Checking in on Wal-Mart’s professional fees and expenses, still pouting, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Wal-Mart’s Professional Fees and Expenses

In its recent 3Q FY2016 earnings call Wal-Mart stated:

“FCPA and compliance related costs were approximately $30 million, comprised of $22 million for ongoing inquiries and investigations, and $8 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements.”

Doing the math, Wal-Mart’s 3Q FCPA and compliance-related costs is approximately $470,000 per working day.

Over the past approximate four years, I have tracked Wal-Mart’s quarterly disclosed pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. While some pundits have ridiculed me for doing so, such figures are notable because, as has been noted in prior posts and in my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples,” settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from corporate FCPA scrutiny.  Pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the largest (in many cases to a degree of 3, 5, 10 or higher than settlement amounts) financial hit to a company under FCPA scrutiny.

While $470,000 per working day remains eye-popping, Wal-Mart’s recent figure suggests that the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have crested as the figures for the past eight quarters have been approximately $470,000, $516,000, $563,000, $640,000, $662,000, $855,000, $1.1 million and $1.3 million per working day.

In the aggregate, Wal-Mart’s disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses are as follows.

FY 2013 = $157 million.

FY 2014 = $282 million.

FY 2015  = $173 million.

FY 2016 = $93 million (through the first three quarters).

Still Pouting 

This prior post discussed why SNC-Lavalin should be grateful about various aspects of Canada’s legal system (compared to the U.S.) and not pout. Namely, that Canada does not offer deferred prosecution agreements and enforcement authorities must actually prove cases to prevail.

As noted here, with a new government in Ottawa, SNC-Lavalin’s new CEO continues the pout.

“SNC-Lavalin Group Inc.’s CEO wants the new federal government to allow companies to settle corporate corruption cases — as what happens in the United States and United Kingdom — so that Canadian firms can remain competitive. In his first speech since taking control of Canada’s largest engineering company last month, Neil Bruce said federal corruption charges laid against a few of SNC-Lavalin’s legal entities unfairly point the finger at 40,000 employees who did nothing wrong. Instead, Canada should allow corporate settlements outside the court system so that SNC-Lavalin and other Canadian businesses are not at a disadvantage when competing against rival firms in other G7 countries, Bruce said.

[…]

The company has said it will plead not guilty to the charges but is willing to pay a fine for the alleged transgressions of former employees.”

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Affinia Group

As noted in this May 2015 post, Affinia Group (a North Carolina based company involved in design, manufacture, distribution and marketing of industrial grade products and services, including extensive offerings of aftermarket parts for automotive and heavy-duty vehicles) has been under FCPA scrutiny and the company disclosed:

“As previously disclosed, the Company conducted a review of certain allegations arising in connection with business operations involving its subsidiaries in Poland and Ukraine. The allegations raised issues involving potential improper payments in connection with governmental approvals, permits, or other regulatory areas and possible conflicts of interest. The Company’s review was supervised by the Audit Committee of Affinia’s Board of Directors and conducted with the assistance of outside professionals. Affinia voluntarily self-reported on these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and cooperated fully with the U.S. government.  The U.S. Department of Justice has advised that it has decided to decline to prosecute the Company in this matter.”

Several companies have been under scrutiny based on alleged improper relationships with Petrobras.  Three such companies: Ensco, Transocean, and Vantage Group recently  made disclosures.

Ensco

The company recently disclosed:

“Pride International, Inc. (“Pride”), a company we acquired in 2011, commenced drilling operations in Brazil during 2001 and, in 2008, entered into a drilling contract with Petrobras for DS-5, a rig Pride had ordered from a shipyard in South Korea.

Beginning in 2006, Pride conducted periodic compliance reviews of its business with Petrobras, and, after the acquisition, Ensco conducted similar compliance reviews, the most recent of which commenced in early 2015 after media reports were released regarding ongoing investigations of various kickback and bribery schemes in Brazil involving Petrobras.

While conducting our compliance review, we became aware of an internal audit report by Petrobras alleging irregularities in relation to DS-5 – specifically, that Petrobras overpaid under the drilling contract. We believe this allegation is inaccurate, as publicly available data show that the contract’s compensation terms were in line with other contracts signed by Petrobras and other customers with our competitors during the same timeframe (late 2007 and early 2008). We provided this information to Petrobras in June 2015. We continue to operate DS-5 under its existing contract. In addition, all our other rigs contracted to Petrobras – ENSCO 6001, 6002, 6003 and 6004 – continue to work under their contracts.

Upon learning of the Petrobras internal audit report, our Audit Committee appointed independent counsel to lead an investigation into the alleged irregularities. Subsequently, the internal audit report and the alleged irregularities were referenced in Brazilian court documents connected to the prosecution of former Petrobras directors and employees as well as certain other third parties, including a former marketing consultant who provided services to Pride in connection with DS-5. The former marketing consultant entered into a plea agreement with the Brazil authorities. This plea agreement was referenced in a Brazilian court proceeding relating to a project for a competitor having no connection to us. This court proceeding document states that another court action would be made public in due course with respect to DS-5; to date no further proceedings relating to DS-5 have been released.

Independent counsel, under the direction of our Audit Committee, has substantially completed the investigation of these allegations by reviewing and analyzing available documents and correspondence and interviewing current and former employees involved in the contracting of DS-5 as well as the former marketing consultant.

To date, our Audit Committee has found no evidence that Pride or Ensco or any of their current or former employees were aware of or involved in any wrongdoing, and our Audit Committee has found no evidence linking Ensco or Pride to any illegal acts committed by our former marketing consultant. Although the investigation is substantially complete, we cannot predict whether any new or additional allegations will be made and what impact those allegations will have on the timing or conclusions of the investigation. Our Audit Committee will examine any new or additional allegations and the facts and circumstances surrounding them. To date, we have not been contacted by Brazil authorities, and no authority has alleged wrongdoing by Pride or Ensco or any of their current or former employees. In June and July 2015, we voluntarily contacted the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), respectively, to advise them of this matter and our Audit Committee’s independent investigation, and we provided them an update on the investigation in September 2015. We cannot predict whether any governmental authority will seek to investigate this matter, or if a proceeding were opened, the scope or ultimate outcome of any such investigation. If the SEC or DOJ determines that violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”) have occurred, or if any governmental authority determines that we have violated applicable anti-bribery laws, they could seek civil and criminal sanctions, including monetary penalties, against us, as well as changes to our business practices and compliance programs, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”

As highlighted in this previous post, in 2010 Pride International resolved a $56 million FCPA enforcement action based on alleged conduct in Nigeria, India, Mexico, Venezuela and other countries.

Transocean

The company recently disclosed:

“We are currently investigating allegations made by a former Petrobras employee relating to the award of a drilling services contract to us. These allegations were made public through an investigation being conducted by Brazilian authorities in response to allegations of corrupt practices involving Petrobras business. To date, we have not identified any wrongdoing by any of our employees or agents in connection with our business in Brazil. We will continue to investigate these types of allegations and, if contacted, will cooperate with governmental authorities. Through the process of monitoring and proactive investigation, we strive to ensure no violation of our policies, code of integrity or law has, or will, occur; however, there can be no assurance as to the outcome of these matters.”

As highlighted in this previous post, in 2010 Transocean resolved a $20.7 million FCPA enforcement action based on alleged conduct in Nigeria.

Vantage Drilling

The company recently disclosed:

“In July 2015, we became aware of media reports that the Brazilian agent that we used in the contracting of the Titanium Explorer drillship, Mr. Padilha, had entered into a plea arrangement with the Brazilian authorities in connection with his role in obtaining bribes for former Petrobras executives.  Mr. Padilha, who simultaneously has represented several international companies in their contracts with Petrobras, provided evidence to the Brazilian prosecutors of an alleged bribery scheme between former Petrobras executives and Mr. Su, a former member of our Board of Directors and a significant shareholder.  Mr. Su was the sole owner of the company that owned the Titanium Explorer at the time the alleged bribe was paid.  At the same time we learned of Mr. Padilha’s plea agreement, we voluntarily contacted the SEC and the DOJ to advise them of these recent developments. We subsequently terminated his advisory contract with us.  Our internal and independent investigations, which are still ongoing, to date have found no evidence of wrongdoing by our employees or participation in any manner with the inappropriate acts alleged to have been conducted by Mr. Padilha.

We cannot predict whether any governmental authority will seek to investigate this matter, or if a proceeding were opened, the scope or ultimate outcome of any such investigation. If the SEC or DOJ determines that we have violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”), or if any governmental authority determines that we have violated applicable anti-bribery laws, they could seek civil and criminal sanctions, including monetary penalties, against us, as well as changes to our business practices and compliance programs, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”

Reading Stack

“The (Unintended) Consequences of the Yates Memo” here from Kurt Wolfe (Allen & Overy).

“The Yates Memo’s Chilling Effect on FCPA Self-Disclosure” here from Alison Tanchyk and Melissa Coates (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius). “Ironically, the unintended consequence [of the Yates Memo] may be fewer companies opting to self-disclose FCPA concerns, leading to fewer individual corruption prosecutions.”

*****

A good weekend to all.