Category: Foreign Nationals

SEC Responds To Steffen’s Motion To Dismiss

Overshadowed by FCPA guidance waiting and now the guidance, the foreign official challenge in the 11th Circuit, and the DOJ’s “Kool-Aid” stand in the Morgan Stanley so-called declination (see here for the prior post), one of the most significant FCPA stories of 2012 is that the SEC is being put to its burden of proof in an FCPA enforcement action.  Not once, not twice, but three times. (See this prior post for discussion of the three cases and links to previous posts).

As noted in the previous post, two of the challenges focus on the SEC’s alleged jurisdiction over foreign nationals.  With both the DOJ and SEC bringing more FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors – for instance in 2011 90% of DOJ individual prosecutions were against foreign nationals and 100% of SEC individual prosecutions were against foreign nationals – the challenges are noteworthy.  Particularly so because Judge Leon, in the Africa Sting case, rejected the DOJ’s jurisdictional theory against U.K. national Pankesh Patel (see here for the prior post) in what was believed to be the first instance of judicial scrutiny concerning FCPA jurisdiction against foreign nationals.

Recently the SEC filed its opposition brief (here) to Herbert Steffen’s motion to dismiss.  Steffen is a former Siemens executives who was charged in December 2011 (see here for the prior post).

In summary, the SEC states as follows.

“Steffen’s motion contends (1) that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over him and (2) that the SEC’s claims are time-barred under the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The Court should deny the motion on both grounds.

Steffen is subject to personal jurisdiction in this Court because his conduct caused foreseeable consequences in the United States. The complaint alleges that Steffen played a central role in a long-running bribery scheme at Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (“Siemens”); that he coerced a reluctant lower-ranking official to authorize and cover up bribe payments; and that his actions caused Siemens to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC in the United States that misrepresented the company’s financial statements and that included false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications. The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Steffen on these facts is consistent with a long line of Second Circuit case law and entirely reasonable. Because Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, provides for nationwide service of process, the Court need not look to New York’s long-arm statute, the N.Y. C.P.L.R., as a basis for jurisdiction.

Nor are the SEC’s claims time-barred. The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 provides that the five-year limitations period runs only “if, within the same period, the offender . . . is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.” 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Steffen is a German national who, by his own admission, has lived outside the United States during the entire relevant period. And even if he had spent the last five years in this country, the bribery scheme Steffen was a part of did not conclude until February 6, 2007, when Siemens realized the scheme’s objective, a $217 million arbitration award against the Argentine government. The SEC filed its complaint less than five years later, on December 13, 2011. Finally, as a long line of decisions in the Southern District of New York have recognized, the SEC’s claims for equitable relief — in this case, an injunction and disgorgement — are not subject to Section 2462 at all.”

In addition to its “foreseeable consequences” assertion, the SEC brief also contains the following sentence as to its alleged jurisdiction.

“Steffen also discussed the bribery scheme over the telephone with defendant Sharef while Sharef was in the United States, and a portion of the payments that Steffen pressured Regendantz to make were deposited in a New York bank.”  [As noted in this previous post, Sharef has agreed in principle to a settlement with the SEC and Regendantz previously settled with the SEC].

In its brief, the SEC acknowledges that there is no case law interpreting its Section 2462 tolling position.

Former Magyar Telekom Execs To Challenge SEC

In December 2011, the DOJ and SEC brought related FCPA enforcement actions against Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom alleging various bribery schemes in Macedonia and Montenegro.  (See here for the prior post).  Total fines and penalties were approximately $95 million ($59.6 million against Magyar Telekom via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement, $4.4 million against Deutsche Telekom via a DOJ non-prosecution agreement, and $31.2 million against Magyar Telekom via a settled SEC civil complaint).

As indicated in the prior post, the sole jurisdictional allegations in the enforcement action (other than the companies made filings with the SEC) were two e-mails that passed through, were stored on, and transmitted to servers located in the U.S.  The prior post also highlighted that the alleged improper conduct occurred in 2005 and 2006.

The Magyar Telekom enforcement action was a rare instance that also involved charges against individuals.  As noted in the prior post, the SEC, in addition to charging the company, also brought civil charges against former Magyar Telekom executives: Elek Straub (former Chairman and CEO of Magyar Telekom) and Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai (two former senior executives in Magyar Telekom’s Strategy Department) based on the same alleged Macedonia and Montenegro bribery schemes.

The prior post provided the following summary of the individual charges.  In both schemes, the SEC alleged that the individuals authorized or caused the payments at issue with “knowledge, the firm belief, or under circumstances that made it substantially certain” that all or a portion of the money would be forwarded to foreign officials.  The complaint also alleged that the individuals caused the payments to be falsely recorded in Magyar Telekom’s books and records.  The complaint charged the defendants  with violating or aiding and abetting violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA; knowingly circumventing internal controls and falsifying books and records; and making false statements to the company’s auditor.

Litigation of jurisdictional issues (heck litigation of any issue) in corporate FCPA enforcement actions is nearly non-existent.  However, foreign nationals individually charged with FCPA offenses are more likely to contest aggressive jurisdictional theories.  Indeed, a notable development from 2011 was judicial rejection of the DOJ’s asserted jurisdiction in prosecution of a foreign national in the Africa Sting case.  (See here for the prior post regarding Africa Sting defendant Pankesh Patel).

Litigation of statute of limitations issues is also nearly non-existent in FCPA enforcement actions.  Dig into the details of most FCPA enforcement actions and one quickly discovers that the conduct at issue is old – in some cases very old. However, cooperation is the name of the game in corporate FCPA inquiries and asserting statute of limitations issues is not cooperating.  Thus, most companies the subject of FCPA scrutiny enter into tolling agreements with the enforcement agencies or otherwise waive statute of limitations defenses.  However, individuals charged with FCPA offenses tend to fight more including by asserting black letter legal defenses such as statute of limitations.

Which brings us back to the former Magyar Telekom executives.   As reported last week by Law360, lawyers for the defendants argued last week at an initial appearance in the U.S. District Court (S.D. of New York)  that the court lacks jurisdiction over the defendants.  William Sullivan (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman –  here, counsel for Balogh) is quoted as follows concerning the jurisdictional issues.  “The allegations that an email may have been caught in a U.S. server without the knowledge of the alleged sender is not enough.”

The Law360 article also suggests that the defendants are likely to raise statute of limitation defenses.

Straub is represented by Saul Pilchen of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP (see here).

Morvai is represented by Michael Koenig and Victoria Lane of Greenberg Traurig.

In an order issued last week, Judge Richard Sullivan set the following schedule for the defendants’ contemplated omnibus motion to dismiss.

• Oct. 29, 2012 (Defendants to file their motion and accompanying brief)
• Nov. 30, 2012 (SEC to file its opposition brief)
• Dec. 14, 2012 (Defendants to file their reply brief)
• Jan. 17, 2013 (Oral argument)

Given that the enforcement agencies have continued to push the envelope on jurisdictional and statute of limitations issues (coupled with the fact that the DOJ recently lost a jurisdictional challenge in the Africa Sting case), the judicial challenge by the former Magyar Telekom executives is a notable development.  It is also a needed development in that the expected challenge will facilitate judicial scrutiny of these issues

It will be a busy end of the year for the SEC’s FCPA unit.  As noted in this previous post (and links embedded therein), on October 31st oral arguments will take place in the S.D. of Texas on defendants’ motion to dismiss in the Jackson and Ruehlen SEC FCPA enforcement action.

An Important FCPA Case You’ve Likely Never Heard About

Last week (here) I noted, in connection with Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure, that the enforcement theory that payments outside the context of foreign government procurement fall under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions has been subjected to judicial scrutiny three times.  After summarizing those three instances, I noted that the scorecard was as follows:  US – 1; Defendants – 2; or if you prefer US – .5; Defendants – 2.5 (recognizing that the 5th Circuit decision in Kay is equivocal).

Last week in doing some research, I stumbled upon a fourth instance where this enforcement theory was subjected to judicial scrutiny.

The result?  DOJ lost.

Thus, the scorecard is as follows when an enforcement agency is put to its burden of proof on the enforcement theory that payments outside the context of foreign government procurement fall under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions:  US – 1; Defendants – 3; or if you prefer US – .5; Defendants – 3.5 (again recognizing that the 5th Circuit decision in Kay is equivocal).

This 1990 FCPA enforcement action is so obscure it was not even cited in any of the decisions of the other challenges which occurred between 2002-2004.   For instance, in the Kay trial court decision in 2002, the court stated that it was confronting an issue of first impression in the federal courts.

Below is a summary of U.S. v. Alfredo Duran.

AEA Aircraft Recovery (“AEA”) was a division of Summerland Engineering Corp. (a Florida corporation) and engaged in the business of recovery of seized aircraft.  The sole shareholder of Summerland was Robert Gurin.

In 1989, the DOJ charged Joaquin Pou (a Dominican Republic citizen and an agent of AEA, Summerland and Gurin), Alfredo Duran (a U.S. citizen and agent of AEA, Summerland, and Gurin)  and Jose Guasch (a U.S. citizen and agent of AEA, Summerland, and Gurin) with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  See here for the criminal indictment.  In a criminal information (see here) the DOJ also charged Robert Gurin.

According to the charging documents, the defendants conspired to make payments to officials of the Dominican Republic in order to obtain the release of two aircraft seized by the government of the Dominican Republic.  The charging documents then proceed to set forth various acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Gurin and Guasch pleaded guilty and Pou (a citizen of the Dominican Republic) became a fugitive.  Gurin was sentenced to 5 years probation and 100 hours of community services and Guasch was sentenced to 4 years probation, 1 month of house arrest and 75 hours of community service.

Duran, a former Florida state Democratic Party chairman, pleaded not guilty and put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial.  At the close of the DOJ’s case, he filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (see here).  Duran argued that “no reasonable jury could find that the purpose of any of the alleged intended payments was to assist […] in obtaining or retaining business” and that the government “has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove any intended payments were not facilitating or expediting payments for the purpose of expediting or securing routine governmental action (i.e. grease payments).”

The motion stated that “the legislative history to the 1977 Act makes clear that the evil redressed by the Act was the use of bribery by U.S. corporations to obtain contracts for the sale of good or services to foreign countries.”  The motion then referenced that in 1988 Congress “created an exception for expediting or facilitating payments for the purpose of securing routine governmental action.”  The motion stated, “by clear implication, payments in respect of the awarding of procurement contracts of the foreign government are the type of payments targeted” by the FCPA.

The motion then stated as follows.  “The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, shows at best that payments were to be made to Joaquin Pou and, through him, to unidentified Dominican government officials for the purpose of obtaining the release of a single aircraft to its owner.  Clearly, this is not what Congress intended by the phrase obtaining or retaining business …  The fact that this intended payment may have indirectly benefited Gurin’s business by facilitating the release of an aircraft does not establish the type of direct business purpose contemplated by the statute.”  Duran argued that “the government has failed to establish that the intended payments in this case were for the specific purpose of obtaining or retaining business … and, accordingly, a judgment of acquittal should be entered.

Turning next to facilitating payments, the motion argued that “the government bears the burden of disapproving that the payment was not a ‘facilitating or expediting payment” and that had “Congress intended the ‘facilitating or expediting payment exception’ to be an affirmative defense, it would have placed it” in the portion of the FCPA containing affirmative defenses.  The motion stated as follows.  “By its nature, therefore, the exception creates an additional element which the government must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt to establish the crime.”  The motion then goes through the legislative history of facilitating payments and how in the original FCPA the concept was imbedded in the definition of “foreign official” and how in 1988 Congress created the stand-alone facilitating payment exception.

As to the evidence at trial, the motion stated as follows.  “Here the evidence introduced by the prosecution is only consistent with a finding that the purpose of the alleged intended payments was to facilitate or expedite the release of an aircraft.  The Defendant had been told by an undercover government informant that there was no legal holds upon the aircraft.  He was led to believe that neither the Dominican Republic nor any other government held any legal claim to or right in the aircraft.  He understood that it was simply a straightforward matter of expediting the release of an aircraft on behalf of the owner.  Any intended payment was simply for the purpose of hurrying along a bureaucratic process.  The purpose of the alleged intended payment was to expedite a routine governmental action.  Consequently, no reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant agreed upon an illegal objective.”

Elsewhere, the motion stated as follows.  “The facts simply show that the army of the Dominican Republic had no discretion in the matter of the release of the aircraft, and that some government officials were simply trying to line their pockets outside of their official capacities.”  Further the motion stated as follows.  “There was no decision-making process in this case, the facts merely demonstrate a ministerial or clerical matter involving the processing of government papers and the automatic release of the aircraft.”

On April 17, 1990, U.S. District Court Judge Jame Kehoe granted a judgment of acquittal (see here).

Original source media accounts note that  Judge Kehoe said “the government failed to prove the charges against [Duran] were a crime under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”  According to media reports, Judge Kehoe refused a government request to stay acquittal while prosecutors appealed.  Duran is reported as stating, “I feel that I have been throughly vindicated.  I was ready to take the stand in my own defense.  I am very happy.”

An additional dynamic in the case was that Pou fled the U.S. and Judge Kehoe agreed with the defense that all evidence concerning Pou should be excluded from the case.

According to media reports, the case began when the Government used an informant to pose as an agent for the owner of a drug plane seized by the Dominican military.    Media reports suggest that the government was investigating Gurin in light of allegations he had bribed high-ranking military officials in the Dominican Republic and other Caribbean countries to recover drug planes.

The Elusive Mr. Kozeny

DOJ Enforcement Of The FCPA – Year In Review

Yesterday, I highlighted various aspects of the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA in 2011.

In this post, I highlight certain facts and figures from the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program in 2011.

In 2011, the DOJ brought 11 corporate FCPA enforcement actions (this includes the enforcement action against Cinergy Telecommunications that remains pending).

[In 2010, the DOJ brought 16 corporate FCPA enforcement actions (in addition to the BAE enforcement action that was related to the FCPA, but did not involve FCPA charges and the Lindsey Manufacturing enforcement action that began in 2010 and resulted in the convictions being vacated and the indictment dismissed in 2011 due to prosecutorial misconduct – see here)]

In the 11 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions from 2011, the DOJ collected approximately $355 million in criminal fines.  Including the $149 million forfeiture in the Jeffrey Tesler individual enforcement action which resulted in a plea agreement in 2011 (see here), the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program in 2011 took in approximately $504 million.  Approximately $432 million (86%) of the $504 million was in three enforcement actions (JGC Corp., Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom, and Tesler).  Approximately $458 million of the $504 million (91%) collected by the DOJ was in enforcement actions against foreign companies (JGC Corp., Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom, Tenaris, and Bridgestone) or foreign nationals (Tesler).

[In 2010, the DOJ collected approximately $870 million in criminal fines in the 16 corporate FCPA enforcement actions ($1.27 billion by including the $400 million BAE enforcement action)].

Tack on the SEC’s collections in 2011 corporate FCPA enforcement actions of approximately $148 million and the overall corporate FCPA fine, penalty and disgorgement amount from 2011 is approximately $503 million  – approximately $652 million including Tesler.

[In 2010, corporate fines, penalties and disgorgement in DOJ/SEC enforcement actions was approximately $1.8 billion (including the BAE enforcement action)]

DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2011 was both large (JGC Corp. – $219 million) and small (Comverse Technologies – $1.2 million; Aon – $1.8 million).  Three FCPA enforcement actions in 2011 were DOJ only (JGC Corp., Bridgestone, and Cinergy Telecommunications).

In all six corporate FCPA enforcement actions where an analysis was possible, the DOJ agreed to a criminal fine below the minimum range suggested by the sentencing guidelines.  In these six actions, the average was approximately 28% below the minimum guidelines range and the distribution range was 55% below the minimum guidelines range (Bridgestone) and 18% below the minimum guidelines range (Magyar Telekom).  There were no corporate FCPA enforcement action in 2011 in which the company paid a criminal fine within the guidelines range.

[Note – why are only 6 of the 11 enforcement actions included in the above analysis? 4 corporate enforcement actions involved an NPA and the DOJ  does not set forth a guidelines range in the agreement or related documents and 1 enforcement action (Cinergy Telecommunications) remains pending].

[In 2010, the average was approximately 25% below the minimum guidelines range and the distribution range was 55% below the minimum guidelines range (Pride International) and 5% below the minimum guidelines range (Panalpina).  The only two corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2010 where the company paid a criminal fine within the guidelines range were Alliance One (the company voluntarily disclosed and receive a non-prosecution agreement) and Alcatel-Lucent.]

How many corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved related individual prosecutions of company employees by the DOJ (recognizing that such prosecutions may be forthcoming in the future)?  Of the 11 corporate DOJ enforcement actions or indictments, 8 of the 11 enforcement actions (73%) have not involved thus far any DOJ prosecutions of company employees.  2011 corporate FCPA enforcement actions that have resulted in criminal charges against company employees are Armor Holdings (Richard Bistrong), Bridgestone (Misao Hioki) and Cinergy Telecommunications (Washington Cruz and Amadeus Richers).

[In 2010, 12 of the 17 corporate FCPA enforcement actions (70%) did not involve, and have not yet involved, DOJ prosecutions of company employees.]

Including Washington Cruz and Amadeus Richers (a German citizen) mentioned above, the DOJ brought 10  individual FCPA enforcement actions in 2011.   In December, in connection with the 2008 Siemens enforcement action, the DOJ brought criminal charges against:  Uriel Sharef, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer, Eberhard Reichert, Carlos Sergi and Miguel Czysch.  All of these individuals are foreign nationals.  Thus, 90% of the DOJ’s individual enforcement actions in 2011 were against foreign nationals.  As noted in yesterday’s SEC year in review post, all 12 of the individuals the SEC charged with FCPA violations in 2011 were foreign nationals (in a few cases, dual citizens of a foreign country and the U.S.).

What about non-prosecution and deferred prosecutions vs. old fashioned law enforcement (i.e., if a company committed a crime the DOJ charged it and if the company did not commit a crime the DOJ did not charge it)?  In 2011, 9 of the 11 corporate FCPA enforcement actions (82%) were resolved via non-prosecution agreements (Comverse Technologies, Tenaris, Armor Holdings, and Aon) or deferred prosecution agreements (Maxwell Technologies, Tyson Foods, JGC Corp., and Johnson & Johnson).  The Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom enforcement action involved both a non-prosecution agreement (Deutsche Telekom) and a deferred prosecution agreement (Magyar Telekom).  The two corporate FCPA enforcement from 2011 that involved an indictment or plea to criminal charges were Bridgestone and Cinergy Telecommunications.

[In 2010, 15 of the 16 (94%) corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved NPAs (4) or DPAs (11)].

As Gibson Dunn highlighted in this recent report, FCPA enforcement actions comprised approximately 40% of the DOJ’s 26 NPAs or DPAs in 2011. [In 2010, FCPA enforcement actions comprised approximately 50% of all DOJ NPA or DPA agreements].  Among the criticisms noted in the Gibson Dunn report of NPAs / DPAs is that “from a company’s perspective, the threat of indictment can force a company to agree to a DPA or NPA based on the government’s perception of alleged misconduct even under novel, expansive, or unlitigated theories of liability.”

In yesterday’s SEC year in review post, I noted that 90% of the $148 million the SEC collected in 2011 corporate FCPA enforcement actions was the result of volunatary disclosures or other instances of public disclosure – not original investigations by the SEC.

What does this number look like for DOJ FCPA enforcement actions in 2011?  Of the $504 million in criminal fines collected by the DOJ in FCPA enforcement actions, $502 million (99%) appear to be result of voluntary disclosures or other instances of public disclosure such as previous foreign law enforcement investigations.  The only exception would appear to be Aon ($1.8 million).

[In 2010, 97% of DOJ criminal fines would appear to fit this description].

This remainder of this post provides an overview of corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2011.

*****

Maxwell Technologies (Jan. 31st)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: FCPA anti-bribery violations and knowingly violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions.

Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information resolved through a DPA (three year term).

Guidelines Range: $10.5 million to $21 million.

Penalty: $8 million (25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged: No.

Tyson Foods (Feb. 10th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions; FCPA anti-bribery and books and records violations.

Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information resolved through a DPA (two year term).

Guidelines Range: $5.04 to $10.08 million.

Penalty: $4 million (approximately 20% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines)

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged: No.

JGC of Japan (April 6th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations.

Resolution Vehicle: Criminal charges resolved through a deferred-prosecution agreement – term two years.

Guidelines Range: $312.6 million to $625.2 million

Penalty: $218.8 million (30% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines).

Disclosure: Yes, based on a previous foreign law enforcement investigation.

Monitor: Yes.

Individuals Charged: No.

Comverse Technology (April 7th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None – although the non-prosecution agreement refers to a “knowing violation of the books and records provisions of the FCPA.”

Resolution Vehicle: non-prosecution agreement – term two years.

Guidelines Range: Not set forth in the NPA.

Penalty: $1.2 million.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged: No.

Johnson & Johnson (April 8th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: FCPA anti-bribery violations and conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and record provisions.

Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (three year term).

Guidelines Range: $28.5 million to $57 million.

Penalty: $21.4 million (25% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines).

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure (however Iraq Oil for Food conduct was not voluntarily disclosed).

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged: None by U.S. authorities (Robert Dougall (a former DePuy executive) previously plead guilty to a U.K. SFO enforcement action – see here).

Tenaris (May 17th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: None, although the non-prosecution agreement refers to “knowing violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions.”

Resolution Vehicle: NPA – term two years.

Guidelines Range: Not set forth in the NPA.

Penalty: $3.5 million.

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged: No.

Cinergy Telecommunications (July 12th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges:  conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud; FCPA anti-bribery violations; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and money laundering.

Resolution Vehicle:  N/A

Guidelines Range:  N/A

Disclosure:  No.

Monitor:  N/A

Individuals Charged:  Yes.

Armor Holdings (July 13th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges:  None

Resolution Vehicle:  Non-Prosecution Agreement – term two years.

Guidelines Range: Not set forth in the NPA.

Penalty: $10.3 million

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No (although Armor Holdings is now part of BAE and falls under the monitorship in the BAE FCPA-related enforcement action).

Individuals Charged: Yes.

Bridgestone (Sept. 15th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: Conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions (and conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act).

Resolution Vehicle:  Criminal information resolved via a plea agreement.

Guidelines Range:  For the FCPA conduct, the guidelines range (see here) was approximately $40 million – $80 million.

Penalty: $28 million (it would appear that approximately 80% of this figure – approximately $22 million was based on the FCPA conduct)

Disclosure: Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged:  Yes.

Aon Corp. (Dec. 20th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges: N/A although the NPA refers to Aon’s knowing violation of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions.

Resolution Vehicle:  NPA – term two years.

Guidelines Range:  Not set forth in the NPA.

Penalty: $1.8 million.

Disclosure: Aon’s SEC filings stated that  ”following inquiries from regulators, the Company commenced an internal review of its compliance with certain U.S. and non-U.S. anti-corruption laws, including the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

Monitor: No.

Individuals Charged:  No.

Magyar Telekom / Deutsche Telekom (Dec. 29th)

See here for the prior post.

Charges:  Magyar Telekom – FCPA anti-bribery and books and records charges; Deutsche Telekom – N/A

Resolution Vehicle:  Magyar Telekom – DPA – term two years; Deutsche Telekom – NPA – term two years.

Guidelines Range:  Magyar Telekom – $72.5 million – $145 million; Deutsche Telekom – not set forth in the NPA.

Penalty:  Magyar Telekom – $59.6 million (18% below the minimum Guidelines range); Deutsche Telekom – $4.4 million

Disclosure:  Yes, voluntary disclosure.

Monitor:  No.

Individuals Charged:  No.