Kickbacks For Bugging Equipment
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions]
In 1989, the DOJ charged (see here) F.G. Mason Engineering Inc. (a Connecticut company that manufactured anti-bugging devices to detect the presence of electronic surveillance) and Francis Mason (the President and sole shareholder of the company) with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. The conduct at issue focused on payments to Dirk Ekkehard Zoeller (a civilian employee of the West German Military Intelligence Services (“MAD”), an agency of the Ministry of the Defense) whose responsibilities included the selection, procurement and testing of various equipment for MAD and other agencies of the West German Government.
According to the criminal information, the amount of kickbacks to Zoeller were approximately 13% of the payments received by F.G. Mason Engineering from MAD under the procurement contracts and approximately 50% of the payments received by the company from MAD for service contracts. The total amount of the corrupt payments to Zoeller was approximately $225,000.
The information alleged that the conspiracy permitted F.G. Mason Engineering to “obtain inflated and excessive prices on its contracts with MAD,” caused “MAD and other agencies of the West German government to make excessive and unnecessary expenditures for the procurement and servicing” of the devices, and “deprived MAD and other agencies of the West German government of economically material information in their business dealings with F.G. Mason Engineering.”
F.G. Mason Engineering and Francis Mason pleaded guilty. (See here and here for the plea agreements). F.G. Mason Engineering and Francis Mason were ordered to pay a $75,000 fine to be paid jointly and severally. F.G. Mason Engineering was placed on probation for two years and Francis Mason was placed on probation for five years. (See here and here).
The plea agreements note that the defendants agreed to “make restitution to the [West German government] which is the victim of the defendants’ illegal conduct.” Specifically, the company was ordered to make restitution to the West German government “in the amount of $160,000 which will take the form of a credit granted by the company against monies to be paid to the company by the Ministry of Defense under existing contracts.” In addition, the company agreed to “provide certain discounts on future purchases of equipment or services should such purchases be made by the German Government.” In the plea agreements the defendants also agreed to cooperate in the West German prosecution of Zoeller.
According to this article, F.G. Mason Engineering also provided surveillance equipment to the U.S. government. This internet source suggests that the company closed after the FCPA enforcement action.
Friday Roundup
Another individual defendant added to the broker-dealer enforcement action, scrutiny alert, want to open a building in China open to the public?, and additional boondoggle specifics. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Additional Individual Defendant Added to the Broker-Dealer Enforcement Action
This previous post highlighted the SEC examination that led to DOJ and SEC charges (including FCPA charges) against Tomas Clarke (a Direct Access Partners (“DAP”) Executive Vice President who worked out of the company’s Miami office) and Alejandro Hurtado (a back-office employee of DAP in Miami). The enforcement action is based on alleged improper payments to Maria Gonzalez (V.P. of Finance / Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration at Bandes, an alleged Venezuelan state-owned banking entity that acts as the financial agent of the state to finance economic development projects).
Earlier this week, the DOJ announced here that Ernesto Lujana (a managing partner at DAP and a branch manager of its Miami offices) was arrested and charged (see here for the criminal complaint) in connection with the same alleged bribery scheme. As noted in the DOJ’s release “Lujan was charged with one count each of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), violation of the FCPA, conspiracy to violate the Travel Act and violation of the Travel Act [as well as] conspiracy to commit money laundering and money laundering.
Like in the previous enforcement action, the SEC also brought an enforcement action (see here for the complaint) against Lujana. In this SEC release, Andrew Calamari (Director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office) stated as follows. “For a scheme this bold to succeed, it required the sneaky collaboration of several individuals including the head of the Miami office. Lujan and the others may have believed they were covering their tracks, but the SEC’s exam and enforcement teams unraveled their fraud.”
Scrutiny Alert
The Wall Street Journal reported yesterday in this article that GlaxcoSmithKline “is investigating allegations from an anonymous tipster that it sales staff in China was involved in widespread bribery of doctors to prescribe drugs, in some cases for unauthorized uses, between 2004 and 2010.”
The article reported as follows. “According to e-mails and other documents reviewed by the Wall Street Journal, the tipster has alleged that Glaxo’s China sales staff provided doctors with speaking fees, cash payments, lavish dinners and all-expenses-paid trips in return for prescribing the drug firm’s products.” As reported in the WSJ article, a Glaxo spokesman confirmed that the company is investigating the allegations, but that after thoroughly investigating “each and every claim” from the anonymous source, the company “has found no evidence of corruption or bribery in or China business.”
The WSJ article further noted that “in 2010 Glaxo disclosed it had been contacted by the Justice Department and the SEC about its overseas operations as part of a wider FCPA investigation into pharmaceutical industry practices abroad.”
As noted in this prior year in review post, in 2012 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, foreign health care providers (such as physicians, nurses, mid-wives, lab personnel, etc.). See here for a prior post on the origins and prominence of this enforcement theory.
Want to Open a Building in China Open to the Public?
This recent article in the South China Morning Post reminded me of the many business barriers (including arcane and complex licensing, certification and inspection requirements) which often funnel companies seeking to do business in a foreign country into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants who frequently supplement their meager salaries through payments condoned in the host country.
The article states, in pertinent part, as follows.
“To obtain a fire-safety certificate from a local fire department, a business owner must pass five ‘checkpoints’ in a complicated and lengthy administrative process. Each checkpoint is guarded by officials in charge of site inspections and reviewing construction blueprints, equipment and contingency plans. Bribes considerably expedite the process that officials might otherwise draw out for weeks, months or years. Bribes range from a few thousand yuan to hundreds of thousands, per official, depending on their rank and the size of the project. But money isn’t everything – some officials must be wined and dined or given luxury cigarettes. Others request the services of prostitutes. […] Salaries of firefighters are quite low – about 3,400 yuan (HK$4,300) a month in Shanghai – and many come from poor or rural families, as the job hazards dissuade many people from joining. […] However, competition for administrative posts within fire departments was fierce, and only those with strong connections or family influence would stand a chance of winning non-frontline jobs where the real money was made.”
Additional Boondoggle Specifics
This recent Friday roundup detailed boondoggle specifics concerning Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny and related investigation. As noted here, Jeff Gearheart, the executive officer overseeing global compliance for Wal-Mart Stores Inc., told analysts last week that “300 legal and accounting professionals have logged more than 100,000 hours toward FCPA issues.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
“Get The Business, I Don’t Want To Know How”
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]
In 1989 the DOJ charged (see here) Goodyear International Corp., a subsidiary of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., with FCPA anti-bribery violations. The two-paragraph information states, in pertinent part, as follows.
“[In 1984] Goodyear International corruptly used the U.S. mails to convey a check, in payment of an invoice for bogus advertising expenses in the amount of $167,429, in furtherance of an offer, payment and promise to pay money in the aggregate amount of $981,124, to an official of the Government of Iraq, to induce said official to use his influence to affect and influence an act of the Government of Iraq, to wit, the purchase of truck tires manufactured by the defendant, in order to obtain and retain business with the Government of Iraq.”
Goodyear International pleaded guilty (see here for the plea agreement) to the information and was ordered to pay a fine of $250,000 (see here).
The “Statement of Facts Supporting the Guilty Plea” (see here) makes for an interesting read.
The conduct at issue focused on David Janasik (a regional export manager for Goodyear International) and his relationships with certain alleged Iraqi officials. According to the statement of facts, an Iraqi official told Janasik that Goodyear International’s competitors “had been willing to pay cash ‘commissions’ to the official in order to ensure a ‘good relationship’ between those companies and the Iraqi government’s purchasing organization. The same official then “explained to Janasik that absent such payments Goodyear International could hope for only very limited business from” the government. The statement of facts indicate, however, that “Janasik told [the official] that such payments were against [company] policy and that he did not feel that he could do business on those terms.”
Thereafter, according to the statement of facts, Janasik told Goodyear International’s Assistant Director for Export Operations of the payment demand and the Assistant Director for Export Operations, in turn, discussed the payment demand with Goodyear International’s Regional Director for Europe / Vice President who stated, with respect to Janasik’s contact in Iraq, “get the business, I don’t want to know how.”
According to the statement of facts, Janasik then carried out the scheme by using Goodyear International’s advertising manager for Greece – who has once operated an advertising agency in Iraq – to arrange for false invoices to be prepared billing Goodyear for Arab language advertising purportedly placed in Baghdad newspapers.
According to this New York Times article, “Goodyear auditors uncovered the scheme in 1985 and immediately reported it to the Justice Department for prosecution.” Interestingly, according to other media reports, Charles F.C. Ruff, a lawyer for Goodyear, said “I don’t think by any measure the company blesses everything that was said in the statement of facts.”
According to media reports, Janasik pleaded guilty to federal income tax charges in connection with the bribery scheme, cooperated in the DOJ’s investigation, and was sentenced to two years’ probation and a $10,000 fine.
Ashland Oil – The “FCPA’s” First Repeat “Offender”
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]
In 1986 the SEC brought this civil injunctive action against Ashland Oil, Inc. (a Kentucky based oil refining company) and its Chairman and CEO Orin Atkins for engaging in conduct in violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
The complaint began by noting that in 1975, prior to the passage of the FCPA, the defendants consented to final judgments of permanent injunction enjoining them from using corporate funds “for unlawful political contributions or other similar unlawful purposes.” As noted in “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” Ashland Oil’s payments to Albert Bernard Bongo, the President of Gabon, were among a group of payments that drew Congressional attention to the foreign corporate payments problem and motivated Congress to pass the FCPA in 1977.
The 1986 Ashland Oil enforcement action is thus notable as the first instance of an “FCPA” repeat “offender.”
As highlighted in more detail below, the enforcement action is also notable for the following reasons: (i) the thing of value consisted of buying a “foreign official’s” interest in a largely worthless mine); (ii) the conduct at issue lead to an FCPA-related civil suit in which two terminated company employees were awarded $70 million in damages; and (iii) there was controversy both as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s handling of the conduct at issue.
In the 1986 action, the SEC alleged that Ashland Oil and Atkins “paid $25 million in principal plus approximately $4 million in interest, and by virtue of the acquisition of an interest in Midlands Chrome [a largely worthless Zimbabwe mine owned by the “foreign official” and his family], gave something of value to James Landon [a British national seconded (detailed) to the government of Oman who served as a special adviser to the Sultan of Oman on Omani intelligence and security matters] … for the purpose of inducing Landon to use his influence with the government of Oman … in order to assist Ashland in obtaining and retaining business with the government of Oman … namely certain business related to crude oil.”
According to the complaint, Atkins was told that Midlands Chrome “could be purchased from persons who could be sympathetic to Ashland’s desire to become a purchaser of crude oil from Oman.” Even though a company lawyer advised that the transaction raised issues under the FCPA, the SEC alleged that the “board of directors of Ashland held a meeting at which Atkins presented for the Board’s approval the acquisition of Midland Chrome.” According to the complaint, Atkins viewed the acquisition as a “high risk project” but one that had “potential of being more than offset by a potential crude oil contract …”. According to the complaint, initial board meeting minutes show that Atkins said “the corporation was interested [in the Midlands Chrome acquisition] for the reason that it might thereby be enabled to obtain a contract to purchase crude oil from Oman” but that “this statement was deleted from the final version of the minutes at Atkins’ direction.”
Based on the above core conduct, in a detailed 35 page complaint, the SEC alleged three substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations.
Atkins resigned as chairman of Ashland in 1981 after an internal investigation into a number of questionable foreign payments. According to media reports, when the 1986 matter was resolved Atkins issued a statement which read as follows. “Although it would be my personal preference to litigate this matter, I have agreed to settle this action so that the company can put this lingering dispute behind it, and because to contest this matter would have involved disproportionate trouble and expense.” For more on the life of Orin Atkins, see here and here.
In media reports, Richard Murphy, an SEC enforcement lawyer, said the Ashland case was significant because it demonstrated that the SEC will go beyond the traditional “cash cases” and scrutinize more complicated transactions to determine if they represent violations.
In 1995, Ashland Oil changed its name to Ashland Inc.
In an interesting side note, former Ashland employees Bill McKay and Harry Williams sued the company for breach of contract and wrongful discharge, asserting that Ashland’s pattern of corrupt practices amounted to a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations law. McKay alleged that he was terminated because he refused to take part in any bribery schemes and that he refused in subsequent investigations to hide Ashland’s conduct from officials at the IRS and SEC. According to a 1989 ABA Journal report, “Williams had not been asked to take part in any foreign payments, but he’d become sympathetic to McKay’s efforts to change Ashland’s policy.” According to the report, Williams “made an anonymous phone call to the SEC and spoke freely about Ashland’s recent actions abroad.” A jury returned a verdict of approximately $70 million. According to the ABA report, McKay was awarded over $44.5 million, and the rest was apportioned to Williams. According to the report, Ashland threatened to appeal and the parties settled for $25 million.
Set forth below, in pertinent part, is an interesting article published in the Washington Post on July 10, 1988. about the DOJ’s and SEC’s handling of the conduct at issue.
“Lawyers for two former executives who won a $ 69.5 million award from Ashland Oil Co. contend that their victory shows the Securities and Exchange Commission pulled its punches in handling charges of overseas bribery and other illegal conduct by Ashland. The two former vice presidents had said in wrongful-dismissal lawsuits and in SEC testimony that Ashland paid tens of millions of dollars in bribes to foreign officials to get scarce crude oil and then tried to cover up the illegal conduct. They said they lost their jobs after refusing to participate in conspiracies, perjury and other crimes. Last month, a U.S. District Court jury in Covington, Ky., awarded Bill E. McKay $ 44.6 million and Harry D. Williams $ 24.9 million after a 35-day trial. The jury said the liability should be shared by Ashland; its former chairman and chief executive, Orin E. Atkins; John R. Hall, who succeeded Atkins in 1981, and Richard W. Spears, senior vice president for human resources and law.”
“The SEC filed a much narrower civil lawsuit in July 1986 charging that Ashland and Atkins had bribed an official of Oman to get oil from the sultanate. The suit was filed in tandem with a consent decree, a final court judgment in which Ashland and Atkins neither admitted nor denied past violations while agreeing to face criminal penalties for future ones.”
“The jury and the SEC each had essentially the same evidence of possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977. The gap between the jury’s verdict and the SEC action shows that the SEC dealt with the matter too lightly, according to John R. McCall and Kenneth M. Robinson, the lawyers for McKay and Williams. ‘I can understand how counsel for McKay and Williams are proud of their achievement, and they certainly have the right to crow about it,’ said SEC enforcement chief Gary G. Lynch. ‘But any criticism of the commission’s investigation, or of the results that we achieved, is simply unwarranted.'”
“Punitive damages accounted for only $ 3 million of the awards to McKay and Williams. Compensatory damages were tripled — to $66.5 million — for conspiring to violate, and for violating, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. RICO makes it unlawful for any person associated with an enterprise affecting commerce to lead or to join in ‘conduct of [the] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.’ The jury found that the three individual defendants had all conducted or participated in ‘a pattern of racketeering activity’ principally through multiple violations of the FCPA antibribery section and of a law prohibiting travel for the purpose of violating the section.”
[…]
“The SEC’s 1986 lawsuit, which followed months of negotiations with Ashland’s law firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, named only one person paid by the oil company, James T.W. (Tim) Landon of Oman, as a foreign government official under the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. The complaint also alleged only one bribe, described by Ashland as a $ 25 million investment in a Landon-controlled chromium mine in Rhodesia. But the jury found that Ashland, ‘with corrupt intent to bribe,’ had made payments to three figures it said were foreign officials under the FCPA: Landon and Yehia Omar of Oman, and Hassan Y. Yassin of Saudi Arabia (who also has operated a consulting firm in McLean). With the same corrupt intent, the jury said, Ashland had made payments to a fourth recipient, Sadiq Attia, ‘knowing or having reason to know that’ all or a portion of the money — $ 17 million — ‘would be used to bribe a government official of Abu Dhabi.'”
“The SEC complaint and consent decree did not mention Yehia Omar or cite any Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia payments. Last December, SEC Chairman David S. Ruder told Senate Banking Committee Chairman William Proxmire (D-Wis.) that the Division of Enforcement ‘concluded that the evidence was … insufficient to support further charges of violations’ of the FCPA. In an interview after the jury verdict, Lynch said ‘there was not sufficient evidence that we felt comfortable we could prevail’ if charges were brought based on Ashland payments to Omar. ‘Even before we sat down to negotiate, we had decided privately to exclude Omar, Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia from the consent decree. ‘It was clear to us that the Landon transaction was the strongest, because we believed we could establish that Landon was a government official at the time the chrome transaction occurred.’ Lynch said. He called a multiple-count complaint unnecessary. ‘We were suing for injunctive relief,’ and ‘we could get it with Landon,’ he said. ‘There was no need to push and take on a litigation risk in a case that was much less certain.’ He extended this argument to the omission of the Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia cases.”
“But lawyers McCall and Robinson disagreed. ‘The finest judicial scrutiny our American judicial system can provide has now determined that the earlier government efforts were incomplete,’ McCall said. It’s ‘ridiculous’ for the SEC to claim the evidence was insufficient to convince a jury that bribery far beyond that which it alleged hadn’t occurred, he said.”
“Lynch also defended the SEC’s decision not to ask a federal court to find Ashland and Atkins had violated a 1975 consent decree and to hold them in criminal contempt. ‘We did have a concern about meeting the higher burden of proof in order to prove criminal contempt,’ Lynch said. […] One difficulty in going the criminal route was that ‘the major thrust’ of the 1975 decrees involved unlawful political contributions, and ‘these were foreign bribes,’ Lynch said.”
“But the lawyers for McKay and Williams dismissed this explanation. They pointed out that the 1975 consent decrees prohibited false or fictitious bookkeeping entries, and said the $ 25 million Oman item that the SEC called a bribe, as well as the Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia payments, all were recorded by Ashland as ordinary outlays. ‘It was like shooting ducks in a barrel,’ Robinson said. ‘There was no answer that any Ashland official could give on the stand to explain the fraud that was in the documents that they wrote. And how the SEC could miss that is beyond description.’ ‘The SEC should have seen it. These were indictable offenses … I don’t see the evidence that the SEC even slapped Ashland’s wrist. They just closed the book by executing another consent decree — a promise to pay, which is all that it is.'”
“Arthur F. Mathews, who was an SEC deputy enforcement chief in 1969, said in an interview that ‘in the horse-trading for not litigating,’ Cravath, Swaine ‘got the staff to strike Yehia Omar … If I had to guess, they did not include Yehia Omar in their action because they thought it was a toss-up whether you could prove it, and they gave it up in the bargain.'”
“McCall said the SEC staff may well have done all it could have, particularly in light of the Reagan administration’s apparent reluctance to enforce the FCPA’s antibribery provisions.’ The SEC commissioners, for example, voted 3 to 2 to reject the division’s initial recommendation for a lawsuit that named only Landon as the recipient of a bribe. Only after the division reargued its case did the commission reverse itself, allowing Lynch to file the lawsuit. Lynch said the SEC disregarded a report by an outside counsel who concluded that the Oman transactions had not violated the FCPA or the 1975 consent decree. Williams and McKay had challenged the independence of the outsider, Pittsburgh attorney Charles J. Queenan. Queenan is a friend of Cravath, Swaine presiding partner and Ashland director Samuel C. Butler, who submitted the report to the SEC as the work of an independent counsel. ‘We did not accept the conclusion that it was an ‘independent counsel’ report,” Lynch said. The SEC staff ‘did our own very thorough investigation of the matter,’ he said. ‘It is clear that if we had accepted the Queenan report’s findings, we would not have filed an action.”
[…]
“Sen. Proxmire, who monitors FCPA enforcement, also has raised questions about the Justice Department’s role in the Ashland case. The department had full access to the SEC’s files from the start of the SEC staff investigation in May 1983. Last October, after a Washington Post series on Ashland’s payments to overseas consultants, Proxmire asked the department if it had investigated the matter and if ‘it has concluded that violations of the FCPA have taken place.’ If the conclusion was that there’d been no violations, ‘I would like an explanation of the rationale underlying such a judgment,’ Proxmire said. ‘If the department has not investigated these allegations, I request that you do so and let me know the results.’ Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton said on Jan. 20 that he would respond when he received a report from the fraud section of the Criminal Division. On June 20, Proxmire, having heard nothing more for six months, sent Attorney General Edwin Meese III a news story on the jury verdict in Kentucky and asked ‘whether the Department of Justice will now initiate a criminal action.’ If not, Proxmire said he wanted to know why. A department spokesman said a response is being prepared.”
SEC Examination Leads To Criminal FCPA Charges Against Bond Traders
It is one of the more unusual origins of a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action.
In November 2010, the SEC conducted a periodic examination of Direct Access Partners LLC (“DAP”), a broker-dealer registered with the SEC. DAP’s Global Markets Group (“DAP Global”) primarily executed fixed income trades for customers in foreign sovereign debt. One of its customers was Bandes, an alleged Venezuelan state-owned banking entity that acts as the financial agent of the state to finance economic development projects.
According to the DOJ and SEC, the SEC examination lead to the discovery of a “fraud that was staggering in audacity and scope” (see here for the SEC release). A component of the alleged fraud included payments by Tomas Clarke (a DAP Executive Vice President who worked out of the company’s Miami office) and Alejandro Hurtado (a back-office employee of DAP in Miami) to Maria Gonzalez (V.P. of Finance / Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration at Bandes). According to this DOJ criminal complaint, Gonzalez oversaw Bande’s trading by DAP.
According to the criminal complaint, Clarke, Hurtado and others “directed kickback payments” to Gonzalez “in exchange for Gonzalez steering Bandes business to [DAP] and authorizing Bandes to execute bond trades with [DAP]. According to the complaint, between 2008 and 2010 “Gonzalez received at least $3.6 million in payments through insiders and affiliates of [DAP]. According to the complaint, during this time period, “with Gonzalez both acting as the authorized trading contact in regard to [DAP] and managing the relationship between Bandes and [DAP], Bandes directed substantial business to [DAP] and carried out bond transactions that resulted in [DAP] generating tens of millions of dollars in revenue.” The criminal complaint alleges various payments made or authorized by Clarke and Hurtado to an account in Switzerland held in the name of Gonzalez and/or a company owned in part by Gonzalez.
Based on the above core set of conduct, the criminal complaint charges Clarke and Hurtado with the following offenses: conspiracy to violate the FCPA, substantive FCPA violations, conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, substantive Travel Act violations, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and substantive money laundering violations.
Gonzalez, the alleged “foreign official,” was charged with conspiracy to violate the Travel Act, substantive Travel Act violations, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and substantive money laundering violations. (For other examples of “foreign officials” being criminally charged with non-FCPA offenses in connection with an FCPA enforcement action, see here and here).
In this DOJ release, Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman stated as follows. “Today’s announcement is a wake-up call to anyone in the financial services industry who thinks bribery is the way to get ahead. The defendants in this case allegedly paid huge bribes so that foreign business would flow to their firm. Their return on investment now comes in the form of criminal charges carrying the prospect of prison time. We will not stand by while brokers or others try rig the system to line their pockets, and will continue to vigorously enforce the FCPA and money laundering statutes across all industries.”
As noted in the DOJ release, “the government [also] filed a civil forfeiture action … seeking the forfeiture of assets held in a number of bank accounts associated with the scheme, including several bank accounts located in Switzerland. The forfeiture complaint also seeks the forfeiture of several properties in the Miami area related to Hurtado that were purchased with his proceeds from the scheme.”
The above core conduct also resulted in this SEC civil complaint against Clarke and Hurtado (and others) charging a variety of non-FCPA securities law violations.