Category: Foreign Official

Friday Roundup

Enforcement agency speeches, “foreign official” delay, and for reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Enforcement Agency Speeches

This prior post detailed comments by Mary Jo White prior to becoming SEC Chairman.

Last week, White spoke before the Investment Company Institute on the general topic of the SEC’s role in an increasingly global financial and regulatory system.  She stated as follows (see here) concerning the SEC’s enforcement of the FCPA.

“Of course, misrepresentations and other unlawful actions travel in both directions across borders, which is another reason why our partnership with our regulatory counterparts abroad is so important.  Among the most prominent concerns in this regard is bribery by U.S. companies overseas, which not only undermines international markets and governments but also simultaneously undermines the reporting and disclosure integrity of our own markets.  Thus, strong and fair enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which forbids U.S. companies from bribing foreign officials, has been and will continue to be a priority for us. Our first objective is to help companies avoid FCPA violations by educating them. And so our staff along with our colleagues at the Department of Justice recently published a comprehensive Guide to the FCPA to give clear guidance and clear up some myths.  Of course, the other side of education is deterrence.  Deterrence can mean strong enforcement actions with tough disgorgement and penalties.  But it can also mean the tangible benefits that come with cooperation – as demonstrated by the Non-Prosecution Agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation we announced in April. In this particular case, the corporation’s Argentine subsidiary paid bribes to government and customs officials to improperly secure the importation of their products into the country.  The bribes occurred during a period when the U.S. parent company lacked meaningful anti-corruption compliance and control mechanisms over its foreign subsidiary.  The misconduct came to light as a result of the company’s efforts to improve internal controls and compliance.  And the company immediately reported the problem to the SEC and provided exceptional assistance to our investigation. Successful FCPA cases also increasingly require assistance from foreign law enforcement authorities.  That is why we recently partnered with the DOJ and FBI in conducting a foreign bribery training program that provided intensive training to 130 foreign investigators and prosecutors from 30 countries, many on which the SEC staff relies for mutual legal assistance in FCPA cases.”

Yesterday, Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division) spoke at the Minnesota Bar Association’s Annual International Business Law Institute.  (See here).  Suleiman offered “some views from the U.S. Department of Justice on the topic of anti-corruption enforcement” and “what the Justice Department is doing in the area of criminal enforcement to fight corruption at home and abroad.”  He stated, in pertinent part, as follows.

“I think of our anti-corruption efforts as falling into three principal buckets:  number one is criminal prosecution; number two is assisting foreign countries to build up their judicial, prosecutorial, and investigative institutions; and number three is the pursuit, through civil actions, of the proceeds of foreign official corruption.  I will discuss each of these buckets in turn.

First and foremost, the Criminal Division is a litigating operation.  We investigate and prosecute cases.  Our corruption prosecutions are of two kinds:  we prosecute corruption by domestic officials, and we prosecute foreign bribery offenses under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA.”

[…]

“[W]e have an incredibly strong team of prosecutors who focus exclusively on enforcing the FCPA.  Depending upon how familiar you are with FCPA enforcement, you may know that the Criminal Division is the entity in the United States with primary responsibility for criminal enforcement of the Act.  It is Justice Department policy that no FCPA prosecution can be brought without authorization from the Criminal Division, which distinguishes FCPA prosecutions from most other kinds of federal criminal cases.  The Securities and Exchange Commission, which is a few blocks up the street from us, has primary responsibility for the Act’s civil enforcement.”

“Foreign bribery enforcement has for a long time been an important aspect of U.S. policy.  The FCPA was enacted roughly 35 years ago, around the same time that our Public Integrity Section was created to focus on public corruption prosecutions, and it was the first effort of any nation to specifically criminalize the act of bribing foreign officials.  The statute was enacted in the wake of the Watergate scandal, but it took more than 20 years for the Act to become a strong enforcement tool.  And, over the past several years, the Justice Department has substantially increased its enforcement of the Act.”

“One important aspect of our FCPA enforcement involves, of course, our corporate resolutions.  We have collected billions of dollars in criminal fines and penalties to resolve FCPA investigations against companies doing business abroad, including BizJet International Sales and Support Inc., a Lufthansa subsidiary; Alcatel-Lucent; Johnson & Johnson; and many others.”

“But another, critically important aspect of our enforcement regime involves holding individuals responsible for FCPA offenses.  There is no greater deterrent to corporate crime than the prospect of prison time.  As many have recognized, if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be seen as merely the cost of doing business.  In the past four years, the Criminal Division’s FCPA Unit has obtained over three dozen criminal convictions of individuals, including of people who have been sentenced to as many as 15 years in prison.”

“We are as active today in this area as we have ever been.  In the past month alone, we have announced charges against several key defendants in ongoing, active FCPA investigations.  In mid-April, in a case that we are prosecuting with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, we secured the arrest of a defendant in connection with an alleged bribery scheme to secure mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.  In a separate case, which we are prosecuting with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Connecticut, we also secured the arrest last month of a defendant in connection with an alleged bribery scheme to secure power contracts in Indonesia.  And just two days ago, together with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Manhattan, we announced charges against two broker-dealer employees and a senior Venezuelan banking official for engaging in a multi-million dollar bribery scheme.”

[…]

“Finally, I want to tell you about a relatively new Justice Department initiative.  About three-and-a-half years ago, Attorney General Holder gave a speech in Qatar, at which he pledged to increase the United States’ commitment to recovering foreign corruption proceeds.  Since that time, the Criminal Division has led the charge in developing what we refer to as the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative.”

“The initiative’s purpose is to identify the proceeds of foreign official corruption – in other words, the spoils – forfeit them through civil actions, and, to the extent possible, repatriate the forfeited funds for the benefit of the people harmed. In most criminal prosecutions, a court can order forfeiture, upon conviction, as part of the defendant’s sentence.  Often, however, it may be impractical or impossible to bring a criminal prosecution against a particular person – because that person is immune from prosecution, for example, beyond our jurisdiction, or otherwise unavailable.  In these circumstances, we have begun bringing civil forfeiture actions to recover the stolen property.”

“We have brought several Kleptocracy cases in the past couple of years, and forfeited millions of dollars in corrupt proceeds.  The most high-profile of our Kleptocracy cases to date involves two civil actions we have brought against approximately $70 million in assets allegedly belonging to a government minister in Equatorial Guinea who is also the son of that country’s president.  According to court papers, despite an official government salary of less than $100,000 per year, this minister amassed wealth of over $100 million.  Among the items we are seeking to forfeit are nearly $2 million worth of Michael Jackson memorabilia (including the white glove), a Gulfstream G-V jet worth $38.5 million, and a $30 million house in Malibu.  These are hard, and hard-fought, cases, but we believe strongly that foreign officials who amass wealth through corruption should not be permitted to use the United States as a haven for their ill-gotten gains.”

“Foreign Official” Delay

Oral argument in the “foreign official” challenge pending in the 11th Circuit – originally scheduled for later this month, has been postponed until the week of October 7th.

This is a historic appeal in that it will be the first instance in which a circuit court directly confronts the enforcement theory that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled entities are “foreign officials” under the FCPA (see here for a prior post, including embedded links).

Scrutiny Alerts

For more on Barclay’s scrutiny, on both sides of the Atlantic, see this recent article in Middle East Monitor concerning the bank’s relationship with the Abu Dhabi government, including Sheikh Mansour, the deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Samuel Rubenfeld (Wall Street Journal Risk & Compliance Journal) has the latest (here) regarding BSG Resources Ltd. a Guernsey-based company in the news after Frederic Cilins, a French citizen associated with the company, was recently arrested and accused of attempting to obstruct an ongoing investigation into whether a mining company paid bribes to win lucrative mining rights in the Republic of Guinea.  (See here for the prior post).  As noted in the WSJ article, BSG recently released this detailed statement concerning its conduct in Guinea.

Reading Stack

Several articles of interest to pass along from last week’s Corporate Crime Reporter conference.  This article details comments made by Denis McInerney (DOJ Criminal Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General) regarding non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.  This article details comments made by McInerney concerning my suggested two-step reform plan (see here for the prior post) and also details McInerney’s response to my question concerning the definition of a declination.  Articles here and here concern corporate monitors.

*****

Over the years, Bloomberg’s David Glovin has written some excellent articles concerning Viktor Kozney, Frederic Bourke, et al.  With Bourke soon to report to prison, Glovin pens another great article here.

*****

This prior post discussed the NY Times recent “With Bags of Cash, CIA Seeks Influence in Afghanistan” story and how the story put our stark double standards in the headlines once again.  More recently, the NY Times reports (here) as follows. “[Afghan President] Karzai said he had called a meeting […] with the CIA’s Kabul station chief. “I told him because of all these rumors in the media, please do not cut all this money, because we really need it,” he said. “We want to continue this sort of assistance, and he promised that they are not going to cut this money.”  For more on the situation, including the views of others, see here from Alison Frankel’s On the Case column.

*****

See here from Josh Goodman (an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission) titled “The Anti-Corruption and Antitrust Connection.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Simply inexcusable, tell us who, an interesting case study, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Simply Inexcusable

The government holds those subject to the FCPA to high standards.  If the proverbial “right hand” in a company doesn’t know what the “left hand” is doing, the government is likely to call that an internal control failure.

In this post earlier this week regarding Ralph Lauren Corp.’s (RLC) FCPA enforcement action, it was noted that the RLC enforcement action was a rare instance of an issuer not previously disclosing its FCPA scrutiny.  Thus, the first instance of public scrutiny appears to have been announcement of the enforcement action on Monday morning.  RLC’s stock dipped approximately 2% on the news and closed at $165.93.  The “FCPA dip” lasted only a day, as Tuesday the stock rebounded and then some and closed yesterday at $175.38.

Reading Stack

A good weekend to all.

Current And Former Alstom Employees Charged In Connection With Payments In Indonesia

The final catch-up post from recent FCPA enforcement activity – this one concerning the recently unsealed enforcement actions against David Rothschild and Frederic Pierucci.

First, what to make of this month’s enforcement activity?  Quite frankly, not much as I told Samuel Rubenfeld (Wall Street Journal) last week in this article.  Much of this “new” enforcement activity is really not “new.”  For instance, the BizJet individual enforcement actions were filed in 2011 and in 2012, but recently unsealed.  Parker Drilling disclosed last year its settlement and the amount, it just took a while for resolution documents to be finalized.  It was publicly reported last year that former Siemens executive Uriel Sharef was going to settle the SEC enforcement action, it just took a while for the resolution documents to be finalized.  And finally, the charges against Rothschild and Pierucci discussed below were filed last year, but recently unsealed.

This post summarizes the Rothschild information (dated November 2, 2012) and plea agreement (dated November 2, 2012) and then the Pierucci indictment (dated November 27, 2012).

Pierucci, a French national, has been identified as a current executive of Alstom and he was arrested on April 14th at JFK airport in New York City.  Rothschild is a former vice president of sales for Alstom Power Inc., a Connecticut-based subsidiary of Alstom.

According to this report, Alstom said in a statement that it “has been working  constructively with the Justice Department for the last two years to address allegations of past misconduct.” It went on to say that Pierucci, its current executive, is entitled to the presumption of innocence.  “We urge everyone to respect the judicial process, which will provide a full  and fair opportunity for the facts to be adjudicated,” the statement read.

Rothschild Information

The conduct at issue concerned the Tarahan coal-fired steam power plant project in Indonesia.  According to the charging documents Perusahaan Listrik Negara (“PLN”) “the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Indonesia and an ‘agency’ and ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign government […] was responsible for sourcing the Tarahan Project.

The officials allegedly involved were.

“Official 1  … a member of Parliament in Indonesia [who] had influence over the award of contracts by PLN, including on the Tarahan Project”

“Official 2 … a high-ranking official at PLN [who] had broad decision-making authority and influence over the award of contracts by PLN, including on the Tarahan Project”

“Official 3 … an official at PLN [who] was a high-ranking member of the evaluation committee for the Tarahan Project.  Official 3 had broad decision-making authority and influence over the award of the Tarahan contract.”

The information charges one count of conspiracy and alleges that Rothschild and others, between 2002 through 2009, conspired to make “corrupt payments to a member of Parliament in Indonesia, officials at PLN, and others in order to obtain and retain business related to the Tarahan Project on behalf of the following entities and in violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Alstom

Alstom Power Inc.

Power Company Switzerland – an indirect subsidiary of Alstom.

Power Company Indonesia – an indirect subsidiary of Alstom.

Consortium Partner – “a trading company … headquartered in Japan, incorporated in Japan, an in the business of providing power generation related services around the world.”  According to the information, this entity “acted as the partner” of the above Alstom entities “in the bidding and carrying out of the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”  Consortium Partner would sure seem to be Marubeni Corp. of Japan.  (See here for its 2004 press release concerning the Tarahan Project).  This will be interesting to follow as Marubeni in 2012 resolved an FCPA enforcement action concerning conduct at Bonny Island, Nigeria (see here for the prior post) and is currently under a two year DPA.

Specifically the information alleges various telephone and e-mail communications between Rothschild and others concerning the alleged bribe payments and efforts to “conceal the payments to foreign officials by entering into consulting agreements with Consultant A (described as a “consultant who purportedly provided consulting related services [for the above companies] in connection with the Tarahan Project in Indonesia”) and Consultant B (same description) in order to disguise the bribe payment to the foreign officials.”

All of the alleged overt acts in the information allegedly occurred between 2002 and 2004, although the information does allege the following wire transfers:

In 2005 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.’s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2006 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.’s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2007 “200,064 from [Alstom Power Inc.’s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

In 2009, “66,688” from [Alstom Power Inc.’s] bank account to the bank account of Consultant A in Maryland”

Other individuals generically identifed in the information include the following.

“Executive A – Senior Vice President for the Asia Region at [Alstom].  Executive A’s responsibilities at [Alstom] included oversight of [Alstom’s] and [Alstom’s] subsidiaries’ efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers in Asia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Executive B – who held executive level positions at [Alstom Power Inc.] and [Alstom], including Vice President of Global Sales [this is Pierucci].  Executive B’s responsibilities at [Alstom Power Inc.] included oversight of [Alstom Power Inc.] efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers around the world, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee A – Vice President of Regional Sale at [Alstom Power Inc.]  Employee’s A’s responsibilities at [Alstom Power Inc.] included obtaining contracts with new customers retaining contracts with existing customers in various countries, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee B – the General Manager of Power Company Indonesia.  Employee B’s responsibilities at Power Company Indonesia including obtaining contracts with new customers and retaining contracts with existing customers in Indonesia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

“Employee C – Director of Sales at Power Company Indonesia. Employee C’s responsibilities at Power Company Indonesia including obtaining contracts with new customers and retaining contracts with existing customers in Indonesia, including the Tarahan Project in Indonesia.”

In the plea agreement, Rothschild pleaded guilty to the one count information charging him with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  According to the plea agreement, the offense carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment and a $250,000 fine.  Other than setting forth the DOJ’s recommendation that the court reduce by two levels Rothschild’s offense level “based on the defendant’s prompt recognition and affirmative acceptance of person responsibility,” the plea agreement does not set forth any further specifics concerning sentencing.

Pierucci Indictment

The indictment is based on the same core set of facts alleged above in the Rothschild information.  Because it is an indictment, and not an information, the Pierucci indictment is more detailed and indeed contains additional charges beyond the one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  In addition, Pierucci is charged with four substantive counts of FCPA anti-bribery violations, money laundering conspiracy and four substantive counts of money laundering.

In the indictment, the DOJ alleges that “Pierucci was one of the people responsible for approving the selection of, and authorizing payments to, Consultants A and B, knowing that a portion of the payments to Consultants A and B was intended for Indonesian officials in exchange for their influence and assistance in awarding the Tarahan Project contract to [Alstom] and its subsidiaries.”

The indictment further alleges that Pierucci and others “came to the conclusion that Consultant A was not effectively bribing key Indonesian officials” and accordingly in 2003 Pierucci and others concluded “that Consultant A would be responsible only for paying bribes to Official 1, a member of the Indonesian Parliament” and that Alstom and its subsidiaries would retain another consultant to pay bribes to PLN officials.”

In this release, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman stated as follows.

“Frederic Pierucci and David Rothschild allegedly used outside consultants to bribe foreign officials in Indonesia in exchange for lucrative power contracts.  Stamping out foreign bribery is a Justice Department priority, and we are determined to continue our vigorous enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

The FCPA’s First Mega Enforcement Action

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]

The year was 1982 and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was nearing five years old.  Up to this point, enforcement was sparse and focused on single-actor type cases.  See here, here, here, here and here for FCPA enforcement actions up to this point.

In 1982, the first FCPA mega-case was brought and it involved five corporate defendants and twelve individual defendants.

Specifically, in October 1982, the DOJ brought an indictment (here) against:

• Crawford Enterprises Inc. (“CEI”) (a Houston based private company that sold compression equipment systems to oil and gas companies);
• Donald Crawford (CEI’s Chairman and sole shareholder and, at certain relevant times, CEI’s President);
• William Hall (CEI’s Executive Vice President and, at certain relevant times, CEI’s President);
• Ricardo Beltran (President and majority shareholder of Grupo Industrial Delta, a Mexican corporation);
• Mario Gonzalez (a U.S. citizen who assisted Grupo Delta and CEI communicate with certain alleged foreign officials);
• Andres Garcia (a U.S. citizen who assisted Grupo Delta and CEI communicate with certain alleged foreign officials);
• George McLean (Vice President of Solar Turbines International (“Solar”), a division of International Harvester Company);
• Luis Uriarte (the Latin American Regional Manager of Solar);
• Al Eyester (President of Ruston Gas Turbines “Ruston”);and
• James Smith (Vice President of Ruston).

The indictment charged a conspiracy between the defendants and others to pay money to Mexican foreign officials and Grupo Delta “knowing that all or a portion of such money would be offered, given or promised directly or indirectly” to foreign officials for the purpose of influencing the acts and decisions of the officials “in their official capacity, and inducing them to use their influence with Pemex so as to affect and influence the acts and decisions of Pemex in order to assist” Crawford, the other defendants, and others in “obtaining or retaining business with Pemex.”

The indictment alleges that Petroleos Mexicanos (“Pemex”) was the “national oil company wholly owned by the Government of the Republic of Mexico and was responsible for the exploration and production of all of the oil and natural gas resources of Mexico and for acquiring the equipment, including compression equipment systems, necessary for such exploration and production.”

The indictment alleged that “Pemex was an instrumentality of a foreign government” and that two individuals (Ignacio de Leon and Jesus Chavarria) were “foreign officials” based on their positions of “subdirector of Pemex responsible for the purchase of goods and equipment on behalf of Pemex” and “subdirector of Pemex responsible for the exploration and production of Mexican oil and natural gas.”

[As an aside, it should be noted that in the recent “foreign official” challenges, the DOJ has argued that its charging decision in the Crawford cases as to Pemex demonstrated the validity of its position that employees of SOEs are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  For instance, the recent FCPA Guidance states that the SEC and DOJ ‘‘have pursued cases involving instrumentalities since the time of the FCPA’s enactment’’ and that the ‘‘second-ever FCPA case charged by the DOJ’’ involved bribes to executives of the Mexican national oil company.  

However being consistently wrong, does not make one right and, as noted in my article “Grading the FCPA Guidance,” missing from the Guidance discussion or associated citations on this issue, is any reference to the fact that George McLean, the only defendant in the series of related cases to put DOJ to its burden of proof at trial, was found not guilty by the jury.]

The conspiracy charge alleged that CEI and Crawford agreed to pay and paid the “foreign officials” “bribes equalling approximately 4.5% of each Pemex purchase order for compression equipment systems in which” CEI participated and that “it was further a part of the conspiracy” that CEI and Crawford arranged with defendants Beltran, Gonzalez and Garcia that Grupo Delta would: “(a) hold itself out as the Mexican agent of CEI, while in truth acting primarily as the conduit for the bribe payments; (b) disguise the bribe payments as ‘commissions’ due by providing to CEI false and fictitious invoice for each payment received; and (c) provide Gonzalez and Garcia with a base of operations from which to perform their function as middlemen and channels of communications between the co-conspirators” and the foreign officials.”

The indictment further alleged that the defendants used the term “folks” as a code word for the “foreign officials” “in order to conceal from others their true identities as Pemex officials and the existence of the bribe scheme.”  The indictment alleged that “in order to create a pool of money with which to pay bribes” CEI along with Solar and Ruston “submitted to Pemex bids which were inflated to include a 4.5% markup for the “folks.”

The indictment alleged that CEI, along with Solar and Ruston received purchase orders from Pemex for compression equipment systems in the approximate amount of $225 million and that approximately $10 million in bribe payments were made to the “foreign officials” as part of the bribery scheme.

In addition to the conspiracy charge, the indictment also alleged approximately fifty substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations against various combinations of the defendants.  The indictment also charged CEI, Crawford and Hall with an obstruction charge based on allegations that the defendants destroyed certain documents relevant to a grand jury subpoena.

Media reports described the action as the first major criminal investigation under the FCPA.  According to the reports, in November 1982, CEI, Crawford, Hall, Garcia, McLean, Uriate, and Eyster pleaded not guilty.  Crawford and Hall stated that while commission payments were made to Grupo, no such bribes were paid to Pemex officials.

CEI released a statement which said that “despite vigorous and repeated denials by Crawford Enterprises of any wrongdoing in connection with these allegations, the investigation has continued for nearly 3.5 years.”  The company said that Pemex and the Mexican government had looked into similar charges and found no wrongdoing in the award of Pemex contracts to Crawford.  The company’s statement further indicated as follows.  “Four factors accounted for CEI’s success in becoming one of Pemex’s principal gas compression contractors:  its proven experience in the industry; its aggressive delivery schedules that other firms simply could not match; its maintenance and repair of equipment installed in Mexico; and the lower costs to Pemex as a result of all the above.”

Prior to the above-reference October 1982 indictment, in September 1982 the DOJ charged Ruston Gas Turbines Inc., C.E. Miller Corporation and Charles Miller based on the same core set of allegations.  The DOJ charged Ruston Gas Turbines in a one count criminal information (see here) with a substantive FCPA violation and the company pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a $750,000 fine (see here).  The DOJ charged C.E. Miller Corporation and Miller (President, Chairman of the Board, and majority shareholder of the company) in a one count criminal information charging substantive FCPA violations and aiding and abetting FCPA violations. (See here).  C.E. Miller Corporation and Miller both pleaded guilty and the company was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine and placed on probation for three years (see here) and Miller was sentenced to three years probation (see here).

Prior to the above-referenced September 1982 charges, in May 1981 the DOJ charged Gary Bateman (an International Sales Manager for CEI and also Chairman of the Board, President and sole shareholder of Applied Process Products Overseas, Inc.) in a multi-count information (see here) charging various misdemeanor violations of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act concerning the transportation of money to Mexico in connection with the bribery scheme.  Bateman pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a civil penalty of approximately $330,000.  In January 1983, the DOJ also charged Applied Process Products Overseas, Inc. in a one-count information (here) charging a substantive FCPA violation based on the same core set of allegations.  The company pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.  (See here).

After the above-referenced October 1982 charges, in November 1982 the DOJ also filed a criminal information against International Harvester (see here).  The information was based on the same core set of allegations as set forth above and based on the conduct of its employees McLean and Uriarte.  International Harvester pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA (see here) and was ordered to pay a $10,000 fine and agreed to also pay $40,000 civil cost reimbursement.

The DOJ’s offer of proof in the International Harvester case (see here) contained the following statement.

“After Solar had agreed to participate and to cooperate with CEI, and pursuant to the 1977 enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [International Harvester’s long-standing Policy on Conflicts of Interest and Ethical Business Conduct] was revised and supplemented to affirm that improper payments prohibited by the Act were also prohibited as a matter of company policy.  In 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980, through an annual audit process, each International Harvester managerial employee was required to certify his or her compliance and to report any action that might conflict with company policy for review by the Office of the General Counsel and corrective action, if warranted.  During those years, Uriarte and McLean each reported in the annual audit process that he was aware of International Harvester policy and had taken no action in violation thereof.  Insofar as each of them participated in the conspiracy described herein, he accordingly concealed from International Harvester his participation and the participation of the Solar Turbine Division.  Neither Solar employee held a position which required him to report to International Harvester management.  There has been no evidence that any officers, directors or management of International Harvester knew of or participated in the conspiracy charged.”

In January 1983, the DOJ charged Marquis King (an officer and director of C.E. Miller) in a one-count information charging a misdemeanor violation of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act concerning the transportation of money to Mexico in connection with the bribery scheme. (See here).  King pleaded guilty and he was sentenced to 14 months probation and ordered to pay a $5,000 fine.  (See here).

In June 1985, CEI pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations.  (See here).  CEI agreed to pay a $10,000 criminal fine as to the conspiracy charge and $75,000 as to each of the 46 substantive charges for a total fine amount of $3,460,000.  At the same time, the following defendants pleaded nolo contendere:  Donald Crawford, Al Eyster, James Smith, Andres Garcia, and William Hall.  Crawford pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $309,000 (see here); Eyster pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 41 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $5,000 (see here); Smith pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 44 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $5,000 (see here); Garcia pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 46 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $75,000 (see here); and Hall pleaded nolo contendere to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 32 substantive FCPA violations and was ordered to pay a total fine amount of $150,000 (see here).

That leaves McLean and Uriarte.  Stay tuned for the rest of the story.

Of further note from this enforcement action, Pemex filed a civil suit in U.S. District Court in Houston against Crawford, CEI, the two foreign officials, and twelve others in a bid to recover monies allegedly extracted from Pemex.  In its complaint, Pemex sought several million dollars in both compensatory and punitive damages from Crawford and the other entities based upon the same conduct that was alleged in the DOJ enforcement actions.  Pemex’s suit was based upon alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act,  the Robinson-Patman Act, and the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.  Pemex also asserted causes of actions based upon commercial bribery and common law fraud.  Various of the defendants in the civil action sought relevant documents from Pemex and it was ultimately held in contempt for not producing the documents.  For additional background on this case, see 643 F.Supp. 370; 826 F.2d 392.

Looking Back On February 21st

February 21, 2011

Two years ago today, for the first time in FCPA history a motion to dismiss was filed, with the benefit of a detailed and complete overview of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history on the “foreign official” element (see here for my declaration) ,challenging the DOJ’s interpretation that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.

The Carson “foreign official” challenge lead to other “foreign official” challenges in the Lindsey Manufacturing and John O’Shea matters, as well as the 11th Circuit appeal pending in the Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez matter – the first time in FCPA history that “foreign official” will be directly before an appeals court.  You of course are entitled to your own opinion as to the end results in the Carson, Lindsey Manufacturing and O’Shea matters, including whether “foreign official” impacted the results.  (See prior posts here and here).

It is interesting to note that since the Carson “foreign official” challenge two years ago, there has been no new case in which an individual has been charged with an FCPA anti-bribery violation based on the theory that SOE employees are “foreign officials.”

February 21, 2012

One year ago today, the DOJ moved to dismiss the Africa Sting cases after suffering several losses in the first two sets of trials.   (See here for the prior post).  The dismissal occurred shortly after the jury foreman in the second trial wrote this guest post published on FCPA Professor.

In granting the DOJ’s motion, Judge Richard Leon stated as follows.

“This appears to be the end of a long and sad chapter in the annals of white collar criminal enforcement.  Unlike takedown day in Las Vegas, however, there will be no front page story in the New York Times or the Post for that matter tomorrow reflecting the government’s decision today to move to dismiss the charges against the remaining defendants in this case.  Funny isn’t it what sells newspapers.

The good news, however, is that for these defendants, agents, prosecutors, defense counsel and the Court we can get on with our professional and personal lives without the constant strain and burden of three to four more eight week trials hanging over our heads.

I for one hope this very long, and I’m sure very expensive, ordeal will be a true learning experience for both the Department and the FBI as they regroup to investigate and prosecute FCPA cases against individuals in the future.

Two years ago, at the very outset of this case I expressed more than my fair share of concerns on the record regarding the way this case has been charged and was being prosecuted.  Later, during the two trials that I presided over I specifically commented again on the record regarding the government’s very, very aggressive conspiracy theory that was pushing its already generous elasticity to its outer limits.  Of course, in the second trial that elastic snapped in the absence of the necessary evidence to sustain it.

In addition, in that same trial, I expressed on a number of occasions my concerns regarding the way this case had been investigated and was conducted especially vis-a-vis the handling of Mr. Bistrong.  I even had an occasion, sadly, to chastise the government in a situation where the government’s handling of the discovery process constituted sharp practices that have no place in a federal courtroom.

Notwithstanding all of this water over the dam, and there has been a lot of water, I’m happy to see and I applaud the Department for having the wisdom and courage of its convictions to face up to the limitations of its case as revealed in the past 26 weeks of trial and the courage to do the right thing under the circumstances.

Having served at the higher levels of the Department, I know that that was not an easy decision.  They never are, when so much has been invested, and the agents and the prosecutors are so convinced of the righteousness of their position.  I for one however am confident this will be in the end a positive, if not painful, lesson that results in better prosecutions of individuals in the future under the FCPA.  As for the defendants, I hope the healing process is a swift one and that they get back to their normal lives in the very near future.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the tireless and spirited effort by the defense counsel from all over the country who came here to try these very lengthy and complicated cases under difficult circumstances and some even pro bono.  Their hard work and effective advocacy are a testament to how strong our criminal defense bar is nationwide.

As so without further adieu I grant the government’s motion to dismiss.  The defendants are excused.”