The Demand Side Of Bribery
This new era of FCPA enforcement has resulted in many things, including an increase in quality legal scholarship devoted to the FCPA and related topics.
Case in point, Joseph Yockey’s recently released scholarship “Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA” (see here for the download). Yockey (here – Associate Professor at the University of Iowa College of Law) provides the following abstract.
“The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits firms from paying bribes to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. It is one of the most significant and feared statutes for companies operating abroad. FCPA enforcement has never been higher and nine-figure monetary penalties are not uncommon. This makes the implementation of robust FCPA compliance programs of paramount importance. Unfortunately, regardless of whether they have compliance measures in place, many firms report that they face bribe requests and extortionate threats from foreign public officials on a daily basis. The implications of these demand-side pressures have gone largely unexplored in the FCPA context. This Article helps fill that gap. First, I describe the nature and frequency of bribe solicitation and extortion to illustrate the scope of the problem and the costs it imposes on firms and other market participants. I then argue that current FCPA enforcement policy in cases of solicitation and extortion raises several unique corporate governance and compliance challenges, and ultimately poses a risk of overdeterrence. Though these concerns can be partially addressed through enhanced statutory guidance, I conclude by urging regulators to shift some of their focus from bribe-paying firms in order to directly target bribe-seeking public officials. Confronting the market for bribe demands in this way will help reduce corruption in general while also allowing employees and agents to spend less time worrying about how to respond to bribe requests and more time on legitimate, value-enhancing transactions.”
Yockey’s article also nicely touches upon other topics as the below excerpts demonstrate.
“As regulators continue to push the boundaries of statutory interpretation firms, find it difficult to predict ex ante whether conduct that appears permissible under the FCPA‟s terms will later expose them to sanction (or the threat of sanction). Left unchecked, this hinders efforts to design monitoring programs that will prevent illegal payments without also deterring employees from pursuing legitimate transactions or engaging in socially desirable risk-taking.”
“Several factors explain the recent resurgence in FCPA enforcement. […] A more cynical explanation for the government‟s focus on the FCPA is based on the “revolving door” between government and private sector employment. The rise in FCPA enforcement has produced a cottage industry of FCPA experts, including lawyers, accountants, and consultants at prestigious firms, which DOJ and SEC personnel often join after leaving their federal jobs for considerably higher compensation.”
“Another factor adding to the compliance challenges faced by firms concerns the way in which the DOJ and SEC have recently interpreted and applied several of the FCPA’s key provisions. Regulators have become more expansive in their interpretation of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions and considerably narrower in their assessment of the statute’s exceptions and defenses. Much of the trouble in this regard comes because the government’s authority under the FCPA is not as broad as the recent resurgence in enforcement activity might suggest.”
“Whether there is truly an unfair balance of power between regulators and corporate defendants [given the prevalence in which FCPA enforcement actions are resolved via non-prosecution or deferred prosecution agreements] is outside the scope of this paper. What appears undeniable, however, is that an absence of judicial review on key aspects of the FCPA makes it considerably more difficult for firms to design compliance programs that efficiently separate lawful but aggressive competitive activity from conduct that clearly violates the statute.”
The FCPA’s “Illusory” Facilitating Payments Exception
Facilitating payments. The FCPA is clear, as was Congress when it passed the FCPA. Such payments are excepted from the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Yet why do so many FCPA enforcement actions concern payments to low-level foreign officials to secure permits, licenses and the like?
In the words of former SEC FCPA enforcement attorney Richard Grime (see here) it is because “the DOJ and the SEC’s narrow interpretation of the facilitating payments exception is making that exception ever more illusory, regardless of whether the federal courts – or Congress – would agree.”
In this piece, Grime and co-author Sara Zbed (here) discuss the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception, how “recent enforcement actions have diminished the availability of the exception,” and why the exception has been “further eroded by the recently-enacted U.K. Bribery Act, which lacks any comparable exception and applies broadly to individuals and companies as long as they carry on some business in the United Kingdom.”
Excerpts from the article appear below.
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“The drafters of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) recognized that such demands for “grease payments” are a reality in many countries, and accordingly made clear that certain payments made to expedite the approval of permits or licenses, or to prompt the expeditious performance of similar low-level ministerial duties, fell outside the ambit of the statute’s anti bribery provisions. Yet that exception for “facilitating payments” – enacted during the FCPA’s 1988 amendments – is becoming harder and harder to rely on.”
“By excluding facilitating payments from the FCPA’s ambit, Congress acknowledged that such payments – while considered reprehensible within the United States – are “not necessarily [considered reprehensible] elsewhere in the world” and, for that reason, that “it is not feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.””
“The FCPA contains no indication of whether permitted facilitating payments are required to be below a certain dollar amount; nor does the statute provide any additional guidance about where a facilitating payment ends and a corrupt payment begins. Federal courts have not squarely confronted the issue, either. To the contrary, only a small handful of decisions even mention the facilitating payments exception, and those that do provide little clarity about the exception’s outer limits.”
“… [T]he Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have pressed a narrow view of the exception in recent years, and businesses and other defendants, reluctant to test the law’s boundaries at trial, have settled their cases instead.”
“The DOJ and the SEC have stepped into the void created by this absence of relevant case law, and their recent enforcement actions have diminished the availability of the exception in two principal ways. First, the business purpose requirement of the FCPA is being expanded to cover all manner of circumstances regardless whether there is a clear connection between the payment to the foreign official and obtaining or retaining business. For example, payments to obtain tax refunds, expedite inspections, and procure inspections from government officials are being charged as violations of the anti-bribery provisions without any explanation of why those payments satisfied the business purpose requirement of the law. Second, both the SEC and DOJ have charged violations of the accounting provisions for facilitation payments that are not recorded accurately.”
“Of course, the fact that the FCPA’s twin enforcement agencies have treated certain payments as prohibited despite their possible categorization as facilitating payments does not mean a federal court would agree. But because the vast majority of enforcement actions are resolved through deferred prosecution agreements, non-prosecution agreements, and other settlement devices, these cases never make it to trial. As a result, the DOJ and the SEC’s narrow interpretation of the facilitating payments exception is making that exception ever more illusory, regardless of whether the federal courts – or Congress – would agree.”
Grime and Zbed then shift gears and talk about the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception in light of the U.K. Bribery Act, a law that went live on July 1st.
“Whatever force the facilitating payments exception retains in this environment has been further eroded by the recently-enacted U.K. Bribery Act, which lacks any comparable exception and applies broadly to individuals and companies as long as they carry on some business in the United Kingdom.”
“If the increasing skepticism with which the FCPA’s enforcement agencies view facilitating payments gives pause to companies that permit such payments, so too should the recently enacted Bribery Act – a United Kingdom law that does not permit facilitating payments and whose broad territorial sweep may render the FCPA’s exception even more illusory.”
“The risk associated with permitting facilitating payments are particularly great for companies that do some business in the U.K., because the Bribery Act prohibits such payments and has a broad jurisdictional scope.”
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As to the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception, I previously observed here that some find facilitating payments to be corrupt payments under a different name. However, Congress did not agree, and the fact remains that the FCPA contains an express exception for facilitating payments. The enforcement agencies are obligated to enforce the statute that Congress passed, not a statute they wish they had. If Congress wants to remove the facilitating payment exception from the FCPA, let Congress do that, not the enforcement agencies through its charging decisions.
Summer Reading For Representative Conyers
During last week’s FCPA hearing in the House, Representative John Conyers (D-MI) had a contentious Q&A exchange with Shana-Tara Regon (Director, White Collar Crime Policy, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). See here for the previous post regarding the hearing.
Conyers asked – “give me some examples of overcriminalization of the FCPA.” He repeatedly interrupted Regon and asked “just give me some examples” “give me an instance of where one case was ever brought by the DOJ that would constitute overcriminalization.” Conyers stated, “only 140 cases have been brought in 10 years -that averages 14 cases a year – is that overcriminalization to you?” Regon stated that overcriminlization occurs when a statute provides no reasonable limits and that she is concerned more about prosecutions that may occur in the future more so than prosecutions that have already occurred.
There should be plenty of concern regarding prosecutions that have already occurred, but given the glare of the cameras, the stress of testifying, and the disruption of being interrupted, it would have been difficult for any witness to retrieve from their memory bank specific FCPA enforcement actions.
This post provides a summer reading list of FCPA enforcement actions, commentary and analysis, and legal scholarship for Representative Conyers so that he can best seek answers to the question he posed to Regon.
For starters, what does overcriminalization mean?
To be sure, it can mean different things to different people in different circumstances. In “The Overcriminalization Phenomenon(here) Eric Luna provides this definition – “the overcriminalization phenomenon consists of: (1) untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that
overextend culpability; (4) crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations. In this piece, Jeffrey Parker (while observing that “definitions of “overcriminalization” are a bit fuzzy and debatable”) identifies the following as among the factors that may contribute to overcriminalization: “the vague, arcane, or trivial nature of such prohibitions, as undermining citizens ability to conform, and debasing the moral moment of the criminal sanction” and “the lack of adequate mens rea standards in criminal prohibitions.”
Not all overcriminalization factors are relevant to this “new era of FCPA enforcement” (see here), but in the minds of many, several factors are.
Enforcement Actions
In the 2011 Comverse Technologies enforcement action (see here), the company paid $2.8 million in combined fines and penalties (and no doubt millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter in which the DOJ did not allege that the company even knew about the improper payments at issue. The action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ’s enforcement theory.
In the 2010 Alliance One International enforcement action (see here), the company paid approximately $20 million in combined fines and penalties (and millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter in which it did absolutely nothing wrong. Rather, the entire DOJ enforcement action was based on a successor liability theory. Again, the action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ’s enforcement theory.
In the 2010 Noble Corporation enforcement action (see here), the company paid approximately $8 million in combined fines and penalties (and millions more in connection with the investigative and resolution process) to resolve a matter involving the import and export of goods into Nigeria. When Congress passed the FCPA, its intent as to so-called facilitating or grease payments was clear. Senate Report No. 95-114 (May 2, 1977) states, in pertinent part, as follows. “The statute does not […] cover so-called ‘grease’ payments such as payments for expediting shipments through customs …”. The relevant House Report (No. 95-640, September 28, 1977) similarly states as follows. “The language of the bill is deliberately cast in terms which differentiate between [corrupt payments] and facilitating payments, sometimes called ‘grease payments.’ […] For example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a customs document would not be reached by this bill. Nor would it reach payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity be performed in any event. While payments made to assure or to speed the proper performance of a foreign official’s duties may be reprehensible in the United States, the committee recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.” The Noble enforcement action was resolved via a non-prosecution agreement meaning, again, there was no judicial scrutiny of the DOJ’s enforcement theory.
And then of course there is the issue of “foreign official” and the fact that most FCPA enforcement actions in this new era are based on alleged improper payments to employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (“SOEs”) on the theory that such business entities are “instrumentalities” of a foreign government and thus all employees, regardless of rank or position, are “foreign officials” under the FCPA. Yet, (1) During its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that some of the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved such entities. (2) In certain of the bills introduced in Congress to address foreign corporate payments, the definition of “foreign government” expressly included SOE entities. These bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House during both the 94th and 95th Congress. (3) Despite being aware of SOEs and despite exhibiting a capability for drafting a definition that expressly included SOEs in other bills, Congress chose not to include such definitions or concepts in what ultimately become the FCPA in 1977. See here for extensive reading on this issue.
Commentary and Analysis
In 2010, Forbes ran a feature article (here) titled “The Bribery Racket” – “How Federal Crackdown on Bribery Hurts Business And Enriches Insiders.” Lucinda Low, a respected FCPA practitioner, notes in the article that “the scope of things companies have to worry about is enlarging all the time as the government asserts violations in circumstances where it’s unclear if they would prevail in court” and that “you don’t have the checks and balances you would normally have if you had more litigation.” Commenting on the current era of FCPA enforcement, Joseph Covington (who headed the DOJ’s FCPA efforts in the 1980’s) said that the current era “is good business for law firms […] good business for accounting firms, it’s good business for consulting firms, the media–and Justice Department lawyers who create the marketplace and then get yourself a job.”
Here, Michael Levy (a former Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia and law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.) talks about what he calls prosecutorial common law. Levy states that “prosecutors don’t set out deliberately to interpret criminal statutes in ways that convict hundreds of people on the basis of a standard that not a single Supreme Court Justice finds supportable …”. Levy notes that “we have seen this before in connection with the interpretation of the honest services fraud and obstruction of justice statutes, and it is certainly happening today with the FCPA.”
In this publication, an author group including Philip Urofsky (former Assistant Chief of the DOJ Fraud Section responsible for FCPA enforcement) and Danforth Newcomb (a dean of the FCPA bar) noted that in several recent FCPA enforcement actions “the theories used to hold parents accountable for the acts of subsidiaries and vice versa appear to be unclear.” In other cases, the author group states that in many cases critical elements of the statute were not pleaded or were pled in a way “that is not consistent with established precedent and the language of the statute.”
In a September 10, 2010 interview with the Corporate Crime Reporter, Mark Mendelsohn (the former head of DOJ FCPA enforcement during this era of resurgence who departed the DOJ for private practice in 2010) stated that “some of the factors” the DOJ uses to resolve FCPA cases are transparent, but “there are other factors less easy to see from the outside.” Mendelsohn also noted, in connection with non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements (the common way FCPA enforcement actions are resolved) that the “danger” “is that it is tempting for the Department, or the SEC [to use these vehicles] to seek to resolve cases through DPAs or NPAs that don’t actually constitute violations of the law.”
In this Q&A exchange, Martin Weinstein (a former DOJ FCPA attorney who prosecuted the Lockheed case in the mid-1990’s and is now a prominent FCPA practitioner) stated as follows. “The last decade of FCPA enforcement has seen extraordinary evolution, and I think you have to say that when Congress passed the law in 1977, they did not envision the wide reach of enforcement today and the types of things that the government gets involved in, such as transactions, joint ventures, and successor liability.”
Legal Scholarship
In “Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” (here), Amy Westbrook (Washburn University School of Law) argues that the recent “transformation of the FCPA has been brought about by ad hoc enforcement actions, rather than legislation, judicial decision, or regulation” and that “in the absence of formal process or reasoned articulation, the actual scope of the law is unclear.”
In “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” (here), I argue that “the FCPA often means what the enforcement agencies say it means” and that “even though the resolution vehicles typically used to resolve an FCPA enforcement action are not subject to judicial scrutiny and [thus] the vehicles do not necessarily reflect the triumph of the enforcement agencies’ theories, in the absence of substantive FCPA case law, these privately negotiated resolution vehicles have come to represent de facto FCPA case law” which breed “inefficient overcompliance by risk averse business actors fearful of enterprise – threatening liability because of the enforcement agencies’ untested and dubious theories.”
House Hearing – Pregame
Yesterday, Global Financial Integrity (“GFI”) and The Task Force on Financial Integrity and Economic Development issued identical press releases (here and here) regarding today’s House Judiciary subcommittee hearing on the FCPA (see here).
The releases, titled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under Attack” portray today’s hearing as a U.S. Chamber of Commerce sponsored event and states as follows. “Among other things, the hearing will specifically consider amendments proposed to the act by the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which FCPA-proponents charge will significantly weaken the anti-corruption legislation and undermine efforts to tackle corruption and illicit financial practices abroad. The Chamber’s proposed changes would seriously undermine one of the most important anti-corruption statues we have on the books. […] This is a blatant attempt by the business lobby to limit accountability and reduce a company’s risk of prosecution for paying bribes. It is a real threat to global efforts to stamp out corruption and foster economic development.”
GFI legislative affairs director and legal affairs council Heather Lowe states as follows. “With the exception of [the DOJ witness – Greg Andres], the witness lineup represents commercial interests. There is no witness on the panel representing those who are working to fight corruption without a commercial interest or government policy driving their testimony. Members of Congress need to have an opportunity to hear those voices as well.”
Attached to the releases are two documents.
The first document is titled “Concerns About the U.S. Chamber Institute of Legal Reform’s Proposals for Amending the FCPA.” (For a copy of the Chamber’s reform proposals – see here).
The document addresses five topics: (i) limiting liability of a parent company for acts of its subsidiaries; (ii) defining “foreign official”; (iii) allowing companies with compliance programs to escape liability (compliance as an affirmative defense); (iv) limiting the liability of a successor company for the prior acts of a company that has merged into it or that it has acquired; and (v) adding a “willfulness” requirement for corporate criminal liability.
As to “foreign official,” the document states as follows. “The U.S. Chamber is promoting the creation of a definition of “foreign official” so that companies have greater legal certainty. Greater certainty of what? Greater certainty of who they are permitted to bribe and who they are not permitted to bribe.”
In all due respect, this is a naive statement.
As I noted in this article, because of the enforcement agencies’ current interpretation of “foreign official,” those subject to the FCPA are spending significant time and money investigating the ownership structure of foreign customers and potential customers for any trace of foreign government ownership or control. Such a costly investigation, often involving lawyers and other investigative firms, is not motivated by the company’s desire to make improper payments to the foreign customer or potential customer to obtain or retain business should the investigation reveal no foreign government ownership or control. Rather, the costly investigation is often motivated for the simple reason that the company wants to treat these foreign customers the same as it treats its other customers. That means hosting such customers at corporate events in which some fun may take place (e.g., golf) or inviting such customers to an industry trade show—events that often take place in tourist locations. Companies fear providing such “things of value” to a “foreign official” (under the enforcement agencies’ interpretation) even though the company is legitimately and legally providing the exact same thing to its non- “foreign official” customers or potential customers. It is highly questionable whether Congress foresaw company lawyers being involved in the simple decision of whether to invite a particular customer to the company’s golf outing or trade show.
As to a potential compliance defense, the document states as follows. “If a company is found to be in violation of the FCPA, then the existence of a company’s compliance program must not have prevented the acts of bribery. So why should the existence of their compliance program be a defense to the charge of bribery?”
Again, an unsophisticated statement.
For instance, the U.K. Bribery Act Guidance (here) states as follows. “The objective of the Act is not to bring the full force of the criminal law to bear upon well run commercial organizations that experience an isolated incident of bribery on their behalf.”
“[N]o bribery prevention regime will be capable of preventing bribery at all times.”
“[A] commercial organization will have a full defense if it can show that despite a particular case of bribery, it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place to prevent persons associated with it from bribing.”
Similarly, in a 1981 FCPA speech (to be profiled in a future post) the SEC Chairman noted as follows. “The test of a company’s internal control system is not whether occasional failings can occur. Those will happen in the most ideally managed company. But, an adequate system of internal controls means that, when such breaches do arise, they will be isolated rather than systemic, and they will be subject to a reasonable likelihood of being uncovered in a timely manner and then remedied promptly. Barring, of course, the participation or complicity of senior company officials in the deed, when discovery and correction expeditiously follow, no failing in the company’s internal accounting system would have existed. To the contrary, routine discovery and correction would evidence its effectiveness.”
Elsewhere in the speech, the SEC Chairman stated as follows. “If a violation was committed by a low level employee, without the knowledge of top management, with an adequate system of internal control, and with appropriate corrective action taken by the issuer, we do not believe that any action against the company would be called for.”
This speech was given during the same general time frame when Congress was last seriously considering substantial FCPA reform in the 1980’s. Numerous FCPA reform bills included a specific defense which stated a company would not be held vicariously liable for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions by its employees or agents, who were not an officer or director, if the company established procedures reasonably designed to prevent and detect FCPA violations by employees and agents. An FCPA reform bill containing such a provision did pass the U.S. House.
In my forthcoming scholarship, “Revisiting an FCPA Compliance Defense” (to be presented at the Wisconsin Law Review symposium – see here), I argue that amending the FCPA to include a compliance defense (a defense found in the “FCPA-like” laws of other nations) will best incentivize corporate FCPA compliance and not put a company at risk of FCPA scrutiny, costly FCPA internal investigations, and the growing collateral consequences of FCPA inquiries should a non-executive employee engage in conduct contrary to a company’s pre-existing FCPA compliance policies and procedures and compliance culture.
The second document attached to the GFI releases is titled “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Context.” The 2 page document ends with the following in red caps. “WE HAVE SHOWN THE WORLD THAT THE U.S. IS SERIOUS ABOUT COMBATING BRIBERY, AND THE WORLD IS FOLLOWING OUR LEAD. WEAKENING THE FCPA NOW WILL SEND A MESSAGE TO THE WORLD THAT THE U.S. IS SOFT ON CORRUPTION AND OUR COMPANIES ARE DEEP POCKETS FOR BRIBE-SEEKERS. THE U.S. SHOULD FOCUS ON ENCOURAGING WORLDWIDE ENFORCEMENT, NOT CRIPPLING A STATUTE THAT HAS BEEN THE MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY LEGISLATION.”
Enjoy today’s hearing.
Branch Office Of The Prosecutor
David Hilzenrath of the Washington Post recently profiled a dynamic that readers of this site know well – and that is “as the U.S. government steps up investigations of companies suspected of paying bribes overseas, law enforcement officials are leaving much of the detective work to the very corporations under suspicion.” See here for the article.
The article touches upon themes also addressed in Nathan Vardi’s “Bribery Racket” article in Forbes (see here) as Hilzenrath notes that “for the people who conduct the internal investigations – many of them former Justice and SEC employees – it is big business.” Hilzenrath notes – “The corporations, sometimes at the request of the government, hire teams of lawyers and accountants to interview employees, gather electronic records and sift through documents. The government reviews the results and decides whether further legwork is warranted – and ultimately, whether to pursue charges.”
The recent Washington Post article motivated me to read a law review article that has long been on my reading stack and that is “Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions.” (See here).
Written by Harry First, the Charles Denison Professor of Law at New York University School of Law (see here) and published by the North Carolina Law Review, the “article describes the evolution of the public corporation’s role in the criminal justice process – from potential defendant to “branch office of the prosecutor,” partnering with the government in investigating business crime – and assesses the impact of this evolution on criminal justice policy.”