Friday Roundup
The sting may be over but it effects are not, Orthofix information unsealed, checking in on Wal-Mart, a pipeline report, a safe assumption, and the alternative reality. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
The manufactured Africa Sting case may be over, but it effects are still being felt.
Allied Defense Group (“ADG”) employed Mark Frederick Morales, one of the individuals charged in the case. The company stated in its recent quarterly filing (here) as follows.
“In February and March, 2012, the DOJ dismissed charges against all individuals indicted in the FCPA sting operation, including the former employee of MECAR USA. Since this time, the Company’s FCPA counsel has had several discussions with the DOJ and SEC regarding the agencies’ respective inquiries. Based upon these discussions, it appears likely that resolution of these inquiries will involve a payment by the Company to at least one of these government agencies in connection with at least one transaction involving the former employee of Mecar USA. At this point, the amount of this payment is undeterminable.”
As noted in this previous post, in January 2010, ADG agreed to be acquired by Chemring Group PLC.
Another publicly traded company that employed an Africa Sting defendant, Amaro Goncalves, is Smith & Wesson. The company disclosed in its most recent quarterly filing (here) as follows.
“On February 21, 2012, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the indictments of the remaining defendants who are pending trial, including our former Vice President-Sales, International & U.S. Law Enforcement. On February 24, 2012, the district court granted the motion to dismiss. We cannot predict, however, when the investigation will be completed or its final outcome. There could be additional indictments of our company, our officers, or our employees. If the DOJ determines that we violated FCPA laws, we may face sanctions, including significant civil and criminal penalties. In addition, we could be prevented from bidding on domestic military and government contracts and could risk debarment by the U.S. Department of State. We also face increased legal expenses and could see an increase in the cost of doing international business. We could also see private civil litigation arising as a result of the outcome of the investigation. In addition, responding to the investigation may divert the time and attention of our management from normal business operations. Regardless of the outcome of the investigation, the publicity surrounding the investigation and the potential risks associated with the investigation could negatively impact the perception of our company by investors, customers, and others.”
Even though the individual Africa Sting cases are over, the case provided a point of entry into several companies and an entire industry and its effects are still being felt as demonstrated by the above disclosures.
Orthofix
This previous post discussed the July enforcement action against Orthofix International. As noted in the post, the specifics of the DOJ’s allegations were not known as the information against Orthofix was filed under seal. The information (here) was recently unsealed. In summary fashion, the DOJ alleged as follows under the heading “corrupt conduct.” “From [2003 through March 2010], with the knowledge of Orthofix Executive A [a citizen of Peru and legal permanent resident in the U.S. who was a senior manager of Orthofix Inc. (an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary) and responsible for sales operations in Latin America], Promeca [an entity incorporated and headquartered in Mexico and an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of Orthofix International] and its employees paid approximately $300,000 to Mexican officials, in return for agreements with IMSS and its hospitals to purchase millions of dollars in Orthofix International products.”
IMSS is a social service agency of the Mexican government that provided public services to Mexican workers and their families and the Mexican Officials identified in the information are as follows.
Mexican Official 1 – a deputy administrator of Magdelena de las Salinas (a hospital in Mexico City that IMSS owned and controlled)
Mexican Official 2 – the purchasing director of Magdelena de las Salinas
Mexican Official 3 – the purchasing director of Lomas Verdes (a hospital in the State of Mexico that IMSS owned and controlled)
Mexican Official 4 – a sub-director of IMSS
According to the information, “Executive A knew of the payments and things of value [provided to the Mexican Officials] but failed to stop the scheme or report the scheme to Orthofix Interntional or Orthofix’s Inc.’s compliance department.”
Under the heading “Internal Controls” the information alleges, among other things, as follows. “Orthofix International,which grew its direct distribution footprint in part by purchasing existing companies, often in high-risk markets, failed to engage in any serious form of corruption-related diligence before it purchased Promeca. Although Orthofix International promulgated its own anti-corruption policy, that policy was neither translated into Spanish nor implemented at Promeca. Orthofix International failed to provide any FCPA-related traning to many of its personnel, including Executive A. Orthofix also failed to train Promeca personnel for years on the FCPA, to test regularly or audit particular transactions, or to ensure that subsidiary maintained controls sufficient to detect, deter or prevent illicit payments to government officials.”
The information charges one count of violating the FCPA’s internal control provisions.
Checking In On Wal-Mart
During the media feeding frenzy after the New York Times Wal-Mart article (see here for the prior post), I had the pleasure to appear on Eliot Spitzer’s Viewpoint program on Current TV. At the end of the segment, after the substantive issues were discussed, Spitzer offered that he has several contacts in the FCPA bar and that, regardless of the substantive issues involved in Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny or the ultimate outcome, lots of lawyers were poised to make lots of money.
Spitzer of course was right.
During its second quarter earnings call (see here for the transcript) Wal-Mart executives stated as follows. “Within core corporate, we incurred approximately $34 million in expenses related to third-party advisors reviewing matters involving the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and we expect these expenses to continue through the rest of the year.” Later in the call, the following was said. “We also expect to incur approximately $35 to $40 million in expenses for the review of matters relating to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act during each of the remaining quarters for this fiscal year.”
In other news, on the civil litigation front, as noted in this Reuters article “an Indiana union pension fund that owns shares in Wal-Mart Stores Inc has sued the company to gain access to thousands of internal documents related to allegations that a Wal-Mart subsidiary bribed Mexican government officials.” According to the report, the lawsuit, filed in Delaware’s Chancery Court, alleges the “company had made a ‘woefully deficient’ production of documents following an earlier out-of-court demand and that hat documents were produced were ‘so heavily redacted,’ or blacked out, they were nearly worthless.”
Turning to Capital Hill, several prior posts have chronicled efforts by Representative Elijah Cummings and Henry Waxman to conduct a shadow investigation of Wal-Mart in the aftermath of the New York Times article (see here for the previous post). As indicated in this recent press release and this recent letter the lawmakers are growing impatient. In pertinent part, the letter to Wal-Mart CEO Michael Duke stated as follows.
“We are writing to give you a final opportunity to respond to our requests for information about allegations that your company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Although you have stated on multiple occasions that you intend to cooperate with our investigation, you have failed to provide the documents we requested, and you continue to deny us access to key witnesses. Your actions are preventing us from assessing the thoroughness of your internal investigation and from identifying potential remedial actions.
During the course of our investigation, we have learned that Wal-Mart’s concerns about potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are not limited to operations in Mexico, but are global in nature. Your outside counsel informed us that, before allegations of bribery in Mexico became public, Wal-Mart retained attorneys to conduct a broad review of the company’s anti-corruption policies. This review identified five “first tier” countries “where risk was the greatest.” Wal-Mart then conducted a worldwide assessment of the company’s anti-corruption policies, culminating in a series of recommendations and policy changes based on those findings.
In addition, we have obtained internal company documents, including internal audit reports, from other sources suggesting that Wal-Mart may have had compliance issues relating not only to bribery, but also to “questionable financial behavior” including tax evasion and money laundering in Mexico.”
Pipeline Report
Add NCR Corporation and Expro International to the list of companies under FCPA scrutiny.
NCR
Global technology company NCR Corp. recently disclosed here as follows.
This previous post regarding the recent Pfizer enforcement action raised the following question(s).
Does anyone truly believe that the only reason Chinese doctors prescribed Pfizer products was because under the “point programs” the physician would receive a tea set? Does anyone truly believe that the only reason Czech doctors prescribed Pfizer products was because the company sponsored educational weekend took place at an Austrian ski resort? Does anyone truly believe that the only reason Pakistani doctors offered Wyeth nutritional products to new mothers was because the company provided office equipment to the physicians?
The questions were asked in the context of disgorgement remedies, but can also be asked in the context of product safety. One can safely assume that if the enforcement agencies had any evidence to suggest that the products at issue jeopardized public safety, the enforcement agencies would have alleged such facts, as they occasionally do in FCPA enforcement actions (see Innospec for instance).
The absence of such allegations make this recent article by Online Pharmacy Safety foolishly speculative. The article states as follows.
“[The conduct at issue in the enforcement action] puts the safety of consumers at risk. If large companies are able to bribe their way to getting more business, and anticipate government officials to turn a blind eye, the wrong products could be getting into the hands of consumers worldwide. The Pfizer products approved by foreign governments and prescribed by doctors may not have been the best product available, which could endanger consumers. Doctors put selfishness at the expense of patients, and the company was putting profits ahead of its public safety.”
Harvey Silverglate (author of Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent) hit the ball out of the park with this recent Wall Street Jouranl op-ed. Referring to the recent Gibson Guitar Lacey Act enforcement action and how the resolution documents muzzle the company (as is typical in FCPA NPAs and DPAs), Silverglate wrote as follows.
“Through these and myriad other techniques, federal investigator and prosecutors create an alternative reality that favors their own institutional interests, regardless of the truth or of justce. All citizens and companies become subject to the Justice Department’s essentially unfettered power. Remedying this problem cannot be left to the victims of this governmental extortion, because their risks are too high if they fight; nor will their lawyers likely blow the whistle, since the bar makes a tidy living by playing the game. It is up to the rest of civil society to let the Justice Department emperor know that we see he is not wearing clothes.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
Next Up – Pfizer
First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011). Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012). Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012). The latest Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement based on the enforcement theory that various foreign health care providers are “foreign officials” is Pfizer / Wyeth (an entity acquired by Pfizer in 2009).
Total fines and penalties in the Pfizer / Wyeth enforcement action are approximately $60 million ($15 million via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement, and $45 million via separate settled SEC civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth). This post goes long and deep as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents (approximately 100 pages in total).
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. (an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).
Criminal Information
The criminal information begins with a description of Pfizer HCP and notes that during the relevant time period it “operated in several international markets through representative officers, including offices in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Kazakhstan, as well as through contracts with Russian distributors and employees of a representative officer of Pfizer HCP’s parent company in Moscow (‘Pfizer Russia’).” According to the information, “books and records of Pfizer HCP … were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer for purposes of preparing Pfizer’s year-end financial statements” filed with the SEC.
The information alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.
“The manufacture, registration, distribution, sale, and prescription of pharmaceuticals were highly-regulated activities throughout the world. While there were multinational regulatory schemes, it was typical that each country established its own regulatory structure at a local, regional, and/or national level. These regulatory structures generally required the registration of pharmaceuticals and regulated labeling and advertising. Additionally, in certain countries, the government established lists of pharmaceuticals. that were approved for government reimbursement or otherwise determined those pharmaceuticals that might be purchased by government institutions. Moreover, countries often regulated the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals, pharmacies, and healthcare professionals. In those countries with national healthcare system, hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were generally agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments, and, thus, many of the healthcare professionals employed by these agencies and instrumentalities were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA. During the relevant period, for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance, employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia made and authorized the making of payments of cash and the provision of other things of value both directly and through third parties. Funds for these payments were often generated by employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia through the use of collusive vendors to create fraudulent invoices.”
The information charges two counts: (i) conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and (ii) substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations. The conduct at issue took place between 1997 and 2006 and focuses on payments to alleged “foreign officials” as listed below “in exchange for improper business advantages for Pfizer HCP, including the approval of pharmaceutical products and increased sales of pharmaceutical products.”
Croatian Official (a citizen of the Republic of Croatia who held official positions on government committees in Croatia and had influence over decisions concerning the registration and reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 1 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a medical doctor employed by a public hospital who had influence over the Russian government’s purchase and prescription of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 2 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a high-ranking government official who held official positions on government committees in Russia and had influence over decisions concerning the reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 3 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who had influence over decisions concerning the treatment algorithms involving Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
In addition to the above alleged “foreign officials” the information describes “other foreign officials in various countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia.”
Under the heading “Manners and Means of the Conspiracy” the information alleges as follows.
“Pfizer HCP through its employees and agents agreed to make improper payments and provide benefits (including kickbacks, cash payments, gifts, entertainment and support for domestic and international travel) to numerous government officials, including physicians, pharmacologists and senior government officials, who were employed by foreign governments or instrumentalities of foreign governments, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. During the relevant time period, Pfizer HCP, through its employees and agents, corruptly authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of at least $2,000,000 to intermediary companies, government officials, and others, to corruptly induce the prescription and purchase of Pfizer products and to obtain regulatory approvals for Pfizer products. Pfizer HCP through its employees falsely recorded the improper transactions by booking them in a variety of ways, including as educational or charitable support, “Travel and Entertainment,” “Convention and Trade Meetings and Conferences,” “Distribution Freight,” “Clinical Grants/Clinical Trials,” “Gifts,” and “Professional Services —Non Consultant,” in order to conceal the improper nature of the transactions in the books and records of Pfizer HCP.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Bulgaria” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about January 24, 2003, a District Manager in Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Bulgaria (“Pfizer HCP Bulgaria”) sent an email to his subordinates that discussed marketing programs and “various possibilities to stimulate the prescribers” and instructed them to give individual doctors employed in Bulgarian public hospitals “a specific target as to how many packs (or new patients) per month he should achieve” and then provide support for international travel on the basis of the promises to prescribe made by the doctors. On or about October 14, 2003, a Pfizer HCP Bulgaria sales department manager sent an electronic message to multiple sales representatives containing instructions for submitting sponsorship requests. The manager wrote, “[e]ach representative wanting to sponsor someone …must very precisely state the grounds for recommending the sponsorship, and also what the doctor in question is expected to do or has already done (which is the better option).”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Croatia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about July 9, 2003, employees of Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Croatia (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”) caused a wire transfer of $1,200 to be made from a bank account in Belgium to an account in Austria controlled by Croatian Official, which wire transfer was part of more than $85,000 paid to Croatian Official between 1997 and 2003, and which was for a purpose described by the country manager as follows: “as [Croatian Official] is a member of the Registration Committee regarding pharmaceuticals, I do expect that all products which are to be registered, will pass the regular procedure by his assistance. On or about February 18, 2004, a Pfizer HCP Croatia sales representative drafted a memorandum reporting on her discussions with doctors at Croatian public hospitals regarding bonus agreements for purchases of a Pfizer product, which reflected an agreement with the chief doctor who promised purchases of the product in exchange for Pfizer HCP providing various things of value, including travel benefits and bonuses based on a percentage of sales.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Kazakhstan” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about May 5, 2000, Pfizer HCP entered into an exclusive distribution contract for a Pfizer product with Kazakh Company [a Kazakh company that contracted with Pfizer HCP to provide distribution services and related services in the Republic of Kazakhstan] that was valued at a minimum of $500,000 believing that all or part of the value of the contract would be provided to a high-level Kazakh government official. On or about September 23, 2003, a regional supervisor responsible for Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Kazakhstan sent a memorandum to his supervisor memorializing a conversation held in Kazakhstan, in which he indicated that the controller of Kazakh Company was “very close to government officials,” and that Kazakh Company was likely responsible for Pfizer HCP’s past problems with the registration of a Pfizer product in Kazakhstan.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Russia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about September 8, -2003, a Pfizer Russia. employee emailed colleagues that a Russian government doctor, Russian Official 1, requested funds to attend a conference and, in return, “has pledged to prescribe at least 20 packs of [a Pfizer product] per month, and 20 [] packs [of another Pfizer product]. On or about November 19, 2003 in an invoice cover letter, a Pfizer Russia employee requested “payment for the (motivational) trip of [Russian Official 2] for the inclusion of [a Pfizer product] into the list … of medications refundable by the state” in order to influence Russian Official 2 to add the product to the regional formulary list. On or about April 7, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested that a payment be made to a Russian government official “who took an active part in getting [a Pfizer product] into the bidding.” On or about July 26, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to his supervisors stating that Russia Company 1 [a Russian company that bid on tenders issued by Russian healthcare institutions and worked with Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia to fill tenders using Pfizer products] had won a tender for the use of a Pfizer product, and that Russian Company 1’s costs included “10% – Motivation of Officials.” On or about December 2, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested sponsorship for a local department of health employee who was assisting the chief pharmacologist of a regional pediatric hospital, Russian Official 3, who was compiling algarithms for antibiotic therapy and wanted “to be financially compensated” for this work. The Pfizer Russia employee noted that, “in return for this,” the pharmacologist “will include our product’s in the treatment algorithms” to be used in government hospitals. On or about June 9, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to her supervisor stating that a cash payment had been made to an individual government doctor, which represented 5% of the value of the purchases of a Pfizer product made by a certain government hospital during the month of March 2005. On or about June 27, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that a government doctor “should be assigned the task of stretching the amount of the purchases … to US $100 thousand” as an “obligation” in exchange for a trip to a conference in the Netherlands or Germany. On or about September 14, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that an”agreement on cooperation” had been reached with a government doctor, and that Pfizer Russia’s requirements were the “purchase quantities,” and the government doctor’s requirement was “a trip to a conference.” In or around October 2005 through on or about December 8, 2005, Pfizer Russia caused payments totaling at least $69,000 to be made to Russian Company 2 [a Russian company that provided certain services to Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia, including making improper payments to Russian government officials and other companies on Pfizer HCP’s behalf, in order to conceal the payments] with the understanding that the payments would be provided to individual Russian doctors employed in public hospitals, and that the payments represented 5% of the value of the purchases of Pfizer products in the doctors’ respective government hospitals. In or around October 2005, Pfizer Russia employees discussed how a regional distributor would provide Pfizer Russia with companies that have “neutral names,” to which Pfizer Russia could make improper payments that would be booked as conferences to provide benefits to government doctors.”
DPA
The DOJ’s charges against Pfizer HCP were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement. Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer HCP admitted, accepted and acknowledged “that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, employees and agents” as set forth in the information. As is customary in DOJ FCPA corporate enforcement actions, Pfizer HCP agreed not to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility for the conduct set forth in the resolution documents.
The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors: “(a) the extraordinary cooperation of Pfizer HCP’s parent company, Pfizer Inc., (“Pfizer”}, with the Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including thorough and responsive reporting of potential violations, including the conduct of other companies and individuals; (b) Pfizer’s initial voluntary disclosure of potential improper payments and the timely and complete disclosure of the facts [described in the DPA] as well as facts relating to potential improper payments in various countries that had been identified by its compliance program, internal audit function and global internal investigations concealing bribery and related misconduct; (c) the early and extensive remedial efforts undertaken by Pfizer, including the substantial and continuing improvements Pfizer has made to its global anticorruption compliance procedures; (d) Pfizer’s agreement to maintain an anti-corruption compliance program for all of its subsidiaries worldwide, including Pfizer HCP, to continue in its efforts to implement enhanced compliance measures [as required by the DPA] and to provide to the Department written reports on its progress and experience in maintaining and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures [as described in the DPA].”
Pursuant to the DPA, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for the conduct at issue was $22.8 – $45.6 million. The DPA specifically states that a downward departure “is warranted for substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.” The DPA then states as follows. “The Government and Pfizer HCP agree that $15 million is the appropriate monetary penalty, which is a 34% reduction off the bottom of the recommended Guidelines fine range. Pfizer HCP and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given the nature and extent of Pfizer’s voluntary, prompt and thorough disclosure of the misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of Pfizer’s extensive cooperation in this matter, Pfizer’s cooperation … in the Department’s investigation into other misconduct in the industry, and Pfizer’s extraordinary and ongoing remediation.”
Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer’s HCP’s parent company, Pfizer, agreed that it will report to the DOJ during the term of the DPA regarding remediation and implementation of certain compliance measures required under the agreement.
The DPA contains a section titled “Origin of the Investigation and Cooperation with the authorities” and states as follows.
“In May 2004, Pfizer’s Corporate Compliance Division learned of potentially improper payments by the Croatian representative office of Pfizer HCP (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”). After conducting a preliminary investigation using external counsel, Pfizer made a voluntary disclosure to the Department and to the Commission. At the time, neither agency was aware of the allegations of improper payments or had any open investigation involving the overseas operations of Pfizer or any of its subsidiaries. From 2004 to the present, Pfizer, using external counsel and forensic accountants, internal Legal, Compliance, and Corporate Audit personnel, conducted an extensive, global review of its operations regarding allegations of improper payments to government officials and government doctors, including in Pfizer HCP markets and those of other Pfizer subsidiaries. This included a review of allegations that were identified by Pfizer’s own internal investigations and compliance controls, including its system of proactive FCPA reviews and enhanced audits. Pfizer reported to the Department and the Commission on the results of these investigations on a regular basis. At the request of the Department and the Commission, Pfizer agreed to periodically toll the statute of limitations on its own behalf and on behalf of its subsidiaries. In addition, starting immediately in 2004, Pfizer launched extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive review of its compliance program, implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis, developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures, adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits, performing proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately ten markets annually, and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization. Pfizer regularly reported to the Department and the Commission on these activities and sought their input concerning the scope and focus of these remedial activities.”
In a release (here) DOJ representatives stated as follows. “Pfizer took short cuts to boost its business in several Eurasian countries, bribing government officials in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia to the tune of millions of dollars.” “Corrupt pay-offs to foreign officials in order to secure lucrative contracts creates an inherently uneven marketplace and puts honest companies at a disadvantage. Those that attempt to make these illegal backroom deals to influence contract procurement can expect to be investigated by the FBI and appropriately held responsible for their actions.”
SEC
The SEC enforcement action includes separate settled civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth.
Pfizer Complaint
The settled civil complaint (here) against Pfizer alleges, in summary, as follows.
“This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [FCPA by Pfizer] relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Pfizer’s subsidiaries in order to assist Pfizer in obtaining or retaining business. At various times from at least 2001 through 2007, employees and agents of subsidiaries of Pfizer, conducting business in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. These improper payments were variously made to influence regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and to clear customs. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples included falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, clinical trials, freight, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, but the inaccurate books and records of Pfizer’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer, and Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls.”
The SEC’s allegations concerning conduct in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia are substantively similar to the DOJ’s allegations described above.
As to Russia, the SEC complaint contains the following additional allegations concerning customs related payments. “During the relevant period, Russian Federation customs officials would not clear pharmaceutical products for importation unless the importer provided an official certification indicating that the products conformed to the specific terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed by the manufacturer with the Ministry of Health. The Russian government licensed a private certification company (the “Certification Center”) to perform this governmental function, which performed inspections and furnished the necessary certificates. In the spring of 2005, Pfizer Russia began to experience increasing difficulty in obtaining the necessary certificates because the Pfizer products did not conform to the precise terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed with the Ministry of Health. On or about September or October 2005, a Certification Center employee proposed that the Certification Center would overlook the non-compliance of Pfizer Russia’s products in exchange for monthly payments of approximately $3,000. With the approval of the then-Pfizer Russia Country Manager, between October and December 2005 Pfizer Russia made payments of over $13,000 through an intermediary company, which then forwarded the payments to a company Pfizer Russia employees believed to be controlled by the Certification Center’s employees. The customs clearing problems ceased after Pfizer Russia started making payments, but they resumed when Pfizer Russia stopped the payments in 2006 after Pfizer began a Corporate Compliance review in Russia.”
As to conduct in China, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Investment Co. Ltd. (Pfizer China). “From at least 2003 through 2007, Pfizer China, through its employees and agents, provided cash payments, hospitality, gifts, and support for international travel to doctors employed by Chinese government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products, provide hospital formulary listing, and otherwise use their influence to grant Pfizer China an unfair advantage.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the cash payments, gifts, and travel support made to Chinese government doctors by failing to accurately record the transactions.”
As to conduct in the Czech Republic, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer spol. s.r.o. (Pfizer Czech). “From at least 2003 and through 2004, Pfizer Czech, through its employees and agents, provided support for international travel and recreational opportunities to doctors employed by the Czech government with the intent to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Czech employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions, and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Conventions and Trade Meeting,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Italy, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Italia S.r.l (Pfizer Italy). “From at least 2001 and continuing through early 2004, Pfizer Italy provided, directly or through vendors, cash payments, gifts, support for domestic and international travel, and other benefits to doctors employed by Italian government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Italy employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Marketing Expenses,” “Professional Training,” and “Advertising in Scientific Journals,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Serbia, the SEC alleges as follows as to a representative office of Pfizer HCP (Pfizer HCP Serbia). “Pfizer HCP Serbia, through one of its sales representatives, paid for a government employed doctor to attend a conference in Chile in exchange for the doctor’s agreement to increase his department’s purchases of Pfizer products. Although Pfizer HCP Serbia management discovered the improper agreement and terminated the responsible sales representative, it still provided the support after the doctor threatened to spread negative information about Pfizer’s reputation as a company.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls” the SEC alleged as follows. “[F]our Pfizer subsidiaries engaged in transactions in eight countries which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance. Through the four subsidiaries, Pfizer earned aggregate profits of $16,032,676 as a result of these improper transactions. [D]uring the relevant period the Pfizer subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. The false entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. [D]uring the relevant period Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.”
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Pfizer with violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint further notes as follows. “Pfizer made an initial voluntary disclosure of certain of these issues to the Commission and Department of Justice in October 2004, and thereafter diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of its operations in no less than 19 countries, which identified additional potential violations, and regularly reported on the results of these investigations and fully cooperated with the staff of the Commission. Pfizer also undertook a comprehensive compliance review of its operations, enhanced its internal controls and compliance functions, engaged in significant disciplinary measures, and developed and implemented global FCPA compliance procedures, including the development and implementation of innovative proactive procedures, and sophisticated supporting systems.”
In addition, the SEC complaint contains a separate section titled “remedial efforts” that states as follows.
“Pfizer has taken extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive worldwide review of its compliance program; implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis; developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures; adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits; performing innovative and proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately 10 markets annually; and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”
Wyeth Complaint
The SEC also brought a settled civil complaint (here) against Wyeth LLC. According to the complaint, Wyeth was an issuer but in connection with its acquisition by Pfizer in October 2009, Wyeth delisted and became a wholly-owned subsidary of Pfizer.
The complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows. “This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [by Wyeth], while an issuer, relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Wyeth’s subsidiaries in order to assist Wyeth in obtaining or retaining business. During the time relevant to this Complaint, Wyeth was a pharmaceutical company engaged in business throughout the world, and an issuer as that term is used under the FCPA. At various times from at least 2005 through 2010, subsidiaries of Defendant Wyeth conducting business in several countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples include falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Wyeth, but the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Wyeth, and Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls. Certain of these payments were made following the acquisition of Wyeth by Pfizer Inc. (“Pfizer”) without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, and the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries regarding those payments were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer.”
As to Indonesia, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 until 2010, Wyeth Indonesia [an Indonesian company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments and nutritional products to employees of Indonesian government-owned hospitals, including doctors employed by the Indonesian government. The cash payments and products were intended to influence the doctors’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia employees also took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Miscellaneous Expenses – Joint Promotions,” “Medical Education – Promo,” “Trade Allowances,” and “Miscellaneous Selling Expenses,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to Pakistan, the complaint alleges as follows. “Starting at least in 2005 and continuing into 2009, Wyeth Pakistan [a Pakistani company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth] employees provided improper benefits to doctors who were employed by healthcare institutions owned or controlled by the Pakistani government. These improper benefits included cash payments, travel, office equipment and renovations, and were intended to influence the doctors to recommend Wyeth products to new mothers.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Pakistan employees and local management took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Advertising and Sales Promotion,” “Film Show,” “Entertainment,” “Product Meetings,” and “Give Aways and Gifts,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to China, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 through 2010 and until the conduct was stopped by Pfizer, Wyeth China [a Chinese company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments to Chinese state-owned hospitals and healthcare providers (including doctors, nurses, and midwives) employed by the Chinese government that were intended to influence the healthcare providers’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the payments by falsifying expense reimbursement requests and, in concert with local travel agencies, by submitting false or inflated invoices and other supporting documentation for large-scale consumer education events, resulting in those transactions being falsely recorded in Wyeth China’s books and records.
As to Saudi Arabia, the complaint alleges as follows. “In June 2007, the local distributor, at the direction of Wyeth Saudi Arabia [a Delaware corporation that operated a representative office in Saudi Arabia], made a cash payment to a Saudi Arabian customs official to secure the release of a shipment of promotional items that were to be used in connection with the marketing and sale of Wyeth’s nutritional products. These promotional items were held in port because Wyeth Saudi Arabia had failed to secure a required Saudi Arabian Standards Organization Certificate of Conformity. In July 2007, Wyeth Saudi Arabia reimbursed the distributor for this cash payment and improperly recorded it as a “facilitation expense” in its books and records.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls,” the SEC alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia, Wyeth Pakistan, and Wyeth China engaged in transactions which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials. Through these three subsidiaries Wyeth earned aggregate profits of approximately $17,217,831 as a result of these improper transactions. […] During the relevant period, the Wyeth subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. False entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Wyeth, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. […] During the relevant period, Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Wyeth with violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint notes as follows. “Following Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth, which was finalized on or about October 15, 2009, Pfizer undertook a risk-based FCPA due diligence review of Wyeth’s global operations and reported the results of that diligence review to the Commission staff within 180 days of the closing. Pfizer’s post-acquisition review identified potential improper payments, and it diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of Wyeth’s operations and voluntarily disclosed the results to the Commission staff, which included identifying improper payments made by Wyeth’s Nutritional Products Division in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, as well as additional improper payments made by other Wyeth subsidiaries. Following the acquisition, Pfizer diligently and promptly integrated Wyeth’s legacy operations into its compliance program and cooperated fully with the Commission staff.”
In this SEC release, Kara Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC’s FCPA Unit) states as follows. “Pfizer subsidiaries in several countries had bribery so entwined in their sales culture that they offered points and bonus programs to improperly reward foreign officials who proved to be their best customers. These charges illustrate the pitfalls that exist for companies that fail to appropriately monitor potential risks in their global operations.”
As noted in the SEC release, in settling the charges Pfizer and Wyeth neither admitted nor denied the allegations. The release states as follows. “Pfizer consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $16,032,676 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $10,307,268 for a total of $26,339,944. [Pfizer] also is required to report to the SEC on the status of its remediation and implementation of compliance measures over a two-year period, and is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions. “Wyeth consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $17,217,831 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $1,658,793, for a total of $18,876,624. As a Pfizer subsidiary, the status of Wyeth’s remediation and implementation of compliance measures will be subsumed in Pfizer’s two-year self-reporting period. Wyeth also is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
Brett Campbell and Peter Clark (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft – here and here) represented Pfizer. Clark is a former head of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program.
See here for Pfizer’s press release.
Friday Roundup
Add two more companies to the list, a reply to a retort, Avon developments, Total S.A. perhaps nears a top-5 settlement, the reason for those empty Olympic seats, another FCPA-inspired derivative action is dismissed, Sensata Technologies and more on the meaning of “declination,” one of my favorite reads and additional material for the weekend reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Recent Disclosures
As noted in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post “German healthcare firm Fresenius Medical Care AG has opened an internal investigation into potential violations” of the FCPA. The company’s recent SEC filing (here) states as follows.
“The Company has received communications alleging certain conduct that may violate the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and other anti-bribery laws. In response to the allegations, the Audit and Corporate Governance Committee of the Company’s Supervisory Board is conducting an internal review with the assistance of counsel retained for such purpose. The Company has voluntarily advised the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice that allegations have been made and of the Company’s internal review. The Company is fully committed to FCPA compliance. It cannot predict the outcome of its review.”
In addition, as noted in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, “the Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, the world’s largest manufacturer of generic drugs, for possible violations” of the FCPA. The Israel based company recently stated in an SEC filing (here) as follows.
“Teva received a subpoena dated July 9, 2012 from the SEC to produce documents with respect to compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (“FCPA”) in Latin America. Teva is cooperating with the government. Teva is also conducting a voluntary investigation into certain business practices which may have FCPA implications and has engaged independent counsel to assist in its investigation. These matters are in their early stages and no conclusion can be drawn at this time as to any likely outcomes.”
U.K. DPAs
In this previous post, I discussed my letter to the U.K. Ministry of Justice urging the MoJ to just say no to deferred prosecution agreements. Over at thebriberyact.com (a site that has lead discussion of the issue) the authors disagree with me (see here). That’s all fine and dandy and healthy to the discussion, but the substance of the retort is not persuasive.
The retort is basically that the SFO “frequently has to fight its corner in court” and that “sometimes it loses” whereas in the U.S. “the accepted wisdom [is] that an FCPA investigation would result in a corporate settlement” and the “DOJ simply [does] not have to test its legal theories in court.” In short, the authors state “statistically in the US corporates and their counsel often fold in the face of a DOJ investigation” but “in the UK this is not so.”
Contrary to the suggestion in the retort, I did not ignore the Bribery Act’s Section 7 offense – rather it is all the more reason to reject DPAs.
The retort closes as follows. “Sadly, as it stands, the UK enforcement agencies do not have equality of arms when it comes to their enforcement toolkit. Put another way the DOJ can end run UK enforcement agencies because it does have the potential to enter into DPA’s. This reason alone is justification enough for putting in place a system which delivers a similar result to the US system.”
This confirms in my mind that the UK’s desire for DPAs has little to do with justice and deterring improper conduct, but more to do with enforcement statistics and posturing in an emerging “global arms race” when it comes to “prosecuting” corruption and bribery offenses.
Avon Developments
Avon was in the news quite a bit this week.
On Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported (here) that “federal prosecutors looking into possible bribery of foreign officials by Avon have asked to speak to Andrea Jung, the former chief executive and current full-time chairman.”
On Wednesday, the company filed its quarterly report and stated, among other things, as follows. “We are in discussions with the SEC and DOJ regarding mutually resolving the government investigations. There can be no assurance that a settlement will be reached or, if a settlement is reached, the timing of any such settlement or that the terms of any such settlement would not have a material adverse effect on us.” During the Q2 earnings call, company CEO Sheri McCoy stated as follows. “We are in discussion with the SEC and DOJ regarding mutually resolving the government investigations.”
On Thursday, the Wall Street Journal reported (here) that McCoy “frustrated with the pace of Avon’s internal probe, has pushed to bring in a second law firm for advice on the progress of the investigation. The company has held discussions with law firm Allen & Overy LLP for that role.” Arnold & Porter has been leading Avon’s investigation. According to the article, Avon’s “probe has turned up millions of dollars of payments in Brazil and France made to consultants hired to assist with Avon’s tax bills in those countries.”
What to make of the above information?
It is unusual for the enforcement agencies to want to speak to a former CEO and current chairman in connection with an FCPA inquiry. But then again, prosecutors have reportedly spoken to several other Avon executives in connection with the probe. Given Avon’s disclosure that it has begun settlement discussions, this would suggest that the factual portion of the enforcement agencies investigation is over.
Avon’s FCPA scrutiny has perhaps been most notable for the amount of pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses – approximately $280 million. Thus, yesterday’s report that the company is considering bringing in a second law firm nearly four years into the investigation is interesting and unusual.
Even though Avon has disclosed it is in settlement talks, an enforcement action in 2012 is not certain. In many cases, companies have disclosed the existence of FCPA settlement discussions, but the actual enforcement action did not happen for 6-12 months (or longer).
Whenever the enforcement action occurs, and whatever the ultimate fine and penalty is, Avon’s greatest financial hit has likely already occured – its pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. For instance, assuming a settlement amount would match the $280 million, this would be the sixth largest FCPA settlement of all time, and none of the enforcement actions in the top 5 were outside the context of foreign “government” procurement.
Total Settlement Near?
For some time, there has been speculation that Total S.A. (you better sit down for this) would actually mount a defense and put the DOJ and SEC to its burden of proof in an enforcement action. Information in a recent company press release suggests that this is unlikely to occur. In this recent release, Total stated as follows. “Total has been cooperating with the … SEC and DOJ in connection with an investigation concerning gas contracts awarded in Iran in the 1990’s. Total, the SEC, and the DOJ have conducted discussions to resolve issues arising from the investigation. In light of recent progess in these discussions, Total has provisioned 316 million euros [$389 million] in its accounts in the second quarter of 2012.”
A $389 million settlement would be a top five FCPA settlement in terms of fine and penalty amounts. For additional coverage, see here from Reuters.
Empty Olympic Seats
A reason, perhaps, for those empty Olympic seats? According to a recent study (see here) by the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics “tighter than anticipated corporate entertainment and gift policies.”
Smith & Wesson Derivative Action Dismissed
Even against the backdrop of generally frivolous plaintiff derivative claims in the FCPA context, the action against Smith & Wesson (“S&W”) stood out. After S&W employee Amaro Goncalves was criminally indicted in the manufactured Africa Sting case, certain investors filed a derivative claim in U.S. District Court in Massachusetts suing members of the board of S&W and company officers derivatively on behalf of the corporation for failing to have effective FCPA controls and oversight, thereby breaching their duty of care.
In dismissing the complaint (see here for the decision) Judge Michael Ponsor characterized the complaint as follows. “[I]n essence, that the company enjoyed an increase in international sales and then had an employee indicted for FCPA violations. This indictment, later dropped, supposedly evidenced a failure to implement proper controls.”
For another recent dismissal of an FCPA inspired derivative claim against Tidewater, see this prior post. See also this recent post from Kevin LaCroix at The D&O Diary blog.
Sensata Technologies
In October 2010, Sensata Technologies disclosed in a quarterly report (here) as follows.
“An internal investigation has been conducted under the direction of the Audit Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors to determine whether any laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), may have been violated in connection with a certain business relationship entered into by one of the Company’s operating subsidiaries involving business in China. The Company believes the amount of payments and the business involved was immaterial. The Company discontinued the specific business relationship and its investigation has not identified any other suspect transactions. The Company has contacted the United States Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission to begin the process of making a voluntary disclosure of the possible violations, the investigation, and the initial findings. The Company will cooperate fully with their review.”
In its most recent quarterly report (here), the company disclosed as follows.
“During 2012, the DOJ informed us that it has closed its inquiry into the matter but indicated that it could reopen its inquiry in the future in the event it were to receive additional information or evidence. We have not received an update from the SEC concerning the status of its inquiry.”
Did Sensata “win a declination” as the FCPA Blog suggested here?
Since August 2010 (see here for the prior post) I have proposed that when a company voluntarily discloses an FCPA internal investigation to the DOJ and the SEC, and when the DOJ and/or SEC decline enforcement, the DOJ and/or the SEC should publicly state, in a thorough and transparent manner, the facts the company disclosed to the agencies and why the agencies declined enforcement on those facts.
Perhaps then we would know if the DOJ concluded it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the necessary elements of an FCPA charge, yet decided not to pursue Sensata – which is my definition of declination as noted in this prior post. Anything else, is what the law commands, not a declination.
Favorite Read
One of my favorite reads is always Shearman & Sterling’s “Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” See here for the most recent edition.
As to “foreign official,” the report states as follows. “[T]he government does not appear to have been deterred by the [foreign official] debate. In most of the cases brought in 2012, the relevant government officials were employed by “instrumentalities” such as state health insurance plans (Orthofix), a state-owned nuclear plant (Data Systems & Solutions), government hospitals (Biomet and Smith & Nephew), a state-owned real estate development company (Peterson) a state-owned oil company (Marubeni), and state-owned airlines (NORDAM).”
As to FCPA guidance, the report states as follows. “We understand that this guidance will be issued before October, when the US is scheduled to issue a written progress report on its implementation of the OECD Working Group on Bribery’s recommendations.”
A final kudos – Shearman & Sterling keeps its FCPA enforcement statistics the best way. As it explains – “we count all actions against a corporate “family” as one action. Thus, if the DOJ charges a subsidiary and the SEC charges a parent issuer, that counts as one action.” This is consistent with my “core” approach (see here), but unlike many others in the industry.
Weekend Reading Stack
An interesting and informative article (here) in Fortune about the Alba-Alcoa tussle and the role of Victor Dahdaleh. For more on the underlying civil suit between Alba and Alcoa see this recent Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post.
SOX’s executive certification requirements were supposed to be a panacea for corporate fraud. It has not happened. See here from Alison Frankel (Reuters) and here from Michael Rapoport (Wall Street Journal). As noted in this prior post concerning the Paul Jennings (former CFO and CEO of Innospec) enforcement action, SOX certification charges were among the charges the SEC filed against Jennings. Then SEC FCPA Unit Chief Cheryl Scarboro stated, “we will vigorously hold accountable those who approve such bribery and who sign false SOX certifications and other documents to cover up the wrongdoing.” Speaking of Jennings, as noted in this recent U.K. Serious Fraud Office, Jennings recently pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to corrupt Iraqi public officials and other agents of the Government of Iraq.
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A good weekend to all.
The U.K. Ministry Of Justice Should Say No To DPAs In The Bribery Act Context
As noted in this prior post, the U.K. Ministry of Justice (“MoJ”) has a consultation process open concerning its proposal to adopt deferred prosecution agreements. Below is the text of my letter to the MoJ urging it to say no to DPAs in the Bribery Act context. You too can make your voice heard on this issue before August 9th (see here for more information).
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This letter responds to the Ministry of Justice’s (“MoJ”) request for consultation regarding deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) (Consultation Paper CP9/2012).
While the MoJ’s DPA proposal concerns a variety of economic crimes, it is probable that a significant percentage of DPAs, if implemented, will be used to resolve Bribery Act enforcement actions as has happened in the U.S. where a significant percentage of DPAs and related nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) have been used to resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) enforcement actions. Given that my primary area of expertise is the FCPA and related anti-corruption laws and initiatives including the Bribery Act, I confine my comments to potential application of DPAs to resolve Bribery Act prosecutions.
To begin, I applaud the MoJ for its wholesale rejection of non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) to resolve allegations of corporate criminal activity. Like the MoJ, I agree that such resolution vehicles, which are a prominent feature of the U.S. criminal justice system including in FCPA enforcement actions, are not suitable given the lack of transparency in such agreements including the lack of judicial oversight. I can only hope that the U.S. Department of Justice sees the wisdom of your decision and likewise abolishes such agreements as I have advocated.
I also applaud the MoJ for insisting, should there be DPAs in the U.K., “that there should be judicial involvement from an early stage whereby the proposed DPA is considered at a preliminary hearing before it returns for final judicial approval.” As noted by the MoJ’s consultation paper, U.S. style DPAs lack such a feature.
I am concerned however that in its consultation paper the MoJ relies upon several unfounded assertions when discussing use of DPAs in the U.S. For instance, the consultation paper asserts, as if a fact, that such vehicles have been “successfully adopted” in the U.S. and that such vehicles “support an existing culture of self-reporting of serious economic crimes.”
If “successfully adopted” means that such vehicles has resulted in an increase in enforcement actions, then yes I agree with the MoJ’s statement. After all, it is not surprising that the more options an enforcement agency has (beyond the traditional two options of prosecuting and not prosecuting) the more enforcement actions that will result. Yet, I submit that a factor in determining success ought to be quality of the enforcement action and whether an enforcement agency theory of prosecution, if subjected to judicial scrutiny and an adversarial proceeding, can meet its high burden of proof. This element of “success” is missing from U.S. style resolution vehicles replaced with a system whereby entering into such a resolution vehicle is often merely a cost/benefit exercise for a company often divorced from the law and relevant facts. I’ve called this dynamic “the façade of enforcement” and I urge the MoJ to place greater importance on quality, not quantity, in assessing “success.”
Moreover, the MoJ asserts, as if fact, that such resolution vehicles “support an existing culture of self-reporting of serious economic crimes” in the U.S. While empirical data is lacking as to the frequency of voluntary disclosures of improper conduct during this era of frequent U.S. use of NPAs and DPAs, anecdotal evidence and comments from various experts suggest that a high percentage of corporate conduct that could implicate criminal laws is not reported to the enforcement agencies. I submit that one factor driving this dynamic is that companies and its counsel have come to realize that the enforcement agency will not be diligent and complete in its application of law to facts and its consideration of mitigating facts because the enforcement agency will never have to prove its enforcement theory to anyone other than itself. In short, U.S. alternative resolution vehicles ought not be viewed as a successful or desirable export.
Regardless of the divergent views one may have as to the “success” of alternative resolution vehicles in the U.S. and whether such vehicles support a culture of self-reporting, my primary concern with the U.K. looking to the U.S. for support in considering DPAs is the material differences between U.K. and U.S. corporate criminal liability, including in the bribery context.
Under the U.S. principle of respondeat superior a business organization can face criminal liability based on the acts of any employee or agent to the extent the individual’s conduct was in the scope of their duties and was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization. U.S. adoption of alternative resolution vehicles largely developed out of a sense of injustice when this principle was applied to organizations based on isolated conduct or conduct that occurred despite the organization’s good faith compliance efforts.
Unlike the ease in which a business organization can be subject to criminal liability under U.S. law, as the consultation paper itself notes, organization criminal liability under U.K. law is very difficult to prove and “depends on establishing that the ‘directing mind and will’ of an organization was at fault.” In short, U.S. adoption of DPAs was largely a function of general circumstances not present under U.K. law.
Moreover, U.S. use of alternative resolution vehicles in the FCPA context implicates specific circumstances not present in the Bribery Act. As the consultation paper itself notes, the Bribery Act is a unique law in that it already provides in Section 7 a unique offense to hold organizations liable that fail to adopt adequate procedures to prevent bribery. Although many, including myself, have called for the FCPA to be amended to include such a compliance defense, the FCPA currently does not contain such an exception.
In conclusion, I pose the following questions the MoJ should consider during its consultation process. Why does a law with an adequate procedures defense require the third option of a deferred prosecution agreement (the first two options being prosecute vs. not prosecute)? If a corporate has adequate procedures, but an isolated act of bribery nevertheless occurs within its organization, the corporate presumably would not face prosecution under the Bribery Act. This seems like a just and reasonable result and there is no need for a third option in such a case. On the other hand, if a corporate does not have adequate procedures (thus demonstrating a lack of commitment to anti-bribery compliance) and an act of bribery occurs within its organization, it presumably would face prosecution under the Bribery Act. This seems like a just and reasonable result. Does a third option really need to be created for corporates who do not implement adequate procedures? I submit the answer is no and urge the MoJ to reject use of DPAs in the Bribery Act context.
Summer Reading Spectacular
Grab your beverage of choice, find some shade, and sit back and enjoy the recent work product of FCPA Inc – plus the recent annual report of the OECD Working Group on Bribery.
Gibson Dunn
Gibson Dunn recently released it 2012 mid-year FCPA update (see here). The update begins as follows. “As the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act turns 35 years old, the spike in enforcement activity that we first observed five years ago appears (at least for the moment) to be leveling off. Nevertheless, numerous developments this year bespeak a statute that is maturing rather than falling into obscurity: the first sustained pattern of trial activity; increasing “private attorney general” enforcement; and serious policy debates between industry, executive, and legislative interests leading up to much-anticipated statutory guidance from government regulators. The first half of 2012 was packed with important FCPA developments.” Thereafter, the update is a buffet of useful information and summaries including recent sentencing activity, a discussion of FCPA-related civil litigation, legislative and policy developments, U.K. developments, and a handy chart containing DOJ and SEC statements on corporate cooperation.
Another Gibson Dunn update you should read concerns NPA and DPAs. The firm recently released (here) its mid-year update on corporate deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements. As noted in the update, once again among the most frequent use of such agreements is to resolve FCPA enforcement actions.
Speaking of NPAs and DPAs, Law36o carried an article yesterday titled “DOJ Develops a Taste for Deferred Prosecution Deals.” I liked what Skadden partner John Carroll (here) had to say – that such agreements are a “way for the government to outsource its work and harvest relatively easy settlements” because “the government only has to win the case in the government’s office; it doesn’t have to win in the courtroom.”
Miller Chevalier
Miller & Chevalier recently released its FCPA Summer Review 2012 (see here). The review begins as follows. “‘Expectant’ describes the mood of FCPA practitioners during the first half of 2012. With a slow first half of the year for enforcement releases, and expected developments such as the issuance of the new FCPA Guidance around the corner, the second half of 2012 should be eventful, if not historic, for the 35-year old statute.” Thereafter, the review contains several goodies such as a chart containing known declinations in FCPA investigations 2008 to the present, “comings” and “goings” in the DOJ’s FCPA team, and how a recent district court rulings(discussed in this previous post) appears to have impacted the deferred prosecution agreement in the recent Data Systems enforcement action (see here for the previous post).
Debevoise & Plimpton
Debevoise & Plimpton recently released its periodic FCPA Update (see here). Among other things, the update contains an article on the “current status of the ‘selective waiver’ doctrine, i.e., the notion that a waiver of attorney-client privilege or work-product protection in a submission to the government is not a ‘waiver to all others.'” As the article notes, this is often an issue for counsel to consider in FCPA investigatons when disclosing to the DOJ or SEC.
Sidley Austin
Sidley Austin recently released its anti-corruption quarterly (see here). Although the quarterly did not include a certain FCPA related development from the second quarter, it did contain an informative lead article concerning FCPA joint venture liability.
OECD Annual Report
The OECD Working Group on Bribery recently released its annual report (here). Spectacular it is not. For all the good the OECD does in raising awareness of bribery and its effects and seeking to reduce bribery and corruption around the world, its enforcement statistics remain misleading, incomplete and in some cases inaccurate.
For instance, as noted in this prior post, it is fairly obvious why OECD member countries have varying degrees of enforcement of bribery and corruption offenses. Among other reasons, in most OECD member countries, prosecuting authorities have two choices – to prosecute or not to prosecute – there is no such thing as non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements. Moreover, in many OECD member countries there is no such thing as corporate criminal liability – or even if there is – such corporate liability can only be based on the actions of high-ranking executives or officers. This of course is materially different than the U.S. respondeat superior standard in which a business organization can face legal liability based on the actions of any employee to the extent the employee was acting within the scope of his or her duties and to the extent the conduct was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization.
The OECD’s statistics as to the U.S. are incomplete. Footnotes in the report state that DOJ and SEC enforcement actions “exclusively for violations of the books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA” are not captured. This misses a meaningful chunk of FCPA enforcement actions as it is common for the DOJ and SEC to structure settlements (so as to avoid collateral consequences or to reward cooperation or both) without charging FCPA anti-bribery violations (such as in Siemens and Daimler).
Moreover, the OECD statistics as to the U.S. are inaccurate in some cases. In a table “Decisions on Foreign Bribery Cases from 1999 to December 2011,” in a column titled number of individuals and legal persons acquitted / found not liable, the report indicates that only 1 individual or legal person has been acquitted or found not liable in a U.S. foreign bribery case. Not true.
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A good weekend to all.