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Selective Prosecution?

The term selective prosecution is a legal term of art with rather exacting factors.  This post is not about the legal term of art selective prosecution, but rather selective prosecution as a practical matter, in order words, in layman terms.

As highlighted in the below chart, there have been eight corporate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions based largely on alleged improper payments to Nigerian officials in connection with Nigeria’s Temporary Import Process (TIP) for oil and gas rigs.

Company Settlement Amount Related Individual Actions 
Panalpina $81.9 million

$70.6 (DOJ)
$11.3 (SEC)
 
No
Pride Int’l $56.2 million

$32.6 (DOJ)
$23.5 (SEC)
 
No
Royal Dutch Shell $48.1 million

$30 (DOJ)
$18.1 (SEC)
 
No
Transocean $20.7 million

$13.4 (DOJ)
$7.2 (SEC)
 
No
Parker Drilling $15.9 million

$11.8 (DOJ)
$4.1 (SEC)
 
No
Tidewater $15.7 million

$7.4 (DOJ)
$8.3 (SEC)
 
No
Noble Corp. $8.2 million

$2.6 (DOJ)
$5.6 (SEC)
 
Yes
GlobalSantaFe $5.9 million

$5.9 (SEC)
No

As indicated in the above chart, the enforcement agencies collected approximately $253 million in the enforcement actions.  (Note certain of the enforcement actions also alleged other improper payments to Nigerian customs officials and, because of the “where else” question, certain of the enforcement actions also alleged improper payments in other countries as well).

To extent settlement amounts serve as a reasonable proxy for the severity of an FCPA enforcement action, the above chart highlights that among the TIP-related enforcement actions, the enforcement action against Noble Corp. was comparatively minor.  This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that among the TIP-related enforcement actions to involve a DOJ component, the Noble enforcement action was the only action to be resolved via a non-prosecution agreement.

Nevertheless, as highlighted by the above chart, the Noble enforcement action was the only TIP-related enforcement action to result in any related charges against individuals.  In February 2012, the SEC charged Mark Jackson (Noble’s former CEO) and James Ruehlen (a current Noble executive) in a wide-ranging enforcement action charging violations of, among other things, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and books and records and internal controls provisions.

This contemporaneous post flagged the SEC action as one to follow since the SEC has never been put to its burden of proof in an FCPA enforcement action.  The post further noted that the FCPA’s facilitation payments exception was likely to be at issue and even highlighted the unusual nature of the DOJ’s NPA against Noble Corp. which, not once but twice, stated that the alleged payments at issue “would not constitute facilitation payments for routine government actions within the meaning of the FCPA.”

In an ironic twist, after the enforcement agencies collected more than $200 million in the TIP-related enforcement actions against risk averse corporate defendants, Jackson and Ruehlen did indeed put the SEC to its burden of proof and the court ruled that the SEC “must bear the burden of negating the facilitating payments exception” and that the “exception is best understood as a threshold requirement to pleading that a defendant acted ‘corruptly.’”  (See here for the prior post).

The SEC, a law enforcement agency with merely a civil burden of proof, was never able to carry this burden and this was among other reasons why the SEC’s case against Jackson and Ruehlen failed – and yes – this is the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from last week’s settlement (see here).

The above facts and circumstances from the many TIP-related enforcement actions should cause any reasonable observer to ask why Jackson and Ruehlen were singled out for prosecution by the SEC?

As will be explored in a future post that goes more in-depth into the SEC’s failed prosecution of Jackson and Ruehlen, the SEC’s case against the individuals  was all the more curious given that Noble actually booked the TIP-related payments as facilitating payments (the SEC of course disagreed with this position) and given that – per the SEC’s own briefing in the matter – its charges were based on little more than a series of supposed inferences supported by little more than circumstantial evidence.

Parker Drilling Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Involving Conduct In Nigeria

It’s been quite a week on the FCPA enforcement front.

On Monday, the DOJ announced (here) criminal obstruction of justice charges against “Frederic Cilins a French citizen [for] attempting to obstruct an ongoing investigation into whether a mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.”

Yesterday, it was reported (here) that former Siemens executive Uriel Sharef had, as expected, settled the SEC enforcement action against him by agreeing, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, to pay a $275,000 penalty.  (See here for the prior post discussing the DOJ’s and SEC’s December 2011 charges against Sharef and others).

Yesterday, the DOJ announced (here) that criminal charges “have been unsealed against one current and one former executive of the U.S. subsidiary of a French power and transportation company for their alleged participation in a scheme to pay bribes to foreign government officials.”  The individuals are:

Frederic Pierucci (“a current company executive who previously held the position of vice president of global sales for the Connecticut-based U.S. subsidiary) “who was charged in an indictment unsealed in the District of Connecticut with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and to launder money, as well as substantive charges of violating the FCPA and money laundering.”  According to the DOJ, Pierucci, a French national, was arrested Sunday night at John F. Kennedy International Airport.

David Rothschild (“a former vice president of sales for the Connecticut-based U.S. subsidiary”) who pleaded guilty on Nov. 2, 2012, to a criminal information charging one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  The charges against Rothschild and his guilty plea were recently unsealed.

Future posts will explore in more detail each of the above developments.

Today’s post is about yesterday’s other FCPA development – the announcement of the long-expected enforcement action against Parker Drilling (a Houston-based oil drilling services company) for conduct in Nigeria.

As indicated in this DOJ release, the Parker Drilling action “stemmed from the DOJ’s Panalpina-related investigations.”

As detailed in this prior post, in November 2010, the DOJ and SEC announced coordinated FCPA enforcement actions against Swiss-based freight forwarder Panalpina and six oil and gas companies that utilized its services in connection with business in Nigeria.  The November 2010 enforcement action resulted in approximately $237 million in combined DOJ/SEC settlement amounts.  (For additional reading on these actions, please visit the CustomsGate tab under the search feature of this site or see here where all the prior actions are linked).  As noted in this prior statistical post, Panalpina-related enforcement actions are one, of just a few unique events, that have given rise to the majority of FCPA enforcements since 2007, and Panalpina-related enforcement actions significantly contributed to the “spike” in FCPA enforcement actions in 2010.

Total fines and penalties in the Parker Drilling enforcement action were approximately $15.9 million (approximately $11.8 million in the DOJ enforcement action and approximately $4.1 million in the SEC enforcement action).

This post summarizes the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents.

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Parker Drilling resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here)

Criminal Information

Parker Drilling operated oil-drilling rigs in Nigeria owned by Parker Drilling (Nigeria Limited), a Nigerian entity and wholly-owned subsidiary of Parker Drilling Offshore International, Inc., (a Cayman Islands corporation wholly-owned by Parker Drilling).  According to the information, “Parker Drilling ceased drilling operations in Nigeria in 2006” and the conduct at issues focused on two issues or events that occurred between 8 to 12 years ago.

First, the information, like the prior Panalpina-related enforcement actions, alleged conduct in connection with obtaining temporary importation permits (TIPs) in Nigeria for oil-drilling rigs.  The information alleges that in 2001, Parker Drilling retained Panalpina to “obtain TIPs and TIP extensions on Parker Drilling’s behalf.  According to the information, between 2001 and 2002:

“Panalpina obtained new TIPs for Parker Drilling’s rigs by submitting false paperwork on Parker Drilling’s behalf to avoid the time, cost, and risk associated with exporting the rigs and re-importing them into Nigerian waters (a process that Panalpina referred to as the ‘paper process’ or ‘recycling.’).  Panalpina created and caused to be presented to Nigerian officials documents that reflected that the rigs had been physically exported and re-imported.  In reality, the drilling rigs never left Nigerian waters.”

Second, and more significant in terms of the conduct alleged in the information, the DOJ alleges conduct in relation to the Nigerian “Panel of Inquiry for the Investigation of All Cases of Temporary Import Permits Issued Between 1984 to Year 2000” (the “TI Panel”).  According to the information, the TI Panel was “presidentially appointed, operated under the auspices of the Nigerian President’s Office, and possessed the power to issue subpoenas and levy fines” in connection with certain duties and tariffs that the Nigerian Customs Service (“NCS”) collected or failed to collect between 1984 and 2000.

As to the TI Panel, the information alleges that beginning in 2002 the TI Panel began reviewing Parker Drilling.  According to the information, thereafter Parker Drilling engaged Nigeria Outside Counsel (a Nigerian citizen based in Nigeria who advised Parker Drilling on customs and other matters in Nigeria) and a Nigeria Agent (a Nigerian and British citizen based in the U.K. to assist Parker Drilling in connection with customs matters in Nigeria) who represented Parker Drilling before the TI Panel.

The information alleges that in 2004 “the TI Panel concluded that Parker Drilling had violated [Nigerian law] with respect to several of its TIPS” and that the “TI Panel assessed a fine of $3.8 million against Parker Drilling.”  The information then outlines a “bribery scheme,” that resulted in the TI Panel reducing Parking Drilling’s fine “to just $750,000.”

In connection with this “bribery scheme,” the information alleges conduct as to Employee A (a U.S. citizen based in Nigeria who, during the relevant time period, was the General Manager of Parker Drilling’s operations in Nigeria); Employee B (a U.S. citizen based in Nigeria who also was a General Manager of Parker Drilling’s Operations in Nigeria); Executive A (a U.S. citizen based in Houston who performed financial and compliance functions for Parker Drilling between 2002 through 2005); Executive B (a U.S. citizen based in Houston who performed a legal function for Parker Drilling); U.S. Outside Counsel (a U.S. citizen and partner in a U.S. law firm who served as Parker Drilling’s outside counsel who provided legal and business advice to Parker Drilling on customs and other issues in Nigeria).

Specifically, the information alleges that U.S Outside Counsel suggested that Parker Drilling retain the Nigeria Agent to resolve its Nigerian customs issues even though Nigeria Agent’s “resume, which U.S. Outside Counsel provided to Parker Drilling, did not reflect any past experience in Nigeria or handling customs issues.”  According to the information, Parker Drilling “conducted no additional due diligence into Nigeria Agent’s qualifications.”

The information alleges that “with one exception, Parking Drilling paid Nigeria agent indirectly through the U.S.-based law firm” and that “Executives A and B paid and caused to be paid all of Nigeria Agent’s expenses without receiving any invoices particularly describing the expenditures’ purposes.”   According to the information, many of expenses related to food, entertainment, social events and the like and the information alleges various meetings the Nigeria Agent had with various Nigerian foreign officials.

The information further alleges that Parker Drilling’s treasurer informed Executive B “that the lack of invoices could raise an issue in Parker Drilling’s ongoing Sarbanes Oxley audit.”  Thereafter, the information alleges, the Nigeria Agent sent an invoice and that Executive B “accepted the invoice and retained it in Parker Drilling’s files, knowing that the invoice did not accurately reflect the true purpose of Parker’s Drillings” prior payments to the Nigeria Agent.

The information then states as follows.  “All told, Parker Drilling transferred and caused to be transferred to Nigeria Agent approximately $1.25 million to address Parker Drilling’s TI Panel issues” and that “Nigeria Agent succeeded in reducing Parker Drilling’s TI Panel Fines.”

Based on the above conduct, the information charges one count of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  Although the above Panalpina-related allegations are incorporated by reference into the paragraphs charging the FCPA violation, the information specifically identifies only the TI Panel conduct and states as follows.  “Parker Drilling made and cause to be made from the United States … a series of payments totaling approximately $1.25 million to Nigeria Agent, knowing that all or a portion of those payments would be given or used to procure goods and services that were to be given to a foreign government official in return for the diminution of a lawfully assessed fine.”

Deferred Prosecution Agreement

The above charge against Parker Drilling was resolved via a DPA in which Parker Drilling admitted, accepted, and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, directors, employees and agents as charged in the information.

The DPA has a term of three years and under the heading “relevant considerations” it states as follows.

“The Department enters into this Agreement based on the individual facts and circumstances presented by this case and the Company.  Among the facts considered were the following:  (a) the Company’s cooperation, including conducting an extensive internal investigation and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Department; (b) the Company has engaged in extensive remediation, including ending its business relationships with officers, employees or agents primarily responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, increasing training and testing requirements, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for all the Company’s contracts; (c) the Company has retained a full-time Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel who reports to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee, as well as staff to assist the Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel; (d) the Company has already significantly enhanced and is committed to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth [elsewhere in the DPA]; (e) the Company has implemented a compliance-awareness improvement initiative and program that includes issuance of periodic anti-bribery compliance alerts; (f) the Company has already implemented many of the elements described [elsewhere in the DPA]; and (g) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation …”.

Pursuant to the DPA, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for the conduct at issue was $14.7 million to $29.4 million.  The DPA then states as follows.

“The Company agrees to pay a monetary penalty in the amount of $11,760,000, an approximately 20% reduction off the bottom of the fine range […].  The Company and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given the facts and circumstances of this case, including the Company’s cooperation, extensive remediation, committment to continue to enhance its compliance program, and culpability relative to other companies examined in this investigation.”

During the period of the DPA, Parker Drilling will have annual reporting obligations to the DOJ concerning its remediation and implementation of various compliance measures.  As is typical in FCPA DPAs, Parker Drilling also agreed to a “muzzle clause” (see this prior post for more information).

SEC

In a related enforcement action based on the same core conduct, the SEC brought a civil complaint (here) against Parking Drilling.

The introductory paragraph of the complaint states as follows.

“This matter involves violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Defendant Parker Drilling Company.  In 2004, through its outside counsel, Parker Drilling retained a Nigerian agent to assist the company with customs disputes related to the importation of its drilling rigs into Nigeria. During the course of the agent’s work, two Parker Drilling executives knowingly paid the agent large sums of money through its outside counsel for, among other things, the “entertainment” of Nigerian foreign officials in an effort to obtain their influence in resolving the customs disputes.”

The SEC complaint also contains a paragraph with the same general Panalpina-related allegations as alleged in the DOJ’s criminal information.

Under the heading “Remedial Efforts” the complaint states as follows.

“Parker Drilling demonstrated significant cooperation and conducted an extensive internal investigation. Since the time of the conduct noted in this Complaint, Parker Drilling has made significant enhancements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: retaining a full-time Chief Compliance Officer and Counsel who reports to the Chief Executive Officer and Audit Committee and full-time staff to assist him; enhancing anti-corruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; increasing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; implementing a compliance awareness initiative that includes issuance of periodic anti-bribery compliance alerts; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”

Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged an FCPA anti-bribery violation and an FCPA books and records and internal controls violation.  Other than restating the language of the books and records and internal controls provisions, the SEC complaint does not contain any specific allegations concerning these charges.

As noted in this SEC release, Parker Drilling agreed to pay disgorgement of 3,050,00 plus pre-judgment interest of $1,040,818, and consented to the entry of a final judgment permanently enjoining it from future FCPA violations.

Mitchell Ettinger, Saul Pilchen and Stephanie Cherny (Skadden, Arps) represented Parker Drilling.

Parker Drilling in this release stated as follows.

“After an extensive investigation, with which we fully cooperated, we are pleased to have reached agreement with the DOJ and the SEC, and we will continue to maintain a vigorous FCPA compliance program, to emphasize the importance of compliance and ethical business conduct, and to enhance our compliance efforts.”

Parker Drilling had previously disclosed that the DOJ and SEC’s investigations concerned “certain of our operations relating to countries in which we currently operate or formerly operated, including Kazakhstan and Nigeria.”

Keeping FCPA Enforcement Statistics In Perspective

The below chart provides a summary of corporate FCPA enforcement data (DOJ and SEC combined) for the years 2007-2012, as well as notable circumstances that significantly skewed enforcement data statistics for a particular year.  (The below data was assembled using the “core” approach – see this prior post for an explanation).

Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007-2012)

Year

Enforcement Actions

Settlement Amounts

Of Note

2007

15

$149 million

Six   enforcement actions involved Iraq Oil for Food conduct and these enforcement actions comprised 40% of all enforcement actions and approximately 50% of the $149 million amount.

2008

10

$885 million

The   $800 million Siemens enforcement action comprised approximately 90% of the $885 million amount.

2009

11

$645 million

The   $579 million KBR / Halliburton Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised approximately 90% of the $645 million amount.

2010

21

$1.4 billion

Six   enforcement actions, all resolved on the same day, centered on various oil   and gas companies use Panalpina in Nigeria.  Panalpina also resolved an enforcement action on the same day.Two enforcement actions (Technip and Eni / Snamprogetti) involved Bonny Island conduct.  In other words, there were 14 unique corporate enforcement actions in 2010.  Of further note, the two Bonny Island enforcement actions, Technip($338 million) and Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 million) comprised approximately 50% of the $1.4 billion amount.

2011

16

$503 million

The   $219 million JGC Corp. Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement action comprised approximately 44% of the $503 million amount

2012

12

$260 million

None that significantly skewed the statistics.
TOTAL: 85 TOTAL: $3.9 billion

As demonstrated by the above chart, 2010 was the apex of FCPA enforcement, both in terms of the number of enforcement actions and settlement amounts.  FCPA enforcement in 2012 was less than in 2011, and FCPA enforcement in 2011 was less than in 2010.

Industry participants have offered various reasons for the decrease in FCPA enforcement in 2012 – all speculative and not empirically based.

What is not speculative and what is empirically based is an analysis of how just a few unique historical events had a significant impact on FCPA enforcement data between 2007 and 2011 and how these events place 2012 FCPA enforcement data in a proper context.

The events, as suggested by the above chart, are the following: (i) publication in 2005 of the so-called Volcker Report on the United Nations Iraq Oil for Food Program which served as a ready-made list of enforcement actions; (ii) in 2003 Georges Krammer, a former top official at Technip, shared information with French investigators concerning a $6 billion dollar project at Bonny Island, Nigeria; and (iii) several oil and gas companies utilized the services of Panalpina.

As indicated in the below charts, these unique historical events had a significant impact on FCPA enforcement data between 2007 and 2011.

Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions Based on Iraq Oil For Food Conduct (2007-2011)

Enforcement Actions

Total Enforcement Action Percentage

 

Settlement Amounts

Total Settlement Amount Percentage

14

19%

$267 million

7%

Corporate Bonny Island, Nigeria FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007-2011)

Enforcement Actions

Total Enforcement Action Percentage

 

Settlement Amounts

Total Settlement Amount Percentage

4

5%

$1.5 billion

41%

Corporate Panalpina Related FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007-2011)

Enforcement Actions

Total Enforcement Action Percentage

 

Settlement Amounts

Total Settlement Amount Percentage

8

11%

$262 million

7%

As demonstrated by the above charts, the combined effect of just three unique historical events –  Iraq Oil for Food, Bonny Island conduct, and use of Panalpina – had a significant impact on FCPA enforcement data between 2007 and 2011.  These events served as the foundation for 35% of all corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011 and resulted in 55% of the settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.

Adding just the 2008 Siemens enforcement action to the settlement amount calculation, results in just four unique historical events accounting for 77% of settlement amounts in corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011.

While the January 2012 FCPA enforcement action against Marubeni did involve Bonny Island conduct, the unique events identified above have run their course.  Recognizing these events and how they impacted FCPA enforcement data is important to understanding why FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years.

Even though FCPA enforcement has declined in recent years, unique events giving rise to FCPA enforcement actions have remained relatively constant between 2007 and 2012.  In 2007, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 15 unique events.  In 2008, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 10 unique events.  In 2009, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 11 unique events.  In 2010, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 14 unique events.  In 2011, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 16 unique events.  In 2012, corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of 12 unique events.

Inside FCPA Enforcement Statistics

FCPA Inc., it often seems, is obsessed with enforcement statistics.  Increasing FCPA enforcement, and the ability to demonstrate it through numbers and graphs, is an effective marketing device for many in the industry.  But what happens when enforcement actually decreases?  How do you market decreasing FCPA enforcement?  As Michael Volkov recently stated (here) on his Corruption, Crime and Compliance site  “law firms are wringing their hands wondering how they can ‘scare’ businesses with the latest FCPA enforcement action.”  It seems the answer is to speculate as to possible reasons for the decrease and remind your marketing targets of the many cases in the “pipeline.”

The decrease in FCPA enforcement has been a hot topic of late, for instance see here from the FCPA Blog.

Let me share a not-so-secret, secret and that is this.  FCPA enforcement 2007-2011 was, to a great extent, the function of just three unique events:  (1) publication in 2005 of the so-called Volcker Report on the United Nations Iraq Oil for Food Program which served as a ready-made list of enforcement actions; (2) in 2003 Georges Krammer, a former top official at Technip, shared information with French investigators concerning a $6 billion dollar project at Bonny Island, Nigeria; and (3) several oil and gas companies utilized the services of Panalpina.

These three unique events have resulted in approximately 35% of the core corporate FCPA enforcement actions between 2007-2011.

There have been 14 core corporate enforcement actions focused on Iraq Oil for Food conduct (Chevron, Azko Nobel, El Paso, Novo Nordisk, AGCO, ABB, Innospec, Ingersall-Rand, Textron, York, AB Volvo, Flowserve, General Electric and Fiat).  Siemens and Daimler also included Iraq Oil for Food conduct, but such conduct was a minor focus of the overall allegations and thus not included in the above figure.  In short, the Iraqi Oil for Food enforcement actions have largely run their course (one of the few remaining inquiries would seem to be Weatherford International where the conduct under investigation includes Iraq Oil for Food conduct).  [Note:  most of the Iraq Oil for Food enforcement actions involved “only” FCPA books and records and internal control charges given that the kickback payments were to the Iraqi government, not a particular foreign official.  Nevertheless such actions are usually included in FCPA enforcement statistics].

There have been 7 core corporate enforcement actions concerning oil and gas companies utilizing the services of Panalpina in Nigeria (Panalpina, Noble, Pride, Shell, Tidewater, Transocean, and Global SantaFe).  These actions, all announced in November 2010, largely account for the spike in 2010 corporate FCPA enforcement.

There have been 4 core corporate enforcement actions concerning the so-called TSKJ joint venture in relation to Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct (KBR / Halliburton, Technip, ENI/Snamprogetti, and JGC Corp.) [Throw in the 2012 enforcement action against Marunbeni and the number is 5].  These enforcement actions of course have not been mere garden-variety types; rather Bonny Island enforcement actions have resulted in 4 of the top 6 FCPA enforcement actions of all time.

Add these numbers together and you find that 25 of the 73 core corporate enforcement actions between 2007-2011 were the direct result of just three unique events.

Viewing FCPA enforcement statistics in the abstract is not a very useful exercise.  Rather, the more thoughtful way to view such statistics is to understand the root causes leading to the enforcement actions in the first place.  When viewed in this way, the not-so-secret, secret is that approximately 35% of FCPA enforcement actions between 2007-2011 were the direct result of just three unique events.  These events have largely run their course and I submit this is the biggest reason why enforcement actions in 2012 are not on pace with the past few years.

[Note – as discussed in previous posts, unlike some others, I keep my corporate FCPA statistics using the “core” approach.  Thus, for instance, the Siemens  enforcement action was 1 ”core” enforcement action even if the DOJ entered into separate agreements with Siemens AG, Siemens Argentina, Siemens Bangladesh, and Siemens Venezuela and even if the SEC separately brought an enforcement action against Siemens AG.  I submit that counting Siemens as 5 corporate enforcement actions, as many do, results in misleading FCPA enforcement statistics.  Further distorting FCPA enforcement statistics is separately counting related individual enforcement actions.  For instance, if one took such an approach in connection with Siemens the end result would be 20 enforcement actions – even though all enforcement actions were based on the same core set of conduct].

Will The SEC Be Put To Its Burden Of Proof In The Jackson And Ruehlen Enforcement Action?

As discussed in this previous post, in November 2010, Noble Corporation was one of several companies to resolve FCPA enforcement actions in what I called CustomsGate – enforcement actions largely focused on alleged payments to Nigerian customs officials to receive various permits.  The Noble enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $8.2 million ($2.6 million criminal fine via a non-prosecution agreement; $5.6 million in disgorgement and interest via a SEC complaint).

As noted in the previous post, in the Noble Corporation enforcement action it was stated, not once but twice, that the payments at issue “would not constitute facilitation payments for routine governmental actions within the meaning of the FCPA.”  I noted then that one can reasonably conclude that if the DOJ felt the need to express such a statement twice, that the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception should probably be on the minds of many in connection with the CustomsGate enforcement  actions.

Against the backdrop of recent and well-deserved scrutiny of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program, the SEC reminds us all that it too can enforce the FCPA.  [As an aside, Professor Barbara Black (University of Cincinnati College of Law) recently released her forthcoming scholarship – see here – “The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Fighting Global Corruption is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission].

Last Friday, the SEC announced here charges against “three oil services executives with violating the FCPA by participating in a bribery scheme to obtain illicit permits for oil rigs in Nigeria in order to retain business under lucrative drilling contracts.”

In this complaint filed in the S.D. of Texas, the SEC charged Mark Jackson (former Noble Corporation CEO) and James Ruehlen (current Director and Division Manager of Noble’s subsidiary in Nigeria) based on the same core set of facts relevant to the prior corporate enforcement action – namely that Noble and its wholly-owned subsidiary (Noble-Nigeria) “authorized its customs agent to pay bribes” on the companies behalf “to Nigerian government officials to influence or induce them to (1) favorably process false paperwork, (2) grant temporary import permits (TIPs) based on the false paperwork, and (3) favorably exercise or abuse their discretion in granting extensions to these illicit TIPs.”

The complaint (a meaty 46 pages) next states, in summary fashion, as follows.

“Defendants approved payment of the bribes.  Defendant Ruehlen also assisted the customs agent in preparing false documents, processed the customs agent’s invoices for the bribes, and signed the checks reimbursing the customs agent for the bribes he paid to Nigerian government officials.  Defendants acted in this way to obtain TIPs and TIP extensions and retain business under drilling contracts in Nigeria.  As a consequence, Defendants violated the anti-bribery provisions [of the FCPA.]  Defendants also took steps to circumvent Noble’s internal controls and to falsely record these bribes as legitimate operating expenses on Noble’s books.  Defendant Jackson failed to implement internal accounting controls to prevent the bribery and false recording of the bribes.  As a consequence, Defendants violated the records falsification and internal control provisions of the Exchange Act and aided and abetted Noble’s violations of the books and records and internal control provisions [of the FCPA].  Defendant Jackson misled Noble’s auditors about the bribes and signed certifications required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 falsely stating that he had created and maintained effective internal controls, and that there were no internal control weaknesses, fraud or FCPA violations.  As a consequence, Jackson violated Rules 13b2-2 and 13a-14 of the Exchange Act.  During the violations, Jackson was Noble’s Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operating Officer, and ultimately President and Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of Directors.  Jackson directly or indirectly controlled Noble, Defendant Ruehlen, and others, and therefore is liable as a control person under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act for all of their violations.”

[For previous Section 20(a) control person (or similar) FCPA enforcement actions – see here and here.]

Unlike the vast majority of FCPA defendants (corporate and individual) charged in an SEC enforcement action, Jackson and Ruehlen appear poised to launch a defense.

Jackson’s lawyer, David Krakoff (here – BuckleySandler) stated as follows.  “We unequivocally deny the SEC’s baseless allegations. Mr. Jackson will vigorously defend himself in court where the evidence will show what the SEC already knows, that at all times Mr. Jackson acted in good faith at Noble. He looks forward to clearing his good name in this proceeding.”

Ruehlen’s lawyer F. Joseph Warin (here – Gibson Dunn & Crutcher) told the Wall Street Journal  that his client was the one who initially raised concerns about the payments and that Ruehlen “fully cooperated throughout the investigation and always acted in an ethical and transparent manner.”  Warin stated that “the claims against Mr. Ruehlen are wrong and they will be proven so at trial.”

This will be most interesting to follow as the SEC is rarely put to its burden of proof in FCPA enforcement actions (or any of its actions for that matter).  This is due to the SEC’s long-standing policy of allowing defendants to settle SEC complaints without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.  For recent judicial scrutiny of this settlement device, see this prior post.

The last time the SEC is believed to have been put to its burden of proof in an FCPA enforcement action was in the Eric Mattson and James Harris enforcement action also filed in the S.D. of Texas.  Like the Jackson and Ruehlen enforcement action, the Mattson and Harris enforcement action involved conduct outside the context of foreign government procurement.  As detailed in this Memorandum and Order, the SEC had its FCPA anti-bribery charges dismissed in that case.  The case involved alleged goodwill payments to an Indonesian tax official for a reduction in a tax assessment.  The SEC claimed that the FCPA’s unambiguous language plainly encompassed the goodwill payment and the issue before the Court was whether the plain language of the FCPA prohibited goodwill payments for the purpose of reducing a tax assessment.  When Mattson and Harris was decided, the S.D. of Texas in U.S. v. Kay case had already dismissed that case finding that the plain language of the FCPA does not prohibit goodwill payments to foreign government officials to reduce a tax obligation.  The SEC attempted to distinguish the trial court’s Kay ruling by arguing that in the civil enforcement context, the Court should interpret the FCPA’s language more liberally than in criminal cases.  The Court rejected the SEC’s arguments and followed the trial court’s analysis in Kay that the payments at issue to the Indonesian tax official did not violate the FCPA because it did not help Mattson’s and Harris’s employer (Baker Hughes) “obtain or retain business.”

Of course, the 5th Circuit overturned the Kay trial court ruling and held that making payments to a “foreign official” to lower
taxes and custom duties in a foreign country can provide an unfair advantage to the payer over competitors and thereby assist the payer in obtaining and retaining business.  However, the Kay court emphatically stated that not all such payments to a “foreign official” outside the context of directly securing a foreign government contract violate the FCPA; it merely held that such payments “could” violate the FCPA. The 5th Circuit then listed several hypothetical examples of how a reduction in custom and tax liabilities could assist a company in obtaining or retaining business in a foreign country. On the other hand, the court also recognized that “there are bound to be circumstances” in which a custom or tax reduction merely increases the profitability of an existing profitable company and thus, presumably, does not assist the payer in obtaining or retaining business.  The court specifically stated:  “[i]f the government is correct that anytime operating costs are reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that expresses the necessary element of assisting in obtaining or retaining business would be unnecessary, and thus surplusage – a conclusion that we are forbidden to reach.”

The point of this extended discussion in the context of Jackson and Ruehlen is two-fold:  (1) that the SEC has already lost a non-government procurement FCPA case in the S.D. of Texas; and (2) even with the 5th Circuit precedent in Kay, and even taking the SEC’s allegations as true, payments in connection with TIPs would seem to be only to increase the profitability of an existing profitable company and thus – following the logic of the Fifth Circuit – fall outside of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out should the SEC’s FCPA anti-bribery charges be fully litigated in the Jackson and Ruehlen enforcement action.

As noted in the SEC’s release last week, the Noble executive enforcement action also involved a separate complaint (here) against Thomas O’Rourke (the former controller and head of internal audit at Noble).  The complaint alleged that O’Rourke: (1) aided and abetted Noble’s violations of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions, books and records and internal controls provisions; and (2) directly violated the FCPA’s internal controls provisions and false records provisions of the Exchange Act.

Under the heading “defendants’ violations” the SEC alleged, among other things, that O’Rourke: (1) “understood that Noble-Nigeria had used false paperwork to obtain TIPs, and that Noble-Nigeria paid its customs agent for ‘special handling charges’ that were passed through to Nigerian officials; (2) “knew that the ‘special handling charges’ were entered into Noble-Nigeria’s books as legitimate operating expenses, and he knew or was reckless in not knowing that those entries were improper”;  (3) “knowingly allowed TIP-related payments to government officials to be improperly accounted for as legitimate operating expenses.

Like the vast majority of FCPA defendants in SEC enforcement actions, O’Rourke chose to settle the SEC’s complaint without admitting or denying the SEC allegations.  According to the SEC release, O’Rourke consented to entry of a court order requiring him to pay a $35,000 civil penalty and permanently enjoining him from future violations.

*****

Last week I participated in a discussion with Howard Sklar regarding a potential FCPA compliance defense (see here for the webcast.)  In the aftermath of the SEC’s charges against the Noble executives, Sklar penned a Forbes blog (here) and stated as follows.  “One example Mike brings to prove his point [that the FCPA should be amended to include a compliance defense] is the Panalpina line of cases, including Noble.  I don’t think he’ll be able to use the Noble case as an example after today.  These complaints are against the CEO (who formerly held the CFO spot) and the country leader for Nigeria.  Plus, there’s Thomas O’Rourke. Thomas O’Rourke was Noble’s Director of Internal Audit, Controller, and VP of Internal Audit.”

Nice try Howard, but you are off-target.

Sklar is correct that I discuss the Noble Corp. enforcement action (and other related CustomsGate enforcement actions) in my “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” article (see here at pgs. 9-12 ).  However, that discussion is focused on specific reasons warranting an FCPA compliance defense, including that in many markets, companies subject to the FCPA must navigate challenging environments replete with barriers and other conditions that serve as breeding grounds for payments implicating (at least in the eyes of the enforcement agencies) the FCPA.

In discussing harassment bribes, I then talk about the notoriously corrupt Nigerian Customs Service (“NSC”) and how business interactions with NSC officials have been the basis for several FCPA enforcement actions including the coordinated enforcement actions from November 2010 involving Noble Corp. and others.  Anticipating the counter-argument that the FCPA does not need a compliance defense due to the harassment bribery conditions many companies face in foreign markets because the FCPA already contains a facilitating payments exception, I then stated that so long as the DOJ refuses to recognize a facilitating payments exception to the FCPA, that Congressional intent on the facilitating payments issue is best advanced through an FCPA compliance defense in which a company can assert, as a matter of law, that its pre-existing FCPA policies and procedures sought to prevent such payments in foreign markets.

In short, I was using the Noble Corporation enforcement action in connection with a discussion of facilitating payments, not using that particular enforcement action to support an FCPA compliance defense because it somehow was based on low-level employee conduct.  Indeed, in the DOJ’s non-prosecution agreement (here) which I discussed in this previous post, “Senior Executive,” “Executive A” and “Executive B” are all specifically mentioned as participating in the alleged improper conduct and an FCPA compliance defense would not apply to corporate conduct engaged in by executive officers.

The point of the Noble Corp. reference in my article was that the company should not have been the subject of an FCPA enforcement action based on the alleged conduct because Congress intended to exempt such payments from the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions (regardless of who made, directed, or authorized the payments).

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