Category: GlaxcoSmithKline

Should Motivations Matter?

GlaxoSmithKline’s (GSK) scrutiny in China – by the Chinese government – dominated the headlines in July (see here for a prior post).

Shortly thereafter, many began to question the motivations of the Chinese government in investigating GSK and several other multinational pharmaceutical companies operating in China.  Did the Chinese government have pure motivations?  Or was there something else going on as the scrutiny was occurring at the same general time the Chinese government was seeking price concessions from multinational pharma companies in an effort to make healthcare more affordable for its citizens

See here from Bloomberg, here from Reuters.

The general issue gained plenty of traction in the blogosphere and editorial pages.

See here (“The decision of the Chinese government to act against Glaxo is likely motivated by a desire to make a strategic example of an international pharma company in China”).

See here  (“With national healthcare expenses expected to reach $1 trillion annually by the end of the decade, China is looking for ways to reduce costs.  The country’s National Development and Reform Commission has targeted the drug pricing policies of GSK, Merck, Novartis, Baxter, Astellas Pharma and almost 60 other international drug manufacturers for investigation. […] Growing drug costs in China thus appear to have provided the Chinese government with the motivation to institute and “go public” with the GSK investigation, as well widening the probe into other pharmaceutical companies.

See here (“Still to be seen, however, is what’s motivating the crackdown. Drug makers have faced increasing pressure by Beijing to cut prices and share intellectual property, but neither aim should be accomplished through prosecuting bribery.”)

If GSK and other foreign firms operating in China did indeed violate Chinese law, should the real motivations of the Chinese government in investigating GSK and other companies even matter?  What if the motivations of the Chinese government are less than pure?

Bringing the question home, if a company subject to the FCPA violates the law, should the real motivations of the U.S. government in bringing an enforcement action even matter?  Are the motivations of our government always pure when it comes to FCPA enforcement?  After all, the lack of FCPA anti-bribery charges against Siemens and BAE was hardly pure.  The DOJ’s sentencing memorandum in those cases make clear that the settlements were structured in such a way as to avoid debarment issues for the company (and for the U.S. government).  That is hardly a pure motivation for enforcing a law.

The mysterious end to the James Giffen enforcement action (see here for the prior post) – in which he asserted a public authority defense and that his actions were undertaken with the knowledge and approval of the highest levels of U.S. government – was hardly pure.

Impure motives are improve motives whether the impurity leads to lax enforcement or aggressive enforcement.

And certainly the U.S. is not alone.  When the U.K. Serious Fraud Office dropped its investigation of BAE concerning business conduct in Saudi Arabia because the Saudis allegedly threatened to cease cooperation on terrorism issues, that was not a pure motive.

The interesting thing is this.  With increased competition among nations in enforcing anti-bribery laws (an issue frequently discussed on these pages – see here instance), we can expect to see more motives being questioned.

This makes it all the more important – as I highlighted several years ago – in “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement” that we get things right here in the U.S. when it comes to FCPA enforcement.

But then again, this is not merely an enforcement issue.

Let’s not forget that the real reason the U.S. ended up with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 was not exactly pure.

Sure, one will find certain statements in the legislative history to support the notion that what motivated Congress to enact the FCPA was so-called post-Watergate morality.  However, as detailed in “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” the main motivation of Congress in enacting the FCPA was clearly foreign policy.

Senator Frank Church, an FCPA leader, was clear in opening initial hearings as to the so-called foreign corporate payments in May 1975.  He stated.

“For what we are concerned with is not a question of private or public morality. What concerns us here is a major issue of foreign policy for the United States. […] It is time to treat the issue for what it is: a serious foreign policy problem.”

In chairing another Congressional hearing in 1975, Senator Church likewise stated:  “I have focused on the foreign policy aspects of this issue because that is the chief concern of my subcommittee.”

Representative Solarz, who emerged as an FCPA leader in the House, stated:

“What is in fact at stake is the foreign policy and national interest of the United States. It is clearly in our interest to put a stop to these pernicious practices.  […]  We simply cannot permit activity which so damages U.S. foreign policy.”

Representative Moss stated:

“Business practices of these corporations abroad often impact directly on U.S. foreign policy. Disclosures have shown that United Brands dealings with the Honduran Government and Lockheed’s relationship with the Dutch Crown, Italian political parties, and former key leaders of the ruling Japanese party had an impact as great as the Department of State might have had. Surely the public expects more than to have foreign policy made in the board rooms of United Brands or Lockheed. Not only is a publicly owned corporation unaccountable to the public when it uses its assets to bribe foreign governmental officials, but also it is unaccountable to its shareholders, the ones to whom the assets belong.”

In short, Congressional leaders wanted foreign governments and foreign political parties accountable and answerable to the U.S. government itself, not to private enterprise because of the bribe payments.  This was not a pure or altruistic reason for enacting the FCPA, it was a power play tied directly to foreign policy.

Should motivations matter?

Friday Roundup

Interesting, hardly a smoking gun, law enforcement ought not be a competition, quotable, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Interesting

An interesting study (here) from Michael Klausner (Nancy and Charles Munger Professor of Business and Professor of Law at Stanford Law School) and Jason Hegland (Project Manager for Stanford Securities Litigation Analytics).  Using a “universe of SEC enforcement actions involving nationally listed firms for violation of disclosure-related rules—fraud, books and records and internal control rules” from 2000 to the present, the authors found, among other things, that only 7 percent of corporate SEC enforcement actions involved no individual defendants.

Such a finding stands in stark contrast to corporate SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions.  As noted in this previous post,  since 2008 approximately 80% of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.  This figure is likely to climb when I re-calculate the statistic to account for 2013 FCPA enforcement.  To date, the SEC has brought four corporate FCPA enforcement and none have resulted (at least yet) in any SEC charges against company employees.

Kudos to Klausner and Hegland for the quality of their data and using the “core” approach.  The authors state:

“We define a “case” in a specific way in order to organize the data. A case, as we use the term, is a set of one or more enforcement actions against a company and/or its executives and/or third parties such as accountants or underwriters for the same misstatement that led to a violation. Thus, if the SEC brings an action against ABC Co and one or more separate actions against ABC Co.’s executives and its outside auditor, all for a misstatement in ABC Co.’s 2012 financial statements, we consider all those separate actions as one “case.””

This is consistent with the “core” approach I use to keep my FCPA statistics.  (See here for the prior post).  The “core” approach is also what the DOJ uses (see here for the prior post).  However, many in FCPA Inc. use other creative counting methods to measure FCPA enforcement and related issues.  This is a huge quality of data issue and completely muddies the conversational waters on many FCPA issues.

Hardly a Smoking Gun

Reuters and other media outlets have carried forward Chinese state media reports as follows.  “A Chinese police investigation into drugmaker GlaxoSmithKline has discovered that alleged bribery of doctors in China was coordinated by the British company and was not the work of individual employees.”

The smoking gun?

Apparently GSK “had set goals for annual sales growth as high as 25 percent. That rate was 7 to 8 percentage points above the average growth rate for the industry” [according to one of GSK’s detained executives] and “GSK implemented salary policies based on sales volumes and such goals could not be achieved without “dubious corporate behavior.”

That is hardly a smoking gun.

Competition

At times it seems like there is a new “global arms race” to see which country can bring the most enforcement actions for the largest dollar value.  Competition is generally good, but law enforcement ought not be a competition where quantity of enforcement becomes more important than quality of enforcement.  Evidence of the former can be found in the following.

In this recent speech David Green (Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office) stated as follows.

“When it comes to prosecutions of corporates, the SFO’s performance is often compared unfavourably to that of US prosecutors. The key reason for this is the much higher bar that we in the SFO face in proving corporate criminal liability. Currently, in order to prove corporate liability, we have to prove that the controlling mind of the corporate was complicit in the relevant criminality.”

In other respects, Green’s speech reads like a political stump speech, not that of a high-profile law enforcement official.

This article in the South China Morning Post titled “Beijing Weighing Large Fines Against GlaxoSmithKline quotes from the China Ministry of Public Security website which states:  “We should learn from the practice of other countries in imposing astronomical fines.”

Quotable

From Jonathan Weil’s Bloomberg View column:

“In the U.S., companies hire powerful people’s children all the time for reasons beyond their obvious skill set. (Chelsea Clinton working at a hedge fund?) And they don’t just bother with the kids — they hire the powerful people themselves. (Do you think Larry Summers got a high-paying job at the hedge fund D.E. Shaw because of his skills as a trader?)

If the feds are going to target wheel-greasing in China — where it can be difficult to get business done without bribing somebody — does this mean we need a Domestic Corrupt Practices Act, too? In Colorado, JPMorgan used to employ Chris Romer as a banker. His father, Roy Romer, was the state’s governor for 12 years. Did that help Chris Romer get hired? It couldn’t have hurt. Do we need a law against this? Of course not.

There are certain facts of life that aren’t worth bringing in the FBI to check out. When rich people with teenage children give millions of dollars to elite universities, there’s a good chance they want special attention from the admissions office for their kids, if not an outright guarantee they will get in. And when owners of companies hire senators’ kids for internships, they probably would like to meet the parents someday.

Perhaps what JPMorgan did in China was worse. We don’t know yet. But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The decision of whether to hire someone often has less to do with that person’s qualifications than it does with who they are. Life isn’t fair — not in the U.S. and not in China.”

Reading Stack

From Thomas Gorman (Dorsey & Whitney), “The New FCPA Guide:  A Road Map to Crafting an Effective Compliance Defense.”

A client alert from Paul Hastings, “Preparing for Shareholder Lawsuits When Dealing with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations.”

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

In the classroom, what if, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

In the Classroom

I am pleased to share this release concerning a new Foreign Corrupt Practices Act class I am teaching this semester at Southern Illinois University School of Law.  As noted in the release, the course is believed to be one of the first specific FCPA law school classes offered that is exclusively devoted to the FCPA, FCPA enforcement and FCPA compliance.

I am grateful for the media coverage the class has attracted.  See here from Corporate Counsel, here from Main Justice, and here from Corporate Crime Reporter.

What If?

As highlighted in this previous post concerning JPMorgan’s scrutiny in China,  the conduct at issue in the front-page New York Times article was disclosed (sort of) in the company’s August 7th quarterly filing.  That filing identified, under the heading “Regulatory Developments” the following.

“A request from the SEC Division of Enforcement seeking information and documents relating to, among other matters, the Firm’s employment of certain former employees in Hong Kong and its business relationships with certain clients.”

In the disclosure context, it has been noted by various courts that once a company “speaks” on an issue, its statements to the market can not be so incomplete as to be misleading.  Was JPMorgan’s August 7th disclosure misleading?  If not misleading, a bit “too cute?”  If JPMorgan’s August 7th disclosure mentioned the reason for the SEC’s request for information and that the request was in connection with an FCPA inquiry, would there even have been a front-page article in the NY Times on August 18th?  And if there was no front-page NY Times article would JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny have dominated the news this week?

Scrutiny Alerts and Updates

Entertainment Gaming Asia

Entertainment Gaming Asia, Inc., a company with shares listed on NASDAQ, is the focus of this article in the Cambodia Daily which states:

“Venturing into Cambodia’s casino market in May 2011, Macau-backed gambling firm Entertainment Gaming Asia (EGA) promised tens of thousands of dollars to the wife of Pailin’s provincial governor in order to lease land for the construction of a new casino … […]   There is no suggestion that the land lease arrangement breaks any laws.  But EGA’s registration with the SEC means the company is subject to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). […] EGA senior vice president Traci Mangini declined to comment on the land-lease arrangement.“We are not available for comment,” Ms. Mangini said in an email. Contacted this week, Mr. Chhean [who has held the powerful local position of governor in Pailin for more than a decade] insisted there was nothing improper about the land being rented from his wife. “It is correct that they hire the land [from my wife], they have hired it for two years already,” he said. He said the casino was fully approved by the government in Phnom Penh, and that he had no role in the licensing decision. Mr. Chhean said there was nothing inappropriate about the wife of a governor having business interests.”

Microsoft

This March 2013 post highlighted Microsoft’s FCPA scrutiny and how the DOJ and SEC “are examining kickback allegations made by a former Microsoft representative in China, as well as the company’s relationship with certain resellers and consultants in Romania and Italy.”  Add Pakistan and Russia to the list.  As reported in this Wall Street Journal article:

“In Russia, an anonymous tipster told Microsoft that resellers of its software allegedly funneled kickbacks to executives of a state-owned company to win a deal, the people familiar with the matter said. In Pakistan, a tipster alleged that Microsoft authorized a consulting firm to pay for a five day trip to Egypt for a government official and his wife in order to win a tender, the people familiar with the matter said. The two contacted Microsoft directly in the last eight months, the people said.”

Eli Lilly

In December 2012, Eli Lilly agreed to pay $29 million to resolve an SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged conduct in China, Brazil, Poland and Russia (see here for the prior post).

Lilly is again under scrutiny.  As referenced here by Reuters:

“U.S. drugmaker Eli Lilly and Co said it was ‘deeply concerned’ about allegations published in a Chinese newspaper that it spent more than 30 million yuan ($4.90 million) to bribe doctors in China to prescribe the firm’s medicines instead of rival products. A former senior manager for the company, identified by the pseudonym Wang Wei, told the 21st Century Business Herald that bribery and illegal payments at Eli Lilly’s China operations were widespread. […] Eli Lilly said in an emailed statement to Reuters that it was looking into the matter. ‘Although we have not been able to verify these allegations, we take them seriously, and we are continuing our investigation,’ the statement said. The U.S. firm said it had been made aware of “similar allegations” of kickbacks in 2012 by a former sales manager. It said the firm had opened an investigation at that time involving staff interviews, e-mail monitoring and expense report audits.”

For the Reading Stack

Informative posts here and here on the FCPAmericas blog on how Brazil’s new bribery law compares to the FCPA.  Also on the FCPAmericas blog, informative posts here and here regarding the unknows of the law.

In reference to JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny over its alleged hiring of family members of alleged “foreign officials,” this article in the Economist states:

“Connections also count in the West, of course. Following initial reports of the SEC’s investigation in the New York Times, a flood of stories have noted the jobs held in politically sensitive American firms by the sprogs of American politicians. Even when offspring are not involved, the revolving door between the public and private sectors raises questions about why people are hired. JPMorgan Chase did not hire Tony Blair as a senior adviser for his knowledge of risk weights, after all. Mary Schapiro, a former head of the SEC, recently joined Promontory, a consultancy packed with ex-regulators used by banks to cope with regulation (she has said she will not lobby any government body in her new role). If it is unfair to cite these names, it is only because there are so many others. If the regulators genuinely fret about why firms make hiring decisions, they may want to extend their inquiries to Washington, DC, and New York as well.”

In the context of GlaxoSmithKline’s scrutiny in China, this Wall Street Journal article highlights “China’s fast-growing but deeply underfunded medical system” where “doctors are widely seen as underpaid, which makes them prime recipients of honorariums, which are
legal, or illegal cuts of sales from drug companies …”.

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Future enforcement actions and scrutiny alerts, in the interest of completeness, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

Future Enforcement Actions and Scrutiny Alerts

Stay tuned for future FCPA enforcement actions against Diebold and ADM in the approximate $50 million range.

Diebold

Diebold recently stated as follows in this filing.

“Diebold continues to monitor its compliance with the FCPA. It also is continuing its cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their ongoing inquiries, and is making continued progress toward a timely resolution of this matter. The company has agreed in principle with the DOJ and the SEC to the terms of a proposed settlement of their inquiries, which terms remain subject to final approval by all parties. These proposed settlement terms include combined payments to the U.S. government of approximately $48.0 million in disgorgement, penalties and prejudgment interest, and the appointment of an independent compliance monitor for a minimum period of 18 months.”

ADM

Archer Daniels Midland Company recently stated as follows in this release.

“ADM has been in discussions with the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission regarding a previously disclosed FCPA matter dating back to 2008 and earlier. Based upon recent progress in these discussions, ADM believes it is appropriate to increase its provision to $54 million, a $29 million increase over the $25 million established in the first quarter.”

In the Interest of Completeness

This recent post generically referred to the SEC’s case against Fabrice Tourre.  In the interest of completeness, the Wall Street Journal also stated as follows.

“For a chance, SEC attorneys went to trial against a real-live person and allowed a jury to decide whether he had violated the law.  This is progress, and a welcome departure from the SEC’s custom of charging institutions and then demanding money paid by shareholders to settle case without having to go to court.  And despite his loss, kudos to Mr. Tourre for manfully seeking to clear his name while accepting the risk of trial.  (Here).

I also liked this recent editorial from the Wall Street Journal concerning the Tourre case.

“The Securities and Exchange Commission is doing a victory lap over last week’s verdict against former Goldman Sachs trader Fabrice Tourre, but its spin is revealing about the political motivation behind the case. Lead SEC prosecutor Matthew Martens keeps saying again and again that the case was ‘about Wall Street greed.’ Last time we checked, greed is not a crime under the securities laws or any other statutes in the federal code. […] Greed has existed since man committed original sin, and no doubt it has always existed on Wall Street and most other places. Greed in moderation might even be  called ambition. While the media most often attribute it to bonus-seeking  traders on Wall Street, greed can exist in other locations, too. Perhaps you  have noticed how frequently prosecutors leave their government jobs for higher  pay as corporate attorneys. Mr. Martens may eventually be one of them.”

Speaking of which, this previous Friday roundup highlighted former SEC Enforcement Director of Enforcement Robert Khuzami’s new position at Kirkland & Ellis.  This Bloomberg column states:

“The appalling — yet hardly surprising — news that Robert Khuzami, the former enforcement director at the Securities and Exchange Commission, has cashed in his four-year stint for a $5 million-plus salary at Kirkland & Ellis, a prominent Wall Street law firm, is the latest example of the corrupt relationship between money and power in the U.S.”

Speaking of which, in this post on his Corruption Crime and Compliance site, Michael Volkov states: “I am sure Justice Department and Securities and Exchange Commission lawyers sometimes sit back and marvel at the world they have helped create …”.

Indeed, this is why I have long argued that the unique attributes of FCPA enforcement and the special government policies that impact enforcement, and thus make it a highly niched area of law, warrant special solutions. As to DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement attorneys who have supervisory and discretionary positions and articulate government FCPA policies, it is in the public interest that such individuals be prohibited, when leaving government service, from providing FCPA defense or compliance services in the private sector for a five-year period.

See here for an article in the New York Times regarding fake receipts in China.  Among other things, the article states:

“[The use of fake receipts] is so pervasive that auditors at multinational corporations are also being duped. The British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline is still trying to figure out how four senior executives at its China operation were able to submit fake receipts to embezzle millions of dollars over the last six years. Police officials say that some of the cash was used to create a slush fund to bribe doctors, hospitals and government officials. […]  China’s fapiao system took root in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the government began requiring companies to use official receipts issued by the tax authorities for every business transaction. The receipts usually come with a number and government seal.  But the tax receipt system was quickly exploited. Gangs began producing high-quality imitations of the official invoices using specially designed printers with markings that bore a striking likeness to red government seals.  And at many companies, rogue employees started colluding with advertising, consulting and travel agencies to forge or falsify receipts for the purpose of embezzling corporate funds.”

Looking for a good slide show to spice up FCPA training?  See here from the Huffington Post regarding companies that recently resolved FCPA enforcement actions.

This article is titled “False Claims Act Settlements Often are Business Deals” and states:

“But for contractors, the decision on whether to settle a case or to fight accusations and go to trial can have less to do with guilt or innocence and more to do with practical business considerations. ‘Often, it’s really just a cost-benefit analysis,’ said Jonathan Cone, counsel at the Crowell & Moring LLP law firm. ‘In some cases, it’s actually more cost-effective to settle a case rather than risk losing business with the federal government.'”

Spot-on and the logic is even more compelling the bigger and sharper the DOJ’s stick becomes (i.e. a criminal FCPA enforcement action vs. a civil False Claims Act action).

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Scrutiny alerts, misleading yet interesting, the flip side, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Scrutiny Updates

Baxter International

The Wall Street Journal reports that Baxter International “investigated a joint venture in China and discovered expense violations there last year.”  According to the article, Baxter took action after employees of Guangzhou Baxter Qiaoguang Healthcare Co., reported problems internally in July 2012.  According to the article, similar allegations were made in July 2013 that “employees at Baxter’s joint venture paid travel agencies for arranging conferences between 2011 and 2012 for Chinese health officials.”  According to the article, “employees at several hotels identified as the conference sites in the documents said they had no records of the conferences.”

ENI

IntelliNews report here:  “ENI SpA  chief executive Paolo Scaroni will become a target of a major US Foreign Corruption Practices Act investigation by the US Department of Justice and the US Securities Exchange Commission in connection with an Algerian bribery scandal, [Italian] judicial sources said.” Among other things, the article states: “Judicial sources in Milan said they have compelling evidence Scaroni had personal knowledge of the bribe paid by SAIPEM and that SAIPEM is directly controlled by ENI and its management.”

As noted in this previous post, Eni has ADRs registered with the SEC.  In 2010, Eni resolved (see here) an SEC FCPA enforcement action concerning Bonny Island, Nigeria conduct.  In resolving the action, Eni consented to the entry of a court order permanently enjoining it from violating the FCPA’s books and record and internal controls provisions.

Weatherford

The company recently disclosed as follows concerning its long-lasting FCPA scrutiny.

“During the quarter ended June 30, 2013, negotiations related to the oil-for-food and FCPA matters progressed to a point where we recognized a liability for a  loss contingency that we believe is probable and for which a reasonable estimate  can be made.  Certain significant issues remain unresolved in the negotiations and, if these issues are not resolved to the Company’s satisfaction,  negotiations may be discontinued and such unresolved issues may ultimately  impact our ability to reach a negotiated resolution of the matters.  At this  time, the Company estimates that the most likely amount of this loss is $153 million.”

A $153 million settlement would be the eighth largest in FCPA history.

Avon

The company recently disclosed as follows concerning its long-lasting FCPA scrutiny.

“As previously reported in August 2012, we are in discussions with the SEC and the DOJ regarding resolving the government investigations. Our factual presentations as part of these discussions are substantially complete. In June 2013, we made an offer of settlement to the DOJ and the SEC that, among other terms, included payment of monetary penalties of approximately $12. The DOJ and the SEC have rejected the terms of our offer. Although we expect that the DOJ and the SEC will make a counterproposal to our offer, they have not yet done so. Our discussions with the DOJ and the SEC are ongoing.

There can be no assurance that a settlement with the SEC and the DOJ will be reached or, if a settlement is reached, the timing of any such settlement or the terms of any such settlement. We expect any such settlement will include civil and/or criminal fines and penalties, and may also include non-monetary remedies, such as oversight requirements and additional remediation and compliance requirements. We may be required to incur significant future costs to comply with the non-monetary terms of any settlement with the SEC and the DOJ. Under certain circumstances, we may also be required to advance significant professional fees and expenses to certain current and former Company employees in connection with these matters. Until any settlement or other resolution of these matters, we expect to continue to incur costs, primarily professional fees and expenses, which may be significant, in connection with the government investigations.

At this point we are unable to predict the developments in, outcome of, and economic and other consequences of the government investigations or their impact on our earnings, cash flows, liquidity, financial condition and ongoing business.  However, based on our most recent discussions with the DOJ and the SEC, the Company believes that it is probable that the Company will incur a loss upon settlement that is higher than the offer made by the Company of approximately $12, which was accrued by the Company as of June 30, 2013. We are unable to reasonably estimate the amount of any additional loss above the amount accrued to date; however it is reasonably possible that such additional loss will be material.”

Owens-Illinois

The beverage company recently disclosed as follows.

“The Company conducted an internal investigation into conduct in certain of its overseas operations that may have violated the anti-bribery provisions of the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the “FCPA”), the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions, the Company’s own internal policies, and various local laws. In October 2012, the Company voluntarily disclosed these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”). The Company intends to cooperate with any investigation by U.S. authorities. On July 18, 2013, the Company received a letter from the DOJ indicating that it presently did not intend to take any enforcement action and is closing its inquiry into the matter. The Company is presently unable to predict the duration, scope or result of any investigation by the SEC or whether the SEC will commence any legal action.”

AB InBev

The beverage company recently disclosed as follows.

“As previously disclosed, we have been informed by the SEC that it is conducting an investigation into our affiliates in India, including our non-consolidated Indian joint venture, InBev India Int’l Private Ltd, and whether certain relationships of agents and employees were compliant with the FCPA. We continue to cooperate in this investigation and have been informed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) that it is also conducting a similar investigation. Our investigation into the conduct in question is ongoing and we are cooperating with the SEC and the DOJ.”

Misleading Yet Interesting

Perhaps one reason for why there appears to much confusion about the FCPA and FCPA enforcement is due to the vast amount of misleading information in the public domain concerning the FCPA.

This recent article in the Economic Times of India concerning Wal-Mart is an instructive example.

Stating that the FCPA is a “law that prohibits American companies and their foreign subsidiaries from bribing officials” is not a completely accurate statement concerning the scope of the law.  Stating that “the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA are enforced by the Department of Justice and the accounting provisions by the Securities and Exchange Commission” is not completely accurate either.  The SEC can also bring civil actions for FCPA anti-bribery violations and the DOJ can also bring criminal actions for wilful violations of the accounting provisions.

“In 2008, for example, Siemens paid a fine of $1.6 billion, the largest ever for an FCPA violation.”  This is a false statement.  While the Siemens enforcement action is indeed the largest in FCPA history in terms of fine and penalty amount, the amount was $800 million.”

Citing a source that says Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny could result in an enforcement action “between $4.5 billion and $9 billion” is outrageous beyond belief.

Despite its deficiencies, the article highlights an interesting tension between conducting a thorough internal investigation and the treatment of employees.  The article states:

“The long shadow of Bentonville, channelled by the permanent gaze of investigators, is causing angst among the Indian staff of Walmart. A company official quoted earlier says the army of investigators, who enjoy sweeping powers to seize documents and equipment of the staff, are seen by many employees as intrusive and as an extra-judicial authority in the office. For example, the investigators scan even the couriers sent out by the staff. The official quoted above says the objective to ensure FCPA compliance is causing even minor situations to snowball.”

[…]

“In another case, Richard Leonard, a British citizen and general manager for asset protection in India, was on a store visit to Ludhiana, that too with Asia head Price, when he received a frantic call from a colleague that KPMG executives were trying to seize his desktop computer and break open his drawer. He immediately called other colleagues, asking them to stop the investigators from taking possession of his workstation. On his return to the office, Leonard dashed off e-mails to his bosses, including Walmart’s global head Mike Duke, on how employees like him have lost respect in the office and they are being portrayed as “criminals” by independent auditors.”

The article also states:

“Walmart is asking all India employees who have left or been suspended to sign a three-page ‘consultancy and cooperation agreement’, ostensibly with the FCPA fallout in mind. The agreement essentially requires them to make themselves available to provide any information or explanation of materials or documents requested by Walmart or any government authority. “The manner in which lawyers and audit team are going about doing their business, I have started believing that I have done something wrong,” says an employee.”

The Flip Side

This Forbes columnist asks – in the context of GlaxoSmithKline –  “is big pharma addicted to fraud?”

The question reminded me of the spot-on statement previously profiled here.  In a Law360 interview, Stephen Jonas (here), a partner in the Boston office of WilmerHale, was asked “what aspects of law in your practice are in need of reform, and why?”  He stated:

“One area greatly in need of reform, in my view, is the investigation of alleged health care fraud. This is an area in which the government regularly secures enormous settlements, starting in the tens of millions of dollars, and now exponentially expanding to the billions of dollars. Virtually every pharmaceutical company has now been subjected to one or more of these investigations and the results are predictable — enormous monetary contributions to the federal government. I find it hard to believe that wrongdoing is so rampant in this industry that every company has at least several hundred million dollars worth of it. The more likely answer is that these settlements often have far more to do with the leverage the government enjoys than the merits of what the company did or didn’t do. In order to stay in business, pharmaceutical and medical device companies must be able to sell products that can be paid for by Medicaid and Medicare. But a conviction for a health care offense would result in exclusion of the companies from federal health insurance and essentially a death sentence for their business. So they cannot afford to fight even the most debatable of charges. One of the results is that novel legal theories and sketchy evidence will never be tested in a court of law and negotiated settlements (under threat of exclusion) serve as “precedent” for the next case. That is a system badly in need of reform.”

Related to GSK, see here for my recent TV interview with LinkAsia.

Reading Stack

The always informative Miller & Chevalier FCPA Summer Review 2013.  As noted in the review “while investigation activity levels appear robust, the overall pace of  enforcement in 2013, in terms of resolved dispositions, remains at its lowest  level since 2006.”  This is correct, although difficult to square with a recent article from Compliance Week titled “FCPA Enforcement on the Rise Once Again.”  This is why an FCPA lingua franca is so important.  (See prior posts here and here).  Among other things, the Miller & Chevalier review contains useful charts including the nationality of companies under FCPA investigation and the countries implicated most frequently in FCPA enforcement actions.

Press coverage of BSG Resources and Beny Steinmetz (the wealthy Israeli for whom BSG Resources is named) regarding its business in Guinea continues.  (See this recent article from the U.K. Guardian).

An informative read from John Rupp (Covington) on how corporate interests and individual interests in a bribery investigation can collide and what corporate counsel can do to prevent this dynamic.

An interesting read from Trace Blog on how bribery schemes fall apart.  The post states:

“The reality is that many bribery schemes simply self-implode.  Think of it this way, once a bribe is paid, a corresponding debt is created to all who are involved in the scheme:  to the business partner who provides the funds; to the third party “consultant” who launders them through false pretense; to the accountant who cooks the books; to the bagman who delivers the payment; to each and every role player, big or small, who helps to bring about the bribe. At the time, loyalties may seem obvious: each co-conspirator will usually have a clear self-interest in keeping the bribery scheme hidden.  But as situations change, so too do incentives, and in business there are few guarantees as unsure as the honor among thieves.  […] Think of all the bribery stories that have come to light simply by their own accord.”

*****

A good weekend to all.