Analyzing Allianz
Earlier this week, $12.3 million flowed into the U.S. treasury.
Why?
Because a German company used to have shares and bonds registered with the SEC. The German company had a German subsidiary that invested in an Indonesian joint venture. The Indonesian joint venture made, without any apparent knowledge or approval of the German company, alleged improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia between seven to eleven years ago. When the German company learned of suspicious account activity at the Indonesian joint venture seven years ago, it directed the joint venture to close the suspicious account. The joint venture agreed to close the account and stop making the payments, even though it continued to make the payments through 2008.
The above paragraph pretty much explains the SEC’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action earlier this week against Allianz SE , a German company engaged in property and casualty insurance, life and health insurance, and asset management businesses around the world.
From November 2000 to October 2009, Allianz’s American Depositary Shares and bonds were registered with the SEC and it was thus an “issuer” under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In 1989 PT Asuransi Allianz Utama Indonesia (“Utama”) was formed as a joint venture. JV members included Allianz of Asia-Pacific and Africa GmbH (AZAP – a German company and a wholly-owned subsidiary of Allianz), PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (“Jasindo”) (“an Indonesian state-owned entity) and PT Asuransi Wuwungan. According to the SEC, during the relevant time period, AZAP owned 75% of Utama.
In the administrative cease and desist order (here) announced (here) earlier this week, the SEC found improper payments by Utama to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain or retain business. The order also found that the payments were improperly recorded and that Allianz failed to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal controls.
The SEC order states, in summary, as follows.
“These proceedings arise out of violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) by Allianz SE (“Allianz” or the “Company”), through its Indonesian majority-owned subsidiary, PT Asuransi Allianz Utama (“Utama”). Between 2001 and 2008, Utama managers made improper payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia in order to obtain and retain business. Allianz learned of the improper payments from two complaints made several years apart. The first complaint was submitted in 2005 alleging significant misconduct, including unsupported payments to agents. A subsequent audit of Utama’s accounting records uncovered that managers at Utama were using “special purpose accounts” to make illicit payments, many to government officials, in order to secure business in Indonesia. Despite the audit, the conduct continued. The second complaint was lodged in 2009 to Allianz’s external auditors and alleged that Allianz created illicit off-the-books accounts. In response, Allianz began an internal investigation. The Commission staff opened an investigation in April 2010 after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The investigation determined that from at least 2001 through December 2008, the Utama managers, with the assistance of others in the Indonesian office, made payments to employees of state-owned entities in Indonesia to procure or retain insurance contracts related to large government projects in Indonesia. As a result of improper payments of approximately $650,626 to agents and employees of state-owned entities and others, Allianz realized $5,315,649 in profits. The payments were improperly recorded as legitimate transaction costs, thereby causing Allianz’s books and records to be inaccurate. Allianz failed to devise and maintain a system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances to detect and prevent such payments.”
The order contains the following additional facts.
“In 1989, Allianz established Utama and continued the practice of using special purpose accounts for paying commissions to agents that generated business for Allianz. However, in February 2001, Indonesian Agent, an agent for Utama, Utama CEO 1 [a German citizen who was the Utama CEO from 1998 to 2001] and Utama’s Chief Financial Officer opened a separate, off-the-books account in the Indonesian Agent’s name (the “Agent special purpose account”). The Agent special purpose account was used to make improper payments to employees of Indonesian state-owned entities and others for the purpose of obtaining and retaining insurance contracts. In February 2001, Indonesian Agent and Utama CEO 1 executed a “Paying Agency Agreement” that set up the scheme to make the payments to employees of state-owned entities. This agreement established the off-the-books account that served as a slush fund to make bribe payments to foreign officials and others as instructed by Utama.”
Under the heading “Utama’s 2001-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.
“During the period 2001 to 2005, Utama Marketing Manager [an Indonesian citizen] made payments from the Agent special purpose account to account introducers employed by state-owned entities to secure insurance contracts on large government projects in Indonesia. Utama Marketing Manager received approval from Utama management to use the Agent special purpose account for improper purposes. Utama CEO 2, the CEO from 2003-2006, was aware of the Agent special purpose account and the improper payments to foreign officials. […] The improper payments made to foreign officials were disguised in the Utama insurance contracts as “overriding commissions.” Despite the fact that Allianz has a majority share of Utama and consolidated the subsidiary’s accounts into its own books and records, Utama’s accounting system was maintained in Indonesia and Allianz did not have effective controls over the accounting. Allianz did not have the ability to access Utama’s accounting system and, therefore, did not detect the movement of funds to the Agent special purpose account. In addition, the Agent special purpose account was maintained in the name of the Indonesian Agent to make it appear that all movement of funds to this account was for legitimate commission payments. Likewise, Allianz did not have effective controls over the commission payment request process, which allowed payments to go to the Agent special purpose account without supporting documentation. […] On December 1, 2005, a whistleblower complaint concerning the special purpose account was submitted to both the Allianz whistleblower hotline and Utama’s joint venture partner Jasindo, and then forwarded to the head of AZAP. The complaint itemized a number of control weaknesses, most notably, the existence of the Agent special purpose account and its lack of transparency. On December 8, 2005, Allianz Group Audit initiated an audit of the Indonesian office; however, the review was limited to embezzlement from the Company. […] However, no additional steps were taken to determine the nature and purpose of the accounts or to identify the recipients of payments from the accounts. On December 12, 2005, based on the audit findings Allianz directed the Utama management to close the Agent special purpose account. Although the Utama management agreed to close the account and to stop making the payments, it continued making improper payments to secure business for Allianz through 2008.”
Under the heading “Utama’s Post-2005 Improper Payments” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.
“Despite the directive to close the account and to stop making payments, Utama Marketing Manager continued to use the Agent special purpose account to make improper payments to foreign officials from 2005 to 2008. […] Utama CEO 2 approved the continued use of the Agent special purpose account to make payments on the two government insurance contracts at issue. Later, Utama Marketing Manager and his staff expanded the improper payments to numerous other foreign officials on government insurance contracts. From 2005 to 2008, Utama Marketing Manager employed various methods to make payments to foreign officials. In addition to booking payments through the Agent special purpose account, Utama Marketing Manager made payments by either: 1) booking commissions to an agent that was not associated with the account for the government insurance contract and then withdrawing the funds booked to the agent’s account as cash to pay the foreign official; or 2) overstating the amount of a client’s insurance premium, booking the excess amount to an unallocated account and then “reimbursing” the excess funds to the foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Similar to the Agent special purpose account, Allianz did not have effective controls over the Utama accounting system or the commission payment process, which allowed payments to be made to an agent’s account without supporting documentation. Allianz did not have any controls over the use of the unallocated account that was maintained at Utama. As a result, Utama Marketing Manager was able to take funds from Utama to pay foreign officials without detection. In March 2009, Allianz’s outside auditor received an anonymous complaint alleging that an Allianz executive created or initiated slush funds during his tenure with AZAP. Between December 2005, when the Allianz Executive Vice-President of the Asia-Pacific Division directed Utama to close the Agent special purpose account and the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz took no steps to ensure that the Agent special purpose account was closed and that similar improper payments were not being made.”
Under the heading “Investigation and Remediation” the order states, in full, as follows.
“In response to the March 2009 Whistleblower complaint, Allianz convened a Whistleblower Committee to do an internal investigation and retained counsel to conduct an internal investigation of Utama’s payment practices in Indonesia. Allianz did not report the conduct to the Commission staff. In April 2010, the staff opened an investigation after receiving an anonymous complaint of possible FCPA violations. The staff contacted Allianz concerning the allegations. Allianz’s cooperation in the staff’s investigation and the timeliness of its response to the Commission’s requests for documents and information improved over time. Allianz hired new counsel and took steps to further its cooperation and remedial efforts. The staff’s investigation uncovered 295 government insurance contracts that were obtained or retained by improper payments of approximately $650,626 to Indonesian government officials and others from 2001 through 2008. As stated above, in some instances the nature of the improper payments was disguised in invoices as an “overriding commission” or as a commission for an agent that was not associated with the government insurance contract. In other instances the improper payments were structured as an overpayment by the government insurance contract holder, who was later “reimbursed” for the overpayment. The excess funds were then paid to foreign officials, who were responsible for procuring the government insurance contracts. Allianz took various remedial measures, including employment action against several individuals who were involved in the conduct or failed to stop the conduct. Allianz issued new or enhanced FCPA compliance and internal accounting control policies and procedures, including mandating strict scrutiny of payments to third party intermediaries. Allianz also updated the anti-corruption clause in its third-party contracts to specifically refer to the FCPA. Allianz provided enhanced FCPA compliance training to its employees and improved its current global anti-corruption compliance program.”
Under the heading, “FCPA Violations” the order states, in pertinent part, as follows.
“Utama, a majority-owned subsidiary of Allianz, made improper payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain government insurance contracts. Utama improperly recorded the payments as legitimate transaction costs. Utama’s financial statements were consolidated into Allianz’s financial statements. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to keep accurate books, records and accounts. Further, as evidenced by the extent and duration of Utama’s improper payments and their improper recordation, and the fact that Allianz was not aware that Utama’s commission payment request process allowed funds to be diverted for improper payments, Allianz failed to recognize the compliance risks posed by Utama. Allianz also failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that improper payments were not being made by its subsidiary. As a result of the conduct described above, Allianz violated Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act, which requires issuers to devise and maintain a sufficient system of internal accounting controls. […] Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act does not require that the amounts involved be “material,” nor is it necessary to prove “scienter” under its provisions. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs. Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 749-51 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Similarly, there is no scienter requirement for establishing a violation of Section 13(b)(2)(B).
According to the SEC release, “without admitting or denying the findings, Allianz agreed to cease and desist from further violations and pay disgorgement of $5,315,649, prejudgment interest of $1,765,125, and a penalty of $5,315,649 for a total of $12,396,423.”
See here for a prior guest post discussing the Dodd-Frank provision granting the SEC authority to impose civil monetary penalties in administrative proceedings such as the Allianz matter.
There is much to analyze in the nine-page cease and desist order.
For starters, the SEC required disgorgement even though no FCPA anti-bribery violations were alleged or asserted. This prior post highlighted an article concerning “no-charged bribery disgorgement” by various Debevoise & Plimpton attorneys, including Paul Berger (here) a former Associate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement. The article concluded that “settlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its complaint.” The article noted that such “no-charged bribery disgorgement settlements appear designed to inflict punishment rather than achieve the goals of equity.”
Your first reaction might be – the SEC could have charged Allianz with FCPA anti-bribery violations given the findings of the cease and desist order, but choose not to. If that is your reaction, based on the information in the cease and desist order, you are wrong.
Contrary to popular misperception, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to foreign issuers only to the extent “mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce” are used in connection with the improper payments. The SEC’s order does not contain any findings concerning any U.S. nexus in regards to the payments at issue.
The above paragraph, in addition to the notion that the SEC’s order does not contain any findings to suggest willful violations of the FCPA’s books and records or internal control provisions, helps explain the lack of DOJ involvement in the matter. Nevertheless, some (see here) used the “d” word (as in declination) in describing the DOJ’s decision not to bring charges against Allianz. However, for the reasons explained above, there appears to have been no criminal charges to bring against Allianz. This is not a declination.
In this regard, the Allianz enforcement action is similar to the 2011 enforcement action against Diageo (see here for the prior post).
According to this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, “Claudius Sokenu of Arnold & Porter LLP conducted the company’s internal investigation and Joel Cohen of Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP was brought in subsequently to assist as the company neared a resolution.”
Friday Roundup
A prosecutorial common law defeat, the SEC repeats its prior positions, better but not good, document issues, and recent scrutiny news.
Prosecutorial Common Law Defeat
One of the best guest posts in FCPA Professor history was this 2011 post from Michael Levy in which he described the concept of prosecutorial common law. Prosecutorial common law is all around us. Take a look at the footnotes of the recent FCPA Guidance – most of the “authority” cited for “legal” propositions is DOJ or SEC settlements.
For obvious reasons, prosecutorial common law does not sit well with federal court judges. For instance, in U.S. v. Bodmer, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, in rejecting the DOJ’s position that the FCPA’s criminal penalty provisions applied to a foreign national prior to the 1998 FCPA amendments, noted as follows – “the Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.” Likewise as noted in this previous post about the Giffen enforcement action, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York stated that prosecutorial common law “is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”
Prosecutorial common law recently suffered a major defeat when the Second Circuit, in a non-FCPA case, rejected (see here for the opinion) a DOJ theory of prosecution concerning off-label promotion of drugs that it has previously used to secure billions (yes that is a “b”) in recent settlements with pharmaceutical companies.
Commenting on this recent development, Levy stated as follows. “It is amazing to me how consistently this pattern seems to repeat but, given the incentives on both sides, I don’t really see any structural solutions that would change it.”
For additional reading, see this client alert from Debevoise & Plimpton, this client alert from Arnold & Porter, and this client alert from Gibson Dunn.
SEC Responds to Magyar Telekom Execs Motion to Dismiss
Given the SEC’s positions in its recent response to Herbert Steffen’s motion to dismiss (see here for the prior post), it comes as little surprise that the SEC is taking the same positions in its response to the motion to dismiss filed by former Magyar Telecom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai.
In its response brief (here), the SEC states, in summary form, as follows.
“The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction; (2) the SEC’s claims are time-barred; (3) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s anti-bribery claims; and (4) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s lying to auditors claims. The Court should deny the motion on all four grounds.
First, the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction because their conduct caused foreseeable consequences in the United States. The complaint alleges that the defendants orchestrated a bribery scheme in Macedonia; that they concealed their bribes through the use of sham contracts and falsified books and records; that they lied to Magyar’s auditors by signing false annual and quarterly certifications; and that their actions caused Magyar to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC in the United States that misrepresented the company’s financial statements and included false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.
Second, the complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2462. That provision expressly states that the limitations period does not begin to run until the defendants are “found within the United States.” The defendants acknowledge in their brief that they have remained outside of the United States since their commission of this scheme. Thus, the statute of limitations period has not begun to run as to them. In any event, claims for equitable relief are not subject to the limitations period of Section 2462, which by its terms applies only to “penalties.”
Third, the complaint pleads all facts necessary to support every element of every claim against the defendants. The defendants met the “interstate commerce” prong of Exchange Act Section 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, by sending, in furtherance of their bribery scheme, electronic mail messages that were routed through servers located in the United States. Because the use of interstate commerce is a jurisdictional element, the Exchange Act does not require that defendants know, let alone “corruptly” intend, that their messages would reach the United States. The complaint sufficiently identifies the foreign officials whom the defendants bribed; Section 30A does not require that the officials be expressly named. And the complaint sufficiently identifies the specific false statements made by each defendant to Magyar’s auditors and why those statements were material.”
Of particular note as to “foreign official,” the SEC makes the sweeping statement that “there is no requirement under the FCPA or in the case law interpreting it that the SEC’s complaint [needs to] identify bribed foreign officials by name.” The SEC then states in a footnote as follows. “Any such requirement would be completely at odds with the FCPA’s statutory scheme. […] By its very structure, [the anti-bribery provisions were] drafted to prohibit corrupt transactions in which the precise identity of a government official might not be known even to the payor.”
As noted in this previous post, the SEC is asserting the same “foreign official” position in the Mark Jackson / James Ruehlen challenge. Oral arguments are to take place today on that motion in Houston.
It should be noted that in the DOJ’s unsuccessful prosecution of John O’Shea, Judge Hughes stated as follows. “[W]hile the Government does not have to trace a particular dollar to a particular pocket of a particular official, it has to connect the payment to a particular official, that the funds made under his authority to a foreign official, who can be identified in some reasonable way, that is, with no reasonable doubt.” Judge Hughes also stated as follows. “You can’t convict a man promising to pay unless you have a particular promise to a particular person for a particular benefit. If you call up the [intermediary] and say, look, I’m going to send you 50 grand, bribe somebody, that does not meet the statute.”
Corruption Perception Index
Transparency International (“TI”) recently released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”) (see here). The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be and is a composite index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions and reflecting the views of observers from around the world including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.
The top three (very clean) countries in the CPI were Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. The bottom three (highly corrupt) countries were Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia.
The United States placed 19th on the list of 176 countries. While this is better than last year’s 24th place finish, as noted in this prior post it’s a bit ironic that as the U.S. aggressively expands its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theories, the U.S. remains far from the top of the CPI.
Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently spoke of the U.S. FCPA enforcement effort in religious terms (“we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws more vigorously than we do”), yet CPI’s rankings should again cause pause as to our claimed moral superiority.
Document Issues
I am not one to usually highlight FCPA Inc. marketing material, but I thought this video clip from e-discovery firm H5 was instructive as to many of the document issues involved in an FCPA investigation. The enforcement agencies have commented from time to time that FCPA Inc. has a tendency to sometimes over do it in this area, but be that as it may – data collection, data storage, data analysis, etc. are among the reasons why FCPA investigations often soar into the millions.
Recent Scrutiny News
Rolls-Royce
Reuters reports (here) that Rolls-Royce, the world’s second-largest maker of aircraft engines “said the [U.K. Serious Fraud Office] had asked it to conduct an internal inquiry into dealings involving intermediaries in China, Indonesia and other overseas markets.” According to the report, “a source close to the investigation said the allegations relate to events in the “distant past” and Rolls-Royce had told the U.S. Department of Justice about the inquiry.”
As noted in this previous post, in June, Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rolls-Royce Holdings, resolved an FCPA enforcement action.
Barclays
Reuters also reports (here) that a previously disclosed DOJ and SEC “investigation into whether Barclays Plc paid bribes to win a banking license in Saudi Arabia has spread to other banks that operate in the region.”
Net 1
Earlier this week, Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc. disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows.
“On November 30, 2012, we received a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (the “DOJ”) informing us that the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have begun an investigation into whether Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries, including their officers, directors, employees, and agents (collectively, “Net 1”) and other persons and entities possibly affiliated with Net 1 violated provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S. federal criminal laws by engaging in a scheme to make corrupt payments to officials of the Government of South Africa in connection with securing a contract with the South African Social Security Agency to provide social welfare and benefits payments and also engaged in violations of the federal securities laws in connection with statements made by Net 1 in its SEC filings regarding this contract. On the same date, we received a letter from the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) advising us that it is also conducting an investigation concerning our company. The SEC letter states that the investigation is a non-public, fact-finding inquiry.”
In this additional release, the company states as follows.
“These investigations appear to be directed at matters which are similar to those that were the subject of articles which appeared in various South African newspapers after AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Limited (“AllPay”) instituted legal proceeding in the South African courts to set aside the contract awarded to us in January 2012 by SASSA. AllPay was an unsuccessful bidder for the SASSA contract.”
News of the company’s FCPA scrutiny caused the company’s U.S. listed shares to plunge approximately 58%. This of course caused several plaintiff law firms to announce investigations of their own. See here, here, and here. In the meantime, the company’s shares have risen 46%.
It’s an FCPA world.
*****
A good weekend to all.
In Depth On The Tyco Enforcement Action
Earlier this week, the DOJ and SEC announced a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Tyco International Ltd. (“Tyco”) and a subsidiary company. Total fines and penalties in the enforcement action were approximately $26.8 million (approximately $13.7 million in the DOJ enforcement action and approximately $13.1 million in the SEC enforcement action).
This post goes long and deep as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents (approximately 85 pages in total). Tomorrow’s post will discuss various items of note from the enforcement actions.
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Tyco Valves & Controls Middle East Inc., (an indirect subsidiary of Tyco) resolved through a plea agreement (here) and a non-prosecution agreement (here) entered into between the DOJ and Tyco.
Criminal Information
The criminal information begins by identifying Tyco Valves & Controls Middle East Inc. (TVC ME) as a Delaware company headquartered in Dubai that “sells and markets valves and actuators manufactured by other entities throughout the Middle East for the oil, gas, petrochemical, commercial construction, water treatment,and desalination industries.”
According to the information, Tyco Flow Control Inc. (“TFC) was TVC ME’s direct parent company and TFC was a wholly-owned indirect subsidiary of Tyco. According to the information, “TVC ME’s financials were consolidated into the books and records of TFC for the purposes of preparing TFC’s year-end financial statements, and in turn, TFC’s financials were consolidated into the books and records of Tyco for the purposes of preparing Tyco’s year-end financial results.”
The information alleges a conspiracy as follows.
Between 2003 and 2006 TVC ME conspired with others to “obtain and retain business from foreign government customers, including Aramco, ENOC, Vopak, NIGC, and other customers by paying bribes to foreign officials employed by such customers.”
The information alleges: that Saudi Aramco (“Aramco”) was a Saudi Arabian oil and gas company that was wholly-owned, controlled, and managed by the government, and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Emirates National Oil Company (“ENOC”) was a state-owned entity in Dubai and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; that Vopak Horizon Fujairah (“Vopak”) was a subsidiary of ENOC based in the U.A.E. and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government; and that the National Iranian Gas Company (“NIGC”) was a state-owned entity in Iran and an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government.
Under the heading “manner and means of the conspiracy” the information alleges in pertinent part as follows.
“TVC ME, together with others, decided to pay bribes to employees of end-customers in Saudi Arabia, the U.A.E., and Iran, including to employees at Aramco, ENOC, Vopak, and NIGC, in order to obtain or retain business. TVE ME, together with others, found ways to obtain cash in order to make the bribe payments. TVE ME, together with others, made payments through Local Sponsor [a company in Saudi Arabia that acted as a distributor for TVC ME in Saudi Arabia]. Local Sponsor provided TVC ME with false documentation, such as fictitious invoices for consultancy costs, bills for fictitious commissions, or ‘unanticipated costs for equipment,’ to justify the payments to Local Sponsor that were intended to be used for bribes. TVE ME, together with others, approved and made payments to Local Sponsor for the purpose of paying bribes. TVC ME, together with others, paid bribes to employees of foreign government customers in order to remove TVC manufacturing plans from various Aramco ‘blacklists’ or ‘holds’; win specific bids; and/or obtain specific product approval. TVC ME, together with others, improperly recorded the bribe payments in TVC ME’s books, records, and accounts, and instead falsely described the payments, including as consultancy costs, commissions, or equipment costs. TVC ME earned approximately $1.153,500 in gross margin as a result of the bribe payments.”
Based on the above conduct, the information charges conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Plea Agreement
The plea agreements sets forth a Sentencing Guidelines range of $2.1 million – $4.2 million. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that $2.1 million was “appropriate.” Pursuant to the plea agreement, TVC ME agreed “to work with its parent company in fulfilling the obligations” described in Corporate Compliance Program attached to the plea agreement.
NPA
The DOJ also entered into an NPA with Tyco in which the DOJ agreed “not to criminally prosecute [Tyco] related to violations of the books and records provisions of the FCPA … arising from and related to the knowing and willful falsification of books, records, and accounts by a number of the Company’s subsidiaries and affiliates …”.
The NPA contains a Statement of Facts.
Under the heading, “details of the illegal conduct” the NPA states as follows.
“[From 1999 through 2009] certain Tyco subsidiaries falsified books, records, and accounts in connection with transactions involving customers of Tyco’s subsidiaries, including government customers, in order to secure business in various countries, including China, India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iran, Saudia Arabia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritania, Congo, Niger, Madagascar, and Turkey. During that time period, certain Tyco subsidiaries made payments, both directly and indirectly, to government officials and falsely described the payments to government officials in Tyco’s corporate books, records, and accounts as legitimate charges, including as ‘consulting fees,’ ‘commissions,’ ‘unanticipated costs for equipment,’ ‘technical consultation and marketing promotion expenses,’ ‘conveyance expenses,’ ‘cost of goods sold,’ ‘promotional expenses,’ and ‘sales development’ expenses. As early as 2004, Tyco alerted the Securities and Exchange Commission to payments at certain of Tyco’s subsidiaries that could violate the FCPA. In 2006, Tyco acknowledged that ‘prior to 2003 Tyco did not have a uniform, company-wide FCPA compliance program in place or a system of internal controls sufficient to detect and prevent FCPA misconduct at is globally dispersed business units’ and that ’employees at two Tyco subsidiaries in Brazil and South Korea did not receive adequate instruction regarding compliance with the FCPA, despite Tyco’s knowledge and awareness that illicit payments to government officials were a common practice in the Brazilian and South Korean construction and contracting industries.’ However, despite Tyco’s knowing of a high probability of the existence of improper payments and false books, records, and accounts, the improper payments and falsification of books, records, and accounts continued until 2009.”
As to Thailand, the Statement of Facts states a follows.
“[Between 2004 and 2005] ET Thailand [Earth Tech (Thailand) Ltd. – a Thai corporation that was approximately 49% indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $292,286 to a consultant and recorded those amounts as fictitious disbursements related to the NBIA project [New Bangkok International Airport]. In connection with these improper payments, ET Thailand earned approximately $879,258 in gross profit.”
“[Between 2000 to 2006] ADT Thailand [ADT Sensormatic Thailand an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] recorded payments in the amount of approximately $78,000 to one of its subcontractors as payments for site surveys for a government traffic project in Laos, but the payments instead were channeled to other recipients in connection with ADT Thailand’s business in Laos. During the same time period, ADT Thailand made payments to one of its consultants related to a contract for the installation of a CCTV system in the Thai Parliament House, and ADT Thailand and the consultant created invoices that stated that the payments were for ‘renovation work’ when no renovation work was actually performed. During that same time period, ADT Thailand made three payments in connection with a design and traffic survey that ADT Thailand provided from the city of Pattaya, in Southern Thailand, but the payments were issued pursuant to falsified invoices without any evidence that work was ever performed. In connection with these improper transactions, ADT Thailand earned approximately $473,262 in gross profit.”
As to China, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2003 and 2005] TTC Huzhou [Tyco Thermal Controls (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] authorized approximately 112 payments in the amount of $196,267 to designers at design institutes owned or controlled by the Chinese government, and falsely described the payments in company books, records, and accounts as ‘technical consultation’ or ‘marketing promotion’ expenses. In 2005, in connection with a contract with China’s Ministry of Public Security, TTC Huzhou paid a commission to one of its sales agents that was used, in part, to pay the ‘site project team’ of a state-owned corporation, and that was improperly recorded in the company’s books and records. In connection with these improper transactions, TTC Huzhou earned approximately $3,470,180 in gross profit.”
“TFCT Shanghai [Tyco Flow Control Trading (Shanghai) Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made approximately eleven payments in the amount of approximately $24,000 to employees of design institutes, engineering companies, subcontractors and distributors which were inaccurately described in its books and records. In connection with these improper transaction, TFCT Shanghai earned approximately $59,412 in gross profit.”
“[Between 2005 and 2006] TFC HK [Tyco Flow Control Hong Kong Limited] and Keystone [Beijing Valve Co. Ltd.] [both indirect wholly owned subsidiaries of Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $137,000 to agencies owned by approximately eight Keystone employees, who in turn gave cash or gifts to employees of design institutes or commercial customers, and then improperly recorded these payments. [From 2005 to 2006] Keystone made payments to one of its sales agents in connection with sales to Sinopec, for which no legitimate services were actually provided, and then improperly recorded the payments as ‘commissions.’ In connection with these improper transactions, Keystone earned approximately $378,088 in gross profits.”
“[Between 2001 to 2002] THC China [Tyco Healthcare International Trading (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] gave publicly-employed healthcare professionals (HCPs) approximately $250,00o in meals, entertainment, domestic travel, gifts and sponsorships. [Between 2004 to 2007] employees of THC China submitted expenses claims related to entertaining HCPs that were supported by fictitious receipts, including references to a non-existent company, in order to circumvent Tyco’s internal guidelines. In connection with medical conferences involving HCPs, THC China employees submitted false itineraries and other documentation that did not properly identify trip expenses in order to circumvent internal controls and policies. Approximately $353,800 in expenses was improperly recorded as a result of the false documentation relating to these improper expenditures.”
As to Slovakia, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2004 to 2006] Tatra [a Slovakian joint venture that was approximately 90 percent indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $96,000 to one of its sales agents in exchange for the sale agent’s attempt to have Tatra products included in the specifications for tenders to a government customer, while at the same time the sales agent was getting paid by the government customer to draw up the technical specifications for the tenders. Tatra improperly recorded the payments to the sales agent as ‘commissions’ in Tatra’s books and records. In connection with these improper transactions, Tatra earned approximately $226,863 in gross profit.”
As to Indonesia, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2003 and 2005] Eurapipe [Tyco Eurapipe Indonesia Pt. an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made approximately eleven payments in the amount of approximately $358,000 to a former employee of Banjarmasin provincial level public water company (PDAM) and two payments to the project manager for PDAM Banjarmasin in connection with the Banjarmasin Project. During the same time period, Eurapipe made payments in the amount of approximately $23,000 to sales agents who then passed some or all of the payments on to employees of government entities in connection withe projects other than the Banjarmasin Project. Eurapipe improperly recorded the payments as ‘commissions payable’ in Eurapipe’s books and records. In connection with these improper transactions, Eurapipe earned approximately $1,298,453 in gross profit.”
“[Between 2002 and 2005] PT Dulmision Indonesia [an Indonesia corporation 99% indirectly owned by Tyco] made payments to third parties, a portion of which went to employees of PLN [a state-owned electricity company in Indonesia], including approximately seven payments one of PT Dulmison’s sales agents, who in turn passed money on to the PLN employees. PT Dulmison Indonesia improperly recorded the payments in PT Dulmison Indonesia’s books, records and accounts. In addition, PT Dulmison Indonesia improperly recorded travel expenses in company books and records, including payments for non-business entertainment in connection with visits by PLN employees to TE Dulmision Thailand’s factory and paid hotel costs incurred as part of a social trip to Paris for PLN employees following a factory visit to Germany, as ‘cost of goods sold’ in PT Dulmison Indonesia’s and TE Dulmison Thailand’s records. In connection with these improper transactions, PT Dulmision Indonesia and TE Dulmison Thailand earned approximately $109,259 in gross profit.”
As to Vietnam, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2001 and 2005] TE Dulmison Thailand [a Thai corporation approximately 66% indirectly owned by Tyco] made nine payments in the amount of approximately $68,426, either directly or through intermediaries, to employees of a public utility owned by the Government of Vietnam and recorded these payments in the books and records of the relevant subsidiaries as ‘cost of goods sold.'”
As to Mauritania, Congo, Niger and Madagascar, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2002 to 2007] Isogard [a branch of Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions France (TFIS France0, an indrect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made payments to a security officer employed by a government-owned mining company in Mauritania involved in the technical aspects of sales projects for the purpose of introducing Isogard to local buyers in Africa. Isogard made the payments to the security officer’s personal bank account in France without any written contract or invoice and improperly recorded the payments in Isogard’s books and records. Isogard paid sham ‘commissions’ to approximately twelve other intermediaries in Mauritania, Congo, Niger and Madagascar, half of which were to employees, or family members of employees, of Isogard customers. In total, TFIS France made paments in the amount of approximately $363,839 since 2005.”
As to Saudi Arabia, in addition to the conduct at issue in TVC ME’s criminal information, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2004 through 2006] Saudi Distributor maintained a ‘control account’ from which a number of payments were made at THC Saudi Arabia’s [an operational entity within Tyco Healthcare AG, a indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] direction to Saudi hospitals and doctors, some of whom were publicly employed HCPs. Several expenses from the control account were booked improperly as ‘promotional expenses’ and ‘sales development’ expenses. In connection with these improper transactions, THC Saudi earned approximately $1,960,000 in gross profit.”
As to Turkey, the Statement of Facts state as follows.
“[Between 2001 and 2006] SigInt [a division of M/A-Com, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] products were sold through a sales representative to government entities in Turkey. The sales representatives sold the SigInt equipment in Turkey at an approximately twelve to forty percent mark-up over the price at which he purchased the equipment from M/A-Com and also received a commission on one of the sales. The sales representative transferred part of his commission and part of his mark-up to a government official in Turkey to obtain orders. In connection with these improper transactions, M/A-Com earned approximately $71,770 in gross proft.”
The Statement of Facts also states as follows.
“[Between 2004 and 2009] Erhard [a subsidiary of Tyco Waterworks Deutschland GmBH (TWW Germany), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] made payments in the amount of approximately $2,371,094 to at least thirteen of its sales agents in China, Croatia, India, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates for the purpose of making payments to employees of government customers, and improperly booked the payments as ‘commissions.’ In connection with these improper transactions, TWW Germany earned approximately $4,684,966 in gross profits.”
In the NPA, Tyco admitted, accepted and acknowledged responsiblity for the above conduct and agreed not to make any public statement contradicting the above conduct.
The NPA has a term of three years and states as follows.
“The Department enters into this Non-Prosecution Agreement based, in part, on the following factors: (a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Company’s global internal investigation concerning bribery and related misconduct; (c) the Company’s extensive remediation, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, the termination of employees responsible for the improper payments and falsification of books and records, severing contracts with the responsible third-party agents, the closing of subsidiaries due to compliance failures, and the agreement to undertake further compliance enhancements ….; and (d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures …”.
Pursuant to the NPA, the company agreed to pay a penalty of $13.68 million (the $2.1 million TVC ME agreed to pay pursuant to the plea agreement is included in this figure). Pursuant to the NPA, Tyco also agreed to a host of compliance undertakings and agreed to report to the DOJ (at no less than 12 month intervals) during the three year term of the NPA regarding “remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures” required pursuant to the NPA.
In this DOJ release, Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer stated as follows. “Together with the SEC, we are leading a fight against corruption around the globe.”
SEC
In a related enforcement action, the SEC brought a civil complaint (here) against Tyco.
The introductory paragraph of the complaint states as follows. “This matter concerns violations by Tyco of the books and records, internal controls, and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.”
The complaint then states as follows.
“In April 2006, the Commission filed a settled accounting fraud, disclosure, and FCPA injunctive action against Tyco, pursuant to which the company consented to entry of a final judgment enjoining it from violations of the anti-fraud, periodic reporting, books and records, internal controls, proxy disclosure, and anti-bribery provisions of the federal securities laws and ordering it to pay $1 in disgorgement and a $50 million civil penalty. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York entered the settled Final Judgment against Tyco on May 1, 2006. At the time of settlement, Tyco had already committed to and commenced a review of its FCPA compliance and a global, comprehensive internal investigation of possible additional FCPA violations. As a result of that review and investigation, certain FCPA violations have come to light for which the misconduct occurred, or the benefit to Tyco continued, after the 2006 injunction. Those are the violations that are alleged in this Complaint. […] The FCPA misconduct reported by Tyco showed that Tyco’s books and records were misstated as a result of at least twelve different, post-injunction illicit payment schemes occurring at Tyco subsidiaries across the globe. The schemes frequently entailed illicit payments to foreign officials that were inaccurately recorded so as to conceal the nature of the payments. Those inaccurate entries were incorporated into Tyco’ s books and records. Tyco also failed to devise and maintain internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that all transactions were properly recorded in the company’s books, records, and accounts. […] As reflected in this Complaint, numerous Tyco subsidiaries engaged in violative conduct, the conduct was carried out by several different methods, and the conduct occurred over a lengthy period of time and continued even after the 2006 injunction. Through one of the illicit payment schemes, Tyco violated the FCPA anti-bribery provisions. Specifically, through the acts of its then-subsidiary and agent, TE M/A-Com, Inc. Tyco violated [the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions] by corruptly making illicit payments to foreign government officials to obtain or retain business.”
As to the SEC’s anti-bribery charge based on the conduct of TE M/A-Com, Inc. the complaint alleges that M/A Com retained a New York sales agent who made illicit payments in connection with a 2006 sale of microwave equipment to an instrumentality of the Turkish government. The complaint alleges that “employees of M/A-Com were aware that the agent was paying foreign government customers to obtain orders” and cites an internal e-mail which states as follows – “hell, everyone knows you have to bribe somebody to do business in Turkey.” The complaint then alleges as follows. “Tyco exerted control over M/A-COM in part by utilizing dual roles for its officers. At the time of the September 2006 transaction, four high-level Tyco officers were also officers of M/A-COM, including one who was M/A-COM’s president. Additionally, one of those Tyco officers served as one of five members of M/A-COM’s board of directors. While there is no indication that any of these individuals knew of the illegal conduct described herein, through the corporate structure used to hold M/ A-COM and through the dual roles of these officers, Tyco controlled M/A-COM. As a result, M/A-COM was Tyco’s agent for purposes of the September 2006 transaction, and the transaction was squarely within the scope of M/ACOM’s agency. The benefit obtained by Tyco as a result of the September 2006 deal was $44,513.”
The SEC’s complaint contains substantially similar allegations compared to the NPA Statement of Facts. In addition, the SEC complaint alleges additional improper conduct in Malaysia, Egypt, and Poland.
As to Malaysia, the complaint alleges as follows.
“[Between 2000 to 2007] TFS Malaysia [an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco] used intermediaries to pay the employees of its customers when bidding on contracts. Payments were made to approximately twenty-six employees of customers, and one of those payees was an employee of a government-controlled entity. TFS Malaysia inaccurately described these expenses as ‘commissions’ and failed to maintain policies sufficient to prohibit such payments. As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated. Tyco’s benefit as a result of these illicit payments was $45,972.”
As to Egypt, the complaint alleges as follows.
“[Between 2004 to 2008] an Egyptian agent of TFIS UK [a indirect wholly owned subsidiary] wired approximately $282,022 to a former employee’s personal bank account with the understanding that the money would be used in connection with entertainment expenses for representatives of a company majority-owned by the Egyptian government. A portion of the funds was used to pay for lodging, meals, transportation, spending money, and entertainment expenses for that company’s officials on two trips to the United Kingdom and two trips to the U.S. TFIS UK made payments pursuant to inflated invoices submitted by the company’s Egyptian agent, who wired funds to the former employees to be used to entertain foreign officials. TFIS U.K. books and records did not accurately reflect TFIS’s U.K.’s understanding that the funds would be used for entertainment of government officials, and TFIS UK did not maintain sufficient internal controls over its payments to agents. As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated. Tyco’s benefits as a result of these illicit payments was $1,589,374.”
As to Poland, the complaint alleges as follows.
“[Between 2005 to 2007] THC Polska [an indirect wholly owned subsidiary] used ‘service contracts’ to hire public healthcare professionals in Poland for various purposes, including conducting training sessions, performing clinical studies, and distributing marketing materials. Approximately five such service contracts involved falsified records and approximately twenty-six other service contracts involved incomplete and inaccurate records, including some related expenses paid by THC Polska to family members of healthcare professionals. As a result, Tyco’s books and records were misstated. In connection with the transactions related to these inaccurate books and records, Tyco’s benefit was approximately $14,673.
As to the SEC’s internal controls charge, the complaint contains the following allegation. “Tyco failed to devise and maintain … a system of internal controls and was therefore unable to detect the violations … Numerous Tyco subsidiaries engaged in violative conduct, the conduct was carried out by several different methods, and the conduct occurred over a lengthy period of time, and it continued even after the 2006 injunction.”
The SEC complaint contains the following paragraph.
“As its global review and investigation progressed, Tyco voluntarily disclosed this conduct to the Commission and took significant, broad-spectrum remedial measures. Those remedial measures include: the initial FCPA review of every Tyco legal operating entity ultimately including 454 entities in 50 separate countries; active monitoring and evaluation of all of Tyco’s agents and other relevant third-party relationships; quarterly ethics and compliance training by over 4,000 middle-managers; FCPA-focused on-site reviews of higher risk entities; creation of a corporate Ombudsman’s office and numerous segment-specific compliance counsel positions; exit from several business operations in high-risk areas; and the termination of over 90 employees, including supervisors, because of FCPA compliance concerns.”
As noted in this SEC release, Tyco consented to a final judgment that orders the company to pay approximately $10.5 million in disgorgement and approximately $2.6 million in prejudgment interest. Tyco also agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating the FCPA.
In this release, SEC Associate Director of Enforcement Scott Friestad stated as follows. “Tyco’s subsidiaries operating in Asia and the Middle East saw illicit payment schemes as a typical way of doing business in some countries, and the company illictly reaped substantial financial benefits as a result.”
Martin Weinstin (Willkie Farr & Gallagher – here) represented the Tyco entities.
Friday Roundup
Add a few to the list, take a few off, a word on guest posts, take a deep breath, whose fault is it, once again nobody was charged. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Add Another
Most companies bury FCPA disclosures deep in SEC filings. Not so with Nordion Inc. (here – a Canadian based health sciences company with shares traded in the U.S). It took the open and direct route by issuing a release (here) specifically devoted to the topic. The release states as follows.
“[The company] disclosed that it is conducting an internal inquiry and investigation of a foreign supplier and related parties focusing on compliance with the Canadian Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) and the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). Through the Company’s own internal review as part of its CFPOA compliance program, Nordion discovered potential compliance irregularities. As a result, the Company recently commenced an internal investigation of the possible compliance issues. These issues relate to potential improper payments and other related financial irregularities in connection with the supply of materials and services to the Company. The investigation is being conducted by outside legal counsel and external forensic and accounting firms who are experts in such compliance. These external advisors are reporting regularly to a special Committee of the Board constituted to deal with this matter. Nordion has voluntarily contacted the regulatory and enforcement authorities, including the Canadian and U.S. Department of Justice, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, to provide details of the matter and advise that an internal investigation is underway. The internal investigation is in its early stages and the Company’s external advisors have met with these authorities and will continue to provide reports to them as the investigation progresses.Nordion is committed to the highest standards of integrity and diligence in its business dealings and to the ethical and legally compliant business conduct by its employees, representatives and suppliers. The Company reviews its compliance programs on a regular basis to assess and align them with emerging trends and business practices. Corrupt or fraudulent business conduct is in direct conflict with the Company’s Global Business Practice Standards and corporate policies. The Company will continue to investigate this matter and cooperate with regulatory and enforcement authorities with a view to an expedient resolution.”
By my estimation, in the past four months, approximately twenty companies have become subject to FCPA scrutiny (whether through disclosures or FCPA-related civil complaints). In addition, industry sweeps as to the Hollywood movie industry and retail industry have reportedly been launched. See here for a prior post titled “The Sun Rose, A Dog Barked, and a Company Disclosed FCPA Scrutiny.”
Academi, Inc., formerly known as Xe Services, formerly known as Blackwater was also in the news this week. As noted in this FBI release, pursuant to a deferred prosecution agreement (here) the company admitted to certain facts and agreed to a $7.5 million fine in connection with certain export controls and firearms law violations. As noted in the release, the DPA “also acknowledges and references a $42 million settlement between the company and the Department of State as part of a settlement of violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations.” As noted in this previous post, Blackwater has been under investigation for FCPA violations in Iraq (and Sudan as noted in the FBI release). The above DPA specifically states however that “this agreement does not apply to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation independently under investigation by the DOJ.” As noted in this previous post, Blackwater’s FCPA scrutiny in Iraq inspired Representative Peter Welch to introduce H.R. 5366, the “Overseas Contractor Reform Act,” an impotent debarment bill that passed the House in September 2010 (see here).
There are also developments to report on the other side of the Atlantic as the U.K. Serious Fraud Office announced hereas follows. “The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has decided to open a criminal investigation into allegations concerning GPT and aspects of the conduct of their business in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” As noted in this Bloomberg piece, GPT is a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. (EADS), and the investigation involved suspected payments to win a telecommunications deal with Saudi Arabia’s royal family. The Financial Times stated that the “Serious Fraud Office’s criminal inquiry is a step-change for the agency after it said in March that it was happy with an internal investigation the company was conducting.”
Although he is no longer in Congress, former Representative Todd Tiahrt is probably delighted by this news. See here for the prior post.
Take a Few Off
Huntsman Corporation recently disclosed as follows in a SEC filing (here).
“During the third quarter of 2010, we completed an internal investigation of the operations of Petro Araldite Pvt. Ltd. (“PAPL”), our majority owned joint venture in India. PAPL manufactures base liquid resins, base solid resins and formulated products in India. The investigation initially focused on allegations of illegal disposal of hazardous waste and waste water discharge and related reporting irregularities. Based upon preliminary findings, the investigation was expanded to include a review of the production and off-book sales of certain products and waste products. The investigation included the legality under Indian law and U.S. law, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, of certain payments made by employees of the joint venture to government officials in India. Records at the facility covering nine months in 2009 and early 2010 show that less than $11,000 in payments were made to officials for that period; in addition, payments in unknown amounts may have been made by individuals from the facility in previous years. […] Also in May 2010, we voluntarily contacted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to advise them of our investigation and that we intend to cooperate fully with each of them. We met with the SEC and the DOJ in October 2010 to discuss this matter and we continue to cooperate with these agencies. Steps have been taken to halt all known illegal or improper activity, including the termination of employment of management employees as appropriate. In May 2012, the SEC and DOJ notified us that they would not recommend any enforcement action be taken against our Company in this matter.”
Since August 2010 (see here for the prior post), I have proposed that when a company voluntarily discloses an FCPA internal investigation to the DOJ and the SEC, and when the DOJ and/or SEC decline enforcement, the DOJ and/or the SEC should publicly state, in a thorough and transparent manner, the facts the company disclosed to the agencies and why the agencies declined enforcement on those facts.
In the meantime, we can only speculate as to why the enforcement agencies did not bring an enforcement action against Hunstman. Of note, in the DOJ’s written declination responses after the June 2011 House hearing (see here), the DOJ stated that it has declined matters when, among other circumstances, “the improper payments involved minimal funds compared to the overall business revenue.”
As noted in this previous post, in April Hercules Offshore disclosed as follows. “On April 4, 2011, the Company received a subpoena issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) requesting the delivery of certain documents to the SEC in connection with its investigation into possible violations of the securities laws, including possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in certain international jurisdictions where the Company conducts operations. The Company was also notified by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) on April 5, 2011, that certain of the Company’s activities were under review by the DOJ. On April 24, 2012, the Company received a letter from the DOJ notifying the Company that the DOJ has closed its inquiry into the Company regarding possible violations of the FCPA and does not intend to pursue enforcement action against the Company. The DOJ indicated that its decision to close the matter was based on, among other factors, the thorough investigation conducted by the Company’s special counsel and the Company’s compliance program. The Company, through the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors, intends to continue to cooperate with the SEC in its investigation. At this time, it is not possible to predict the outcome of the SEC’s investigation, the expenses the Company will incur associated with this matter, or the impact on the price of the Company’s common stock or other securities as a result of this investigation.”
Earlier this week, the company updated its disclosure as follows. “On August 7, 2012, Hercules Offshore, Inc. (the “Company”) received a letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) notifying the Company that the SEC staff has completed its investigation into the Company regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and does not intend to pursue enforcement action against the Company. As previously disclosed, the Company was notified by the SEC and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) in April 2011, that certain of the Company’s activities were under review by the SEC and DOJ with respect to possible violations of the FCPA in certain international jurisdictions where the Company conducts operations. The Company previously disclosed that it received a letter from the DOJ on April 24, 2012, notifying the Company that the DOJ has closed its inquiry into the Company regarding possible violations of the FCPA and does not intend to pursue enforcement action against the Company. The DOJ noted that it terminated its investigation ‘…based on a number of factors, including, but not limited to, the thorough investigation undertaken by Hercules and the steps that Hercules has taken in the past and continues to take to enhance its compliance program, including efforts to ensure compliance with the FCPA.’ As a result of the termination by the SEC and the prior termination by the DOJ, there are no open FCPA investigations against the Company.”
As evident from the disclosures, unlike Huntsman, the FCPA scrutiny of Hercules was not based on a voluntary disclosure, but inquiries from the SEC and DOJ. Whether this represents a declination or a dud is the question.
Guest Posts
Part of the mission of FCPA Professor is to facilitate a forum for discussion and analysis of FCPA and related issues among FCPA practitioners, business and compliance professionals, scholars and students, and other interested persons. Given this mission, I frequently publish guest posts (see here for approximately 60 such posts). In publishing guest posts, it should not be assumed in all cases that I agree in whole or in part with the content of such posts. Rather, providing the forum for delivery into the marketplace of ideas is what I hope to facilitate and I encourage all who want to make their voice heard on the issues to consider submitting a guest post.
A Deep Breath
The FCPA is a unique statute, with unique and difficult to manage risks.
Nevertheless , it was refreshing to see this piece by Pamela Marple (Chabourne & Park – here) in the NACD Director Advisory titled “The FCPA: A New Bear in the Woods?” Marple begins as follows. “Over the past five years, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has solidified itself as an industry brimming with expert forums, company departments and substantial news coverage. Is this statute really the bear in the woods some say it is?” Marple states as follows. “The existence of the FCPA industry (and professionals who are available to conduct internal investigations at a high price) does not mean that this reaction is what is always required. What is required first and foremost is reasonable judgment exercised by directors and professionals who seek both compliance and solutions—without assuming a bear is present at every turn.”
As I previously commented (here) to Corporate Board Member, corporate directors need to keep a proper perspective. There’s a whole industry out there that’s trying to sell the steroids version of FCPA compliance. But directors should not get their undies in a bundle over this. This is an issue, just like any other risk area, that directors need to have on their radar screen. Corporate directors should not panic when it comes to FCPA compliance.
Whose Fault is It?
Do FCPA violations occur because companies subject to the law go into foreign markets intent on engaging in bribery or because the companies are confronted by corrupt foreign officials seeking to line their own pockets?
Circumstances vary of course, but this recent article in the African Globe includes comments from human rights lawyer and Senior Advocate of Nigeria Femi Falana who focused on the former. The article stated as follows. “In order to cover up the involvement of western governments and corporations in the promotion of corruption, terrorism and drug abuse in Africa, the impression is often created by top public officials of some foreign governments that Africans are the most corrupt people in the world,” Falana observed noting that only last week, the US Secretary of State, Mrs. Hillary Clinton, kicked off her 11-day tour of some African states in Senegal by condemning corruption in Africa and urging African leaders to fight it in order to get good governance in the continent. He said it was also the kernel of President Barack Obama’s message to Africans when he made a brief stopover in Ghana three years ago. “While we do not condone corruption, it is high time the Obama administration was told to stop blaming the victims of grand corruption promoted and fuelled by western countries led by Switzerland, France, United Kingdom and United States,” Falana said.”
Nobody Was Charged
A recent New York Times article (here) once again raises the issue of why few corporate fraud enforcement actions result in individual charges. The article states as follows. “The Justice Department has collected $8.6 billion over the last three years, more than in any similar period in history, but relatively few prosecutions of individuals have come from the biggest settlements.”
A reason?
In the FCPA context, I submit and stated during my 2010 Senate testimony (here), involves the quality of the corporate enforcement action. Given the prevalence of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context and the ease in which DOJ offers these alternative resolution vehicles to companies subject to an FCPA inquiry, companies often agree to enter into such resolution vehicles regardless of the DOJ’s legal theories or the existence of valid and legitimate defenses. It is simply easier, more cost efficient, and more certain for a company to agree to a NPA or DPA than it is to be criminally indicted and mount a valid legal defense even if the DOJ theory of prosecution is questionable. (See here for my scholarship “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement). Individuals, on the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liberty, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.
A telling statistic?
As noted in this prior post, since alternative resolution vehicles were first used in the FCPA context (December 2004) there have been 61 “core” corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions. 47 of the 61 ”core” corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions (77%) have been resolved via an NPA (19 instances) or a DPA (28 instances). In these 47 “core” corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions, only 7 enforcement actions (15%) have resulted in any individual FCPA criminal charges against company employees. In other words, when the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement action via a NPA or DPA, there is only a 15% likelihood that individual criminal charges will be filed against any company employee or those affiliated with the company. [Note: the above statistics were calculated in Sept. 2011]
For previous posts on this very same issue see here.
*****
A good weekend to all.
Friday Roundup
Add two more companies to the list, a reply to a retort, Avon developments, Total S.A. perhaps nears a top-5 settlement, the reason for those empty Olympic seats, another FCPA-inspired derivative action is dismissed, Sensata Technologies and more on the meaning of “declination,” one of my favorite reads and additional material for the weekend reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Recent Disclosures
As noted in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post “German healthcare firm Fresenius Medical Care AG has opened an internal investigation into potential violations” of the FCPA. The company’s recent SEC filing (here) states as follows.
“The Company has received communications alleging certain conduct that may violate the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) and other anti-bribery laws. In response to the allegations, the Audit and Corporate Governance Committee of the Company’s Supervisory Board is conducting an internal review with the assistance of counsel retained for such purpose. The Company has voluntarily advised the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice that allegations have been made and of the Company’s internal review. The Company is fully committed to FCPA compliance. It cannot predict the outcome of its review.”
In addition, as noted in this Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post, “the Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd, the world’s largest manufacturer of generic drugs, for possible violations” of the FCPA. The Israel based company recently stated in an SEC filing (here) as follows.
“Teva received a subpoena dated July 9, 2012 from the SEC to produce documents with respect to compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (“FCPA”) in Latin America. Teva is cooperating with the government. Teva is also conducting a voluntary investigation into certain business practices which may have FCPA implications and has engaged independent counsel to assist in its investigation. These matters are in their early stages and no conclusion can be drawn at this time as to any likely outcomes.”
U.K. DPAs
In this previous post, I discussed my letter to the U.K. Ministry of Justice urging the MoJ to just say no to deferred prosecution agreements. Over at thebriberyact.com (a site that has lead discussion of the issue) the authors disagree with me (see here). That’s all fine and dandy and healthy to the discussion, but the substance of the retort is not persuasive.
The retort is basically that the SFO “frequently has to fight its corner in court” and that “sometimes it loses” whereas in the U.S. “the accepted wisdom [is] that an FCPA investigation would result in a corporate settlement” and the “DOJ simply [does] not have to test its legal theories in court.” In short, the authors state “statistically in the US corporates and their counsel often fold in the face of a DOJ investigation” but “in the UK this is not so.”
Contrary to the suggestion in the retort, I did not ignore the Bribery Act’s Section 7 offense – rather it is all the more reason to reject DPAs.
The retort closes as follows. “Sadly, as it stands, the UK enforcement agencies do not have equality of arms when it comes to their enforcement toolkit. Put another way the DOJ can end run UK enforcement agencies because it does have the potential to enter into DPA’s. This reason alone is justification enough for putting in place a system which delivers a similar result to the US system.”
This confirms in my mind that the UK’s desire for DPAs has little to do with justice and deterring improper conduct, but more to do with enforcement statistics and posturing in an emerging “global arms race” when it comes to “prosecuting” corruption and bribery offenses.
Avon Developments
Avon was in the news quite a bit this week.
On Monday, the Wall Street Journal reported (here) that “federal prosecutors looking into possible bribery of foreign officials by Avon have asked to speak to Andrea Jung, the former chief executive and current full-time chairman.”
On Wednesday, the company filed its quarterly report and stated, among other things, as follows. “We are in discussions with the SEC and DOJ regarding mutually resolving the government investigations. There can be no assurance that a settlement will be reached or, if a settlement is reached, the timing of any such settlement or that the terms of any such settlement would not have a material adverse effect on us.” During the Q2 earnings call, company CEO Sheri McCoy stated as follows. “We are in discussion with the SEC and DOJ regarding mutually resolving the government investigations.”
On Thursday, the Wall Street Journal reported (here) that McCoy “frustrated with the pace of Avon’s internal probe, has pushed to bring in a second law firm for advice on the progress of the investigation. The company has held discussions with law firm Allen & Overy LLP for that role.” Arnold & Porter has been leading Avon’s investigation. According to the article, Avon’s “probe has turned up millions of dollars of payments in Brazil and France made to consultants hired to assist with Avon’s tax bills in those countries.”
What to make of the above information?
It is unusual for the enforcement agencies to want to speak to a former CEO and current chairman in connection with an FCPA inquiry. But then again, prosecutors have reportedly spoken to several other Avon executives in connection with the probe. Given Avon’s disclosure that it has begun settlement discussions, this would suggest that the factual portion of the enforcement agencies investigation is over.
Avon’s FCPA scrutiny has perhaps been most notable for the amount of pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses – approximately $280 million. Thus, yesterday’s report that the company is considering bringing in a second law firm nearly four years into the investigation is interesting and unusual.
Even though Avon has disclosed it is in settlement talks, an enforcement action in 2012 is not certain. In many cases, companies have disclosed the existence of FCPA settlement discussions, but the actual enforcement action did not happen for 6-12 months (or longer).
Whenever the enforcement action occurs, and whatever the ultimate fine and penalty is, Avon’s greatest financial hit has likely already occured – its pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. For instance, assuming a settlement amount would match the $280 million, this would be the sixth largest FCPA settlement of all time, and none of the enforcement actions in the top 5 were outside the context of foreign “government” procurement.
Total Settlement Near?
For some time, there has been speculation that Total S.A. (you better sit down for this) would actually mount a defense and put the DOJ and SEC to its burden of proof in an enforcement action. Information in a recent company press release suggests that this is unlikely to occur. In this recent release, Total stated as follows. “Total has been cooperating with the … SEC and DOJ in connection with an investigation concerning gas contracts awarded in Iran in the 1990’s. Total, the SEC, and the DOJ have conducted discussions to resolve issues arising from the investigation. In light of recent progess in these discussions, Total has provisioned 316 million euros [$389 million] in its accounts in the second quarter of 2012.”
A $389 million settlement would be a top five FCPA settlement in terms of fine and penalty amounts. For additional coverage, see here from Reuters.
Empty Olympic Seats
A reason, perhaps, for those empty Olympic seats? According to a recent study (see here) by the Society for Corporate Compliance and Ethics “tighter than anticipated corporate entertainment and gift policies.”
Smith & Wesson Derivative Action Dismissed
Even against the backdrop of generally frivolous plaintiff derivative claims in the FCPA context, the action against Smith & Wesson (“S&W”) stood out. After S&W employee Amaro Goncalves was criminally indicted in the manufactured Africa Sting case, certain investors filed a derivative claim in U.S. District Court in Massachusetts suing members of the board of S&W and company officers derivatively on behalf of the corporation for failing to have effective FCPA controls and oversight, thereby breaching their duty of care.
In dismissing the complaint (see here for the decision) Judge Michael Ponsor characterized the complaint as follows. “[I]n essence, that the company enjoyed an increase in international sales and then had an employee indicted for FCPA violations. This indictment, later dropped, supposedly evidenced a failure to implement proper controls.”
For another recent dismissal of an FCPA inspired derivative claim against Tidewater, see this prior post. See also this recent post from Kevin LaCroix at The D&O Diary blog.
Sensata Technologies
In October 2010, Sensata Technologies disclosed in a quarterly report (here) as follows.
“An internal investigation has been conducted under the direction of the Audit Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors to determine whether any laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), may have been violated in connection with a certain business relationship entered into by one of the Company’s operating subsidiaries involving business in China. The Company believes the amount of payments and the business involved was immaterial. The Company discontinued the specific business relationship and its investigation has not identified any other suspect transactions. The Company has contacted the United States Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission to begin the process of making a voluntary disclosure of the possible violations, the investigation, and the initial findings. The Company will cooperate fully with their review.”
In its most recent quarterly report (here), the company disclosed as follows.
“During 2012, the DOJ informed us that it has closed its inquiry into the matter but indicated that it could reopen its inquiry in the future in the event it were to receive additional information or evidence. We have not received an update from the SEC concerning the status of its inquiry.”
Did Sensata “win a declination” as the FCPA Blog suggested here?
Since August 2010 (see here for the prior post) I have proposed that when a company voluntarily discloses an FCPA internal investigation to the DOJ and the SEC, and when the DOJ and/or SEC decline enforcement, the DOJ and/or the SEC should publicly state, in a thorough and transparent manner, the facts the company disclosed to the agencies and why the agencies declined enforcement on those facts.
Perhaps then we would know if the DOJ concluded it could prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the necessary elements of an FCPA charge, yet decided not to pursue Sensata – which is my definition of declination as noted in this prior post. Anything else, is what the law commands, not a declination.
Favorite Read
One of my favorite reads is always Shearman & Sterling’s “Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” See here for the most recent edition.
As to “foreign official,” the report states as follows. “[T]he government does not appear to have been deterred by the [foreign official] debate. In most of the cases brought in 2012, the relevant government officials were employed by “instrumentalities” such as state health insurance plans (Orthofix), a state-owned nuclear plant (Data Systems & Solutions), government hospitals (Biomet and Smith & Nephew), a state-owned real estate development company (Peterson) a state-owned oil company (Marubeni), and state-owned airlines (NORDAM).”
As to FCPA guidance, the report states as follows. “We understand that this guidance will be issued before October, when the US is scheduled to issue a written progress report on its implementation of the OECD Working Group on Bribery’s recommendations.”
A final kudos – Shearman & Sterling keeps its FCPA enforcement statistics the best way. As it explains – “we count all actions against a corporate “family” as one action. Thus, if the DOJ charges a subsidiary and the SEC charges a parent issuer, that counts as one action.” This is consistent with my “core” approach (see here), but unlike many others in the industry.
Weekend Reading Stack
An interesting and informative article (here) in Fortune about the Alba-Alcoa tussle and the role of Victor Dahdaleh. For more on the underlying civil suit between Alba and Alcoa see this recent Wall Street Journal Corruption Currents post.
SOX’s executive certification requirements were supposed to be a panacea for corporate fraud. It has not happened. See here from Alison Frankel (Reuters) and here from Michael Rapoport (Wall Street Journal). As noted in this prior post concerning the Paul Jennings (former CFO and CEO of Innospec) enforcement action, SOX certification charges were among the charges the SEC filed against Jennings. Then SEC FCPA Unit Chief Cheryl Scarboro stated, “we will vigorously hold accountable those who approve such bribery and who sign false SOX certifications and other documents to cover up the wrongdoing.” Speaking of Jennings, as noted in this recent U.K. Serious Fraud Office, Jennings recently pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to corrupt Iraqi public officials and other agents of the Government of Iraq.
*****
A good weekend to all.