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Interesting, Significant and Bold

Last week I had the pleasure of participating in Securities Docket’s Year in Review webcast (see here for viewing – the FCPA portion begins at about 51 minutes).

For those of you who missed the event, below are my thoughts on four significant events from 2010, three interesting events from 2010, and two bold predictions for 2011.

The FCPA in 2010 was interesting, significant, and bold all at once. Among other things, it was a year in which Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer declared a “new era of FCPA enforcement.” (see here).

Significant Events

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

If anyone out there still believes that the FCPA is a law that only applies to U.S. companies, you clearly have been living under a rock.

2010 was the year of non-U.S. companies resolving FCPA exposure.

BAE (here)(I am hesitant to call this matter an FCPA enforcement action because it wasn’t, but everyone seems to be doing so), Daimler (here), Technip (here), Eni/Snamprogetti (here), ABB (here), Panalpina (here), and most recently Alcatel-Lucent (more in a future post).

It has been reported that approximately 90% of 2010 FCPA fines and penalties were paid by foreign companies.

I expect this trend to continue – albeit perhaps not at the level seen in 2010. The 4th member of the JV involved in Bonny Island bribery – JGC of Japan – has yet to settle, certain of the medical device and pharma companies that have disclosed FCPA issues are non-U.S. companies, and an emerging trend I see is an increased focus on China-based issuers. For instance, last year, 25% of the IPOs were China based issuers and last month, Rino International (see here) disclosed an FCPA inquiry, the first time I believe a China-based issuer has been the focus of an FCPA inquiry.

Two Tiers of Justice

Under basic rule of law principles, the law is to be equally and consistently applied to all subject to the law, regardless of how big or small the company is and regardless of what type of company is involved.

In a troubling trend, two tiers of justice have emerged from FCPA enforcement.
If the company is a large multinational company, the company will end up paying large fine, but chances are the company will not be charged with FCPA anti-bribery violations.

For instance, the DOJ’s allegations against BAE (see here) included that the company provided various benefits – through U.S. payment mechanisms – to influence Saudi officials through and through other conduct that clearly had a U.S. nexus. Yet, BAE, one of the world’s largest defense contractors, was not charged with any FCPA anti-bribery violation.

Daimler, according to the DOJ (see here), had a corporate culture that tolerated and/or encouraged bribery and its numerous bribery schemes involved various high-ranking executives. Yet, Daimler, was not charged with any FCPA anti-bribery violations.

It’s bribery yet no bribery, and it contributes to what I’ve called the façade of FCPA enforcement (see here).

While certain companies in certain industries appear immune from FCPA anti-bribery charges, in other instances, instances generally involving small companies such as Nexus Technologies (here) or Lindsey Manufacturing (here), the DOJ seems to come out with guns a blazing and criminally indicts the company for violating the FCPA. One can legitimately ask what did these companies do that BAE, Daimler, and some other companies didn’t do?

The two tiers of justice is also present when it comes to individual enforcement actions. As was highlighted in the recent Senate hearing, one odd aspect of the most high-profile, egregious instances of corporate bribery is that, for the most part, no individuals are charged. Yet in cases that can only be called minor in comparison, Nexus Technologies, Lindsey Manufacturing and the Haiti Teleco cases come to mind, the DOJ again seems to come out with guns a blazing and criminally indicts multiple individuals.

Companies that commit bribery on a major scale, involving hundreds of millions dollars, are still able to secure multi-million dollar U.S. government contracts (see here and here). On the other hand, individuals like Charles Jumet are sent to prison for nearly 7 years for making a $200,000 payment to secure a lighthouse and buoy contract and conspiring to violate the same law that major companies are apparently immune from violating. (See here).

DOJ officials frequently talk about the rule of law (here), and the importance of consistency and transparency in charging decisions (here), but these examples raise the issue of whether such principles are followed when it comes to FCPA enforcement.

Is the Facilitating Payments Exception Meaningless?

When Congress passed the FCPA in 1977 and amended it in 1988 it clearly understood and accepted that the statute was not going to cover every conceivable unethical payment made in transacting overseas business. (See here). The legislative history is clear on this point and that is why the FCPA contains an express exception for so-called facilitating or grease payments.

Yet one can legitimately ask whether this exception intended by Congress has any meaning.

In November, a group of companies collectively paid approximately $235 million to settle FCPA enforcement actions principally involving import permits for oil rigs, other customs and duty payments to Nigerian officials, and payments to expedite shipment of product in Nigeria and some other jurisdictions. (See here for a summary of the CustomsGate enforcement actions).

It seems a bit silly when several major companies settle an FCPA enforcement action for this amount of money to ask the question – did the conduct at issue even violate the FCPA, but this question should be asked in connection with the CustomsGate enforcement actions. It is also a question that can legitimately be asked as to several other recent FCPA enforcement actions that involve permits, licenses, certifications and other administrative tasks that have nothing to do with obtaining or retaining government contracts.

The issue as I see it is not whether such payments are ethical, but whether such payments violate the narrow anti-bribery provisions Congress intended and whether, once again, the DOJ and the SEC are actually enforcing the FCPA as Congress intended or whether the FCPA has morphed into a broader corporate ethics statute.

If the FCPA should become a broader corporate ethics statute, let Congress make that decision – not the DOJ or the SEC.

Emergence of a Plaintiff’s Bar

The FCPA, it has been held by some courts, does not contain a private right of action – yet there are other legal avenues available to plaintiffs to hold companies that violate the FCPA accountable. (See here).

Common causes of action include derivative claims against officers and directors, securities fraud claims by investors, RICO claims, unfair competition claims and antitrust claims such as last year when one of Innospec’s competitors sued it in Virginia state court in connection with its recently settled FCPA enforcement action. (See here).

Such causes of action have been pursued before 2010, but 2010 witnessed an explosion in such claims and so-called investigations by plaintiff firms representing investors.

The most noteworthy example is what I called the feeding frenzy surrounding SciClone Pharamaceutials. (See here). Last August, the company simply made an FCPA disclosure – that it was contacted by the SEC and the DOJ in connection with the government’s pharma industry sweep. The company’s stock dropped about 30%. Within weeks about a dozen plaintiff firms announced “investigations” and/or filed securities fraud cases – never mind the company’s stock price regained all that value within about a month.

When a company’s FCPA violations are found to be condoned or encouraged by the board or officers, such plaintiff causes of action would seem to be warranted.

However, these types of FCPA violations are rare – the more typical situation is where, because of respondeant superior, a company faces FCPA exposure because of the actions of a single or small group of employees whose conduct was in violation of the company’s FCPA policies and procedures. In these typical situations, I question what value these so-called “investigations” by plaintiff firms have or what purpose these derivative or securities fraud claims serve.

Interesting Events

Giffen Enforcement Action

When an enforcement action begins with allegations (here) that James Giffen made more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior Kazakhstan officials in connection with oil transactions for major American oil companies and abruptly ends with a one-paragraph superceding information (here) charging a misdemeanor tax violation and the company he worked for settling an FCPA enforcement action focused solely on two snowmobiles (here) – I call that interesting.

Even more interesting is that part of Giffen’s defense was that his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the CIA, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House. (See here for a prior post).

A few years ago George Clooney and Matt Damon starred in Syriana (here) a movie about the FCPA.

The Giffen enforcement action presents a superb Hollywood script – it is the most mysterious conclusion to an FCPA enforcement action ever – made even more interesting given that the presiding judge called Giffen a cold war hero and stated that the case should never have been brought in the first place. (See here for the prior post).

Africa Sting Cases

In January 2010, the DOJ arrested 22 defendants – most while attending a gun show in Las Vegas – in connection with a major undercover sting operation in which the government, utilizing an individual who had already pleaded guilty to separate FCPA violations, assisted the government in manufacturing a case involving a fake foreign official from Gabon. (See here, here and here for prior posts).

The defendants (see here) are principally owners or employees of small gun and weapons companies.

I would put this case in the interesting category.

Contrary to media reports and even DOJ statements, it is not the first time undercover tactics were used in connection with an FCPA investigation (see here), but the magnitude and breadth of the tactics were indeed unprecedented.

This case is far from over and the remaining defendants are sure to raise entrapment, among other legal issues, and this will be an interesting case to follow in 2011.

The Africa Sting case has draw the attention of an industry that probably had never thought much about FCPA compliance. Thus, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case, it has likely resulted in an industry and small enterprises thinking more proactively about FCPA compliance and risk assessment.

Greater Scrutiny and Why Questions

2010 also saw greater scrutiny and why questions about the FCPA, FCPA enforcement and what I have called FCPA Inc.

For the time time in nearly a decade, Congress held hearings (see here) on the FCPA in which some basic why questions were asked.

The U.S. Chamber sponsored a paper (here) titled “Restoring Balance – Proposed Amendments to the FCPA” that was widely covered and, in some circles, railed.

Several members of Congress are legitimately scratching their heads as to why companies that settle fraud, bribery and corruption cases continue to secure lucrative U.S. government contracts and the House passed a bill (here) that seeks to debar companies found to be in violation of the FCPA from receiving U.S. government contracts. Problem is, because of the façade of FCPA enforcement (see here), it will be an impotent bill.

In May 2010, Congressman Towns, chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, sent a letter to Attorney General Holder expressing concern that settlements of civil and criminal cases, including FCPA cases, by the DOJ are being used as a shield to foreclose other appropriate remedies such as suspension and debarment. (See here for the prior post).

And in Spring 2010, Forbes ran a front-page story titled “The Bribery Racket,” an article, notwithstanding some of its flamboyant language, raised several valid and legitimate questions and issues when it comes to FCPA enforcement. (See here for the prior post).

This scrutiny in 2010 raised valid and legitimate public policy questions that hopefully will be picked up on in 2011.

Bold Predictions

After a year in which (1) the largest individual prosecutions involved a fake “foreign official” (2) the most egregious cases of corporate bribery were prosecuted without FCPA anti-bribery charges; and (3) a signature case abruptly ended with a misdeamenor tax violation and a corporate prosecution involving two snowmobiles, I wonder what bold will look like in 2011.

Here are two bold predictions for 2011.

The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions Will Have a Negligible Impact on FCPA Enforcement

My (what seems) contrarian thoughts are the same as when I first made this post in July.

Enforcement of the U.K. Bribery Act Will Be Disciplined and Measured

The U.K. Bribery Act, already delayed, and with implementation slated for April 2011, has been the subject of much discussion and much over-hype in my opinion.

It has been called the FCPA “on steroids” (here) and if one subscribes to the industry marketing material, you might be left with the impression that the end of the world is near.

True, the Bribery Act is broader than the FCPA. For starters, it is an all-purpose bribery and corruption statute and addresses bribery and corruption in the private sector – not just bribery to “foreign officials” like the FCPA.

True, the Bribery Act has potentially a very broad reach – so does the FCPA.

True, the Bribery Act has no exception for facilitating payments – the FCPA does – although as highlighted above, query whether this exception means anything.

However, the Bribery Act has the “adequate procedures” defense – something the FCPA does not have – but query whether it should.

Thus, while the Bribery Act is indeed more broad than the FCPA, because of this defense, it is at the same time more narrow than the FCPA.

Public statements by U.K. officials suggest that this adequate procedures defense is a meaningful defense. For instance, in September at the World Corruption and Compliance Forum, an event I chaired in London, the U.K. Attorney General (Dominic Grieve) stated (see here) that “any company small or large” that puts into place a system of adequate procedures “has nothing to fear” when an employee or agent “goes off the rails” and makes a bribe payment. Attorney Grieve said that a company should have nothing to fear if it is “walking the walk, and talking the talk” when a rogue employee makes an improper payment. On the other hand, Attorney Grieve stated that that “those who don’t heed the warnings and don’t take the necessary steps have something to fear.” Richard Alderman, the Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office, stated in October (see here) as follows. “I have heard some people say that this offence is one of strict liability. I do not agree. No offence will have been committed if there were adequate procedures. I have also heard people say that the fact of bribery might mean that there were inadequate procedures by definition and so the defence can never be made out. Again, I do not agree. In the real world there may be occasional lapses despite adequate procedures rigorously enforced. The issue ultimately for the Judge and jury (and for the SFO in deciding on a prosecution) will be – were those procedures adequate?” As to the adequate procedures defense, Vivian Robinson (General Counsel of the Serious Fraud Office) said in an October webcast (here) that because of the defense “there is every reason to be optimistic that we won’t get as a result of the Act and this particular section a huge expanse in the number of prosecutions of corporates.”

As demonstrated by the Innospec matter (see here), the U.K. courts are playing, and rightfully so, a much greater role than U.S. courts in reviewing bribery and corruption cases. I’ve been told that even if the SFO prosecutes a corporate bribery case with an NPA or DPA, the U.K. courts will still play a meaningful oversight role – a role that is unfortunately not true here in the U.S.

In sum, I don’t see how companies already subject to the FCPA and already thinking about compliance in a pro-active manner, have much to worry about when it comes to the U.K. Bribery Act because of the adequate procedures defense.

I will be surprised if U.K. enforcement of the Bribery Act reaches the level of U.S. enforcement of the FCPA and I will be surprised if the U.K. Bribery Act develops outside of the judicial system as has generally been true with U.S. enforcement of the FCPA.

Friday Roundup

Nigeria drops charges against Dick Cheney after Halliburton reportedly pays $250 million; James Giffen is sad, though not bitter; an Iraqi Oil for Food prosecution … in Scotland; International Anti-Corruption Day is “marred”; and another voice joins “the FCPA simply means what the enforcement agencies say it means” chorus … it’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

Charges Against Cheney in Nigeria Dropped

On December 7th, Nigerian authorities apparently filed criminal charges against Dick Cheney, and others, in connection with the Bonny Island bribery scheme. As discussed in this prior post, Cheney was CEO of Halliburton from 1995 until 2000. In February 2009, Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, and KBR Inc. agreed to pay $579 million in combined DOJ/SEC FCPA enforcement action to resolve charges related to Bonny Island. According to the DOJ, the improper conduct took place between 1994 and 2004. The case remains the largest ever FCPA enforcement action against a U.S. company.

Farida Mzamber Waziri, the executive chairwomen of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission stated, “Dick Cheney was head of Halliburton” “There’s no way such amount of money would’ve been moved to bribe Nigeria without his approval and without his knowledge, this is what we’re saying.” (See here for a video).

In a swift conclusion to the matter, it is been reported (see here among other places) that Nigeria has dropped charges against Cheney after his former employer, Halliburton, agreed to pay a $250 million fine. According to the report, the sum consists of $120 million in penalties and the repatriation of $130 million.

According to this report in the U.K. Telegraph, former U.S. President George H.W. Bush and former Secretary of State James Baker helped in the negotiations.

A Halliburton spokesman is quoted as saying “we have no comment to make on this.”

Sad, But Not Bitter

David Glovin (Bloomberg) recently sat down with James Giffen and penned this article. For more on the Giffen enforcement action and its mysterious conclusion see here for numerous prior posts.

Giffen is sad, though not bitter about what he terms the DOJ’s “selective” prosecution of him and he asks “in whose interest was the investigation in the first place.” Given Giffen’s “public authority” defense, much of the case focused on classified documents. Not even Giffen’s lawyer, William Schwartz (here) had access to many of the documents – one person did and that was Judge William Pauley (S.D.N.Y.) “who made his feelings known.” (see here).

Wehr Group

Glasgow, Scotland based engineering firm Wehr Group plc (here) recently pleaded guilty to two charges of breaching UN sanctions in connection with a number of UN sanctioned Iraqi Oil for Food contracts awarded between 2000 and 2002. As noted in the company’s release (here), “following the guilty plea, Weir has been subject to a confiscation order in the sum of £13,945,962. In addition it has been fined £3 million.” For more see here.

International Anti-Corruption Day “Marred”

Raymond Baker (here), the Director of Global Financial Integrity, says here that “this year’s International Anti-Corruption Day [was] marred by a U.S. Chamber of Commerce attempt to weaken the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” In November, the Chamber released a paper (here) authored by Andrew Weissman and Alixandra Smith titled “Restoring Balance – Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

According to Baker, “the short answer” to various issues raised by the current era of FCPA enforcement is simple: “don’t bribe anyone, whether she/he is a public official, a private citizen, or someone in between.”

Gee, thanks for that guidance, problem solved!

The FCPA’s Big Lesson

Richard Cassin, creator of the FCPA Blog and a pioneer of the FCPA’s blogosphere, hit the ball out of the park with this recent column for Ethisphere.

Among other things, Cassin writes as follows: “I know there’s practically no FCPA-related case law, no precedent to follow, no stare decisis to light the way. So the FCPA is pretty much what the enforcement agencies say it is. And that’s what’s so very different and difficult about it. It’s what I call the FCPA’s Big Lesson.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Nigeria drops charges against Dick Cheney after Halliburton reportedly pays $250 million; James Giffen is sad, though not bitter; an Iraqi Oil for Food prosecution … in Scotland; International Anti-Corruption Day is “marred”; and another voice joins “the FCPA simply means what the enforcement agencies say it means” chorus … it’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

Charges Against Cheney in Nigeria Dropped

On December 7th, Nigerian authorities apparently filed criminal charges against Dick Cheney, and others, in connection with the Bonny Island bribery scheme. As discussed in this prior post, Cheney was CEO of Halliburton from 1995 until 2000. In February 2009, Halliburton, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, and KBR Inc. agreed to pay $579 million in combined DOJ/SEC FCPA enforcement action to resolve charges related to Bonny Island. According to the DOJ, the improper conduct took place between 1994 and 2004. The case remains the largest ever FCPA enforcement action against a U.S. company.

Farida Mzamber Waziri, the executive chairwomen of Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission stated, “Dick Cheney was head of Halliburton” “There’s no way such amount of money would’ve been moved to bribe Nigeria without his approval and without his knowledge, this is what we’re saying.” (See here for a video).

In a swift conclusion to the matter, it is been reported (see here among other places) that Nigeria has dropped charges against Cheney after his former employer, Halliburton, agreed to pay a $250 million fine. According to the report, the sum consists of $120 million in penalties and the repatriation of $130 million.

According to this report in the U.K. Telegraph, former U.S. President George H.W. Bush and former Secretary of State James Baker helped in the negotiations.

A Halliburton spokesman is quoted as saying “we have no comment to make on this.”

Sad, But Not Bitter

David Glovin (Bloomberg) recently sat down with James Giffen and penned this article. For more on the Giffen enforcement action and its mysterious conclusion see here for numerous prior posts.

Giffen is sad, though not bitter about what he terms the DOJ’s “selective” prosecution of him and he asks “in whose interest was the investigation in the first place.” Given Giffen’s “public authority” defense, much of the case focused on classified documents. Not even Giffen’s lawyer, William Schwartz (here) had access to many of the documents – one person did and that was Judge William Pauley (S.D.N.Y.) “who made his feelings known.” (see here).

Wehr Group

Glasgow, Scotland based engineering firm Wehr Group plc (here) recently pleaded guilty to two charges of breaching UN sanctions in connection with a number of UN sanctioned Iraqi Oil for Food contracts awarded between 2000 and 2002. As noted in the company’s release (here), “following the guilty plea, Weir has been subject to a confiscation order in the sum of £13,945,962. In addition it has been fined £3 million.” For more see here.

International Anti-Corruption Day “Marred”

Raymond Baker (here), the Director of Global Financial Integrity, says here that “this year’s International Anti-Corruption Day [was] marred by a U.S. Chamber of Commerce attempt to weaken the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” In November, the Chamber released a paper (here) authored by Andrew Weissman and Alixandra Smith titled “Restoring Balance – Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

According to Baker, “the short answer” to various issues raised by the current era of FCPA enforcement is simple: “don’t bribe anyone, whether she/he is a public official, a private citizen, or someone in between.”

Gee, thanks for that guidance, problem solved!

The FCPA’s Big Lesson

Richard Cassin, creator of the FCPA Blog and a pioneer of the FCPA’s blogosphere, hit the ball out of the park with this recent column for Ethisphere.

Among other things, Cassin writes as follows: “I know there’s practically no FCPA-related case law, no precedent to follow, no stare decisis to light the way. So the FCPA is pretty much what the enforcement agencies say it is. And that’s what’s so very different and difficult about it. It’s what I call the FCPA’s Big Lesson.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

The Giffen Gaffe – The Final Chapter

The original 2003 indictment (here) charged James Giffen with “making more than $78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan.”

Giffen’s defense?

Partly that his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House. The DOJ did not dispute the fact that Giffen had frequent contacts with senior U.S. intelligence officials or that he used his ties within the Kazakh government to assist the United States. With the court’s approval, Giffen sought discovery from the government to support such a public authority defense and much of the delay in the case was due to the government’s resistance to such discovery and who was entitled to see such discovery.

In August, the case took a mysterious turn when Giffen agreed to plead guilty (here) to a one-paragraph superseding indictment charging a misdemeanor tax violation.

The case ended Friday in a Manhattan court room.

U.S. District Court Judge William Pauley called Giffen a Cold War hero, imposed no jail time, and stated that the case should never had been brought in the first place.

It’s the Giffen Gaffe, the biggest blunder in the history of the FCPA.

Today’s post is from Steve LeVine who was present in Judge Pauley’s courtroom on Friday. LeVine writes “The Oil and The Glory” For Foreign Policy (here) and the below is reprinted with his permission.

*****

James Giffen, the oil dealmaker at the center of what was once the largest foreign bribery case in U.S. history, is officially a free man.

The 69-year-old former oil adviser to Kazakhstan’s president, accused of diverting $78 million from oil companies to the Kazakh government, waited out more than a dozen federal prosecutors and sat through some two dozen court appearances and five trial dates over the course of seven years. Today, the effort paid off. Three months after prosecutors announced a stunning capitulation, dropping all foreign bribery, money laundering, and fraud charges against Giffen in exchange for a guilty plea on a misdemeanor tax charge, U.S. District Judge William Pauley ordered no prison time and no fines in sentencing proceedings at a Manhattan courthouse.

In handing down the non-sentence, Pauley seemingly validated the argument to which Giffen’s lawyers had clung since 2003: that whatever crimes Giffen had allegedly committed occurred while he was a highly valued foreign asset of the American intelligence. “Suffice it to say, Mr. Giffen was a significant source of information to the U.S. government and a conduit of secret information from the Soviet Union during the Cold War,” Pauley said today.

Giffen may have been lesser-known than the other businessmen-cum-criminal-defendants of recent decades, but he was equally colorful, a swaggering, coarse-talking, heavy-drinking womanizer and a charismatic fixture on the Caspian Sea. He arrived in Kazakhstan in 1992, but the trajectory that ultimately landed him there began in 1969, when he started traveling to Moscow as an aide to a Connecticut metals trader. Giffen worked his way up to become a major player in a U.S-Soviet business association with top-level political ties in both Washington and Moscow. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, business in Russia dried up, and Giffen moved on to Kazakhstan, which was quickly becoming one of the hottest oil plays on the planet.

Giffen managed to ingratiate himself with a man he called The Boss: Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. He became Nazarbayev’s chief oil negotiator and, prosecutors alleged, his personal banker. While honchoing some of the era’s biggest oil deals, he also diverted some $78 million in payments made to Kazakhstan by now-dead companies like Mobil, Amoco, and Texaco into Swiss and other bank accounts that he set up in the name of Nazarbayev, other senior Kazakh officials, and their relatives, prosecutors alleged. (U.S. diplomats said that Nazarbayev, an unindicted co-conspirator in the case, so dreaded being tarnished by a Giffen conviction that both he and his envoys pleaded repeatedly for the George W. Bush Administration to order the case dropped.)

The case seemed open and shut, since the prosecutors presented a detailed paper trail — provided by a Swiss magistrate — of Giffen slicing payments into tiny discrete pieces for transfer into secret Swiss bank accounts, rather than shifting them as a whole, a classic method of money laundering. Even at their most voluble and expansive in court, Giffen’s lawyers made no attempt openly to dispute the prosecution’s facts. They simply kept repeating that, whatever Giffen may have done, he was taking orders from the Kazakh government — a sovereign state entitled to its own ideas of legality — and otherwise serving the patriotic interests of the Central Intelligence Agency.

It was an audacious defense that many thought verged on the preposterous. For one thing, CIA officers of the era deny that Giffen was anything of the sort — he walked into CIA headquarters on his own volition and talked to agency officers about Kazakhstan, they said, but that was very different from being a trusted asset on an informal assignment. In short, they asserted, Giffen was simply another dude talking.

The CIA, however, appears to have refused to hand over many — if any — documents sought by the defense. Judge Pauley had ruled that such documents were obligatory if Giffen were to have access to his rights to adequately defend himself. So the prosecution was left with having to drop the charges.

In his sentencing remarks, Pauley said that he had had access to classified documents that no one else in the courtroom had seen, and that they largely validated Giffen’s claims. “He was one of the only Americans with sustained access to” high levels of government in the region, Pauley said. “These relationships, built up over a lifetime, were lost the day of his arrest. This ordeal must end. How does Mr. Giffen reclaim his reputation? This court begins by acknowledging his service.”

*****

For additional coverage see here (David Glovin – Bloomberg) and here (Larry Neumeister – AP).

For Giffen’s contribution to FCPA case law (see here).

Giffen’s Contribution to FCPA Case Law

Notwithstanding its mysterious conclusion, the Giffen enforcement action was instructive because it represented a rare instance in which an FCPA defendant mounted an aggressive legal defense. As a result, the long enforcement action yielded FCPA case law, even though the issues subjected to judicial scrutiny did not involve core FCPA elements.

So what did we learn from the Giffen case law?

For starters, we learned that just because the DOJ charges it, does not mean that the charge is legally viable.

As I explored in this prior post, in addition to the FCPA charges, the original indictment also alleged that Giffen’s actions violated 18 USC 1346 by depriving the citizens of Kazakhstan of the honest services of their government officials – one of the more curious “tag-a-long” charges ever in an FCPA enforcement action.

In 2004, Giffen moved to dismiss portions of the charges that alleged a scheme to deprive the citizens of Kazakhstan of the honest services of their government officials. He asserted that application of the honest services fraud theory of Section 1346 to Kazakhstan impermissibly extended the mail and wire fraud statutes to cover activities beyond the original intent of Congress.

Judge William Pauley of the Southern District of New York agreed and granted Giffen’s motion to dismiss portions of the charges that alleged a scheme to deprive the citizens of Kazakhstan of the honest services of their government officials. See U.S. v. Giffen, 326 F.Supp.2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

In so holding, Judge Pauley stated that the DOJ offered “the slenderest of reeds to support its expansive interpretation.” Among other things, Judge Pauley noted that the DOJ could not point to “any decision where a court upheld application of the honest services theory in an international setting involving a foreign government and its citizens.”

When the DOJ pointed to “two 25-year old indictments” charging a similar theory, Judge Pauley noted that the DOJ “has not unearthed any published decision on the issue” and that the DOJ “conceded that there were no court decisions addressing the validity of the two 25-year old indictments.” Judge Pauley further stated that just because certain U.S. Attorneys were able to obtain indictments “under an intangible rights theory, grounded between a foreign government and its citizenry, is not the kind or quality of precedent this Court need consider.”

Judge Pauley concluded that “Congress did not intend that the intangible right to honest services encompasses bribery of foreign officials in foreign countries” and that “application of Section 1346 to Giffen [was] unconstitutional.”

In the prior post, I noted that many current FCPA legal theories are similarly not supported by any case law or other meaningful precedent or guidance.

I then posed the question – if challenged would a judge (like Judge Pauley in Giffen) conclude that the DOJ offered the “slenderest of reeds” to support many of its expansive FCPA interpretations?

I asked – what case law would the DOJ cite to support certain of its aggressive interpretations (such as employees of seemingly “commercial” enterprises being “foreign officials” under the FCPA)? Would DOJ not have to concede that there are no court decisions addressing the validity of certain of its interpretations? Would the DOJ point to prior enforcement actions settled by companies or individuals to support many of its enforcement theories? If so, presumably a judge would similarly state “this is not the kind of precedent” I need to consider.

We also learned during the Giffen enforcement action that an act of state doctrine is near impossible to properly assert in an FCPA enforcement action. In addition to claiming that his actions were taken with the knowledge and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the Department of State and the White House, Giffen also asserted that he was acting as an official of the Kazakh government and thus, under the act of state doctrine, the court was precluded from considering the validity of Kazakh law and the officials acts of its leaders.

However, Judge Pauley stated that the act of state doctrine has a territorial dimension in that it is limited to acts done within the applicable foreign state in the exercise of government authority. Because the Giffen allegations, like most FCPA allegations, did not relate solely to conduct within Kazakhstan, Judge Pauley concluded that the act of state doctrine did not bar Giffen’s prosecution. For instance, and among other things, the indictment alleged that Giffen transferred funds from Swiss bank accounts.

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