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Friday Roundup

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Wal-Mart related, north of the border, scrutiny alerts and updates, and an issue to watch.

It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Wal-Mart Related

Here is what Wal-Mart said in its recent 4Q FY2015 earnings call.

“FCPA-and compliance-related costs were $36 million in the fourth quarter, comprised of $26 million for the ongoing inquiries and investigations, and $10 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements. For the full year, FCPA-and compliance related costs were $173 million, comprised of $121 million for the ongoing inquiries and investigations, and $52 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements. Last year, total FCPA-and compliance-related costs were $282 million.”

“In fiscal 2016, we expect our FCPA-related expenses to range between $160 and $180 million.”

Doing the math, Wal-Mart’s 4Q FCPA and compliance-related costs is approximately $563,000 in FCPA-related expenses per working day.

Over the past approximate three years, I have tracked Wal-Mart’s quarterly disclosed pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. While some pundits have ridiculed me for doing so, such figures are notable because, as has been noted in prior posts and in my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples,” settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from corporate FCPA scrutiny.  Pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the largest (in many cases to a degree of 3, 5, 10 or higher than settlement amounts) financial hit to a company under FCPA scrutiny.

While $563,000 per working day remains eye-popping, Wal-Mart’s recent figure suggests that the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have crested as the figures for the past five quarters have been approximately $640,000, $662,000, $855,000, $1.1 million and $1.3 million per working day.

In the aggregate, Wal-Mart’s disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses are as follows.

FY 2013 = $157 million.

FY 2014 = $282 million.

FY 2015  = $173 million.

FY 2016 = $160 – $180 million (projected)

North of the Border

Yesterday, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) announced charges against the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., its division SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc. and its subsidiary SNC-Lavalin International Inc.”  As stated in the release:

“The three entities have been charged with one count of corruption under paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act and one count of fraud under paragraph 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.The alleged criminal acts surfaced as part of the ongoing criminal investigation into the company’s business dealings in Lybia.

The charges laid are the following:

In Montreal, Judicial District of Montreal, elsewhere in Canada and abroad

  1. Between on or about August 16, 2001 and on or about September 20, 2011, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., its division SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc. and its subsidiary SNC-Lavalin International Inc., did, in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business, directly or indirectly give, offer or agree to give or offer a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind of a value of CAN$47,689,868 or more, to one or several public officials of the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” or to any person for the benefit of a public official of the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, to induce these officials to use their positions to influence any acts or decisions of the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” for which they perform their duties or functions, thereby committing an indictable offence contrary to paragraph 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act.
  2. Between on or about August 16, 2001 and on or about September 20, 2011, the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., its division SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc. and its subsidiary SNC-Lavalin International Inc. did, by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, whether or not it is a false pretense within the meaning of theCriminal Code, defraud the “Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, the “Management and Implementation Authority of the Great Man Made River Project” of Libya, the “General People’s Committee for Transport Civil Aviation Authority” of Libya, Lican Drilling Co Ltd, and the “Organization for Development of Administrative Centers” of Benghazi in Libya of property, money or valuable security or service of a value of approximately CAN$129,832,830, thereby committing an indictable offence contrary to paragraph 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.”

In the release, Assistant Commissioner Gilles Michaud, Commanding Officer of the RCMP’s National Division, stated: “Corruption of foreign officials undermines good governance and sustainable economic development. The charges laid today demonstrate how the RCMP continues to support Canada’s international commitments and safeguard its integrity and reputation.”

Upon being charged, SNC-Lavalin issued this release which states in full as follows.

“SNC-Lavalin was informed that federal charges have been laid by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada against SNC-Lavalin Group Inc., SNC-Lavalin International Inc. and SNC-Lavalin Construction Inc. Each entity has been charged with one count of fraud under section 380 of the Criminal Code of Canada and one count of corruption under Section 3(1)(b) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act. SNC-Lavalin firmly considers that the charges are without merit and will vigorously defend itself and plead not guilty in the interest of its current employees, families, partners, clients, investors and other stakeholders.

“The charges stem from the same alleged activities of former employees from over three years ago in Libya, which are publicly known, and that the company has cooperated on with authorities since then,” stated Robert G. Card, President and CEO, SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. “Even though SNC-Lavalin has already incurred significant financial damage and losses as a result of actions taken prior to March 2012, we have always been and remain willing to reach a reasonable and fair solution that promotes accountability, while permitting us to continue to do business and protect the livelihood of our over 40,000 employees, our clients, our investors and our other stakeholders.”

It is important to note that companies in other jurisdictions, such as the United States and United Kingdom, benefit from a different approach that has been effectively used in the public interest to resolve similar matters while balancing accountability and securing the employment, economic and other benefits of businesses.

These charges relate to alleged reprehensible deeds by former employees who left the company long ago. If charges are appropriate, we believe that they would be correctly applied against the individuals in question and not the company. The company has and will continue to fully cooperate with authorities to ensure that any individuals who are believed to have committed illegal acts are brought to justice. The company will also consider claims against these individuals to recover any damages the company has suffered as a result.

While the Public Prosecution Service of Canada and the RCMP have selected this as the next formal step in this 3-year old investigation, there is no change to the company’s right and ability to bid or work on any public or private projects.

Becoming a benchmark in ethics and compliance

Over the past three years, we have made significant changes to the company and remained focused on continuous improvements in ethics and compliance. The tone from the top is clear and unequivocal; there is zero tolerance for ethics violations. The individuals alleged to have been involved in past ethical issues are no longer with the company, and a new CEO has changed the face of the executive team. Under the leadership of the Board of Directors, the company has reinforced its Ethics and Compliance program with huge investments in time and money to rapidly make significant and concrete enhancements, including:

  • Creating the position of Chief Compliance Officer, who reports to the board, and hiring world-renowned leaders in compliance
  • Appointing an Independent Monitor recommended by and who reports solely to, the World Bank Group
  • Appointing compliance officers in all of the company’s business units and regional offices worldwide
  • Creating a dedicated Ethics and Compliance team
  • Further reinforcing internal controls and procedures
  • Further reinforcing its Code of Ethics and Ethics and Compliance Hotline
  • Producing a dedicated  Anti-Corruption Manual
  • Offering annual compliance training to all employees, with a special focus on those working in strategic roles
  • Developing and distributing a world-class Business Partners Policy to employees
  • Using an independent third party to screen candidates for senior management positions
Working hard to build a global leader in the engineering and construction industry

Over the past 3 years and while managing issues created by events prior to 2012, we have worked hard to develop and implement a strategy to become a global Tier-1 player and take our place in a consolidating industry. We have taken concrete steps towards a 5-year goal of doubling our size, and we continue to deliver on our strategy. A clear example is the acquisition of Kentz that added 15,000 employees to our oil and gas business, making us a Tier-1 player in this area.

Since 1911, SNC-Lavalin employees have been working with our clients to create world-class projects that improve people’s quality of life and provide value to our clients. We are the only Canadian player among the top engineering and construction firms in the world, ranking as the number one firm in both Canada and Quebec.

“I would like to thank our more than 40,000 employees, clients, shareholders, partners and other stakeholders for their trust and continuing support,” concluded Mr. Card.”

The portion of SNC-Lavalin’s statement highlighted above in bold and underlined is most interesting.

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Flowserve

In 2008, Flowserve Corporation and a related entity agreed to pay approximately $10.5 million to resolve DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement actions concerning conduct in connection with the U.N. Oil for Food Program in Iraq.  As part of the SEC resolution, Flowserve agreed to final judgment permanently enjoining it from future violations of FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions.

Earlier this week, Flowserve disclosed as follows.

“The Company has uncovered actions involving an employee based in an overseas subsidiary that violated our Code of Business Conduct and may have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The Company has terminated the employee, is in the process of completing an internal investigation, and has self-reported the potential violation to the United States Department of Justice and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. While the Company does not currently believe that this matter will have a material adverse impact on its business, financial condition, results of operations or cash flows, there can be no assurance that the Company will not be subjected to monetary penalties and additional costs.”

Eli Lilly

In December 2012, Eli Lilly agreed to pay $29 million to resolve an SEC FCPA enforcement action based on subsidiary conduct in China, Brazil, Poland, and Russia.  At the time, there was no parallel DOJ action which sent a signal to knowledgeable observers that there would likely not be a parallel DOJ action.

Earlier this week, Eli Lilly made this official when it disclosed:

“In August 2003, we received notice that the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was conducting an investigation into the compliance by Lilly’s Polish subsidiary with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA). Subsequently, we were notified that the SEC had expanded its investigation to other countries and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was conducting a parallel investigation. In December 2012, we announced that we had reached an agreement with the SEC to settle its investigation. The settlement relates to certain activities of Lilly subsidiaries in Brazil, China, Poland, and Russia from 1994 through 2009. Without admitting or denying the allegations, we consented to pay a civil settlement amount of $29.4 million and agreed to have an independent compliance consultant conduct a 60-day review of our internal controls and compliance program related to the FCPA. In January 2015, the DOJ advised us that they have closed their investigation into this matter.”

Rolls-Royce

As highlighted here, allegations have surfaced that Rolls-Royce “paid bribes for a contract with Brazilian oil firm Petrobras.” According to the report, “one of the Petrobras informants in the case, received at least $200,000 in bribes from Rolls-Royce, which makes gas turbines for Petrobras oil platforms.”

As noted in the report, “Britain’s Serious Fraud Office is separately investigating Rolls-Royce because of concerns over possible bribery in Indonesia and China.”

As highlighted here and here Rolls-Royce is also under investigation in the U.S. by the DOJ and in 2012 Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of  Rolls-Royce Holdings, resolved an FCPA enforcement action.

U.K. Sentences

The U.K. Serious Fraud Office recently announced that “two employees of Smith and Ouzman Ltd, a printing company based in Eastbourne, were sentenced … following an SFO investigation into corrupt payments made in return for the award of contracts to the company.” As noted in the release:

Smith and Ouzman Ltd specialises in security documents such as ballot papers and education certificates.  Its chairman, Christopher John Smith, aged 72 from East Sussex, was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, suspended for two years, for two counts of corruptly agreeing to make payments, contrary to section 1(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, to run concurrently. He was also ordered to carry out 250 hours of unpaid work and has been given a three month curfew.

Nicholas Charles Smith, the sales and marketing director of the company, aged 43 from East Sussex, was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for three counts of corruptly agreeing to make payments, to run concurrently. The company itself was also convicted of the same three offences and will be sentenced at a later date.

Both men were disqualified from acting as company directors for six years.

Director of the SFO, David Green CB QC commented:

“This case marks the first convictions secured against a corporate for foreign bribery, following a contested trial. The convictions recognise the corrosive impact of such conduct on growth and the integrity of business contracts in the Developing World.”

In passing sentence HHJ Higgins commented:

“Your behaviour was cynical, deplorable and deeply antisocial, suggesting moral turpitude.”

The briberyact.com published in full the Judge’s sentencing remarks.

Issue to Watch

This Wall Street Journal editorial was about Apple’s battle with its corporate monitor in an antitrust action.  While outside the FCPA context, the editorial nevertheless notes:

“Apple might have settled long ago as most corporations do, and that option might even have been cheaper than a protracted appeal. But the company is doing a public service by attempting to vindicate a legal principle and brake the growing abuse of court-appointed monitors and a crank theory of antitrust that will harm many more innovators if it is allowed to stand. If Apple prevails in the Second Circuit, it ought to sue Mr. Bromwich and attempt to disgorge the $2.65 million he has soaked from shareholders.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

In the classroom, what if, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

In the Classroom

I am pleased to share this release concerning a new Foreign Corrupt Practices Act class I am teaching this semester at Southern Illinois University School of Law.  As noted in the release, the course is believed to be one of the first specific FCPA law school classes offered that is exclusively devoted to the FCPA, FCPA enforcement and FCPA compliance.

I am grateful for the media coverage the class has attracted.  See here from Corporate Counsel, here from Main Justice, and here from Corporate Crime Reporter.

What If?

As highlighted in this previous post concerning JPMorgan’s scrutiny in China,  the conduct at issue in the front-page New York Times article was disclosed (sort of) in the company’s August 7th quarterly filing.  That filing identified, under the heading “Regulatory Developments” the following.

“A request from the SEC Division of Enforcement seeking information and documents relating to, among other matters, the Firm’s employment of certain former employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain clients.”

In the disclosure context, it has been noted by various courts that once a company “speaks” on an issue, its statements to the market can not be so incomplete as to be misleading.  Was JPMorgan’s August 7th disclosure misleading?  If not misleading, a bit “too cute?”  If JPMorgan’s August 7th disclosure mentioned the reason for the SEC’s request for information and that the request was in connection with an FCPA inquiry, would there even have been a front-page article in the NY Times on August 18th?  And if there was no front-page NY Times article would JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny have dominated the news this week?

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Entertainment Gaming Asia

Entertainment Gaming Asia, Inc., a company with shares listed on NASDAQ, is the focus of this article in the Cambodia Daily which states:

“Venturing into Cambodia’s casino market in May 2011, Macau-backed gambling firm Entertainment Gaming Asia (EGA) promised tens of thousands of dollars to the wife of Pailin’s provincial governor in order to lease land for the construction of a new casino … […]   There is no suggestion that the land lease arrangement breaks any laws.  But EGA’s registration with the SEC means the company is subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). […] EGA senior vice president Traci Mangini declined to comment on the land-lease arrangement.“We are not available for comment,” Ms. Mangini said in an email. Contacted this week, Mr. Chhean [who has held the powerful local position of governor in Pailin for more than a decade] insisted there was nothing improper about the land being rented from his wife. “It is correct that they hire the land [from my wife], they have hired it for two years already,” he said. He said the casino was fully approved by the government in Phnom Penh, and that he had no role in the licensing decision. Mr. Chhean said there was nothing inappropriate about the wife of a governor having business interests.”

Microsoft

This March 2013 post highlighted Microsoft’s FCPA scrutiny and how the DOJ and SEC “are examining kickback allegations made by a former Microsoft representative in China, as well as the company’s relationship with certain resellers and consultants in Romania and Italy.”  Add Pakistan and Russia to the list.  As reported in this Wall Street Journal article:

“In Russia, an anonymous tipster told Microsoft that resellers of its software allegedly funneled kickbacks to executives of a state-owned company to win a deal, the people familiar with the matter said. In Pakistan, a tipster alleged that Microsoft authorized a consulting firm to pay for a five day trip to Egypt for a government official and his wife in order to win a tender, the people familiar with the matter said. The two contacted Microsoft directly in the last eight months, the people said.”

Eli Lilly

In December 2012, Eli Lilly agreed to pay $29 million to resolve an SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged conduct in China, Brazil, Poland and Russia (see here for the prior post).

Lilly is again under scrutiny.  As referenced here by Reuters:

“U.S. drugmaker Eli Lilly and Co said it was ‘deeply concerned’ about allegations published in a Chinese newspaper that it spent more than 30 million yuan ($4.90 million) to bribe doctors in China to prescribe the firm’s medicines instead of rival products. A former senior manager for the company, identified by the pseudonym Wang Wei, told the 21st Century Business Herald that bribery and illegal payments at Eli Lilly’s China operations were widespread. […] Eli Lilly said in an emailed statement to Reuters that it was looking into the matter. ‘Although we have not been able to verify these allegations, we take them seriously, and we are continuing our investigation,’ the statement said. The U.S. firm said it had been made aware of “similar allegations” of kickbacks in 2012 by a former sales manager. It said the firm had opened an investigation at that time involving staff interviews, e-mail monitoring and expense report audits.”

For the Reading Stack

Informative posts here and here on the FCPAmericas blog on how Brazil’s new bribery law compares to the FCPA.  Also on the FCPAmericas blog, informative posts here and here regarding the unknows of the law.

In reference to JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny over its alleged hiring of family members of alleged “foreign officials,” this article in the Economist states:

“Connections also count in the West, of course. Following initial reports of the SEC’s investigation in the New York Times, a flood of stories have noted the jobs held in politically sensitive American firms by the sprogs of American politicians. Even when offspring are not involved, the revolving door between the public and private sectors raises questions about why people are hired. JPMorgan Chase did not hire Tony Blair as a senior adviser for his knowledge of risk weights, after all. Mary Schapiro, a former head of the SEC, recently joined Promontory, a consultancy packed with ex-regulators used by banks to cope with regulation (she has said she will not lobby any government body in her new role). If it is unfair to cite these names, it is only because there are so many others. If the regulators genuinely fret about why firms make hiring decisions, they may want to extend their inquiries to Washington, DC, and New York as well.”

In the context of GlaxoSmithKline’s scrutiny in China, this Wall Street Journal article highlights “China’s fast-growing but deeply underfunded medical system” where “doctors are widely seen as underpaid, which makes them prime recipients of honorariums, which are
legal, or illegal cuts of sales from drug companies …”.

*****

A good weekend to all.

Of Note From The Eli Lilly Enforcement Action

This previous post went long and deep as to the Eli Lilly enforcement action from last month.  This post continues the analysis by highlighting additional notable issues.

If This Is The Standard, Then Every Issuer Is An FCPA Violater.

This previous post discussed how the SEC’s August 2012 FCPA enforcement action against Oracle diluted FCPA enforcement to a new level.

The SEC’s China allegations against Lilly further dilutes FCPA enforcement.  The focus of the allegations is that sales representatives at Lilly-China, between 3-6 years ago, submitted false expense reports for items such as wine, speciality foods, a jade bracelet, meals, visits to bath houses, card games, karaoke bars, door prizes, spa treatments and cigarettes.  Because the SEC charged only FCPA books and records and internal controls violations based on these allegations, the identity of the ultimate recipients was not relevant, although the SEC did allege that the ultimate recipients were “government-employed physicians.”

If the SEC’s position is that an issuer violates the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions because some employees, anywhere within its world-wide organization, submit false expense reports for such nominal and inconsequential items, then every issuer has violated and will continue to violate the FCPA.

Once again, the SEC’s charging decisions prove hallow its recent Guidance related rhetoric.  (See here for the prior post).

What Is Really Being Accomplished?

Let me state for the record, lest there be any misunderstanding, that I support strong FCPA enforcement as to conduct Congress intended to capture in passing the FCPA, that adheres to fundamental legal principles, and that actually makes a difference in accomplishing the FCPA’s objective.  My criticisms and concerns of the DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement has been across a wide spectrum, including that in egregious instances of corporate bribery, the DOJ has been too lenient.  See here for my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” and here for my November 2010 Senate testimony.

To be sure, certain things were accomplished by the Lilly enforcement action.  $29.4 million was added to the U.S. treasury and FCPA Inc.’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses likely exceeded that amount.

Beyond this, it is an open question whether the Lilly enforcement action really accomplished anything.

For starters, let’s start with the SEC’s mission.  As stated on its website, the SEC’s mission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”

How is this mission accomplished by the Poland and Russia allegations in the SEC’s complaint?

The Poland allegations concern approximately $39,000 in payments made by Lilly-Poland approximately 12 years ago to a legitimate and bona fide Polish charitable foundation, albeit one allegedly headed by the Director of a Government Health Fund.

The Russia allegations, the only allegations in the complaint that give rise to FCPA anti-bribery charges, concern the conduct of Lilly-Vostok and its use of various third parties in connection with government pharmaceutical business.  There is only one paragraph in the SEC’s complaint concerning specific knowledge of the alleged improper conduct and that paragraph (para. 28 of the complaint) cites a Lilly-Vostok e-mail from 18 years ago and another Lilly-Vostok e-mail from 13 years ago.

The same what is really being accomplished question could also be asked concerning a post-enforcement action requirement imposed on Lilly by the SEC.

The SEC devoted a paragraph of its complaint to “Lilly’s Remedial Measures” and stated as follows.

“Since the time of the conduct noted in this Complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anticorruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”

In other words, per the SEC, over the last approximate decade, Lilly has made extensive enhancements to its FCPA compliance program.  Against this backdrop, what is really being accomplished by the requirement that Lilly engage a compliance consultant for a 60 day period?

“Check The Box” Due Diligence?

One of the greater frustrations I experienced during my FCPA practice career was attending meetings with SEC FCPA enforcement attorneys and learning of the alternate world they lived in.  In their alternate world, companies – 7 to 10 years ago – were supposed to have current FCPA best practices throughout their organization and the absence of such current best practices was evidence of FCPA books and records and internal control violations.

I was reminded of this alternate world when reading the SEC’s release (here) in connection with the Lilly enforcement action.  In it, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit) stated as follows. “Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries possessed a ‘check the box’ mentality when it came to third-party due diligence.”

“Check the Box” due diligence?

The SEC’s allegations concerning due diligence (or lack thereof) focus on the conduct of Lilly-Vostok, a Russian subsidiary, between 1994 through 2005.  In other words, 7 to 18 years ago.   Even the SEC acknowledged that, as to the relevant third-parties, “Lilly’s due diligence” consisted of “ordering a Dun and Bradstreet report and conducting a search using an internet service to scan publicly available information.”  Elsewhere, the SEC acknowledges that Lilly-Vostok “in conjunction with outside counsel” conducted due diligence on various third parties.

Effective due diligence?  Probably not – the SEC alleges that certain beneficial owners were not identified and that there was no documentation that certain third parties were capable of performing the engaged services.  Due diligence consistent with today’s best practices?  Probably not.

Yet to call such due diligence efforts – which took place 7 to 18 years ago – “check the box” is emblematic of the SEC’s alternate reality.

The Double Standard On Display

I have frequently written about the FCPA’s double standard.  (See here for all prior posts).  The double standard regards the seemingly obvious fact that there is little intellectual or moral consistency between enforcement of the FCPA and enforcement of the U.S. domestic bribery statute (18 USC 201).  The double standard is present when a U.S company’s interaction with a “foreign official” is subject to more scrutiny and different standards than its interaction with a U.S. official.

Prior double standard posts (here and here) have explored the frequency in which U.S. business gives to charitable donations favored by influential politicans.  No consequences or legal action is taken.

Yet when a U.S. company gives to charitable donation favored by foreign politicians – well that is stuff of bribery and corruption.  In addition to the Chudow (Poland) Castle Foundation allegations in the SEC’s Lilly complaint, is the following allegation concerning Russia.

“From 2005 through 2008, Lilly-Vostok made various proposals to government officials in Russia regarding how Lilly-Vostok could donate to or otherwise support various initiatives that were affiliated with public or private institutions headed by the government officials or otherwise important to the government officials. Examples included their personal participation or the participation of people from their institutions in clinical trials and international and regional conferences and the support of charities and educational events associated with the institutes. At times, these proposals to government officials were made in a communication that also included a request for assistance in getting a product reimbursed or purchased by the government. Generally, Lilly-Vostok personnel believed these proposals were proper because of their relevance to public health issues and many of the proposals were reviewed by counsel. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok did not have in place internal controls through which such proposals were vetted to ascertain whether Lilly-Vostok was offering something of value to a government official for a purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business.”

No DOJ Involvement

As indicated in the prior Lilly post, the Lilly enforcement action was the latest in a series of FCPA enforcement actions begun in 2011 against pharmaceutical / health care-related companies.  All actions (Johnson & Johnson, Smith & Nephew, Biomet, and Pfizer) have been based on the same general set of allegations (things of value to various foreign health care providers for an alleged business purpose).  However, the Lilly enforcement action is the only enforcement action with no DOJ involvement.  In “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement,” I discuss how the lack of enforcement transparency contributes to the facade of enforcement when the same core set of facts are resolved with materially different results.

A Message For Internal Audit

I have long discussed (see here and here for prior posts and here for a recent interview) the importance of FCPA goggles for internal audit and finance professionals – meaning that internal audit and finance personnel should be specifically trained to approach their specific job functions not only in the traditional way, but also with “FCPA goggles” on.  I have noted that it is clear from recent FCPA enforcement actions that the SEC expects much more from non-legal personnel when it comes to FCPA compliance, including the ability to spot FCPA issues and display a high degree of (I’ll call it) intellectual curiosity as to certain issues.

The SEC’s complaint against Lilly contains an emphatic message to the internal audit community.  Paragraph 46 of the complaint states, in full, as follows.

“[D]espite an understanding that certain emerging markets were most vulnerable to FCPA violations, Lilly’s audit department, based out of Indianapolis, had no procedures specifically designed to assess the FCPA or bribery risks of sales and purchases.  Accordingly, transactions with off-shore entities or with government-affilated entities did not receive specialized or closer review for possible FCPA violations.  In assessing these transactions, the auditors relied upon the standard accounting controls which primarily assured the soundness of the paperwork.  There was little done to assess whether, despite the existence of facially acceptable paperwork, the surrounding circumstances or terms of a transaction suggested the possibility of an FCPA violation or bribery.”

Next Up – Eli Lilly

First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011).  Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012).  Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012).  Then it was Pfizer / Wyeth (see here  – $60 million in combined fines and penalties in August 2012).

Next up is Eli Lilly in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action announced last week by the SEC.   This post goes long and deep as to the SEC’s allegations which resulted in a $29 million settlement.

In summary, the SEC alleges in a civil complaint (here) as follows.

“Eli Lilly and Company violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in connection with the activities of its subsidiaries in China, Brazil, Poland, and Russia.  Between 2006 and 2009, employees of Lilly’s China subsidiary falsified expense reports in order to provide improper gifts and cash payments to government-employed physicians. In 2007, a pharmaceutical distributor hired by Lilly in Brazil paid bribes to government health officials in a Brazilian state in order to assure sales of a Lilly product to state government institutions. In Poland, between 2000 and 2003, Lilly’s subsidiary made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to a small charitable foundation that was founded and administered by the head of one of the regional government health authorities at the same time that the subsidiary was seeking the official’s support for placing Lilly drugs on the government reimbursement list. Finally, Lilly’s subsidiary in Russia paid millions of dollars to off-shore entities for alleged “services” beginning as early as 1994 and continuing through 2005 in order for pharmaceutical distributors and government entities to purchase Lilly’s drugs. In some instances, the off-shore entities appear to have been used to funnel money to government officials or others with influence in the government in order to obtain business for the subsidiary. These off-shore entities rarely provided the contracted-for services. Moreover, between 2005 and 2008, contemporaneous with requests to government officials to support the government’s purchase or reimbursement of Lilly’s products, the subsidiary in Russia made proposals to government officials about how the company could donate to, or otherwise support, various initiatives that were affiliated with, or important to, the government officials.  As a result of this conduct, Lilly violated [the FCPA’s internal controls provisions] by failing to have an adequate internal controls system in place to detect and prevent illicit payments.  Lilly violated [the FCPA’s books and records provisions] by improperly recording each of those payments in its accounting books and records.  Lilly also violated the [FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions] in connection with certain activities of its subsidiary in Russia.”

As indicated by the above paragraph, conduct in Poland, China, and Brazil gave rise to FCPA books and records and internal controls violations only.

Poland

The SEC’s allegations relating to Poland are substantively identical to allegations made against Schering-Plough in this 2004 FCPA enforcement action.

In pertinent part, the SEC alleges in its complaint against Eli Lilly as follows.

“During 2000 through 2003, Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary in Poland (“Lilly- Poland”) made eight payments totaling approximately $39,000 to the Chudow Castle Foundation (“Chudow Foundation”), a small charitable foundation in Poland that was founded and administered by the Director of the Silesian Health Fund (“Director”). The Director established the Chudow Foundation in 1995 to restore the Chudow Castle in the town of Chudow and other historic sites in the Silesian region of Poland.

The Silesian Health Fund (“Health Fund”) was one of sixteen regional government health authorities in Poland during the period. Among other things, the Health Fund reimbursed hospitals and healthcare providers for the purchase of certain approved products.  The Health Fund, through the allocation of public money, exercised considerable influence over which pharmaceutical products local hospitals and other healthcare providers in the region purchased.

Beginning in early 2000 and into 2002, Lilly-Poland was in negotiations with the Health Fund over, among other things, the Heath Fund’s financing of the purchase of Gemzar, one of Lilly’s cancer drugs, by public hospitals and other healthcare providers. Those negotiations occurred primarily between a team manager at Lilly-Poland (“Lilly Manager”) and the Director. Continuing at intervals throughout these negotiations, the Director asked that Lilly Poland contribute to the Chudow Foundation. The initial request came directly from the Director and the subsequent requests came from the Chudow Foundation.

The Lilly-Poland Manager knew that the Director had established the Chudow Foundation and that it was a project to which he was devoted and lent much effort. The Manager requested the approval of payments to the Chudow Foundation. The Manager falsely described the first payment as being for the purchase of computers for the Chudow Foundation. The second Lilly-Poland payment request falsely characterized the proposed payment as “[t]o support foundation in its goal to develop activities in [Chudow Castle].” That request documentation also noted that the “value of the request” was “[i]ndirect support of educational efforts of foundation settled by Silesia [Health Fund].” Similarly, the remaining payments were mischaracterized as monies paid by Lilly-Poland to secure the use of the Chudow Castle for conferences after its renovation. No such conferences took place.

Lilly-Poland eventually made a total of eight payments to the Chudow Foundation, starting in June 2000 and ending in January 2003.  […]  The Manager requested the approval of the payments to the Chudow Foundation with the intent of inducing the Health-Fund Director to allocate public monies to hospitals and other health care providers in the Health Fund for the purpose of purchasing Gemzar.

China

As to China, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.

“Lilly’s wholly-owned subsidiary through which it does business in China (“Lilly- China”) employs more than one-thousand sales representatives whose main focus is on marketing Lilly products to government-employed health-care providers. During the relevant period, the sales representatives worked from regional offices and traveled throughout the country, interacting with the health-care providers in order to convince them to prescribe Lilly products. The sales representatives were directly supervised by District Sales Managers who, in tum, were supervised by Regional Managers. Sales representatives paid out-of-pocket for their travel expenses and submitted receipts and other documentation to the company for reimbursement.

Between 2006 and 2009, various sales representatives and their supervisors abused the system by submitting, or instructing subordinates to submit, false expense reports. In some instances, Lilly-China personnel used reimbursements from those false reports to purchase gifts and entertainment for government-employed physicians in order to encourage the physicians to look favorably upon Lilly and prescribe Lilly products.

In one sales area, in 2006 and 2007, a District Sales Manager for Lilly’s diabetes products instructed subordinates to submit false expenses reports and provide the reimbursement money to her. She then used the reimbursements to purchase gifts, such as wine, specialty foods and a jade bracelet, for government-employed physicians. At least five sales representatives in the oncology sales group submitted false expense reports and then used those reimbursements to provide meals, visits to bath houses, and card games to government-employed physicians.

Similarly, in three other provinces, three sales representatives submitted false expense reports and then used the reimbursements to provide government-employed physicians with visits to bath houses and karaoke bars. In another city, five sales representatives submitted false reimbursements and then their Regional Manager used the money to provide door prizes and publication fees to government-employed physicians. In another city, seven sales representatives and the District Sales Manager for the diabetes sales team used reimbursements to buy meals and cosmetics for government-employed physicians.

Between 2008 and 2009, members of Lilly-China’s “Access Group,” which was responsible for expanding access to Lilly products in China by, among other things, convincing government officials to list Lilly products on government reimbursement lists, engaged in similar misconduct. At least six members of the sixteen-member Access Group, including two associate access directors, falsified expense reports and used the proceeds to provide gifts and entertainment to government officials in China. The gifts included: spa treatments, meals, and cigarettes.

Although the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were wide-spread throughout the subsidiary. Lilly has terminated, or otherwise disciplined, the various employees who submitted false expense reports and/or used the proceeds to provide gifts and services to government officials.”

Brazil

As to Brazil, the SEC alleges, in full, as follows.

“Between 2007 and 2009, Lilly-Brazil distributed drugs in Brazil through third party distributors who then resold those products to both private and government entities. As a general rule, Lilly-Brazil sold the drugs to the distributors at a discount; the distributors then resold the drugs to the end users at a higher price and took the discount as their compensation.  Lilly-Brazil negotiated the amount of the discount with the distributor based on the distributor’s anticipated sale. The discount to the distributors generally ranged between 6.5% and 15%, with the majority of distributors in Brazil receiving a 10% discount.

In early 2007, at the request of one of Lilly-Brazil’s sales and marketing managers at the time, Lilly-Brazil granted a nationwide pharmaceutical distributor, unusually large discounts of 17% and 19% for two of the distributor’s purchases of a Lilly drug, which the distributor then sold to the government of one of the Brazilian states. Lilly-Brazil’s pricing committee approved the discounts without further inquiry. The policies and procedures in place to flag unusual distributor discounts were deficient. They relied on the representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transactions. In May 2007, Lilly sold 3,200 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state; in August 2007, Lilly-Brazil sold 13,500 milligrams of the drug to the distributor for resale to the Brazilian state. Together the sales were valued at approximately $1.2 million.

The distributor used approximately 6% of the purchase price (approximately $70,000) to bribe government officials from the Brazilian state so that the state would purchase the Lilly product. The Lilly-Brazil sales and marketing manager who requested the discount knew about this arrangement.”

Russia

As to Russia, in pertinent part, the SEC complaint alleges as follows.

“From 1994 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lilly, sold pharmaceutical products either directly to government entities in the former Soviet Union or through various distributors, often selected by the government, who would then resell the products to the government entities. Along with the underlying purchase contract with the government entity or distributor, Lilly-Vostok sometimes entered into another agreement with a third-party selected by a government official or by the government-chosen pharmaceutical distributor. Generally, these third-parties, which had addresses and bank accounts located outside of Russia, were paid a flat fee or a percentage of the sale. These agreements were referred to as “marketing” or “service” agreements.  In total, Lilly-Vostok entered into over 96 such agreements with over 42 third-party entities between 1994 and 2004.

Lilly-Vostok had little information about these third-party entities, beyond their addresses and bank accounts. Rarely did Lilly-Vostok know who owned them or whether the entities were actual businesses that could provide legitimate services. Senior management employees in Lilly-Vostok’s Moscow branch assisted in the negotiation of these agreements. The contracts themselves were derived from a Lilly-Vostok-created template and enumerated various broadly-defined services, such as ensuring “immediate customs clearance” or “immediate delivery” of the products; or assisting Lilly-Vostok in “obtaining payment for the sales transaction,” “the promotion of the products,” and “marketing research.”

Contrary to what was recorded in the company’s books and records, there is little evidence that any services were actually provided under any of these third-party agreements. Indeed, in many instances, the “services” identified in the contract were already being provided by the distributor, a third-party handler (such as an international shipping handler) or Lilly itself. To the extent services such as expedited customs clearance or other services requiring interaction with government officials were provided, Lilly-Vostok did not know or inquire how the third party intended to perform their services.

Contemporaneous documents reflect that Lilly-Vostok employees viewed the payments as necessary to obtain the business from the distributor or government entity, and not as payment for legitimate services.

The SEC also alleges that in 1997 and in 1999 Lilly conducted a business review of Lilly-Vostok.  According to the SEC, the reports raised concerns about Lilly-Vostok’s business practices and the reports “recommended that Lilly-Vostok modify its internal controls to ensure that [certain third-party] services were documented” and to “assure itself that [certain third-party] agreements accurately and fairly reflect the services to be provided.”

However, the SEC alleged as follows.

“Lilly did not curtail the use of marketing agreements by its subsidiary or make any meaningful efforts to ensure that the marketing agreements were not being used as a method to funnel money to government officials, despite recognition that the marketing agreements were being used to “create sales potential” or “to ‘support’ activities leading to agreement-signing” with government entities. In fact, during the 2000-2004 period — after the above-described reports, but prior to the company ending use of the agreements– Lilly-Vostok entered into the three most expensive of these arrangements.”

The three arrangements are as follows.

First, the SEC alleged that in response to a 2002 Russian Ministry of Health tender, the ministry selected a “large Russian pharmaceutical distributor” for which to purchase the products and the distributor in turn negotiated with Lilly-Vostok for the purchase of diabetes products.  According to the SEC, the distributor required Lilly-Vostok, “as a condition of their agreement” to enter into various agreements with an entity incorporated in Cyprus.

According to the SEC.

“Lilly’s due diligence regarding the entity in Cyprus was limited to ordering a Dun and Bradstreet report and conducting a search using an internet service to scan publicly available information. Neither the Dun and Bradstreet report nor the internet search revealed the Cyprus entity’s beneficial owner or anything about its business. Nonetheless, pursuant to the terms of its arrangement with the distributor, Lilly-Vostok paid the entity in Cyprus over $3.8 million in early 2003.

The Cyprus entity was, in fact, owned by the Russian businessman who was the owner of the distributor. There is no evidence of services provided to Lilly-Vostok by the Cyprus entity in consideration for Lilly-Vostok’s $3.8 million in payments. Lilly’s books and records improperly reflected these payments as payments for services.”

Second, the SEC alleges “at least two instances” involving foreign government officials and alleges as follows.

“Between 2000 and 2005, Lilly-Vostok sold significant amounts of pharmaceutical products to a major Russian pharmaceutical distributor for resale to the Russian Ministry of Health. The pharmaceutical distributor was owned and controlled by an individual who, at the beginning of the distributor’s relationship with Lilly-Vostok, was a close adviser to a member of Russia’s Parliament. In 2003, this official became a member of the upper house of Russia’s Parliament. Throughout the period, this official exercised considerable influence over government decisions relating to the pharmaceutical industry in Russia.

As part of most of the sales arrangements with the distributor, the official demanded that Lilly-Vostok enter into separate “marketing” agreements with entities with addresses and bank accounts in Cyprus. Under the arrangement, Lilly-Vostok paid the Cypriot entities up to thirty percent of the sales price of the underlying sales contracts in return for the Cypriot entities entering into an agreement “to offer all assistance necessary” in various areas like storage, importation and payment.

In conjunction with outside counsel, Lilly-Vostok conducted limited due diligence on these third-parties. However, the due diligence did not identify the beneficial owners of these third-parties or determine whether the third-parties were able to provide the contracted-for assistance. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok concluded that it could proceed with the transactions and paid the Cypriot entities over $5.2 million. In fact, the Cypriot entities were owned by an individual associated with the distributor controlled by the member of the upper house of Russia Parliament. The Cypriot entity transferred the payments from Lilly-Vostok to other off-shore entities.”

Third, the SEC alleges “in connection another series of contracts, from 2000 through 2004, Lilly-Vostok sold products to a distributor, headquartered in Moscow, which was wholly-owned by a Russian government entity.

The SEC alleged as follows.

 “The purchase agreements were signed on the government-owned distributor’s behalf by its General Director. As part of the arrangement, the government-owned distributor selected a third-party entity with an address in the British Virgin Islands (“the BVI entity”) with which Lilly-Vostok entered into agreements for the broadly defined “services” enumerated in the Lilly-Vostok template (see above). Under the terms of the agreements between Lilly-Vostok and the BVI entity, Lilly-Vostok was to pay the BVI entity up to 15% of the price of the product purchased by the government-owned distributor. Accordingly, from 2000 through 2005, Lilly-Vostok made approximately 65 payments to the BVI entity totaling approximately $2 million.

There is no evidence that the BVI entity performed any of the services listed in its agreement with Lilly-Vostok. There is also no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry as to whether the BVI entity was able or did perform the contracted-for services. Lastly, there is no evidence that Lilly-Vostok performed any due diligence or inquiry into the identity of the beneficial owner of the BVI entity. In fact, the beneficial owner of the BVI entity was the General Director of the government-owned distributor, and he ultimately received the payments from the BVI entity.”

As to these various arrangements, the SEC alleges as follows.  “Lilly did not direct Lilly-Vostok to cease entering into these third-party agreements until 2004. However, Lilly permitted the subsidiary to continue making payments under already existing third-party contracts as late as 2005.”

As to the above Russian conduct, the complaint charges violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  Of note, the complaints specifically pleads as follows regarding knowledge.  “When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstances, unless the person actually believes that the circumstance does not exist.”

The SEC complaint also contains the following allegation.

“From 2005 through 2008, Lilly-Vostok made various proposals to government officials in Russia regarding how Lilly-Vostok could donate to or otherwise support various initiatives that were affiliated with public or private institutions headed by the government officials or otherwise important to the government officials. Examples included their personal participation or the participation of people from their institutions in clinical trials and international and regional conferences and the support of charities and educational events associated with the institutes. At times, these proposals to government officials were made in a communication that also included a request for assistance in getting a product reimbursed or purchased by the government. Generally, Lilly-Vostok personnel believed these proposals were proper because of their relevance to public health issues and many of the proposals were reviewed by counsel. Nonetheless, Lilly-Vostok did not have in place internal controls through which such proposals were vetted to ascertain whether Lilly-Vostok was offering something of value to a government official for a purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business.”

As to Lilly’s books and records, the SEC alleges as follows.

“[S]ubsidiaries of Eli Lilly made numerous payments that were incorrectly described in the company’s books and records. In China, payments were falsely described as reimbursement of expenses when, in fact, the money was used to provide gifts to government-employed physicians. In Brazil, money that was described in company records as a “discount” for a pharmaceutical distributor was, in actuality, a bribe for government officials. In Poland, payments classified as charitable donations were not intended for a genuine charitable purpose but rather to induce a government official to assent to the purchase of a Lilly product. Finally, in Russia, millions of dollars in payments, described in the company’s books and records as for various services, were actually payments to assure that Lilly was able to conduct business with certain pharmaceutical distributors.”

As to Lilly’s internal controls, the SEC alleges as follows.

“During the relevant period, Lilly and its subsidiaries failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the company maintained accountability for its assets and transactions were executed in accordance with management’s authorization. Particularly, Lilly did not adequately verify that intermediaries with which the company was doing government-related business would not provide a benefit to a government official on Lilly’s behalf in order to obtain or retain business. Lilly and its subsidiaries primarily relied on assurances and information provided in the paperwork by these intermediaries or by Lilly personnel rather than engaging in adequate verification and analyzing the surrounding circumstances of the transaction. Lilly and its subsidiaries’ employees considered and offered benefits to government officials at the same time they were asking those government officials to assist with the reimbursement or purchase of Lilly’s products with inadequate safeguards to assure that its employees were not offering items of values to a government official with a purpose to assist Lilly in retaining or obtaining business.

Moreover, despite an understanding that certain emerging markets were most vulnerable to FCPA violations, Lilly’s audit department, based out of Indianapolis, had no procedures specifically designed to assess the FCPA or bribery risks of sales and purchases. Accordingly, transactions with off-shore entities or with government-affiliated entities did not receive specialized or closer review for possible FCPA violations.  In assessing these transactions, the auditors relied upon the standard accounting controls which primarily assured the soundness of the paperwork. There was little done to assess whether, despite the existence of facially acceptable paperwork, the surrounding circumstances or terms of a transaction suggested the possibility of an FCPA violation or bribery.

As to Lilly’s remedial efforts, the SEC complaint states as follows.

“Since the time of the conduct noted in this Complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anticorruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”

As noted in this SEC release,  Lilly, without admitting or denying the allegations, agreed to pay disgorgement of $13,955,196, prejudgment interest of $6,743,538, and a penalty of $8.7 million for a total payment of $29,398,734.  The release also notes that “Lilly also agreed to comply with certain undertakings including the retention of an independent consultant to review and make recommendations about its foreign corruption policies and procedures.”

In Lilly’s release (below) the retention period of the consultant is identified as 60 days and in the SEC’s proposed final judgement, the consultant is identified as FTI Consulting which has been assisting Lilly in connection with a previous Corporate Integrity Agreement.

The case has been assigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell (U.S. District Court, District of Columbia).

William Baker III (Latham & Watkins) represented Lilly.

In the SEC’s release, Kara Novaco Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit) stated as follows. “Eli Lilly and its subsidiaries possessed a ‘check the box’ mentality when it came to third-party due diligence. Companies can’t simply rely on paper-thin assurances by employees, distributors, or customers. They need to look at the surrounding circumstances of any payment to adequately assess whether it could wind up in a government official’s pocket.”  In the same release, Antonia Chion (Associate Director in the SEC Enforcement Division) stated as follows.  “When a parent company learns tell-tale signs of a bribery scheme involving a subsidiary, it must take immediate action to assure that the FCPA is not being violated.  We strongly caution company officials from averting their eyes from what they do not wish to see.”

This Lilly release quotes Anne Nobles (Lilly’s Chief Ethics and Compliance Officer and Senior VP of Enterprise Risk Management) as follows.  “Lilly requires our employees to act with integrity with all external parties and in accordance with all applicable laws and regulations.  Since ours is a business based on trust, we strive to conduct ourselves in an ethical way that is beyond reproach. We have cooperated with the U.S. government throughout this investigation and have strengthened our internal controls and compliance program globally, including significant investment in our global anti-corruption program.”  The Lilly release further states as follows.  “The SEC noted that since the time of the conduct alleged in its complaint, Lilly has made improvements to its global anti-corruption compliance program, including: enhancing anti-corruption due diligence requirements for relationships with third parties; implementing compliance monitoring and corporate auditing specifically tailored to anti-corruption; enhancing financial controls and governance; and expanding anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”  The release further notes that “Lilly was first notified of the investigation in August 2003” and describes the independent compliance consultant as conducting a “60-day review of the company’s internal controls and compliance program related to the FCPA.”

Stay Tuned for More

As have been widely reported (see here for the New York Times article), an FCPA sweep of the pharmaceutical / medical device industry is currently underway. Merck, Medtronic, Zimmer and several other companies are reportedly under investigation.

For instance, last week Eli Lilly disclosed (here) that it is “in advanced discussions with the SEC to resolve their investigation” that began in August 2003 as to “compliance by Polish subsidiaries of certain pharmaceutical companies, including Lilly, with the [FCPA].”

AstraZeneca disclosed (here) last week as follows. “As previously disclosed, AstraZeneca has received inquiries from the US Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with an investigation into Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues in the pharmaceutical industry across several countries. AstraZeneca is cooperating with these inquiries and is investigating, among other things, sales practices, internal controls, certain distributors, and interactions with healthcare providers, institutions, and other government officials. AstraZeneca is investigating inappropriate conduct in certain countries, including China.”

Johnson & Johnson, previously included in the group of companies under investigation, resolved an FCPA enforcement action last month (see here for the prior post).

Many have suggested that J&J’s voluntarily disclosed conduct served as the point of entry for the industry wide sweep based on this sentence from the J&J deferred prosecution agreement – “J&J has cooperated and agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in the Department’s investigations of other companies and individuals in connection with business practices overseas in various markets.”

Thus, the J&J enforcement action in many ways provides a glimpse into potential future FCPA enforcement actions involving the pharmaceutical / medical device industry.

Two issues likely to be found in such future FCPA enforcement actions are discussed below.

42 USC 1320a-7(a)

The J&J deferred prosecution agreement states – for why the DOJ agreed to resolve the case the way it did – as follows. “Were the Department to initiate a prosecution of J&J or one of its operating companies and obtain a conviction, instead of entering into this Agreement to defer prosecution, J&J could be subject to exclusion from participating in federal health care programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7(a).” (See here for those provisions).

This component of the J&J enforcement is nothing new – as many companies such as Siemens, BAE and others – have escaped the most serious consequences of the alleged criminal conduct because of “who” the companies were (i.e. the products sold and to whom).

This feature of FCPA enforcement is controversial (for additional reading – see here for my Q&A exchange with former Senator Arlen Specter and here for the recent article titled “FCPA Sanctions: To Big to Debar”).

In recent months, the DOJ has pledged allegiance to the OECD Convention on Bribery to defend certain of its sentencing and “foreign official” enforcement positions (see here for instance).

Does the OECD Convention say anything about enforcement agencies looking at the unique aspects of an alleged violator and then crafting a resolution to fit that alleged violator?

Yes it does.

Article 5 of the OECD Convention (here), under the heading “Enforcement,” states that investigation and prosecution of bribery offenses “shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons involved.”

Health-Care Providers as “Foreign Officials”

As noted in the prior J&J post (here) the principal FCPA enforcement theory at issue in the pharmaceutical / medical device industry sweep would seem to be the notion that [insert country] had a national healthcare system wherein most [insert country] hospitals are publicly owned and operated and thus health care providers who work at publicly-owned hospitals are government employees providing health care services in their official capacities. According to the DOJ, the individuals are therefore “foreign officials” “as that term is defined in the FCPA.”

Against this backdrop, it is interesting to observe that in the United States approximately 20% of hospitals are owned by state or local governments (see here). In addition, approximately 150 more medical centers are run by the Veterans Health Administration (see here).

Are we calling 20+% of U.S. health-care providers U.S. officials? If not, why not and why the difference?

Something to keep in mind as additional pharmaceutical / medical device FCPA enforcement actions burst onto the scene.

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