Category: Legislative History

Judge Trims DOJ’s FCPA Enforcement Action Against Lawrence Hoskins

Last week, U.S. District Court Judge Janet Bond Arterton (D. Conn.) trimmed the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement action against Lawrence Hoskins (a former Alstom executive criminally charged in August 2013 – see here) by granting in part his motion to dismiss and denying a DOJ motion in limine.

In pertinent part, Hoskins (a U.K. citizen) moved to dismiss count one of the DOJ’s Third Superseding Indictment “on the basis that it charges a legally invalid theory that he could be criminally liable for conspiracy to violate the FCPA even if the evidence does not establish that he was subject to criminal liability as a principal, by being an “agent” of a “domestic concern.”

As stated by Judge Arterton:

“Relatedly, the Government moves in limine to preclude Defendant from arguing to the jury that it must prove that he was the agent of a domestic concern because the Government contends that Defendant can also be convicted under theories of accomplice liability. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Third Superseding Indictment will be granted in part to preclude Defendant’s FCPA conspiracy prosecution from being de-linked from proof that he was an agent of a domestic concern and the Government’s Motion in Limine is denied.”

In the words of Judge Arterton:

“[T]hese two motions put before the Court the question of whether a nonresident foreign national could be subject to criminal liability under the FCPA, even where he is not an agent of a domestic concern and does not commit acts while physically present in the territory of the United States, under a theory of conspiracy or aiding and abetting a violation of the FCPA by a person who is within the statute’s reach.2 The Court concludes that the answer is “no” and that accomplice liability cannot extend to this Defendant under such circumstances and thus Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count One is granted in part and the Government’s Motion in Limine is denied.”

Judge Arterton began by discussing the Gebardi Principle that has been used previously by judges in dismissing DOJ FCPA enforcement actions against foreign nationals (Castle and Bodmer referenced below)  Specifically, the Judge noted as follows.

“[T]he Gebardi principle is that where Congress chooses to exclude a class of individuals from liability under a statute, “the Executive [may not] . . . override the Congressional intent not to prosecute” that party by charging it with conspiring to violate a statute that it could not directly violate. United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 181 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“In Gebardi, the Supreme Court held that where Congress passes a substantive criminal statute that excludes a certain class of individuals from liability, the Government cannot evade Congressional intent by charging those individuals with conspiring to violate the same statute.”). The Gebardi principle also applies to aiding and abetting liability.

In determining whether the Gebardi principle applies, the question is “not whether Congress could have” reached a certain class of individuals under the conspiracy or aiding and abetting statutes, “but rather whether Congress intended to do so, or more specifically, whether Congress intended the general conspiracy statute” to apply to these individuals.5 Castle, 925 F.2d at 835 (emphasis in original).

The Government maintains that Gebardi recognized only a “narrow exception to [the] long-established legal principle” that “the conspiracy and accomplice liability statutes apply to classes of persons who lack the capacity to commit a violation of the underlying substantive crime.”  It maintains that this exception only “applies in two limited circumstances: (1) where a class of person is a necessary party to the crime and was specifically excluded from prosecution for the substantive violation by Congress (e.g., the foreign official who receives the bribe payment under the FCPA, or the woman who is transported across state lines under the Mann Act); or (2) where the substantive statute was enacted to protect the class of person to which the individual belongs (e.g., victims).”  Defendant maintains that Gebardi applies whenever “Congress affirmatively chooses to exclude a certain class of individuals from liability under a criminal statute.”

The Court agrees with Defendant that the Government’s interpretation of Gebardi is too narrow and that while the two “[f]actual scenarios . . . posited by the government bring Congress’s intent into view and, thereby, make it easier to glean the existence of an affirmative legislative policy,” Congressional intent can be evident in other circumstances. For example, in Amen, the Second Circuit applied Gebardi and held that a person who was not the head of a criminal enterprise could not be subject to the drug “kingpin” statute’s sentencing enhancement under a theory that he aided and abetted a violation, because “[w]hen Congress assigns guilt to only one type of participant in a transaction, it intends to leave the others unpunished for the offense.” 831 F.2d at 381.

The Second Circuit’s reasoning was not, as the Government maintains, that a violation of the kingpin statute requires “the participation of two classes of persons— those who lead a criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and those who are led, on the other” and that “Congress chose only to provide for an enhanced punishment of one of those necessary parties.”  Rather, the Second Circuit reasoned that while the statute’s “legislative history makes no mention of aiders and abettors, it makes it clear that the purpose . . . was not to catch in the [kingpin] net those who aided and abetted the supervisors’ activities.”

Judge Arterton relied extensively on the FCPA’s legislative history to support her decisions. The application section of the ruling states in its entirety as follows.

“The clearest indication of legislative intent is the text and structure of the FCPA, which carefully delineates the classes of people subject to liability and excludes nonresident foreign nationals where they are not agents of a domestic concern or did not take actions in furtherance of a corrupt payment within the territory of the United States. See Community for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The starting point for [the] interpretation of a statute is always its language.”).

In United States v. Castle, 925 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit applied Gebardi to conclude that another class of individuals not subject to liability as principals under the FCPA—the foreign officials who accept bribes—could not be prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the FCPA. The Fifth Circuit found an intent in the FCPA to exclude the foreign bribe recipients because, in enacting the FCPA in 1977 in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, Congress was principally “concerned about the domestic effects of such payments,” such as “the distortion of, and resulting lack of confidence in, the free market system within the United States.” Id. at 834–35.

Congress was aware that it “could, consistently with international law, reach foreign officials in certain circumstances,” but it was also concerned about “the ‘inherent jurisdictional, enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties’ raised by the application of the bill to non-citizens of the United States” and decided not to do so. Id. at 835 (quoting H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1977 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4121, 4126).7 From the text of the statute and the legislative history expressing concern about reaching non-citizens, the Fifth Circuit found “in the FCPA what the Supreme Court in Gebardi found in the Mann Act: an affirmative legislative policy to leave unpunished a well-defined group of persons who were necessary parties to the acts constituting a violation of the substantive law.” Id. at 836.

Legislative History of 1977

Although the text and structure of the FCPA provide strong indication that Congress did not intend for non-resident foreign nationals to be subject to the FCPA unless they were agents of a domestic concern or acted in the territory of the United States, the Court also considers the legislative history of the Act.

While the extensive legislative history of the enactment of the FCPA in 1977 and its amendments in 1998 identified by the parties contain little discussion of accomplice liability, that which does exist is consistent with what the plain text and structure of the final enactment implies regarding the limits of liability for non-resident foreign nationals. The initial version of the Senate bill introduced by the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on June 2, 1976 made it unlawful for any U.S. “issuer” or “domestic concern” to use any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to authorize or pay a bribe. S. 3664, 94th Cong. (1976). “Domestic concern” was defined to include (1) U.S. citizens and nationals and (2) entities owned or controlled by U.S. citizens and nationals that were either incorporated in or had a principal place of business in the United States. Id. at 7.

An amendment to the Senate bill responded to a request by the administration of President Carter “to clearly cover under the bill individuals making payments” that was not “crystal clear” in the original version. Markup Session on S. 305, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 8 (Apr. 6, 1977). The definition of domestic concern was left unchanged, but the proposal added that officers, directors, employees and stockholders acting on behalf of U.S. issuers or domestic concerns, irrespective of nationality, would be liable for making bribes on behalf of the company. S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 11; 123 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1977). Although the Carter Administration requested that liability be extended to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies, Markup Session on S. 305 at 9, the Senate declined to do so, S. Rep. No. 95-114.

A competing House bill introduced on February 22, 1977 provided for broader liability for non-resident foreign nationals than the Senate bill, proposing liability not just for non-U.S. officers, directors, and employees of domestic concerns, but also (1) any “agent” of a U.S. issuer or domestic concern who “carried out” a bribe and (2) officers, directors, and employees of foreign affiliates irrespective of nationality. H.R. 3815 §§ 30A(c)(2), 3(c)(2), 3(f)(2)(A), 95th Cong. (1977).

The FCPA as enacted included elements from both the Senate and House bills, extending liability to agents of domestic concerns as the House proposed, but limiting criminal liability of agents and employees of domestic concerns to a person who was a “United States citizen, national, or resident or is otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” and predicated such person’s criminal liability on a finding that the domestic concern itself had violated the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(1)(B)(3) (1977).

The final bill excluded foreign affiliates of U.S. companies, as the Senate proposed, which the House Conference Report described as a “recogni[tion] [of] the inherent jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of the bill.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-831, at *14. The Report explained, however, that because U.S. citizens, nationals, and residents were defined as domestic concerns, they could be liable for engaging in bribery “indirectly” through another person and that the “jurisdictional, enforcement and diplomatic difficulties” that applied to extending liability to foreign subsidiaries did not apply to “citizens, nations, or residents of the United States.” Id.

The Government notes that early versions of the Senate and House committee reports discussed accomplice liability: The committee fully recognizes that the proposed law will not reach all corrupt payments overseas. For example, Sections 2 and 3 would not permit prosecution of a foreign national who paid a bribe overseas acting entirely on his own initiative. The committee notes, however, that in the majority of bribery cases investigated by the SEC some responsible official or employee of the U.S. parent company had knowledge of the bribery and either explicitly or implicitly approved the practice. Under the bill as reported, such persons could be prosecuted. The concepts of aiding and abetting and joint participation would apply to a violation under this bill in the same manner in which those concepts have always applied in both SEC civil actions and in implied private actions brought under the securities laws generally. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. Rep. No. 94-1031, at 7 (1976).

As discussed above, this legislative history discussing an early version of the bill was later clarified in response to concerns by the Carter Administration that the extent of individual liability (including for U.S. nationals) was not “crystal clear.” Rather than resorting to concepts of accomplice liability, the enacted version specifically delineated the extent of individual liability by “mak[ing] it clear that” the delineated individuals were “covered directly.” Markup Session on S. 305, Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 8, 12 (Apr. 6, 1977). Therefore, the discussion of accomplice liability cited by the Government does not suggest that Congress intended for those who were excluded from direct liability under the Act to be subject to accomplice liability but only shows that Congress considered imposing individual liability based on concepts of accomplice liability but instead chose to do so directly and carefully delineated the class of persons covered to address concerns of overreaching.

Thus, as in Amen and Gebardi, even absent explicit discussion in the legislative history of accomplice liability, the carefully-crafted final enactment evinces a legislative intent to cabin such liability. See Amen, 831 F.2d at 382; Gebardi, 287 U.S. at 123. As the Fifth Circuit explained, when Congress “listed all the persons or entities who could be prosecuted” under the FCPA, it “intended that these persons would be covered by the Act itself, without resort to the conspiracy statute” and, as in Gebardi, that intent cannot be circumvented by resort to conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability. Castle, 925 F.2d at 836.

1998 Amendments

While the Government argues that the original version of the FCPA in 1977 provided for accomplice liability, it maintains that after the 1998 amendments to the FCPA “Congress unequivocally provided that it intended the accomplice liability and conspiracy statutes to apply to foreign nationals not otherwise subject to the FCPA as principals.” The 1998 amendments to the FCPA were “enacted to ensure the United States was in compliance with its treaty obligations,” United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 923 (11th Cir. 2014), after the United States ratified the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”). Dec. 17, 1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105–43, 37 I.L.M.; International Anti– Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105–366, 112 Stat. 3302.

The OECD Convention required each signatory country to “take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person intentionally” to bribe foreign officials. OECD Convention art. 1.1. In response, the 1998 amendments expanded the scope of liability in three ways. First, Congress added 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a), which prohibited those individuals or entities that did not already fall under other provisions of the statute from taking action “while in the territory” of the United States in furtherance of corrupt payments. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). Second, the 1998 amendments eliminated a disparity in penalties between U.S. and foreign nationals acting as agents of domestic concerns whereby previously foreign nationals were subject only to civil penalties. The amendment made clear that foreign nationals acting as agents of domestic concerns could be criminally prosecuted for violating the FCPA if they used some manner or means of interstate commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Third, Congress provided for nationality jurisdiction12, providing that it “shall also be unlawful for any United States person to corruptly do any act outside the United States in furtherance of” a foreign bribe. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i)(1); see also S. REP. 105-277, at *2–3 (1998) (describing these three changes to the FCPA as being intended “to conform it to the requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention”).

The Government maintains that because the OECD Convention required each signatory country to make it a “criminal offense under its law for any person” to pay a foreign bribe, OECD Convention, art. 1.1 (emphasis added), the “1998 amendments expanded the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA to cover any person over whom U.S. courts have jurisdiction” and a contrary interpretation “would place the United States in violation of its treaty obligations.” While the Supreme Court has admonished that “courts should be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international agreements,” Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995), this Court does not agree with the Government’s contention that the OECD Convention required or even contemplated the extent of liability sought by the Government here by using the term “any person.”

Rather, the OECD’s reference to “any person” is cabined by Article 4 of the Convention, addressing jurisdiction, which provides that each signatory “shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offense is [1] committed in whole or in part in its territory” (OECD Convention, art. 4.1) or [2] by its own nationals while abroad (id., art. 4.2). Therefore, there is no indication that the OECD Convention requires the United States to prosecute foreign bribery committed abroad by non-resident foreign nationals who conspire with United States citizens.

Based on the text and structure of the FCPA and the legislative history accompanying its enactment and its amendment, the Court concludes that Congress did not intend to impose accomplice liability on non-resident foreign nationals who were not subject to direct liability. Count One will not be dismissed in its entirety, however, because if the Government proceeds under the theory that Mr. Hoskins is an agent of a domestic concern and thus subject to direct liability under the FCPA, the Gebardi principle would not preclude his criminal liability for conspiring to violate the FCPA. The Government may not argue, however, that Defendant could be liable for conspiracy even if he is not proved to an agent of a domestic concern.”

*****

Hoskins is represented by Christopher Morvillo and David Raskin of Clifford Chance.

Time Out On Slamming The Brits

As highlighted in this recent report:

“The [U.K.] Government is reviewing the Bribery Act after business leaders claimed it was making it difficult for British firms to export goods. The Business Secretary, Sajid Javid, is inviting companies to comment on whether the tough anti-corruption measures are “a problem”. […] Letters sent by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) invite industry leaders to comment on whether the Act has had an impact on their attempts to export. They also ask if guidance issued to help business people avoid problems under the Act is useful and for suggestions to clarify the information. BIS officials said the guidance that accompanies the Act, rather than the law itself, was the main focus.”

SEC Potpourri

Last week, the SEC released this document titled “Division of Enforcement Approach to Forum Selection in Contested Actions.”

In Foreign Corrupt Practices Act history, one can count the number of “contested” SEC FCPA enforcement actions on one hand, but the recent document is nevertheless an interesting read as it sets forth the SEC’s approach in determining whether an action proceeds as a civil action in federal court or an SEC administrative proceeding.

According to the document:

“There is no rigid formula dictating the choice of forum.  The Division considers a number of factors when evaluating the choice of forum and its recommendation depends on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.  Not all factors will apply in every case and, in any particular case, some factors may deserve more weight than others, or more weight than they might in another case.  Indeed, in some circumstances, a single factor may be sufficiently important to lead to a decision to recommend a particular forum. While the list of potentially relevant considerations set out below is not (and could not be) exhaustive, the Division may in its discretion consider any or all of the factors in assessing whether to recommend that a contested case be brought in the administrative forum or in federal district court.”

• The document then sets forth the following factors;
• The availability of the desired claims, legal theories, and forms of relief in each forum;
• Whether any charged party is a registered entity or an individual associated with a registered entity;
• The cost‐, resource‐, and time‐effectiveness of litigation in each forum;
• Fair, consistent, and effective resolution of securities law issues and matters.

Under the last factors, the document states:

“If a contested matter is likely to raise unsettled and complex legal issues under the federal securities laws, or interpretation of the Commission’s rules, consideration should be given to whether, in light of the Commission’s expertise concerning those matters, obtaining a Commission decision on such issues, subject to appellate review in the federal courts, may facilitate development of the law.”

This statement is beyond concerning.

Unsettled and complex legal issues are deserving of an independent judiciary, not the SEC’s own administrative law judges. Contrary to the SEC’s assertion, the above preference does not facilitate the development of law, it hinders the development of law.

*****

Speaking of SEC administrative actions, no surprise here – the SEC wins a very high percentage of its cases when brought before its own administrative law judges. According to this recent Wall Street Journal article:

“An analysis by The Wall Street Journal of hundreds of decisions shows how much of a home-court advantage the SEC enjoys when it sends cases to its own judges rather than federal courts. That is a practice the agency increasingly follows, the Journal has found.

The SEC won against 90% of defendants before its own judges in contested cases from October 2010 through March of this year, according to the Journal analysis. That was markedly higher than the 69% success the agency obtained against defendants in federal court over the same period, based on SEC data.”

As highlighted in prior posts (see here for instance), the predominate method by which the SEC has brought FCPA enforcement actions over the past few years have been through its own administrative process.  This is against the backdrop of the SEC never prevailing in an FCPA enforcement action when put to its ultimate burden of proof. (See here).

*****

In this recent speech, SEC Chair Mary Jo White talks about the SEC’s whistleblower program:

“There have always been mixed feelings about whistleblowers and many companies tolerate, at best, their existence because the law requires it.  I would urge that, especially in the post-financial crisis era when regulators and right-minded companies are searching for new, more aggressive ways to improve corporate culture and compliance, it is past time to stop wringing our hands about whistleblowers.  They provide an invaluable public service, and they should be supported.  And, we at the SEC increasingly see ourselves as the whistleblower’s advocate.

It has been nearly four years since the SEC implemented its whistleblower program.  While still evolving and improving, we have enough experience now to take a hard look at how the program is working and what we have learned.  Overall, I am here to say that the program is a success – and we will work hard at the SEC to build on that success.

The volume of tips has been greater and of higher quality than expected when the program was first adopted.  We have seen enough to know that whistleblowers increase our efficiency and conserve our scarce resources.  Importantly, internal compliance programs at companies also remain vibrant and effective ways to detect and report wrongdoing.  But despite the success of our program, the decision to come forward, especially in the face of internal pressure, is not an easy one.

The ambivalence about whistleblowers can indeed sometimes manifest itself in an unlawful response by a corporate employer and we are very focused at the SEC on cracking down on such misconduct.  We want whistleblowers – and their employers – to know that employees are free to come forward without fear of reprisals.  In 2014, we brought our first retaliation case and, this month, our first case involving the use of a confidentiality agreement that can impede whistleblowers from communicating with us.  This latter case has generated some controversy, which I will address shortly.  But, first, let’s look a bit closer at the four-year track record of the program.”

A portion of White’s speech also focused on “supporting internal compliance” and she stated:

“Let me say a bit more about company compliance programs.  When the Commission was considering its whistleblower rules, concerns were raised about undermining companies’ internal compliance programs.  Some commenters urged that internal reporting be made a pre-condition to a whistleblower award.  That was not done, but the final whistleblower rules established a framework to incentivize employees to report internally first.  A whistleblower’s participation in internal compliance systems is thus a factor that will generally increase an award, whereas interference with those systems will surely decrease an award. And, a whistleblower who internally reports, and at the same time or within 120 days reports to the Commission, will receive credit for any information the company subsequently self-reports to the SEC.

All indications are that internal compliance functions are as strong as ever – if not stronger – and that insiders continue to report possible violations internally first.  Although there is no requirement under our rules that the whistleblower be a current or former employee, several of the individuals who have received awards were, in fact, company insiders.  Notably, of these, over 80% first raised their concerns internally to their supervisors or compliance personnel before reporting to the Commission.

Many in-house lawyers, compliance professionals, and law firms representing companies have told us that since the implementation of our program, companies have taken fresh looks at their internal compliance functions and made enhancements to further encourage their employees to view internal reporting as an effective means to address potential wrongdoing without fear of reprisal or retaliation.  That is a very good thing, and, so far, we believe that the whistleblower program has achieved the right balance between the need of companies to be given an opportunity to address possible violations of law and the SEC’s law enforcement interests.”

In conclusion, White stated:

“The bottom line is that is that responsible companies with strong compliance cultures and programs should not fear bona fide whistleblowers, but embrace them as a constructive part of the process to expose the wrongdoing that can harm a company and its reputation.  Gone are the days when corporate wrongdoing can be pushed into the dark corners of an organization.  Fraudsters rarely act alone, unobserved and, these days, the employee who sees or is asked to make the questionable accounting entry or to distribute the false offering materials may refuse to do it or just decide that they are better off telling the SEC.  Better yet, either there are no questionable accounting entries or false offering materials to be reported in the first place or companies themselves self-report the unlawful conduct to the SEC.”

*****

If SEC enforcement is an area of interest, you will want to check out this recent article in Securities Regulation Journal about Stanley Sporkin.

Among Sporkin’s other notable accomplishments, he was the Director of Enforcement at the SEC in the mid-1970’s when the so-called foreign corporate payments problem arose and he championed what would become the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions.

Many have called Sporkin the “father of the FCPA” – a label I have always found curious given that Sporkin and his enforcement division were opposed to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and wanted no part in enforcing those provisions.

To learn more about this, see “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

Hail To The Chief

Today is Presidents’ Day.

This post highlights the role of Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and William Clinton in enactment and subsequent development of the FCPA.

My article “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” also contains a detailed overview of the roles of the Ford and Carter administrations.

Ford

After watching Congress investigate and hold hearings on the foreign payments problem for approximately nine months, in March 1976 President Ford issued a  “Memorandum Establishing the Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments  Abroad” (see here).

The great debate at this time was whether the foreign payments problem should be addressed through a disclosure regime or through a criminalization regime.  The Ford Administration favored the former and in June 1976, President Ford released “Remarks Announcing New Initiatives for the Task Force on Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad.” (see here).  As noted in the remarks, President Ford directed the task force “to prepare legislation that would require corporate disclosure of all payments made with the intention of  influencing foreign government officials.”

Certain bills were introduced in Congress consistent with Ford’s vision and in August 1976 President Ford issued “Foreign Payments Disclosure – Message From the President of the United States Urging Enactment of Proposed Legislation to Require the Disclosure of Payments to Foreign Officials.” (see here).

Neither Ford’s proposal, or any other, was enacted by Congress prior to the 1976 elections in which Ford was defeated by Jimmy Carter.

Carter

Unlike the Ford Administration, the Carter administration favored the criminalization regime that was under consideration in the prior Congress.  When Congress reconvened in January 1977 after the election, the movement to adopt a criminalization regime soon picked up speed again.

Certain members of the Carter administration testified at Congressional hearings throughout 1977 in favor of the criminalization regime and in December 1977, S. 305 (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977) was presented to President Carter.

On December 20, 1977, President Carter signed S. 305 into law – see here for his signing statement.

Reagan

As noted in this previous post, President Reagan’s administration very soon sought decriminalization of foreign payments subject to the FCPA. During the Reagan administration, numerous efforts were made in Congress to amend the FCPA. Soon after the FCPA was enacted, it was widely recognized that while the FCPA had addressed a serious problem, the statute created much uncertainty and was, in the minds of many, unworkable.

Among other things, the FCPA antibribery provisions enacted in 1977 contained a broad knowledge standard (“reason to know”) applicable to indirect payments to “foreign officials”; (ii) did not contain any affirmative defenses; and (iii) did not contain an express facilitating payments exception. Beginning in 1980, various bills were introduced – either as stand alone bills or specific titles to omnibus trade and export bills – that sought to amend the FCPA. This legislative process took eight years.

In August 1988, President Reagan signed H.R. 4848 the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Title V, Subtitle A, Part I of the Act was titled “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments.” President Reagan’s signing statement does not refer to the FCPA amendments buried in the omnibus trade bill. Among the amendments were a revised knowledge standard applicable to indirect payments and the creation of affirmative defenses and an express facilitating payment exception.

Clinton

In November 1998, President Clinton signed S. 2375, the “International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.” Among other things, the Act amended the FCPA by (i) creating a new class of persons subject to the FCPA – “any person” not an issuer or domestic concern to the extent such person’s bribery scheme has a U.S. nexus; and (ii) creating a new alternative nationality jurisdiction test for U.S. issuers and domestic concerns.

See here for President Clinton’s signing statement.

The FCPA Turns 37

This weekend, our favorite statute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, turns 37.

President Jimmy Carter’s December 20, 1977 signing statement stated in full as follows.

“I am pleased to sign into law S. 305, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and the Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Act of 1977. During my campaign for the Presidency, I repeatedly stressed the need for tough legislation to prohibit corporate bribery. S. 305 provides that necessary sanction. I share Congress’s belief that bribery is ethically repugnant and competitively unnecessary. Corrupt practices between corporations and public officials overseas undermine the integrity and stability of governments and harm our relations with other countries. Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribery have eroded public confidence in our basic institutions. This law makes corrupt payments to foreign officials illegal under United States law. It requires publicly held corporations to keep accurate books and records and establish accounting controls to prevent the use of ‘off-the-books’ devices, which have been used to disguise corporate bribes in the past. The law also requires more extensive disclosure of ownership of stocks registered with the [SEC]. These efforts, however, can only be fully successful in combating bribery and extortion if other countries and business itself take comparable action. Therefore, I hope progress will continue in the United Nations toward the negotiation of a treaty on illicit payments. I am also encouraged by the International Chamber of Commerce’s new Code of Ethical Business Practices.”

S. 305, of course, did not fall out of the sky onto President Carter’s desk thirty-seven years ago today.  Rather, S. 305 was the result of more than two years of Congressional investigation, deliberation, and consideration.

If the FCPA is your cup of tea, you owe it to yourself to read the most extensive piece ever written about the FCPA’s history – “The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.”

The article weaves together information and events scattered in the FCPA’s voluminous legislative record to tell the FCPA’s story through original voices of actual participants who shaped the law.

Among other things, you will learn: (i) how the foreign corporate payments problem was discovered, specific events that prompted congressional concern, and the policy ramifications of those events which motivated Congress to act; (ii) how seeking new legislative remedies to the foreign corporate payments problem was far from a consensus view of the U.S. government and the divergent views as to a solution; (iii) the many difficult and complex issues Congress encountered in seeking a new legislative remedy; (iv) the two main competing legislative responses to the problem—a disclosure approach as to a broad category of payments and a criminalization approach as to a narrow category of payments, and why Congress opted for the later; and (v) how Congress learned of a variety of foreign corporate payments to a variety of recipients and for a variety of reasons, but how and why Congress  intended and accepted in passing the FCPA to capture only a narrow category of such payments.