Friday Roundup

A prosecutorial common law defeat, the SEC repeats its prior positions, better but not good, document issues, and recent scrutiny news.

Prosecutorial Common Law Defeat

One of the best guest posts in FCPA Professor history was this 2011 post from Michael Levy in which he described the concept of prosecutorial common law.  Prosecutorial common law is all around us.  Take a look at the footnotes of the recent FCPA Guidance – most of the “authority” cited for “legal” propositions is DOJ or SEC settlements.

For obvious reasons, prosecutorial common law does not sit well with federal court judges.  For instance, in U.S. v. Bodmer, Judge Shira Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York, in rejecting the DOJ’s position that the FCPA’s criminal penalty provisions applied to a foreign national prior to the 1998 FCPA amendments, noted as follows – “the Government’s charging decision, standing alone, does not establish the applicability of the statute.”  Likewise as noted in this previous post about the Giffen enforcement action, Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York stated that prosecutorial common law “is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”

Prosecutorial common law recently suffered a major defeat when the Second Circuit, in a non-FCPA case, rejected (see here for the opinion)  a DOJ theory of prosecution concerning off-label promotion of drugs that it has previously used to secure billions (yes that is a “b”) in recent settlements with pharmaceutical companies.

Commenting on this recent development, Levy stated as follows.  “It is amazing to me how consistently this pattern seems to repeat but, given the incentives on both sides, I don’t really see any structural solutions that would change it.”

For additional reading, see this client alert from Debevoise & Plimpton, this client alert from Arnold & Porter, and this client alert from Gibson Dunn.

SEC Responds to Magyar Telekom Execs Motion to Dismiss

Given the SEC’s positions in its recent response to Herbert Steffen’s motion to dismiss (see here for the prior post), it comes as little surprise that the SEC is taking the same positions in its response to the motion to dismiss filed by former Magyar Telecom executives Elek Straub, Andras Balogh and Tamas Morvai.

In its response brief (here), the SEC states, in summary form, as follows.

“The defendants move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction; (2) the SEC’s claims are time-barred; (3) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s anti-bribery claims; and (4) the complaint fails to allege facts supporting the SEC’s lying to auditors claims. The Court should deny the motion on all four grounds.

First, the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction because their conduct caused foreseeable consequences in the United States. The complaint alleges that the defendants orchestrated a bribery scheme in Macedonia; that they concealed their bribes through the use of sham contracts and falsified books and records; that they lied to Magyar’s auditors by signing false annual and quarterly certifications; and that their actions caused Magyar to file annual and quarterly reports with the SEC in the United States that misrepresented the company’s financial statements and included false Sarbanes-Oxley certifications.

Second, the complaint was timely filed within the statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 2462. That provision expressly states that the limitations period does not begin to run until the defendants are “found within the United States.” The defendants acknowledge in their brief that they have remained outside of the United States since their commission of this scheme. Thus, the statute of limitations period has not begun to run as to them. In any event, claims for equitable relief are not subject to the limitations period of Section 2462, which by its terms applies only to “penalties.”

Third, the complaint pleads all facts necessary to support every element of every claim against the defendants.  The defendants met the “interstate commerce” prong of Exchange Act Section 30A, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, by sending, in furtherance of their bribery scheme, electronic mail messages that were routed through servers located in the United States. Because the use of interstate commerce is a jurisdictional element, the Exchange Act does not require that defendants know, let alone “corruptly” intend, that their messages would reach the United States. The complaint sufficiently identifies the foreign officials whom the defendants bribed; Section 30A does not require that the officials be expressly named. And the complaint sufficiently identifies the specific false statements made by each defendant to Magyar’s auditors and why those statements were material.”

Of particular note as to “foreign official,” the SEC makes the sweeping statement that “there is no requirement under the FCPA or in the case law interpreting it that the SEC’s complaint [needs to] identify bribed foreign officials by name.”  The SEC then states in a footnote as follows.  “Any such requirement would be completely at odds with the FCPA’s statutory scheme. […]  By its very structure, [the anti-bribery provisions were] drafted to prohibit corrupt transactions in which the precise identity of a government official might not be known even to the payor.”

As noted in this previous post, the SEC is asserting the same “foreign official” position in the Mark Jackson / James Ruehlen challenge.  Oral arguments are to take place today on that motion in Houston.

It should be noted that in the DOJ’s unsuccessful prosecution of John O’Shea, Judge Hughes stated as follows.  “[W]hile the Government does not have to trace a particular dollar to a particular pocket of a particular official, it has to connect the payment to a particular official, that the funds made under his authority to a foreign official, who can be identified in some reasonable way, that is, with no reasonable doubt.” Judge Hughes also stated as follows.  “You can’t convict a man promising to pay unless you have a particular promise to a particular person for a particular benefit. If you call up the [intermediary] and say, look, I’m going to send you 50 grand, bribe somebody, that does not meet the statute.”

Corruption Perception Index

Transparency International (“TI”) recently released its annual Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”) (see here).  The CPI ranks countries/territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be and is a composite index drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions and reflecting the views of observers from around the world including experts living and working in the countries/territories evaluated.

The top three (very clean) countries in the CPI were Denmark, Finland and New Zealand. The bottom three (highly corrupt) countries were Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia.

The United States placed 19th on the list of 176 countries.  While this is better than last year’s 24th place finish, as noted in this prior post it’s a bit ironic that as the U.S. aggressively expands its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement theories, the U.S. remains far from the top of the CPI.

Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer recently spoke of the U.S. FCPA enforcement effort in religious terms (“we in the United States are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws more vigorously than we do”), yet CPI’s rankings should again cause pause as to our claimed moral superiority.

Document Issues

I am not one to usually highlight FCPA Inc. marketing material, but I thought this video clip from e-discovery firm H5 was instructive as to many of the document issues involved in an FCPA investigation.  The enforcement agencies have commented from time to time that FCPA Inc. has a tendency to sometimes over do it in this area, but be that as it may – data collection, data storage, data analysis, etc. are among the reasons why FCPA investigations often soar into the millions.

Recent Scrutiny News

Rolls-Royce

Reuters reports (here) that Rolls-Royce, the world’s second-largest maker of aircraft engines “said the [U.K. Serious Fraud Office] had asked it to conduct an internal inquiry into dealings involving intermediaries in China, Indonesia and other overseas markets.”  According to the report, “a source close to the investigation said the allegations relate to events in the “distant past” and Rolls-Royce had told the U.S. Department of Justice about the inquiry.”

As noted in this previous post, in June, Data Systems & Solutions, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rolls-Royce Holdings, resolved an FCPA enforcement action.

Barclays

Reuters also reports (here) that a previously disclosed DOJ and SEC “investigation into whether Barclays Plc paid bribes to win a banking license in Saudi Arabia has spread to other banks that operate in the region.”

Net 1

Earlier this week, Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc. disclosed in an SEC filing (here) as follows.

“On November 30, 2012, we received a letter from the U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division (the “DOJ”) informing us that the DOJ and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have begun an investigation into whether Net 1 UEPS Technologies, Inc. and its subsidiaries, including their officers, directors, employees, and agents (collectively, “Net 1”) and other persons and entities possibly affiliated with Net 1 violated provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other U.S. federal criminal laws by engaging in a scheme to make corrupt payments to officials of the Government of South Africa in connection with securing a contract with the South African Social Security Agency to provide social welfare and benefits payments and also engaged in violations of the federal securities laws in connection with statements made by Net 1 in its SEC filings regarding this contract. On the same date, we received a letter from the Division of Enforcement of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) advising us that it is also conducting an investigation concerning our company. The SEC letter states that the investigation is a non-public, fact-finding inquiry.”

In this additional release, the company states as follows.

“These investigations appear to be directed at matters which are similar to those that were the subject of articles which appeared in various South African newspapers after AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Limited (“AllPay”) instituted legal proceeding in the South African courts to set aside the contract awarded to us in January 2012 by SASSA. AllPay was an unsuccessful bidder for the SASSA contract.”

News of the company’s FCPA scrutiny caused the company’s U.S. listed shares to plunge approximately 58%.  This of course caused several plaintiff law firms to announce investigations of their own.  See here, here, and here.  In the meantime, the company’s shares have risen 46%.

It’s an FCPA world.

*****

A good weekend to all.

The Noticeably Missing Hypothetical And The Government’s Two “Instrumentality” Positions

The FCPA guidance issued last week by the DOJ and SEC contains 18 hypotheticals (including sub-parts) ranging from jurisdictional issues; to gifts, travel and entertainment; to facilitation payments; to successor liability; to third party due-diligence.  In addition to these hypotheticals, the guidance also contains 12 (what I will call) vignettes – information set apart from the text that discuss issues ranging from “how can I tell if my company is a issuer;” to obtain and retain business, to numerous other issues such as charitable donations and routine government action.

One hypothetical noticeably missing from the FCPA guidance concerns the most important element of an FCPA anti-bribery violation – the “foreign official” element.  The DOJ’s position on this important FCPA element has become so discombobulated (for example, see here for a recent post) that it was probably easiest to take a pass.

Not only does the guidance pass on providing a “foreign official” hypothetical, but the guidance also creates a situation where the government now has two “instrumentality” positions.  I am not talking about a position based on informal statements delivered on the FCPA conference circuit, but a position set forth in official government documents.

In pertinent part, the FCPA guidance states that “as a practical matter, an entity is unlikely to qualify as an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares.  However, there are circumstances in which an entity would qualify as an instrumentality absent 50% or greater foreign government ownership, which is reflected in the limited number of DOJ or SEC enforcement actions brought in such situations.”  The guidance then lists as an example the Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action (see here for a prior post) in which the enforcement agencies asserted that Telekom Malaysia Berhad was a state-owned and controlled entity, even though the Malaysian Ministry of Finance only owned approximately 43% of the company’s shares, because the Ministry of Finance was a “special shareholder” with apparent veto power over major expenditures and control over important operational decisions.

This position in the guidance conflicts with the recent rule promulgated by the SEC (which co-authored the FCPA guidance) in connection with Section 1504 of Dodd-Frank.  As highlighted in this prior post, Section 1504 defines “foreign government” to mean a “department, agency or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a company owned by a foreign government, as determined by the Commission.”  On page 101 of its  final rules (here), the SEC states as follows.  “[T]he final rules clarify that a company owned by a foreign government is a company that is at least majority-owned by a foreign government.”

The Guidance Press Conference

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act guidance (here) released yesterday by the DOJ and SEC was a year long effort, no doubt subject to multiple revisions and review, and was highly scripted.

Not so with the press conference yesterday by Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer and SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami.  This post highlights certain of the comments made by Breuer and Khuzami at the press conference and contains a few comments of my own.

Breuer began the conference by noting that the guidance represents the “most comprehensive effort ever [by the DOJ] to explain [its] approach to enforcement as to a particular statute.”  He said that the DOJ strives to be “transparent” in this area and wants everyone to “understand why we prosecute cases as vigorously as we do and why we make our charging decisions.”

Khuzami added that the guidance should “clear up some myths about the types of conduct that get prosecuted.”

In response to a question whether the Chamber of Commerce should be satisfied with the guidance, Breuer stated that he called former Attorney General Michael Mukasey [who has lobbied on behalf of the Chamber for FCPA reform) prior to the conference and that the guidance reflects the Chamber’s suggestion for various hypotheticals.  Breuer said that “any fair-minded person” should see the guidance as a “substantial step forward in transparency in a very real way.”

Breuer was asked specifically about an FCPA compliance defense and said such a defense would be “dangerous and antithetical to the way [the DOJ] pursues criminal justice cases.”  Breuer stated that such a defense “runs the risk of a race to the bottom” and that there “can’t be an absolute defense.”

As to declinations and the inclusion in the guidance of various generic examples of apparent enforcement agency declinations, Breuer stated that the enforcement agencies “tried to provide clarity as to how [they] use [their] discretion” and that the guidance tries to give reader sa “fair sense of how we evaluate the cases.”  Khuzami added that the declination “numbers are not really that important” but the principles behind the declinations are and that “companies can mold behavior” based on the declination examples given.

From my perspective, one of the more important statements made during the press conference was when Khuzami and Breuer spoke about how companies should spend compliance dollars.

In reference to the various hypotheticals in the guidance concerning travel and entertainment, Khuzami said that he heard from companies that they were spending compliance dollars to guard against these issues, that companies were spending a huge amount of resources on such issues and that such a focus was taking dollars away from compliance efforts as to high risk activity.  Khuzami said that this was an argument he and Breuer have heard and that this argument “makes perfect sense.”  Khuzami said that he was “interested in companies spending compliance dollars in the most sensible way” and he hoped that the guidance and the hypotheticals provided would help companies as to where they can “minimize investment and where they can maximize it.”  Breuer added that the DOJ wants compliance programs “to address real matters of concern.”

One can interpret Khuzami’s and Breuer’s remarks on this topic as they like, but my interpretation was that they were saying that part of the reason why companies have such a high level of FCPA anxiety is not necessarily because of the FCPA or its enforcement, but rather the marketing and commentary by certain segments of FCPA Inc.  If that was their intent and purpose, I agree.

Breuer next was asked whether the guidance will put an end to the Chamber’s concerns surrounding the FCPA and its enforcement.  He said that “like with everything in life there is a process” and that the Chamber will probably want ongoing discussions about the FCPA and its enforcement and that the DOJ “welcomes that discussion.”  Breuer said that the guidance was likely not “complete closure” as to various concerns regarding FCPA issues.  Khuzami added that he “expects further commentary and proposal and expression of dissatisfaction” but that this “is the nature of the business we are in and an important part of the process.”

As to “foreign official” and the lack of a bright-line rule in the guidance, Khuzami said that they declined to draw a bright line because control of an enterprise can occur in different ways and that there are “many indirect ways of ownership and control.”  Breuer did say that the guidance acknowledges that it is unlikely that less than 50% control will result in an enterprise being considered an instrumentality, but that there might “specific factors” that may make such an enterprise an instrumentality.

To those who are inclined to believe that the guidance represents anything new, Breuer said that the guidance “does not represent a change in policy” but it “gives others a window and greater guidance” as to the enforcement agencies policies.  Khuzami agreed and said that Breuer’s comment was “absolutely right.”  Khuzami said that the “real value [of the guidance] is its clarity and transparency” and that the guidance is a unique opportunity “to communicate directly with the regulated community.”  He said that this opportunity does not always exist and that companies often receive information that is delivered and deciphered through counsel.  Khuzami said that the real “value of the guidance is that [corporate] officials can put this on their desk and read it, understand it directly and not through others.”  He said that this is the “great value” of the guidance.  I agree and previously stated (here) that the guidance collects in one document information that was previously scattered and that in this way the guidance has substantial value and is easily accessible to anyone.

Breuer was next asked whether the enforcement agencies plan to update the guidance over time or whether it represents a one-time publication.  Breuer stated that “for the foreseeable future” the guidance is it.  He said that the public needs to be realistic as to the roles the DOJ has and that by devoting time to the guidance prosecutors were not spending time prosecuting cases.  Khuzami added that rather than a “second-edition” that the guidance may be clarified over time through speeches or other commentary.

Friday Roundup

Thanks, the “foreign officials” of Medicine Bow, are you sure the company is FCPA-compliant in China, quotable, checking in on Brazil, and an interesting read.

Thanks

Many thanks for making FCPA Professor a part of your day.  October readership was an all-time record in the history of FCPA Professor (this site launched in July 2009) and two posts earlier this week “Stop Drinking the Kool-Aid” and “It Ought to Stop” were among the most read posts in FCPA Professor history.  As to these posts, I received many positive and supportive comments.

Should you have ideas for how FCPA Professor can be improved, please let me know at fcpaprofessor@gmail.com.

The “Foreign Officials” of Medicine Bow

Given the enforcement agencies’ untethered and boundless views on who is a “foreign official” under the FCPA, one never knows where a “foreign official” will pop up.

Such as Medicine Bow, Wyoming – population 300.

As noted in this recent Wall Street Journal article, “an arm of [China] state-controlled Sinopec Group, also known as China Petrochemical Corp., is planning to build an advanced facility [in Medicine Bow] that will convert coal into gasoline.”  According to the article, the project will create approximately 400 full-time jobs when the facility goes into operation.

In this 2010 article, I noted that with foreign government owned sovereign wealth funds making investments around the world (including in U.S. companies) and with SOEs listing public shares on various exchanges and otherwise doing business around the world, there has never been a more critical time for the enforcement agencies to make clear their legal and policy reasoning on “foreign official.”

Far from adding clarity on this issue, the recent “foreign official” trial court decisions (see here and here), as well as the DOJ’s recent “foreign official” reversal (see here), has only muddied the waters.

Are You Sure the Company Is Compliant?

Subject to a few observable exceptions, investors seem to care very little about FCPA scrutiny and enforcement actions.  All the more reason the below exchange from the recent Novartis AG earnings conference call caught my eye.

ANDREW BAUM (Citigroup Analyst):  One trend would notice with some of you peers is where there is a sudden acceleration in the growth in China, it is often closely followed by scrutiny under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Could you just give us an update on what you’re doing to ensure compliance in Novartis in China, is held in check, so that doesn’t become a risk?

DAVID EPSTEIN (Novartis, Head of Pharmaceuticals): “You asked about compliance. And just — I would just say rest assured our Company does everything that is in the power to be done, on a worldwide basis, to teach our people to be compliant. Both in terms of training and coming from the top and everything else. So I’m quite pleased with where our Chinese business is going. And leave it at that.”

Quotable

The U.K. Independent recently ran (here) a profile of David Green (who became Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office this past spring).

Below are some notable Green quotes.

  • “I would like the SFO to have a hard-edged, tough reputation. It should be something which is feared. You don’t want to be investigated by the SFO.”
  • On the issue of guidance.  “I am sceptical of guidance notes. I suspect the motives of those that want absolutely precise guidance, because I suspect they want to wait round the corner and hit you over the head with it, and say, you are acting contrary to your guidance. The criminal law covers an endless multitude of possibilities and possible sets of facts. It is very hard to be specific. On corporate hospitality, it rather depends on the motive and the context and the timing and the value. You can’t just say, Wimbledon tickets are OK. They’ll say that you said, ‘Wimbledon tickets are all right.'”
  • On the issue of criminal law enforcement as a funding source.  “It is a good source of income, and as a matter of principle I see nothing wrong with prosecutors being in part funded by money taken from criminals. I am all for that.”

Matthew Jacobs, a former DOJ prosecutor who now heads the San Francisco offices of Vinson & Elkins LLP, stated as follows in a recent Law360 article (“FCPA Enforcement Will Stay Robust Beyond Obama’s 2nd Term”):  “The Department of Justice has figured out that conducting investigations of corporations is a lucrative business.  This is the one area of government activity that actually brings money in rather than shoots money out. We’re talking about literally billions of dollars that the government is able to collect … as long as there’s a budget issue it’s not too cynical to say that … generating revenue is a factor in bringing these cases.”

Matt Kelly at Compliance Week recently stated (here) as follows concerning the DOJ’s promise of upcoming FCPA guidance and the role of Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer.  “We’d be foolish to ignore the profit motive, too [in addressing the why FCPA guidance now question]: Breuer will be in the private sector again soon enough, representing companies ensnared in FCPA probes. He’ll be able to command quite a premium if he can legitimately say, ‘I know how the Justice Department will interpret its FCPA guidance, because I wrote it. I don’t believe that career advancement is why Breuer is pushing for this guidance, but the fact remains that he stands to reap more money because of it.”

Brazil Developments

If Latin America is an area of your interest and concern, you should be reading the FCPAmericas blog (here) run by Matteson Ellis.  This recent post tracks developments of Brazil’s draft bribery bill.

Interesting Read

See here for a write-up of an article examining the differences between a tip and a bribe.  From the article. “It is generally considered a good-natured prosocial thing to tip, but bribing is considered to be antisocial and negative. […] Tips and bribes can possess striking similarities that may lead to their positive association.  In a sense, both are gifts intended to strengthen social bonds and each is offered in conjunction with advantageous service. One could even argue that the main difference between the two acts is merely the timing of the gift: Tips follow the rendering of a service, whereas bribes precede it.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Behind The Camera

Today’s post is short on written words, but long on content.

Many thanks to Mary Jacoby and her team at Main Justice (here) for the opportunity to go behind the camera.

In this 10-minute interview, I address the following topics.

  • My motivation for launching FCPA Professor, what I view as my responsibility to readers, and the feedback I receive;
  • Addressing what are perhaps misperceptions as to my positions on the FCPA and FCPA enforcement and setting the record straight as to my relationships (or lack thereof); and
  • FCPA reform