a Chinese public official a piece worth more than $3 million. The grant of an ill-gotten, multimillion dollar interest in an apartment building is hardly the type of item one typically exchanges in Chinese culture. Any suggestion to the contrary borders on the offensive. […] Even if Peterson’s […] ‘guanxi’ arguments were based upon a true factual recitation – which they are not – they are legally irrelevant. […] Corrupting a Chinese official in the course of stealing an interest in a building cannot be dismissed as a symptom of Peterson’s affinity for China or its culture. If anything, his actions demonstrate quite the opposite.”
In reply (here), Peterson stated as follows.
“The Government argues that Peterson’s inclusion of the Chinese Official was not an expression of ‘guanxi’ because the value of the Chinese Official’s interest was too great to fit within the technical definition of ‘guanxi.’ Whether the term ‘guanxi’ applies misses the point. Peterson seeks to provide the Court with the full context for his actions, including the cultural and relationship-based motivations for his offense. Peterson acknowledges that the Chinese culture and Peterson’s own desire to build his relationship with the Chinese Official do not justify his offense. Cultural context and motivates, however, can be relevant t a defendant’s character for sentencing purposes, and Peterson asks the Court to consider those factors here.”
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The DOJ argues that cultural context is legally irrelevant in FCPA enforcement actions. However, cultural considerations may be one reason for the frequency in which judges sentence below DOJ sentencing recommendations in FCPA cases. For instance, as noted in this prior post, in sentencing Ousama Naaman, Judge Ellen Huvelle’s (D.D.C.) stated that she has “traveled a lot in this world, and it is very complicated to say that our morality is necessarily that of other peoples.” She considered the context of Naaman’s conduct (which occurred in Iraq) and refused to make Naaman “the poster” child that the DOJ wanted.
*****
See here for a recent article in Newsweek regarding guanxi and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act scrutiny of Las Vegas Sands.
Next Up – Pfizer
First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011). Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012). Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012). The latest Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement based on the enforcement theory that various foreign health care providers are “foreign officials” is Pfizer / Wyeth (an entity acquired by Pfizer in 2009).
Total fines and penalties in the Pfizer / Wyeth enforcement action are approximately $60 million ($15 million via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement, and $45 million via separate settled SEC civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth). This post goes long and deep as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents (approximately 100 pages in total).
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. (an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).
Criminal Information
The criminal information begins with a description of Pfizer HCP and notes that during the relevant time period it “operated in several international markets through representative officers, including offices in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Kazakhstan, as well as through contracts with Russian distributors and employees of a representative officer of Pfizer HCP’s parent company in Moscow (‘Pfizer Russia’).” According to the information, “books and records of Pfizer HCP … were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer for purposes of preparing Pfizer’s year-end financial statements” filed with the SEC.
The information alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.
“The manufacture, registration, distribution, sale, and prescription of pharmaceuticals were highly-regulated activities throughout the world. While there were multinational regulatory schemes, it was typical that each country established its own regulatory structure at a local, regional, and/or national level. These regulatory structures generally required the registration of pharmaceuticals and regulated labeling and advertising. Additionally, in certain countries, the government established lists of pharmaceuticals. that were approved for government reimbursement or otherwise determined those pharmaceuticals that might be purchased by government institutions. Moreover, countries often regulated the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals, pharmacies, and healthcare professionals. In those countries with national healthcare system, hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were generally agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments, and, thus, many of the healthcare professionals employed by these agencies and instrumentalities were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA. During the relevant period, for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance, employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia made and authorized the making of payments of cash and the provision of other things of value both directly and through third parties. Funds for these payments were often generated by employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia through the use of collusive vendors to create fraudulent invoices.”
The information charges two counts: (i) conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and (ii) substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations. The conduct at issue took place between 1997 and 2006 and focuses on payments to alleged “foreign officials” as listed below “in exchange for improper business advantages for Pfizer HCP, including the approval of pharmaceutical products and increased sales of pharmaceutical products.”
Croatian Official (a citizen of the Republic of Croatia who held official positions on government committees in Croatia and had influence over decisions concerning the registration and reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 1 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a medical doctor employed by a public hospital who had influence over the Russian government’s purchase and prescription of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 2 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a high-ranking government official who held official positions on government committees in Russia and had influence over decisions concerning the reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 3 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who had influence over decisions concerning the treatment algorithms involving Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
In addition to the above alleged “foreign officials” the information describes “other foreign officials in various countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia.”
Under the heading “Manners and Means of the Conspiracy” the information alleges as follows.
“Pfizer HCP through its employees and agents agreed to make improper payments and provide benefits (including kickbacks, cash payments, gifts, entertainment and support for domestic and international travel) to numerous government officials, including physicians, pharmacologists and senior government officials, who were employed by foreign governments or instrumentalities of foreign governments, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. During the relevant time period, Pfizer HCP, through its employees and agents, corruptly authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of at least $2,000,000 to intermediary companies, government officials, and others, to corruptly induce the prescription and purchase of Pfizer products and to obtain regulatory approvals for Pfizer products. Pfizer HCP through its employees falsely recorded the improper transactions by booking them in a variety of ways, including as educational or charitable support, “Travel and Entertainment,” “Convention and Trade Meetings and Conferences,” “Distribution Freight,” “Clinical Grants/Clinical Trials,” “Gifts,” and “Professional Services —Non Consultant,” in order to conceal the improper nature of the transactions in the books and records of Pfizer HCP.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Bulgaria” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about January 24, 2003, a District Manager in Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Bulgaria (“Pfizer HCP Bulgaria”) sent an email to his subordinates that discussed marketing programs and “various possibilities to stimulate the prescribers” and instructed them to give individual doctors employed in Bulgarian public hospitals “a specific target as to how many packs (or new patients) per month he should achieve” and then provide support for international travel on the basis of the promises to prescribe made by the doctors. On or about October 14, 2003, a Pfizer HCP Bulgaria sales department manager sent an electronic message to multiple sales representatives containing instructions for submitting sponsorship requests. The manager wrote, “[e]ach representative wanting to sponsor someone …must very precisely state the grounds for recommending the sponsorship, and also what the doctor in question is expected to do or has already done (which is the better option).”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Croatia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about July 9, 2003, employees of Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Croatia (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”) caused a wire transfer of $1,200 to be made from a bank account in Belgium to an account in Austria controlled by Croatian Official, which wire transfer was part of more than $85,000 paid to Croatian Official between 1997 and 2003, and which was for a purpose described by the country manager as follows: “as [Croatian Official] is a member of the Registration Committee regarding pharmaceuticals, I do expect that all products which are to be registered, will pass the regular procedure by his assistance. On or about February 18, 2004, a Pfizer HCP Croatia sales representative drafted a memorandum reporting on her discussions with doctors at Croatian public hospitals regarding bonus agreements for purchases of a Pfizer product, which reflected an agreement with the chief doctor who promised purchases of the product in exchange for Pfizer HCP providing various things of value, including travel benefits and bonuses based on a percentage of sales.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Kazakhstan” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about May 5, 2000, Pfizer HCP entered into an exclusive distribution contract for a Pfizer product with Kazakh Company [a Kazakh company that contracted with Pfizer HCP to provide distribution services and related services in the Republic of Kazakhstan] that was valued at a minimum of $500,000 believing that all or part of the value of the contract would be provided to a high-level Kazakh government official. On or about September 23, 2003, a regional supervisor responsible for Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Kazakhstan sent a memorandum to his supervisor memorializing a conversation held in Kazakhstan, in which he indicated that the controller of Kazakh Company was “very close to government officials,” and that Kazakh Company was likely responsible for Pfizer HCP’s past problems with the registration of a Pfizer product in Kazakhstan.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Russia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about September 8, -2003, a Pfizer Russia. employee emailed colleagues that a Russian government doctor, Russian Official 1, requested funds to attend a conference and, in return, “has pledged to prescribe at least 20 packs of [a Pfizer product] per month, and 20 [] packs [of another Pfizer product]. On or about November 19, 2003 in an invoice cover letter, a Pfizer Russia employee requested “payment for the (motivational) trip of [Russian Official 2] for the inclusion of [a Pfizer product] into the list … of medications refundable by the state” in order to influence Russian Official 2 to add the product to the regional formulary list. On or about April 7, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested that a payment be made to a Russian government official “who took an active part in getting [a Pfizer product] into the bidding.” On or about July 26, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to his supervisors stating that Russia Company 1 [a Russian company that bid on tenders issued by Russian healthcare institutions and worked with Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia to fill tenders using Pfizer products] had won a tender for the use of a Pfizer product, and that Russian Company 1’s costs included “10% – Motivation of Officials.” On or about December 2, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested sponsorship for a local department of health employee who was assisting the chief pharmacologist of a regional pediatric hospital, Russian Official 3, who was compiling algarithms for antibiotic therapy and wanted “to be financially compensated” for this work. The Pfizer Russia employee noted that, “in return for this,” the pharmacologist “will include our product’s in the treatment algorithms” to be used in government hospitals. On or about June 9, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to her supervisor stating that a cash payment had been made to an individual government doctor, which represented 5% of the value of the purchases of a Pfizer product made by a certain government hospital during the month of March 2005. On or about June 27, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that a government doctor “should be assigned the task of stretching the amount of the purchases … to US $100 thousand” as an “obligation” in exchange for a trip to a conference in the Netherlands or Germany. On or about September 14, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that an”agreement on cooperation” had been reached with a government doctor, and that Pfizer Russia’s requirements were the “purchase quantities,” and the government doctor’s requirement was “a trip to a conference.” In or around October 2005 through on or about December 8, 2005, Pfizer Russia caused payments totaling at least $69,000 to be made to Russian Company 2 [a Russian company that provided certain services to Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia, including making improper payments to Russian government officials and other companies on Pfizer HCP’s behalf, in order to conceal the payments] with the understanding that the payments would be provided to individual Russian doctors employed in public hospitals, and that the payments represented 5% of the value of the purchases of Pfizer products in the doctors’ respective government hospitals. In or around October 2005, Pfizer Russia employees discussed how a regional distributor would provide Pfizer Russia with companies that have “neutral names,” to which Pfizer Russia could make improper payments that would be booked as conferences to provide benefits to government doctors.”
DPA
The DOJ’s charges against Pfizer HCP were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement. Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer HCP admitted, accepted and acknowledged “that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, employees and agents” as set forth in the information. As is customary in DOJ FCPA corporate enforcement actions, Pfizer HCP agreed not to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility for the conduct set forth in the resolution documents.
The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors: “(a) the extraordinary cooperation of Pfizer HCP’s parent company, Pfizer Inc., (“Pfizer”}, with the Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including thorough and responsive reporting of potential violations, including the conduct of other companies and individuals; (b) Pfizer’s initial voluntary disclosure of potential improper payments and the timely and complete disclosure of the facts [described in the DPA] as well as facts relating to potential improper payments in various countries that had been identified by its compliance program, internal audit function and global internal investigations concealing bribery and related misconduct; (c) the early and extensive remedial efforts undertaken by Pfizer, including the substantial and continuing improvements Pfizer has made to its global anticorruption compliance procedures; (d) Pfizer’s agreement to maintain an anti-corruption compliance program for all of its subsidiaries worldwide, including Pfizer HCP, to continue in its efforts to implement enhanced compliance measures [as required by the DPA] and to provide to the Department written reports on its progress and experience in maintaining and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures [as described in the DPA].”
Pursuant to the DPA, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for the conduct at issue was $22.8 – $45.6 million. The DPA specifically states that a downward departure “is warranted for substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.” The DPA then states as follows. “The Government and Pfizer HCP agree that $15 million is the appropriate monetary penalty, which is a 34% reduction off the bottom of the recommended Guidelines fine range. Pfizer HCP and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given the nature and extent of Pfizer’s voluntary, prompt and thorough disclosure of the misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of Pfizer’s extensive cooperation in this matter, Pfizer’s cooperation … in the Department’s investigation into other misconduct in the industry, and Pfizer’s extraordinary and ongoing remediation.”
Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer’s HCP’s parent company, Pfizer, agreed that it will report to the DOJ during the term of the DPA regarding remediation and implementation of certain compliance measures required under the agreement.
The DPA contains a section titled “Origin of the Investigation and Cooperation with the authorities” and states as follows.
“In May 2004, Pfizer’s Corporate Compliance Division learned of potentially improper payments by the Croatian representative office of Pfizer HCP (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”). After conducting a preliminary investigation using external counsel, Pfizer made a voluntary disclosure to the Department and to the Commission. At the time, neither agency was aware of the allegations of improper payments or had any open investigation involving the overseas operations of Pfizer or any of its subsidiaries. From 2004 to the present, Pfizer, using external counsel and forensic accountants, internal Legal, Compliance, and Corporate Audit personnel, conducted an extensive, global review of its operations regarding allegations of improper payments to government officials and government doctors, including in Pfizer HCP markets and those of other Pfizer subsidiaries. This included a review of allegations that were identified by Pfizer’s own internal investigations and compliance controls, including its system of proactive FCPA reviews and enhanced audits. Pfizer reported to the Department and the Commission on the results of these investigations on a regular basis. At the request of the Department and the Commission, Pfizer agreed to periodically toll the statute of limitations on its own behalf and on behalf of its subsidiaries. In addition, starting immediately in 2004, Pfizer launched extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive review of its compliance program, implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis, developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures, adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits, performing proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately ten markets annually, and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization. Pfizer regularly reported to the Department and the Commission on these activities and sought their input concerning the scope and focus of these remedial activities.”
In a release (here) DOJ representatives stated as follows. “Pfizer took short cuts to boost its business in several Eurasian countries, bribing government officials in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia to the tune of millions of dollars.” “Corrupt pay-offs to foreign officials in order to secure lucrative contracts creates an inherently uneven marketplace and puts honest companies at a disadvantage. Those that attempt to make these illegal backroom deals to influence contract procurement can expect to be investigated by the FBI and appropriately held responsible for their actions.”
SEC
The SEC enforcement action includes separate settled civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth.
Pfizer Complaint
The settled civil complaint (here) against Pfizer alleges, in summary, as follows.
“This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [FCPA by Pfizer] relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Pfizer’s subsidiaries in order to assist Pfizer in obtaining or retaining business. At various times from at least 2001 through 2007, employees and agents of subsidiaries of Pfizer, conducting business in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. These improper payments were variously made to influence regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and to clear customs. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples included falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, clinical trials, freight, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, but the inaccurate books and records of Pfizer’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer, and Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls.”
The SEC’s allegations concerning conduct in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia are substantively similar to the DOJ’s allegations described above.
As to Russia, the SEC complaint contains the following additional allegations concerning customs related payments. “During the relevant period, Russian Federation customs officials would not clear pharmaceutical products for importation unless the importer provided an official certification indicating that the products conformed to the specific terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed by the manufacturer with the Ministry of Health. The Russian government licensed a private certification company (the “Certification Center”) to perform this governmental function, which performed inspections and furnished the necessary certificates. In the spring of 2005, Pfizer Russia began to experience increasing difficulty in obtaining the necessary certificates because the Pfizer products did not conform to the precise terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed with the Ministry of Health. On or about September or October 2005, a Certification Center employee proposed that the Certification Center would overlook the non-compliance of Pfizer Russia’s products in exchange for monthly payments of approximately $3,000. With the approval of the then-Pfizer Russia Country Manager, between October and December 2005 Pfizer Russia made payments of over $13,000 through an intermediary company, which then forwarded the payments to a company Pfizer Russia employees believed to be controlled by the Certification Center’s employees. The customs clearing problems ceased after Pfizer Russia started making payments, but they resumed when Pfizer Russia stopped the payments in 2006 after Pfizer began a Corporate Compliance review in Russia.”
As to conduct in China, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Investment Co. Ltd. (Pfizer China). “From at least 2003 through 2007, Pfizer China, through its employees and agents, provided cash payments, hospitality, gifts, and support for international travel to doctors employed by Chinese government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products, provide hospital formulary listing, and otherwise use their influence to grant Pfizer China an unfair advantage.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the cash payments, gifts, and travel support made to Chinese government doctors by failing to accurately record the transactions.”
As to conduct in the Czech Republic, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer spol. s.r.o. (Pfizer Czech). “From at least 2003 and through 2004, Pfizer Czech, through its employees and agents, provided support for international travel and recreational opportunities to doctors employed by the Czech government with the intent to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Czech employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions, and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Conventions and Trade Meeting,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Italy, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Italia S.r.l (Pfizer Italy). “From at least 2001 and continuing through early 2004, Pfizer Italy provided, directly or through vendors, cash payments, gifts, support for domestic and international travel, and other benefits to doctors employed by Italian government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Italy employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Marketing Expenses,” “Professional Training,” and “Advertising in Scientific Journals,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Serbia, the SEC alleges as follows as to a representative office of Pfizer HCP (Pfizer HCP Serbia). “Pfizer HCP Serbia, through one of its sales representatives, paid for a government employed doctor to attend a conference in Chile in exchange for the doctor’s agreement to increase his department’s purchases of Pfizer products. Although Pfizer HCP Serbia management discovered the improper agreement and terminated the responsible sales representative, it still provided the support after the doctor threatened to spread negative information about Pfizer’s reputation as a company.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls” the SEC alleged as follows. “[F]our Pfizer subsidiaries engaged in transactions in eight countries which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance. Through the four subsidiaries, Pfizer earned aggregate profits of $16,032,676 as a result of these improper transactions. [D]uring the relevant period the Pfizer subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. The false entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. [D]uring the relevant period Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.”
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Pfizer with violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint further notes as follows. “Pfizer made an initial voluntary disclosure of certain of these issues to the Commission and Department of Justice in October 2004, and thereafter diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of its operations in no less than 19 countries, which identified additional potential violations, and regularly reported on the results of these investigations and fully cooperated with the staff of the Commission. Pfizer also undertook a comprehensive compliance review of its operations, enhanced its internal controls and compliance functions, engaged in significant disciplinary measures, and developed and implemented global FCPA compliance procedures, including the development and implementation of innovative proactive procedures, and sophisticated supporting systems.”
In addition, the SEC complaint contains a separate section titled “remedial efforts” that states as follows.
“Pfizer has taken extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive worldwide review of its compliance program; implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis; developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures; adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits; performing innovative and proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately 10 markets annually; and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”
Wyeth Complaint
The SEC also brought a settled civil complaint (here) against Wyeth LLC. According to the complaint, Wyeth was an issuer but in connection with its acquisition by Pfizer in October 2009, Wyeth delisted and became a wholly-owned subsidary of Pfizer.
The complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows. “This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [by Wyeth], while an issuer, relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Wyeth’s subsidiaries in order to assist Wyeth in obtaining or retaining business. During the time relevant to this Complaint, Wyeth was a pharmaceutical company engaged in business throughout the world, and an issuer as that term is used under the FCPA. At various times from at least 2005 through 2010, subsidiaries of Defendant Wyeth conducting business in several countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples include falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Wyeth, but the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Wyeth, and Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls. Certain of these payments were made following the acquisition of Wyeth by Pfizer Inc. (“Pfizer”) without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, and the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries regarding those payments were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer.”
As to Indonesia, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 until 2010, Wyeth Indonesia [an Indonesian company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments and nutritional products to employees of Indonesian government-owned hospitals, including doctors employed by the Indonesian government. The cash payments and products were intended to influence the doctors’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia employees also took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Miscellaneous Expenses – Joint Promotions,” “Medical Education – Promo,” “Trade Allowances,” and “Miscellaneous Selling Expenses,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to Pakistan, the complaint alleges as follows. “Starting at least in 2005 and continuing into 2009, Wyeth Pakistan [a Pakistani company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth] employees provided improper benefits to doctors who were employed by healthcare institutions owned or controlled by the Pakistani government. These improper benefits included cash payments, travel, office equipment and renovations, and were intended to influence the doctors to recommend Wyeth products to new mothers.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Pakistan employees and local management took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Advertising and Sales Promotion,” “Film Show,” “Entertainment,” “Product Meetings,” and “Give Aways and Gifts,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to China, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 through 2010 and until the conduct was stopped by Pfizer, Wyeth China [a Chinese company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments to Chinese state-owned hospitals and healthcare providers (including doctors, nurses, and midwives) employed by the Chinese government that were intended to influence the healthcare providers’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the payments by falsifying expense reimbursement requests and, in concert with local travel agencies, by submitting false or inflated invoices and other supporting documentation for large-scale consumer education events, resulting in those transactions being falsely recorded in Wyeth China’s books and records.
As to Saudi Arabia, the complaint alleges as follows. “In June 2007, the local distributor, at the direction of Wyeth Saudi Arabia [a Delaware corporation that operated a representative office in Saudi Arabia], made a cash payment to a Saudi Arabian customs official to secure the release of a shipment of promotional items that were to be used in connection with the marketing and sale of Wyeth’s nutritional products. These promotional items were held in port because Wyeth Saudi Arabia had failed to secure a required Saudi Arabian Standards Organization Certificate of Conformity. In July 2007, Wyeth Saudi Arabia reimbursed the distributor for this cash payment and improperly recorded it as a “facilitation expense” in its books and records.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls,” the SEC alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia, Wyeth Pakistan, and Wyeth China engaged in transactions which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials. Through these three subsidiaries Wyeth earned aggregate profits of approximately $17,217,831 as a result of these improper transactions. […] During the relevant period, the Wyeth subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. False entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Wyeth, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. […] During the relevant period, Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Wyeth with violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint notes as follows. “Following Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth, which was finalized on or about October 15, 2009, Pfizer undertook a risk-based FCPA due diligence review of Wyeth’s global operations and reported the results of that diligence review to the Commission staff within 180 days of the closing. Pfizer’s post-acquisition review identified potential improper payments, and it diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of Wyeth’s operations and voluntarily disclosed the results to the Commission staff, which included identifying improper payments made by Wyeth’s Nutritional Products Division in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, as well as additional improper payments made by other Wyeth subsidiaries. Following the acquisition, Pfizer diligently and promptly integrated Wyeth’s legacy operations into its compliance program and cooperated fully with the Commission staff.”
In this SEC release, Kara Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC’s FCPA Unit) states as follows. “Pfizer subsidiaries in several countries had bribery so entwined in their sales culture that they offered points and bonus programs to improperly reward foreign officials who proved to be their best customers. These charges illustrate the pitfalls that exist for companies that fail to appropriately monitor potential risks in their global operations.”
As noted in the SEC release, in settling the charges Pfizer and Wyeth neither admitted nor denied the allegations. The release states as follows. “Pfizer consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $16,032,676 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $10,307,268 for a total of $26,339,944. [Pfizer] also is required to report to the SEC on the status of its remediation and implementation of compliance measures over a two-year period, and is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions. “Wyeth consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $17,217,831 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $1,658,793, for a total of $18,876,624. As a Pfizer subsidiary, the status of Wyeth’s remediation and implementation of compliance measures will be subsumed in Pfizer’s two-year self-reporting period. Wyeth also is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
Brett Campbell and Peter Clark (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft – here and here) represented Pfizer. Clark is a former head of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program.
See here for Pfizer’s press release.
Friday Roundup
I didn’t think so, China SOE developments, additional material for the reading pile, and the best part of the Olympics starting. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
I Didn’t Think So
Will tinkering with advisory guidelines that are only implicated when a business organization pleads guilty to or is convicted of a crime best incentivize FCPA compliance, best advance the FCPA’s objective or reducing bribery, increase public confidence in FCPA enforcement actions and allow the DOJ to better allocate its limited prosecutorial resources to cases involving corrupt business organizations and the individuals who actually engaged in the improper conduct?
I didn’t think so, but see here for a recent post on Corruption, Crime and Compliance by Michael Volkov.
What will better achieve each of the above desirable objectives? See here for my scholarship “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense.”
China SOE Developments
Probably one of the most unhelpful statements ever made by an enforcement official concerning the “foreign official” / “instrumentality” issue was when SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro stated (see here for the prior post) that “given the various forms of government found around the world, it would be impractical to articulate each of the myriad of ways that one could use to identify a foreign official in particular countries or cultures.” Two developments this week concerning China SOEs reminded me of Schapiro’s statement.
First, as numerous financial publication headlines indicated, China’s state-owned Cnooc Ltd. announced a $15.1 billion takeover offer for Canada-based Nexen Inc. Should the transaction close, the acquisition would give Cnooc “operational control of a significant Canadian oil-sands field operator” and “catapult it into the driver’s seat in some of the Western world’s richest frontiers, from the U.S. Gulf of Mexico to the North Sea.” (See here for the WSJ article).
Second, earlier this week China Investment Corporation released its annual report (here). Notably, the annual report begins as follows. “In 2011, China Investment Corporation continued to invest on a commercial basis to seek long-term returns and prudently manage our fully deployed portfolio.” (emphasis added). The annual report highlights direct investments in Canada, the U.K., France, Russia, Trinidad & Tobago, Brazil, South Africa, Vietnam and Australia.
For the Reading Pile
If this recent Summer Reading Spectacular post wasn’t enough to quench your thirst for FCPA information, there is more.
This recent FCPA Update from Debevoise & Plimpton contains a timely article in the aftermath of the dramatic collapse of the Africa Sting cases and the Lindsey Manufacturing prosecutions titled “The Difficulty of Recovering Damages From the Government When an FCPA Prosecution Misfires: Sovereign and Official Immunity and Their Impact on FCPA Compliance.” The conclusion states as follows. “Although success in an FCPA litigation is obviously a relief for corporate and individual defendants, FCPA defendants face enormous obstacles when it comes to recovering the significant costs associated with defending themselves against government enforcement actions.”
Arnold & Porter recently published this “FCPA, Bribery Act & Other Global AntiCorruption Insights.” The comprehensive nearly 50 page document contains key enforcement and investigative developments, global enforcement and investigative developments, as well as a focus on FCPA reform.
Olympics
The best part of Olympics starting?
No more client alerts, marketing material, etc. warning of the Bribery Act / FCPA risks of entertaining clients or prospective clients at the Olympics.
Keep an eye out for the Rio Tinto sponsored Mongolian Olympic team (see here for the prior post).
*****
A good weekend to all.
NORDAM Group Resolves Enforcement Action Through A Non-Prosecution Agreement
Earlier this week, the DOJ announced (here) that NORDAM Group. Inc. (here) (a Tulsa, OK based privately held provider of aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services that employs approximately 2,500 people) agreed to enter into a non-prosecution agreement (here) and pay a $2 million penalty “to resolve violations of FCPA.”
The DOJ has previously stated that its DPAs and NPAs benefit the public and industries by “providing guidance on what constitutes improper conduct” (see this GAO report (Appendix III) and that it provides “clear guidance to companies with respect to FCPA enforcement through a variety of means” including “charging documents, plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, press releases, and relevant pleadings and orders” that “are lengthy and detailed.”
If the DOJ wants all to have full confidence in its FCPA enforcement program and if it is genuinely interested in providing transparent guidance through its enforcement actions, the DOJ can do much better than its effort in the NORDAM NPA. It is not as bare-bones as the Lufthansa Technik NPA (see here for the prior post), but close.
The substantive statement of facts (here) (all two pages) state as follows.
“NORDAM’s customers in China include state-owned and -controlled entities, including airlines created, controlled, and exclusively owned by the People’s Republic of China. […] From 1999 until 2008, employees at NSPL [NORDAM Singapore Pte. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of NORDAM that provides MRO services to customers in the Asia Pacific region, including China] and WAAPL [World Aviation Associates Pte. Ltd., an affiliate of NORDAM that performs marketing and sales services for both NORDAM and NPSL in the Asia Pacific region, including in China] paid bribes to employees of state-owned and -controlled entities in China in order to obtain or retain MRO business with those customers. Several NORDAM employees in the United States were made aware of and approved these bribes. The bribes were referred to internally as “commissions” or “facilitator fees.” The facilitator fees were paid to “facilitators” who, in fact, were employees of customers. These facilitators were also referred to internally as “internal guys,” “internal ghosts,” or “our friends inside.” The facilitator fees either were paid directly to the customer’s employee by wire transferring money to the employee’s bank account or were paid indirectly by first depositing the money into the personal bank accounts of WAAPL employees, who would then withdraw all or a portion of these fees to pay the customer employees in cash. In or about 2002, in an effort to further disguise the payments to customer employees, three WAAPL employees created fictitious entities and entered into sales representation agreements with those entities. The commissions that NORDAM paid to these fictitious entities were used, at least in part, to pay employees of customers to assist in securing contracts for NORDAM and NSPL. Although many of the bribe payments were paid out of NORDAM’s and NSPL’s gross profits, in some instances NORDAM, NSPL, and WAAPL artificially inflated the customer invoice to offset the bribes paid to those customers’ employees. As a result, in these instances, NORDAM’s customers were unknowingly reimbursing NORDAM for the bribes that NORDAM paid to customer employees to secure the projects. On or about April 22, 2004, a NORDAM employee sent an e-mail to two WAAPL employees, stating, “[d]o what you have to do to get the business. If that means using an agent, then let’s make sure we are discrete when communicating the information in trip reports. I agree . . . that we should not require an agent at every account, however, I also understand the reality of doing business in Asia. I trust your judgment, it is your call.” On or about December 30, 2004, an agent of WAAPL sent an e-mail to a NORDAM employee and two WAAPL employees, stating, “[o]n this deal we also need to cover our friends inside.” On or about December 30, 2004, the NORDAM employee responded to the email … stating, “I don’t see where our friends have done anything to help us here. If our friends can help us, I will agree to split 50/50 with you any amount we get over $160K.” In all, NORDAM, NSPL, and WAAPL paid as high as $1.5 million in bribes to secure roughly $2.48 million in profits from state-owned and controlled customers in China.”
Who were the state-owned and controlled entities in China? What attributes of those entities made them state-owned or controlled?. As to the employees at NSPL and WAAPL, what types of employees, what was their job function? As to the NORDAM employees in the U.S. “made aware of and approved these bribes” what types of employees, what was their job function? How did they become aware of the bribes? How did they approve the bribes?
Is it asking/expecting too much for the DOJ to set forth such information in its resolution documents?
The NPA (which has a term of three years) states as follows.
“The Department enters into this [NPA] based, in part, on the following factors: (a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Company’s real-time cooperation with the Department, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and collecting and analyzing voluminous documents and information for the Department; (c) the Company’s remedial efforts already undertaken, including enhancing its internal audit function, its compliance program, and its due diligence protocol for third-party agents, and to be undertaken, [pursuant to the NPA]; (d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures [pursuant to the NPA]; and (e) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA.
As noted in the DOJ’s release, the NPA “recognizes that a fine below the standard range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is appropriate because NORDAM fully demonstrated to the department, and an independent accounting expert retained by the department verified, that a fine exceeding $2 million would substantially jeopardize the company’s continued viability.” As to the fine reduction, the NPA further states as follows. “This discount recognizes that, over a period of months, the Company fully cooperated with the Department and with an independent accounting expert that the Department retained to review the Company’s financial condition. Following that review, the Department and its independent expert both concluded that this discount was appropriate under the Sentencing Guidelines.”
What was the discount? There is no information in the NPA or associated documents that shed light on this issue.
This Tulsa World article states as follows.
“NORDAM executives said all but three of the employees involved in the bribery schemes had left the company when the scandal was discovered in 2008. The three employees still with the company were fired, they said. NORDAM officials said three employees of World Aviation Associates created fictitious companies and entered into agreements with the companies under which the companies would be paid commissions for sales of NORDAM products and services to customers. The arrangements made it difficult to trace the money, company executives said.”
The article further states as follows.
“NORDAM CEO Meredith Siegfried said it is “disheartening” for a company that has prided itself on its values and integrity to discover the violations of federal law. “At the same time, our determination and efforts to make sure no such event would ever occur again have given us a significantly higher level of alertness and much improved procedures and processes,” she said. “We are striving to have a robust compliance program which is considered to be an industry benchmark.” In a letter to NORDAM employees, Siegfried said everybody at NORDAM is receiving training to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. “Every stakeholder has also signed a statement that the requirements are understood and agreed to, and this statement is required to be signed annually by all of us,” Siegfried said. “We have also revised our policies and procedures regarding our use of agents and conducted a comprehensive review of the agents we use in other countries. These agents have also received training regarding the FCPA. “We also brought in outside counsel to conduct a comprehensive investigation of all the issues connected to these violations. It is important for you to know that the investigation concluded that no individual associated with NORDAM’s leadership or governance since 2008 was ever involved in, or approved of, any of the illegal activities.
Carlos Ortiz (LeClairRyan – here) represented NORDAM.
NORDAM has an active military aircraft business (see here) and has received, including recently and during the time period relevant to the conduct at issue, numerous federal government contracts.
Friday Roundup
Chevron and others get the front-page treatment, the Aguilar prosecution is officially over as well, some additional FCPA compliance survey data, Wal-Mart civil suits continue to pile up, and Chinese state-owned enterprises continue their global M&A push, it’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Kazakhstan Customs Inquiry
In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, Christopher Matthews and Joe Palazzolo broke a story (“Oil Giants Launch Bribe Probes”) about an apparent investigation regarding Kazakh customs issues involving members of Karachaganka Petroleum Operating BV (“KPO”) including Chevron Corp. and Eni SpA, as well as a logistics arm of Deutsche Post AG, DHL, which handles freight shipments for the group. (For more on KPO see here). According to tips discussed in the WSJ article, the “KPO joint venture authorized DHL to bribe Kazakh customs officials to ignore paperwork irregularities that could have delayed shipments.” The WSJ article discusses “the difficult choices companies face operating in developing countries” and notes that, according to a knowledgeable source, when KPO logistics officials ordered DHL representatives to “stop payments to customs officials” in March 2011 the “customs inspectors found problems with virtually very KPO shipment” and “nothing was cleared to pass” until DHL resumed the payments.
Payments in connection with foreign customs, licenses, permits and the like have been fertile ground for FCPA enforcement activity, although as noted in this recent post in connection with Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure, it is an open question in many cases whether the conduct at issue is the type of conduct Congress sought to capture in passing the FCPA.
In 2007, Chevron resolved an enforcement action (here) involving Iraqi Oil for Food conduct and in 2010 Eni (and related entities) resolved an enforcement action (see here for the prior post) involving Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct. In addition, as highlighted in this recent post, Eni is also reportedly under investigation concerning its conduct in Libya.
Aguilar Conviction Vacated
This recent post highlighted the official end to the Lindsey Manufacturing prosecution. The prosecution of Angela Maria Gomez Aguilar, who was tried along with the Lindsey defendants, is officially over as well. As noted in this previous post, Aguilar (a purported agent of Lindsey Manufacturing) was granted a judgment of acquittal after the DOJ’s case as to one substantive count of money laundering, but the jury convicted her of one count of money laundering conspiracy. After the conviction, Aguilar negotiated an agreement with the DOJ for a time-served sentence and immediate release from custody. Following Judge Matz’s dismissal of the indictment last December based on numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct (see here for the prior post), Aguilar obtained an agreement from the DOJ to stipulate to a motion vacating the one count of conviction, an agreement which took effect upon the DOJ’s recent decision not to further pursue its appeal.
As noted in this recent release, Judge Matz this week signed an order vacating Aguilar’s conviction. In the release, Aguilar’s counsel, Stephen Larson (Arent Fox – here) stated as follows. “The government overreached in its efforts to press this case. It is bittersweet whenever a prosecution is terminated for misconduct. Although Ms. Aguilar is greatly relieved by Judge Matz’s decision to end this ordeal, it is tragic that it was permitted to go this far. I am pleased that the Department of Justice has recognized as much by opting not to pursue its appeal in this case.”
Kroll’s 2012 FCPA Benchmarking Report
This post discussed recent FCPA survey data. Add Kroll’s recent FCPA Benchmarking Report (here) to the list.
As noted in the Report, the study was “designed to take the pulse of corporate compliance officers at U.S. based multinationals and to provide benchmarks for the current state of anti-bribery preparedness.”
Survey results that caught my eye include the following.
“Sixty-nine percent of all respondents said their companies were either moderately or highly exposed to bribery risk; this number jumps to 100 percent in the pharmaceutical industry and drops to 46 percent in the financial services industry. […] 85 percent believe [such risk] will increase or stay the same in the future.”
“Fifty-three percent of respondents said their compliance departments have increased their budgets in the last year; 49 percent said they have increased hiring; and 22 percent said they have experienced a centralization of compliance decision-making.”
“The most frequently cited challenges to anti-bribery compliance include the inability to anticipate regulators’ next moves (21 percent) and ensuring that employee training is taken seriously and is used when a risky situation presents itself (20 percent).”
“Seventy-nine percent of respondents characterized their compliance efforts as a strategic advantage in addition to being a strong defensive tactic.”
“[T]he weakest link among survey respondents was how they handled third party relationships. While 99 percent of respondents said they had anti-bribery provisions for employees in their companies’ codes of conduct, that number fell to 73 percent when compliance officers were asked about anti-bribery provisions for third parties. […] The scope of [FCPA risk by using third parties] is exacerbated by the fact that approximately three in four U.S. companies (77 percent) report that they partner with foreign companies to do business abroad. Thirty-seven percent of respondents said they do business with between 100 and 1,000 third parties; 27 percent said they work with between 1,000 and 10,000 third parties; and 17 percent said they work with between 10,000 and 100,000 different third parties. A small number said they worked with more than 100,000 different third parties.”
It’s a third-party world.
The Report was based on responses from “139 senior corporate compliance executives from companies ranging in size from $100 million to over $10 billion in revenues per year” who were interviewed by phone from July 2011 to February 2012. Survey respondents were drawn mainly from four industries: financial services, IT/telecommunications, energy, and pharmaceuticals.
The report was published by Kroll Advisory Solutions (here), a company that assists clients mitigate and respond to risks, including FCPA issues.
Wal-Mart Civil Suits
One of my earliest Wal-Mart posts (here) noted that not only will the DOJ and SEC likely be examining the conduct of Wal-Mart executives, but so too will plaintiff law firms representing shareholders who will likely scour Wal-Mart’s SEC filings and other statements to the market in bringing derivative claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty and potential Section 10(b) claims based on material omissions concerning Wal-Mart Mexico.
Sure enough.
Wal-Mart’s recent quarterly SEC filing stated as follows.
“The Company is a defendant in several recently-filed lawsuits in which the complaints closely track the allegations set forth in a news story that appeared in the New York Times on April 21, 2012. One of these is a securities lawsuit that was filed on May 7, 2012 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, in which the plaintiff alleges various violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”) beginning in 2005, and asserts violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, relating to certain prior disclosures of the Company. The plaintiff seeks to represent a class of shareholders who purchased or acquired stock of the Company between December 8, 2011, and April 20, 2012, and seeks damages and other relief based on allegations that the defendants’ conduct affected the value of such stock. In addition, eleven derivative complaints were filed in April and May 2012, in Delaware and Arkansas, also tracking the allegations of the Times story, and naming various current and former officers and directors as additional defendants. The plaintiffs in the derivative suits (in which the Company is a nominal defendant) allege, among other things, that the defendants who are or were directors or officers of the Company breached their fiduciary duties in connection with oversight of FCPA compliance. While management cannot predict the outcome of these matters, management does not believe the outcome will have a material effect on the Company’s financial condition or results of operations.”
Chinese SOEs
This recent post focused on China SOEs and provided links to data and analysis concerning the ever increasing global push of Chinese SOEs. Yesterday, the Wall Street Journal ran an article titled “China Buys Overseas Assets” that discusses a recent report from A Capital, a private equity firm based in China and Paris (see here for A Capital’s report). As indicated in the article, “China’s overseas investment surged in the first quarter [of 2012] to $21.4 billion as state-owned companies snapped up resource-related assets around the globe.” According to the report, state-owned companies accounted for 98% of all deal value in the first quarter, a new high.
*****
A good weekend to all.