“Game-Changing” Day at the SEC
In August 2009, Robert Khuzami, the SEC’s Director of the Division of Enforcement, announced that the SEC will be creating five “national specialized units dedicated to particular highly specialized and complex areas of securities law” – including an FCPA unit. (see here).
Khuzami also announced that the SEC was working on other initiatives of interest to FCPA followers including creation of “a public policy statement that will set forth standards to evaluate cooperation by individuals in enforcement actions” as well as “recommend[ation] to the Commission that the SEC enter into Deferred Prosecution Agreements, in which the [Division of Enforcement] agree[s] in the appropriate case to forego an enforcement action against an individual or entity subject to certain terms, including full cooperation, a waiver of statutes of limitations, and compliance with certain undertakings.”
Yesterday, there were developments on each of these issues.
First, the SEC (see here) announced that Cheryl J. Scarboro will lead the FCPA unit. As indicated in the release, Scarboro is an SEC veteran having served as Associate Director, Assistant Director, Deputy Assistant Director, and Staff Attorney in the Division of Enforcement. For many years, Scarboro has been a primary SEC voice on FCPA issues and an active participant at many FCPA conferences.
Second, the SEC (see here) announced a series of measures “to further strengthen its enforcement program by encouraging greater cooperation from individuals and companies in the agency’s investigations and enforcement actions.”
“New cooperation tools” not previously available to the SEC, will now include, among other things:
* “Cooperation Agreements — Formal written agreements in which the Enforcement Division agrees to recommend to the Commission that a cooperator receive credit for cooperating in investigations or related enforcement actions if the cooperator provides substantial assistance such as full and truthful information and testimony.”
* “Deferred Prosecution Agreements — Formal written agreements in which the Commission agrees to forego an enforcement action against a cooperator if the individual or company agrees, among other things, to cooperate fully and truthfully and to comply with express prohibitions and undertakings during a period of deferred prosecution.”
and
* “Non-prosecution Agreements — Formal written agreements, entered into under limited and appropriate circumstances, in which the Commission agrees not to pursue an enforcement action against a cooperator if the individual or company agrees, among other things, to cooperate fully and truthfully and comply with express undertakings.”
The SEC release notes that “similar cooperation tools have been regularly and successfully used by the Justice Department in its criminal investigations and prosecutions.”
More details about these measures can be found in a revised and newly issued version of the SEC’s enforcement manual beginning at pg. 119 (see here).
The SEC news conference announcing these appointments and initiatives is available on the SEC’s website.
While not FCPA specific, these measures as applied to FCPA enforcement are likely to lead to even less judicial scrutiny (not that there is much judicial scrutiny at present) as to SEC interpretations of the FCPA and as to whether factual evidence actually exists to support each element of an FCPA charge.
In fact, as set forth in the manual (p. 130) “[a]n admission or an agreement not to contest the relevant facts underlying the alleged offenses” is a key factor the SEC will consider in determining whether a company should receive a deferred prosecution agreement.
For those anxious to see FCPA enforcement actions contested in an open, transparent, and adversary proceeding, yesterday’s announcements will be a blow as I expect FCPA enforcement to become even more opaque in the future.
Stay tuned as much is surely to be written about these new measures in the coming weeks and months.
Team of Plenty
Voluntary disclosure (i.e. picking up the phone and calling the DOJ and/or SEC (if applicable) to schedule a meeting, during which a company’s lawyers disclose conduct that could potentially implicate the FCPA, even though the enforcement agencies, in many cases, would never find out about the conduct) is a tough issue.
In a November 2009 speech to an FCPA audience (see here), Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer acknowledged that the decision of whether to make a voluntary disclosure is “sometimes a difficult question” […] a question I grappled with as a defense lawyer.”
The Gibson Dunn Year End FCPA Report (the subject of yesterday’s post see here) has this to say about voluntary disclosure:
“To be sure, a company that voluntary discloses a potential FCPA violation to DOJ and the SEC will be better situated than one that otherwise finds itself across the table from the government having not disclosed the conduct.”
[…]
“On the other hand, there is substantial debate about just how “tangible” the benefits of voluntary disclosure truly are.”
[…]
“Although some corporate defendants that self-reported misconduct have certainly received relatively lenient treatment, it is not clear that voluntary disclosure was the reason for any particular settlement term.”
[…]
“Although it is certain that companies do receive some benefit for self-reporting FCPA violations, the real question is whether the company considering a voluntary disclosure is better off for having made the disclosure, which is not necessary one-and-the-same. Because voluntary disclosure makes the government aware of alleged improper conduct that it otherwise may have never discovered on its own, the likelihood of the government uncovering the misconduct through other means, such as a whistleblower, foreign government investigation, tip from a competitor or business partner, or industry-wide investigation, is a critical factor in determining whether to make a voluntary disclosure.”
[…]
“Given the multitude of factors to consider when making a voluntary disclosure decision, it is often challenging to make such a significant decision with any degree of confidence that a particular course of action is the right one. This task is made even more difficult by the uncertainty of obtaining any particular benefits for disclosing.”
As raised in a prior post (see here), a company’s decision in deciding whether or not to voluntarily disclose conduct to the enforcement agencies that could potentially implicate the FCPA is made even more difficult given the potential conflict of interest FCPA counsel has in advising the company as to the important disclosure issue – particularly where the disclosure only involves a potential FCPA violation?
I raised this lurking “elephant in the room” question in connection with Dyncorp International’s recent disclosure of potential FCPA issues.
One could raise the same question in connection with Team Inc.
In August 2009, Team (a Texas-based provider of specialty industrial services) disclosed (here) that an internal investigation conducted by FCPA counsel “found evidence suggesting that payments, which may violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), were made to employees of foreign government owned enterprises.”
The release further noted that “[b]ased upon the evidence obtained to date, we believe that the total of these improper payments over the past five years did not exceed $50,000. The total annual revenues from the impacted Trinidad branch represent approximately one-half of one percent of our annual consolidated revenues. We have voluntary disclosed information relating to the initial allegations, the investigation and the initial findings to the U.S. Department of Justice and to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and we will cooperate with the DOJ and SEC in connection with their review of this matter.”
In the prior post, I noted that a voluntary disclosure often sets into motion a series of events and the next thing the company knows it is paying for a team of lawyers (accompanied by forensic accountants and other specialists) even though the voluntary disclosure that got the whole process started involved conduct that may not actually violate the FCPA.
Fast forward to yesterday as Team disclosed (here) as follows:
“As previously reported, the Audit Committee is conducting an independent investigation regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. While the investigation is ongoing, management continues to believe that any possible violations of the FCPA are limited in size and scope. The investigation is now expected to be completed during the first calendar quarter of 2010. The total professional costs associated with the investigation are now projected to be about $3.0 million.”
A $3 million dollar internal investigation concerning non-material payments made by a branch office that represents less than one-half of one percent of the company’s annual consolidated revenues?
Wow!
Double-wow because the payments may not even violate the FCPA because they were made to “employees of foreign government owned enterprises” (see here for several prior posts on the enforcement agenices untested and unchallenged interpretation of the “foreign official” element)!
Others have scratched their heads about this as well (see here and here).
Of course, the FCPA does not contain a de minimis exception and of course the FCPA contains books and records and internal control provisions applicable to issuers like Team. Thus, even if the payments were not material in terms of the company’s overall financial condition, there still could be FCPA books and records and internal control exposure if they were misrecorded in the company’s books and records or made in the absence of any internal controls.
But then again, the FCPA books and records and internal control provisions would be implicated if a Team employee took his Cousin Randy to the company’s corporate suite for the ballgame but recorded the costs as “marketing expenses” on his reimbursement request causing the company to misrecord the payment. Yet, no one would suggest disclosing this potential FCPA violation!
Voluntary Disclosures and the Role of FCPA Counsel
Dyncorp International Inc. (“Dyncorp”), a provider of “specialized, mission critical professional and support services for the U.S. military, non-military U.S. governmental agencies and foreign governments” (according to its recent 10-Q filing) (see here) recently disclosed a potential FCPA issue.
Page 19 of its filing states:
“We have identified certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies that may raise compliance issues under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The payments, which we believe totaled approximately $300,000 in the aggregate, were made to sub-contractors in connection with servicing a single existing task order that the Company has with a U.S. government agency. We have retained outside counsel to investigate these payments. We are in the process of evaluating our internal policies and procedures and are committed to improving our compliance procedures. During the past week, we voluntarily brought these matters to the attention of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. We cannot predict the ultimate consequences of these matters at this time, nor can we reasonably estimate the potential liability, if any, related to these matters. However, based on the facts currently known, we do not believe that these matters will have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations or cash flow. We have not recorded any reserves with respect to this matter.” (emphasis added).
This disclosure, along with the more recent disclosure that Dyncorp’s Senior Vice President, Chief Compliance Officer and Executive Counsel was terminated (see here) has been covered by the Wall Street Journal (see here and here) and has been discussed elsewhere (see here).
I inject the following question/issue into the conversation (so to speak).
Why did Dyncorp voluntarily disclose to DOJ/SEC conduct that is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA? More broadly, what do such voluntary disclosures of potential FCPA issues say about the potential conflict of interests FCPA counsel has in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue.
First things first.
As readers of this blog likely know, many FCPA enforcement actions result from voluntary disclosures companies make to DOJ and (if an issuer) to SEC.
The reason?
There are some “carrots” out there.
First, “The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (see here) (a.k.a. the former Thompson Memo which is now included in the US Attorney Manual) state that one of the factors a prosecutor should consider in deciding whether to criminally charge a company is the “value of cooperation” and the “corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its cooperation with the government’s investigation…” (see 9-28.700).
Second, Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (specifically s. 8C2.5(g)) (see here) will reduce an organization’s “culpability score” (which is key in calculating a company’s fine upon conviction as well as the company’s fine in a settlement) if: “the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct”
See (here) for what Assistant AG Breuer recently told an FCPA audience about voluntary disclosure.
A company deciding whether or not to voluntarily disclose to the government will thus have to weigh the risk of the government finding out about the conduct in the absence of the company’s voluntary disclosure (and thus likely assume the risk of a harsher fine/penalty) vs. voluntarily disclosing the conduct to the government, yet being able to take advantage of the above mentioned “carrots”.
In weighing these options in the face of evidence of an actual FCPA violation, companies often choose the voluntary disclosure route – although the merits of the voluntary disclosure route and how to assess the leniency are issues subject to debate.
The weighing of these options when confronted with evidence of an actual FCPA violation is one thing.
However, and as demonstrated by Dyncorp’s recent disclosure, companies often also voluntarily disclose conduct to DOJ/SEC that may only potentially violate the FCPA.
Perhaps the analysis is similar to that above; however, is there any other area of law where companies (and their counsel) race to Washington to tell the government not about an actual violation of law, but merely about a potential violation of law (save perhaps for the DOJ’s antitrust leniency program (see here) which nevertheless involves actual violations)?
Before addressing the issue of what potential conflict of interest FCPA counsel may have in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue (particularly where the disclosure merely involves a potential FCPA violation), a bit about why the conduct Dyncorp disclosed is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA.
I’ve written before (see here) about the Fifth Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004) on the FCPA’s obtain or retain business element and how the court concluded that payments to customs officials to reduce customs duties and sales tax could fall within the FCPA, but that such conduct does not automatically constitute an FCPA violation. The Kay case is one of the few instances in which a court has rendered a substantive FCPA decision.
Post-Kay there has been an explosion in FCPA enforcement actions involving payments made to secure foreign government licenses, permits, and certifications or otherwise involving custom duties and the like. However, because these enforcement actions have not been contested, it remains an open question as to under what circumstances such payments can indeed satisfy the FCPA’s obtain or retain business element.
Dyncorp’s disclosure (“[w]e have identified certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies”) involves the type of payments at issue in Kay and one reason why the conduct Dyncorp disclosed is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA is the equivocal nature of the Kay decision (the only case law on this subject).
Here is the real head-scratcher though.
The Dyncorp payments were not made in order to obtain or retain business with any foreign government or foreign government entity, but rather assisted Dyncorp obtain or retain business with the U.S. government.
Has there ever been an FCPA enforcement action where the questionable payments were made to assist the payor in obtaining or retaining business with the U.S. government? To my knowledge no, and if anyone is aware of such an enforcement action please do let me know.
True, the DOJ’s “Lay-Person’s Guide to the FCPA” (see here) (the DOJ’s interpretation of the statute) notes “that the business to be obtained or retained does not need to be with a foreign government or foreign government instrumentality.”
However, as the Kay court noted, the payments still need to be in connection with foreign business (i.e. seemingly not business with the U.S. government).
The Kay court framed the issue as follows: “…how attenuated can the linkage be between the effect of that which is sought from the foreign official in consideration of a bribe (here, tax minimization) and the briber’s goal of finding assistance or obtaining or retaining foreign business with or for some person, and still satisfy the business nexus element of the FCPA?” (emphasis added).
Later in the opinion, the Kay court framed the issue as follows: “…the question whether the defendants’ alleged payments constitute a violation of the FCPA truly turns on whether these bribes were intended to lower ARI’s cost of doing business in Haiti enough to have a sufficient nexus to garnering business there or to maintaining or increasing business operations that ARI already had there, so as to come within the scope of the business nexus element as Congress used it in the FCPA.” (emphasis added).
In holding “that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or retaining business for some person, and that bribes paid to foreign tax officials to secure illegally reduced customs and tax liability constitute a type of payment that can fall within this broad coverage” (emphasis added), the Kay court still nevertheless focused on business in a foreign country (… “the FCPA’s legislative history instructs that Congress was concerned about both the kind of bribery that leads to discrete contractual arrangements and the kind that more generally helps a domestic payor obtain or retain business for some person in a foreign country…) (emphasis added).
The Kay court’s focus on foreign business is consistent with the FCPA’s extensive legislative history which also focuses on payments made to secure foreign business, not business with the U.S. government.
This provides another reason why Dyncorp’s disclosure of “certain payments made to expedite the issuance of a limited number of visas and licenses from foreign government agencies” in “connection with servicing a single existing task order that the Company has with a U.S. government agency” is arguably not even a violation of the FCPA.
So the question remains, why did Dyncorp disclose this conduct – conduct that could only potentially violate the FCPA?
This leads to the final issue/question – what potential conflict of interest does FCPA counsel have in advising companies as to the important disclosure issue (particularly where the disclosure only involves a potential FCPA violation)?
By raising this issue/asking this question, I am not accusing Dyncorp’s counsel of anything (I don’t even know which firm is representing Dyncorp). Rather, I ask this question in the context of the Dyncorp’s disclosure because it seems to present (for the above reasons) the perfect “case” in which to raise this lurking issue / ask this lurking question (even though the same question could legitimately be asked in connection with other corporate voluntary disclosures of conduct that could potentially violate the FCPA).
It truly is the “elephant in the [FCPA] room” in my estimation.
Here is the potential conflict of interest as I see it. FCPA counsel has every incentive (it would seem) to nudge a corporate client to make the disclosure.
Simply stated, no disclosure, the “case” (for all practical purposes) is over and thus no more billable hours.
Conversely, with the disclosure the “case” continues meaning more billable hours.
Often times if a voluntary disclosure is made the “case” continues for several more years as DOJ (and if applicable) SEC will demand a wide range of factual information and documents involving the conduct at issue.
Morever, often times the “case” gets expanded because a favorite question of the enforcement agencies is something along the following lines – “if Business Unit A was involved in this conduct in Country A, how do we know that Business Unit A was not also involved in this conduct in Country B, and, more broadly, how do we know that the Company (in general) was also not involved in this same conduct in Countries C,D, and E (all FCPA high-risk jurisdictions)?
Because cooperation with the government’s investigation is a prominent factor a prosecutor weighs in deciding whether to criminally charge a business entity under the above described “Principles of Prosecution”, a corporate client invariably (yet reluctantly) will accept FCPA’s counsel’s recommendation to broaden the “case” to demonstrate cooperation with the DOJ/SEC’s investigation.
Next thing the company knows, it is paying for a team of lawyers (accompanied by forensic accountants and other specialists) to travel around the world to answer DOJ/SEC’s questions even though the voluntary disclosure that got this whole process started involved conduct that may not actually violate the FCPA.
Because FCPA counsel’s “worldwide review” will often not be deemed credible unless it comes back to DOJ/SEC with at least something of concern or suspicion, FCPA counsel will often disclose several small, non-material, practically meaningless issues which also could potentially violate the FCPA.
DOJ/SEC, to demonstrate the thoroughness of its investigation, will often include these “tag-along” facts in the ultimate resolution documents (most often a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement).
Thus, disclosure often times leads to significantly more work, and more billable hours for FCPA counsel. Because FCPA counsel is able to demand premium billing for its services given the high-profile, sensitive nature of the issue, the disclosure decision is literally a several hundred thousand / multimillion dollar issue for FCPA counsel and could mean the difference between several more months / years of work and no additional work.
To be clear, I am not suggesting any actual conflict of interest by Dyncorp’s counsel (or any other FCPA counsel for that matter).
Rather, I am pointing out that a potential conflict of interest is present in FCPA counsel’s disclosure advice given the significant difference in billable hours hinging on the disclosure decision.
This potential conflict of interest is hardly ever discussed, and this is not surprising given that few “outside” of the FCPA bar (given the opaque nature in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved) even know how the disclosure and resolution process actually works to ask the question.
Here is another issue that is hardly ever discussed.
The same enforcement officials who often encourage the voluntary disclosure route, and speak of the credit that will be given to a company when it voluntarily discloses, are the same individuals who often rotate in and out of government service and the FCPA bar. Again, I am not suggesting any actual conflict of interests by these individuals.
However, these potential conflict of interest issues (i.e. the “elephants in the [FCPA] room”) should not be shoved aside in analyzing why there are so many FCPA voluntary disclosures (including of conduct that may only potentially violate the statute) and why FCPA enforcement is indeed the unique creature that it is.
Monitors
Most FCPA enforcement actions against companies are resolved through a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreement (NPA’s / DPA’s).
Many NPA’s / DPA’s require the company to engage a compliance monitor for a set time period (generally 2-4 years).
Although monitors are not the “rage” they used to be a few years ago, recent FCPA enforcement actions against Control Components, Inc., KBR/Halliburton, and Siemens have included some form of a compliance monitor.
In a recent speech to an FCPA audience, Assistant AG Breuer (see here) indicated that:
“In appropriate cases, [DOJ] will also continue to insist on a corporate monitor, mindful that monitors can be costly and disruptive to a business, and are not necessary in every case. That said, corporate monitors continue to play a crucial role and responsibility in ensuring the proper implementation of effective compliance measures and in deterring and detecting future violations.”
Those interested in corporate monitors (whether in the FCPA context or otherwise) will want to review a recent report on monitors from the Government Accountability Office. (see here).
Among other interesting numbers are the following:
Since 1993 through September 2009, DOJ has entered into 152 NPA’s or DPA’s.
Of the 152 agreements, 48 required the appointment of a compliance monitor.
What does it take to become a monitor? A DOJ background certainly doesn’t hurt. GAO found that of the 48 NPA’s or DPA’s that required the appointment of a monitor, 42 different individuals were selected. Of those 42, 23 (approximately 55%) were former DOJ officials, something many find controversial in that a prior DOJ position could affect the monitor’s independence and impartiality.
Although the GAO report does not specifically discuss (or identify) the monitors in FCPA enforcement actions, a May 2008 DOJ letter to the House Judiciary Committee (see here) does list corporate entities along with the monitor appointed. To my knowledge, the following were FCPA enforcement actions: Aibel Group/Vetco Ltd., Baker Hughes, Ingersoll Rand, InVision Technologies, Micrus, Monsanto, Paradigm, Schnitzer Steel, Statoil, and York.
To see what one of those “FCPA monitors” has to say (here) is the excerpt from the Corporate Crime Reporter interview.
Another FCPA Speech
Last week it was the Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices Forum (see here), this week the audience for Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer was ACI’s National Forum on the FCPA
The ACI conference (see here) is a signature event for the FCPA bar and FCPA compliance community. Breuer participated in past ACI events as a private FCPA practitioner at Covington & Burling and yesterday he gave the keynote luncheon address.
The link to the speech on the DOJ website is inactive, but the speech is embedded in this piece from the WSJ Law Blog (see here).
The speech covers a wide range of topics and will be of interest to all FCPA practitioners and others interested in following FCPA developments.
Here are a few highlights:
On individual prosecutions – “…we tried more individuals for FCPA violations than in any prior year. And we indicted more individuals than ever before. That is no accident. In fact, prosecution of individuals is a cornerstone of our enforcement strategy. […] Put simply, the prospect of significant prison sentences for individuals should make clear to every corporate executive, every board member, and every sales agent that we will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA violations.”
On how the DOJ learns of FCPA issues – “Although many of these cases come to us through voluntary disclosures, which we certainly encourage and will appropriately reward, I want to be clear: the majority of our cases do not come from voluntary disclosures. They are the result of pro-active investigations, whistle blower tips, newspaper stories, referrals from our law enforcement counterparts in foreign countries, and our Embassy personnel abroad, among other sources.”
On resolving corporate FCPA matters – “…despite rumors to the contrary, we do also decline prosecution in appropriate cases. […] With regard to corporate cases, the Department will continue to pursue guilty pleas or, if necessary, indictments against corporations – when the criminal conduct is egregious, pervasive and systemic, or when the corporation fails to implement compliance reforms, changes to its corporate culture, and undertake other measures designed to prevent a recurrence of the criminal conduct. We also recognize that there will be situations in which guilty pleas or criminal charges are not appropriate. Now, we may have good-faith disagreements about when those circumstances present themselves, but we do not take our task lightly. We are mindful of direct impact on the company itself, as well as the numerous collateral consequences that often flow from these charging decisions. We are sophisticated attorneys, and we understand the challenges and complexities involved in doing business around the globe.”
On corporate monitors – “In appropriate cases, we will also continue to insist on a corporate monitor, mindful that monitors can be costly and disruptive to a business, and are not necessary in every case. That said, corporate monitors continue to play a crucial role and responsibility in ensuring the proper implementation of effective compliance measures and in deterring and detecting future violations.”
On whether to make a voluntary disclosure – this is a “sometimes difficult question” […] a question I grappled with as a defense lawyer. I strongly urge any corporation that discovers an FCPA violation to seriously consider making a voluntary disclosure and always to cooperate with the Department. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations obviously encourage such conduct, and the Department has repeatedly stated that a company will receive meaningful credit for that disclosure and that cooperation. […] I can assure you that the Department’s commitment to meaningfully reward voluntary disclosures and full and complete cooperation will continue to be honored in both letter and spirit. I am committed to no less.”
On the road ahead – “In addition to holding culpable individuals accountable and meaningfully rewarding voluntary disclosures and genuine cooperation, we will continue to focus our attention on areas and on industries where we can have the biggest impact in reducing foreign corruption.” Breuer then discusses the pharma industry in particular.
On asset forfeiture and recovery – “We will seek forfeiture in all appropriate cases going forward. […] We will be taking advantage of the expertise of both the Fraud Section and our Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section to forfeit and recover the proceeds of foreign corruption offenses.” Breuer’s comments on this topic largely shadow the recent comments of Attorney General Holder (see here).
On enhanced resources – “As I imagine most of you have heard, in 2007 the FBI created a squad with agents dedicated to investigating potential FCPA violations. The squad has been growing in size and in expertise over the past two years. In addition, we have begun discussions with the Internal Revenue Service’s Criminal Investigation Division about partnering with us on FCPA cases around the country. Finally, we are now pursuing strategic partnerships with certain U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout the United States where there are a concentration of FCPA investigations.”
On Mark Mendelsohn’s rumored departure as DOJ Deputy Chief – FCPA – “… as we look to the future, we will be building on the extraordinary efforts and success of our Deputy Chief over the FCPA area, my friend Mark Mendelsohn, who is beginning to explore options for the next phase of his career. Mark has been an exceptional public servant and a visionary steward of the FCPA Program. Regardless of where Mark chooses to go, we will miss him greatly.”
******
Last week, I questioned Breuer’s characterization of the Jefferson verdict in his pharma address (see here). In that address he said as follows:
“In the past few months, we have the completed the trials of the Greens in California, of Mr. Bourke in New York and of former Congressman William Jefferson in Virginia. In each of these cases, individuals were found guilty of FCPA violations and face jail time.”
Yesterday, Breuer correctly noted, as to the Jefferson case, as follows: Jefferson “was convicted of a conspiracy of which one object was to violate the FCPA by bribing former high-ranking Nigerian government officials.”