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Rama sentenced but what is the back story, scrutiny alert, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Rama Sentenced, But What is the Back Story?

As noted here, last week James Rama, a former executive at defense contractor IAP Worldwide Services, was sentenced to four months in federal prison for his role in a bribery scheme involving a security systems project with the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Interior.

In its sentencing memo, the DOJ requested that Rama be sentenced to one year.  That the judge rejected the DOJ’s sentencing recommendation is not the story – judges frequently reject DOJ sentencing recommendations in individual FCPA cases.

Rather, according to a knowledgeable source who was unable to provide specifics, there is a more interesting back story in connection with the Rama prosecution.  Indeed, as noted in this article:

“Mr. Rama said he was disappointed that after a long investigation the case wasn’t pursued to its “proper conclusion.” Defense counsel William Brennan said the elaborate system required for the bribery reached higher at IAP than the Justice Department prosecuted. “There are people…that should have been prosecuted in this case and for whatever reason they were not,” Mr. Brennan said about the bribery scheme Mr. Rama helped engineer on the ground in Kuwait. The Justice Department lawyers present didn’t respond to the allegations at the hearing. The government said in its settlement with IAP that a “variety of factors, including but not limited to IAP’s cooperation,” led to the non-prosecution agreement.”

Consistent with the above, Rama’s lawyers stated in this sentencing memo as follows.

“Mr. Rama was a minor, albeit integral, part of a much larger scheme concocted by more senior executives at IAP – none of whom will be prosecuted in this case. In addition, IAP has entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the government and agreed to pay a $7.1 million penalty to resolve the matter. It would appear that Mr. Rama is the only individual who will face criminal prosecution in this matter.” (Emphasis in original).

Consistent with there being an interesting backstory in the IAP / Rama prosecution, on the same day the DOJ filed its sentencing memo, the court docket indicates that the DOJ also filed a motion under seal, a motion that will likely never see the light of day.

Just remember as Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell recently stated, “greater transparency benefits everyone.”  (See here for the prior post).

Scrutiny Alert

Approximately four years ago (see here for the prior post), Kraft Foods disclosed FCPA scrutiny resulting from its acquisition of Cadbury in connection with a manufacturing facility in India.  Kraft, now known as Mondelēz International, Inc., was recently the focus of this Wall Street Journal article which states:

“[The SEC] preparing civil charges against snack-food maker Mondelez International Inc. in connection with a long-running investigation of payments its Cadbury unit made in India, said people familiar with the matter. […]  The company concluded in an internal report by its lawyers in 2011 that Cadbury had used a consultant to funnel bribes to Indian officials in return for factory approvals and permits, which ultimately allowed Cadbury to claim a tax exemption valued at more than $90 million, according to the report, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. The report says Cadbury also paid fees to eight other consultants from May 2008 to October 2010 “for which the only reasonable explanation is that they have been used to mask payments to government officials.” […] Mondelez’s outside attorneys at Baker & McKenzie have told government investigators that they identified suspicious payments to consultants but couldn’t determine what ultimately became of the money, according to a person familiar with the matter. […]  The most serious allegations centered on a tax break available to companies that began production in new plants in the Northern Indian state of Himachal Pradesh,where Cadbury’s Baddi plant is located, by March 31, 2010. Cadbury had planned to build a new standalone factory in Baddi, but instead it decided to add a second floor to its existing plant in 2008, with three new production lines for chocolate candies. The company gave the second floor its own entrance and claimed it as an independent unit on paper to qualify for the tax exemption, which would save the company more than $90 million over a decade, according to legal documents the company filed in India. But Cadbury’s lawyers determined in late 2009 that, in order to claim the exemption, the company needed to get separate licenses and approvals for the second-floor unit from Indian authorities, a process that typically takes more than six months, according to a timeline created as part of the internal investigation. With the sunset of the tax break just a few months off, Cadbury hired a consultant to “get all necessary approvals to start-up Unit 2 at Baddi…urgently,” the 2011 report said. Internal investigators concluded that the consultant’s fees—about $55,000—were passed on to Indian officials as bribes, according to their report. […]  In March, an Indian tax commissioner fined Cadbury more than $90 million, rejecting the company’s argument that the addition of a second floor was the legal equivalent, for tax purposes, of a new plant. [A Mondelez spokesman] said the company is appealing the commissioner’s order. “We continue to believe that the decision to claim the excise-tax benefit is valid.”

Reading Stack

An informative read from Morgan Lewis regarding the European Court of Justice opinion in Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, in which the court struck down a US-EU agreement that allowed companies to move personal electronic data between the European Union and the United States.

“This ruling, which is final and cannot be appealed, is likely to have far-reaching effects on how US corporations investigate allegations of wrongdoing by affiliates and subsidiaries based in Europe, including investigations of potential violations of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).”

Among those critical of the DOJ’s recently released Yates Memo is James Koukios (previously the Senior Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section in the DOJ Criminal Division and an Assistant Chief in the Fraud Section’s FCPA Unit).  In this Corporate Crime Reporter interview, Koukios offers his perspectives on the Yates Memo and other issues relevant to FCPA enforcement.

*****

A good weekend to all.

DOJ Brings First Corporate FCPA Enforcement Action Of 2015

IAP

No doubt it was a coincidence, but it was hard to ignore the timing.

Hours after the formal conclusion of the DOJ’s latest FCPA trial court debacle in U.S. v. Sigelman (see here, here and here for prior posts), the DOJ announced its first corporate FCPA enforcement action of 2015.

The enforcement action was against IAP Worldwide Services, Inc. (a small Florida-based company that provides facilities management, contingency operations, and professional and technical services in contracting capacities to the U.S. military and other governmental agencies world-wide).

According to its website, approximately 30% of IAP’s workers are veterans and the company was recently recognized by U.S. Veterans Magazine’s as one of the Top Veteran-Friendly Companies in 2014.  IAP has several contracts with the U.S. Government including the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and Air Force.

Per the DOJ’s allegations, the improper conduct occurred 7-10 years ago and was engaged in by one individual at IAP who left the company approximately 7 years ago.

The allegations focus on James Rama who was IAP’s Vice President of Special Project and Programs between 2005 and 2007. Prior to arriving at IAP, Rama, while employed in Kuwait by a large American defense contractor not affiliated with IAP, was introduced to a Kuwaiti Consultant and learned that the Kuwaiti Ministry of the Interior (MOI) was planning to build a large-scale homeland security systems called the KSP.

When Rama joined IAP he began pursuing Phase I of the KSP contract on behalf of IAP as well as the more lucrative Phase II of the KSP project.  According to the DOJ, Rama and others formed Ramaco International Consulting LLC “to hide IAP’s involvement in the KSP bidding and contracting process.”

According to the DOJ:

“In or about November 2005, IAP (through Rama) received non-public indications that the MOI would select it for the Phase I contract, although the formal bidding process had not yet begun. In February 2006, at the direction of the MOI and Kuwaiti Consultant, Rama and others agreed to and did set up Ramaco as a shell company to “bid” on the Phase I contract. One purpose of setting up Ramaco was to allow IAP to hide its involvement in Phase I and participate in the later Phase II without any apparent conflict of interest. Ramaco began acting as the agent for IAP on the KSP.

IAP agreed with the MOI that it would perform the KSP Phase I contract for approximately $4 million. Of that amount, IAP agreed that half, or approximately $2 million, would not be for actual work executing the KSP Phase I contract, but instead would be diverted to Kuwaiti Consultant.

In or about 2006, IAP, Ramaco, Rama, and others structured an illicit payment scheme to funnel approximately 50% of the payments received on the Phase I contract to Kuwaiti Consultant so that he could pay bribes to Kuwaiti government officials and took numerous steps to hide these payments and prevent the detection of their scheme. IAP, Ramaco, and Rama understood that to pay Kuwaiti Consultant, Kuwaiti Company would first inflate its invoices to IAP by charging IAP for the total amount of both the legitimate services that Kuwaiti Company was providing and the payments that Kuwaiti Company was funneling to Kuwaiti Consultant without listing or otherwise disclosing the payments that were funneled to Kuwaiti Consultant. After the MOI paid Ramaco for work on the KSP Phase I contract, Ramaco would transfer funds to a bank account of IAP, and IAP would then transfer funds to Kuwaiti Company. IAP, Ramaco, and Rama knew that Kuwaiti Company was then paying Kuwaiti Consultant approximately 50% of the KSP Phase I contract amount. IAP, Ramaco, and Rama knew that these payments to Kuwaiti Consultant were often further disguised.

In or about April 2006, Ramaco opened a bank account in Kuwait for Ramaco that would be used, in part, to pay Kuwaiti Consultant a portion of the money that IAP and Ramaco received from the KSP Phase I contract.

On or about May 10, 2006, Rama signed the KSP Phase I contract between Ramaco and the Government of Kuwait, which included a markup of approximately $2 million that would be kicked back, in whole or in part, to Kuwaiti government officials through Kuwaiti Consultant.

On or about September 19, 2006, IAP wired KD 120,000 (approximately $420,000) from its bank account to Kuwaiti Company’s bank account, and, on or about that same day, Kuwaiti Company paid that amount to Kuwaiti Consultant.

In or about October 2006, employees of IAP and G3 met with Rama and others at IAP’s office in Arlington, Virginia, which is in the Eastern District of Virginia, in an effort to persuade IAP to continue making payments to Kuwaiti Consultant.

On or about October 18, 2006, IAP wired KD 63,000 (approximately $220,500) from its bank account to Kuwaiti Company’s bank account, and, on or about that same day, Kuwaiti Company paid that amount to Kuwaiti Consultant.

On or about June 5, 2007, IAP wired KD 29,962.27 (approximately $105,000) from its bank account in the United States to Kuwaiti Company’s bank account in Kuwait so that Kuwaiti Company could pay Kuwaiti Consultant, and, on or about June 13, 2007, IAP wired that amount from its bank account in the United States to Kuwaiti Company’s bank account.

On or about December 6, 2007, Ramaco paid Kuwaiti Consultant KD 52,250 (approximately $183,000). 22. On or about March 10, 2008, Ramaco paid Kuwaiti Consultant KD 44,250 (approximately $155,000).

Between September 2006 and March 2008, IAP and its co-conspirators paid Kuwaiti Consultant at least KD 509,625 (approximately $1,783,688) on the understanding that some or all of that money would be provided as bribes to Kuwaiti government officials to assist IAP in obtaining and retaining the KSP Phase I contract and to obtain the KSP Phase II contract.”

The above allegations were resolved via a non-prosecution agreement in which IAP agreed to pay”a monetary penalty in the present value amount of $7.1 million”.  Pursuant to the NPA, the penalty is to be paid in four yearly installments of $1.775 million. The NPA, which has a three year term, states as follows:

“Among the facts considered were the following: (a) the Company has cooperated with the Offices, including conducting an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the Offices; (b) the Company has engaged in remediation, including disciplining the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments or terminating their employment, enhancing its due diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and instituting heightened review of proposals and other transactional documents for relevant Company contracts; (c) the Company has committed to continue to enhance its compliance program and internal controls, including ensuring that its compliance program satisfies the minimum elements set forth in Attachment C to this Agreement; and (d) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Offices in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to possible violations under investigation by the Offices.”

As noted in the DOJ’s release:

“[The] non-prosecution agreement requires IAP to conduct a review of its existing internal controls, policies and procedures, and make any necessary modifications to ensure that the company maintains accurate record keeping and a rigorous anti-corruption compliance program.  The non-prosecution agreement further requires IAP to report periodically to the Criminal Division and to the U.S. Attorney’s Office of the Eastern District of Virginia regarding remediation and implementation of the aforementioned compliance program and internal controls, policies and procedures.”

Typical of most corporate FCPA enforcement actions, the NPA contains a “muzzle clause” in which IAP agreed that it shall not directly or indirectly make any public statement contradicting the information set forth in the NPA.

Based on the same core conduct alleged in the NPA, the DOJ announced a plea agreement with James Rama to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.  See here for the plea agreement, here for the Statement of Facts, and here for the criminal information.

For additional coverage of the enforcement action see here from Reuters.

 

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