The only category of actor that both the DOJ and SEC can bring a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against are “issuers” (the 78dd-1 portion of the FCPA).
The other two categories of actors covered by the FCPA, “domestic concerns” (78dd-2) and “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns” (78dd-3) are only subject to DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.
This post analyzes the percentage of SEC FCPA enforcement that also involve a DOJ component.
I recently spent some time on the DOJ’s FCPA Website and looked at all “Enforcement Actions” involving individuals from 2018 to the present.
Many of the separately listed “Enforcement Actions” involve multiple individual defendants and some individual enforcement actions are listed in more than one year.
By my estimation though, the DOJ’s FCPA website – from 2018 to the present – contains information about 175 individuals and set forth below are some interesting statistics.
For at least 15 years the government has encouraged business organizations to voluntary disclosure conduct that violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In more recent years, in 2012 the government sought in the FCPA Guidance to entice business organizations to voluntarily disclose by, among other things, highlighting six “anonymized examples of matters DOJ and SEC have declined to pursue” where a common thread was voluntary disclosure. In April 2016, it was the DOJ’s pilot program, an effort – in the words of the DOJ – to “encourage voluntary corporate self-disclosure.” Thereafter, it was the November 2017 DOJ FCPA Corporate Enforcement policy which – in the words of the DOJ – was intended to provide “guidance and greater certainty for companies struggling with the question of whether to make voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing…”.
But what do the numbers show? What percentage of DOJ and SEC enforcement actions are the result of a voluntary disclosure? The below post provides the answers.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act contains specific penalty provisions for both violations of the anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions. However, in the FCPA’s modern era there has been a dramatic shift by the SEC away from the FCPA’s statutory penalties in most corporate enforcement action towards disgorgement.
The 2004 FCPA enforcement action against ABB is believed to be the first FCPA enforcement in which the SEC sought a disgorgement remedy.
Since then, the SEC has secured approximately $5.1 billion in disgorgement (and associated pre-judgment interest) in approximately 150 corporate enforcement actions. Set forth below is the current top 20 list of SEC disgorgement amounts.
The only category of actor that both the DOJ and SEC can bring a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against are “issuers” (the 78dd-1 portion of the FCPA).
The other two categories of actors covered by the FCPA, “domestic concerns” (78dd-2) and “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns” (78dd-3) are only subject to DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.
This post analyzes the percentage of SEC FCPA enforcement that also involve a DOJ component.
Before highlighting the yearly and aggregate statistics, it is not surprising that the DOJ does not join every issuer FCPA enforcement action brought by the SEC. Even though the DOJ and SEC are almost never put in a position to prove an FCPA violation against an issuer, theoretically the DOJ’s burden of proof is a very high beyond a reasonable doubt whereas the SEC’s civil burden of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence.
