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Analyzing Alcatel-Lucent

In 2006, Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel”) was formed when an Alcatel S.A. subsidiary merged with Lucent Technologies, Inc. Prior to the merger, Alcatel was a worldwide provider of a wide variety of telecommunications equipment and services and other technology products. The company operated in more than 130 countries directly and through certain wholly owned and indirect subsidiaries including in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia and Taiwan. From 1998 until late 2006, ADR shares of Alcatel were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

In 2007, the right side of the hyphen – Lucent Technologies – settled an FCPA enforcement action (see here and here).

In 2010, in what was the last FCPA enforcement action of the year, the left side of the hyphen – Alcatel and certain of its subsidiaries – settled an FCPA enforcement.

This post analyzes the Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action. The enforcement action (all 360 pages) is a FCPA feast. Principally based on the lack of due diligence of third-party agents, the enforcement action serves up the following: lots of alleged state-owned or state-controlled telecommunication entities; consultants hired after contracts were secured; a purported telecommunications consultant with only perfume experience; payments to legislators and political parties; things of value including excessive travel and entertainment expenses and crystal for the secretary; joint ventures; and payments from New York and Miami bank accounts.

The Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $137.4 million ($92 million criminal fine via DOJ plea agreements and a deferred prosecution agreement; $45.4 million in disgorgement via a SEC settled complaint).

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel”) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement and a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent France S.A. (“Alcatel CIT”), Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. (“Alcatel Standard”), and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. (“ACR”) resolved through plea agreements. See here for the DOJ release.

Alcatel-Lucent S.A. Criminal Information

The information (here) begins with a heading “Background Regarding Alcatel’s Business Practices and the State of Its Internal Controls.”

It states as follows. “Starting in the 1990s and continuing through at least last 2006, Alcatel pursued many of its business opportunities around the world through the use of third-party agents and consultants. This business model was shown to be prone to corruption, as consultants were repeatedly used as conduits for bribe payments to foreign officials (and business executives of private customers) to obtain or retain business in many countries.”

The information also highlights Alcatel’s “de-centralized business structure” which permitted different Alcatel employees around the world “to initially vet the the third-party consultants, and then rely on Executive 1 [a French citizen who served as Chief Executive Officer of Alcatel Standard in Basel, Switzerland] at Alcatel to perform due diligence on them.” According to the information, “this de-centralized structure and approval process permitted corruption to occur, as the local employees were more interested in obtaining business than ensuring that business was won ethically and legally.”

Further, the information alleges that “Executive 1 performed no due diligence of substance and remained, at best, deliberately ignorant of the true purpose behind the retention of and payment to many of the third-party consultants.” Specifically, the information alleges that “Executive 1 made no effort, or virtually no effort, to verify the information provided by the consultant in the Consultant Profile [a form the consultant was supposed to complete with information concerning its ownership, business activities, capabilities, banking arrangements, and professional references], apart from using Dun & Bradstreet reports to confirm the consultant’s existence and physical address.” According to the information, “if the paperwork was completed, regardless of any obvious issues (such as close relationships with foreign officials or a clear lack of skill, experience or telecommunications expertise), Executive 1 authorized hiring and paying the third-party consultant.”

As to payments to the consultants, the information alleges that “Alcatel Standard [a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in Switzerland and an entity “responsible for entering into most agreements with consultants worldwide on behalf of Alcatel and certain other entities] would contract with the third-party consultant and then Alcatel CIT [a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in France] would pay the consultant” including through a bank account at ABN Amro Bank in New York.

The information alleges as follows. “Often senior executives at Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR [a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in Costa Rica], among others, knew bribes were being paid, or were aware of the high probability that many of these third-party consultants were paying bribes, to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. For example, in a significant number of instances, the consultant contracts were executed after Alcatel had already obtained the customer business, the consultant commissions were excessive, and lump sum payments were made to the consultants that did not appear to correspond to any one one contract.”

According to the information, “Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, ACR, and certain employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knew, or purposefully ignored” that much of the consultant documentation “did not accurately reflect the true nature and purpose of the agreements” and that “many of the invoices submitted by various third-party consultants falsely claimed that legitimate work had been completed, while the true purpose of the monies sought by the invoices was to funnel all or some of the money to foreign officials, directly and indirectly.”

The information alleges that “these transactions were designed to circumvent Alcatel’s internal controls system and were further undertaken knowing that they would not be accurately and fairly reflected in Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR’s books and records, which were included in the consolidated financial statements that Alcatel filed with the SEC.”

The information then contains ten separate sections: conduct in Costa Rica; conduct in Honduras; conduct in Malaysia; conduct in Taiwan; conduct in Kenya; conduct in Nigeria; conduct in Bangladesh; conduct in Ecuador; conduct in Nicaragua; and other consultancy agreements entered into without proper due diligence.

Costa Rica

The alleged conduct focuses on the actions of Christian Sapsizian and Edgar Valverde Acosta and consultancy agreements on behalf of Alcatel CIT with two Costa Rican consultants which were intended to make improper payments to Costa Rican government officials for telecommunications contracts. According to the indictment, Sapsizian (a French citizen) was a long-term employee of Alcatel and Alcatel CIT responsible for developing business in Latin America. Valverde (a Costa Rica citizen) served as the President of ACR and the Country Senior Officer of Costa Rica. See here for the prior enforcement actions against Sapsizian and Valverde.

According to the information, “both consultants had many personal contacts at ICE [Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad S.A. – a “wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Costa Rica responsible for awarding and administering public tenders for telecommunications contracts].

According to the information, Sapsizian’s supervisor, the President of Area 1 who worked in Miami, approved more than $18 million in payments to the consultants notwithstanding that the President of Area 1, according to Sapsizian, “told him on several occasions that he knew he was ‘risking jail time’ as a result of his approval of these payments, which he understood would, at least in part, ultimately wind up in the hands of public officials.”

The information alleges that various Alcatel entities “conducted insufficient due diligence” on the consultants and that “neither Alcatel nor any of its subsidiaries took sufficient steps to ensure that the consultants were complying with the FCPA or other relevant anti-corruption laws.”

According to the information, the above described payments were ultimately used to provide money to various ICE officials, a Costa Rica executive branch official, and a Costa Rica legislator, that ultimately assisted Alcatel CIT obtain a $44 million contract, a $149.5 million contract, a $109.5 million contract.

The information also alleges that Sapsizian “approved the payment of approximately $25,000 in travel, hotel, and other expenses incurred by ICE officials during a primarily pleasure trip to Paris” – a trip that “was partially intended to reward these government officials for providing Alcatel with lucrative contracts …”.

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and made inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC. As a result of the contracts won by Alcatel CIT in Costa Rica as a result of bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $23,661,000 in profits.”

Honduras

The information charges that “employees of ACR, along with Sapsizian, pursued business opportunities on behalf of Alcatel in Honduras with Hondutel [Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunicaciones – an alleged wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Honduras responsible for providing telecommunications services in Honduras including evaluating and awarding telecommunications contracts on behalf of the government of Honduras] and Conatel [Comision Nacional de Telecouniciaciones – an alleged Honduran government agency that regulated the telecommunications sector in Honduras that issued licenses and concessions for fixed-line and wireless telephony, data transmission and internet services].”

According to the information, Alcatel CIT and Alcatel Mexico made large commission payments to at least one consultant, knowing that all or some of the money paid to that consultant would be paid to a close relative of a Honduran government official, with the high probability that some or all of the money would be passed on to the Honduran government official, in exchange for favorable treatment of Alcatel, Alcatel CIT, and Alcatel Mexico.”

According to the information, the consultant was retained at the request of a high-ranking government official in the Honduran executive branch; however, the consultant was an exclusive distributor of “brand name perfumes” and had no contacts in, or prior experience with, the telecommunications industry in Honduras or anywhere else.

The information alleges that in retaining the consultant, “Alcatel Standard knowingly failed to conduct appropriate due dligence” and “did not follow up on numerous, obvious red flags.”

The information alleges that by utilizing the services of the consultant, Hondutel awarded Alcatel a $1 million contract and four additional contracts for a combined value of approximately $47 million.

The information also alleges that “Alcatel CIT and ACR employees arranged for several other Honduran government officials to take primarily pleasure trips to France, which were paid by Alcatel CIT or ACR directly.” In addition, the information charges that a “high-ranking executive at Hondutel” also “received gifts and improper payments from Alcatel CIT and ACR employees” including $2,000 for an educational trip for the official’s daughter and a trip to Paris (along with the official’s spouse) that mostly consisted of “touring activities via a chauffeur-driven vehicle.” Further, the information alleges that “Alcatel CIT also made payments to a Hondutel attorney who worked” on a contract secured by Alcatel including paying for a trip by the attorney and the attorney’s daughter to Paris.

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and caused inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC.” According to the information, “as a result of the bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $870,000 in profits.”

Malaysia

The information alleges that “in at least 17 instances in or around 2004 to in or around 2006, Alcatel Malaysia [a joint venture in which Alcatel owned a majority share of and exercised control of] employees, with the consent and approval of Alcatel Malaysia’s management, such as Executive 2 [Alcatel Malaysia’s Country Senior Officer] and Executive 3 [Alcatel Malaysia’s Chief Financial Officer], made improper payments to Telekcom Malaysia [an alleged state-owned and controlled telecommunications provider in Malaysia responsible for awarding telecommunications contracts 43% owned by the Malaysian Ministry of Finance] employees in exchange for nonpublic information relating to ongoing public tenders.” According to the information, “the documents purchased generally consisted of internal assessments by Celcom’s [Telekom Malaysia’s wholly owned subsidiary] tender committee of non-public pricing information.” According to the information, “eight of the 17 improper payments to Telekom Malaysia employees were made in connection with a single public tender that Alcatel Malaysia ultimately won …”. The information alleges that the payments were falsely characterized as “document fees” or accurately as “purchase of tender documents.”

The information further alleges that Alcatel Standard entered into a consulting agreement for more than $500,000 with a Malaysian consultant even though “Alcatel typically paid its agents and consultants commission rates based on the total value of a contract rather than pay a fixed fee for services.” According to the information, “at the time the payments were made to Malaysian Consultant 1, Alcatel Malaysia and Alcatel Standard were aware of a significant risk that Malaysian Consultant 1 would pass on all or a part of these payments to foreign officials.”

The information further alleges that Alcatel Standard entered into another consulting agreement with another consultant by which Alcatel Standard agreed to pay the consultant $500,000 for a “strategic intelligence report on Celcom’s positioning in the celluar industry in relation to its competitors.” According to the information, despite paying the consultant “half a million dollars for this report … there is no evidence that Malaysian Consultant 2 did any actual work for Alcatel Malaysia or ever produced the report.” The information states that “Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia were aware of a significant risk that Malaysian Consultant 2 was serving merely as a conduit for bribe payments to foreign officials.”

The information further alleges, in summary fashion, as follows. “Alcatel Malaysia lacked internal controls, such as formal policies covering expenditure for gifts, travel, and entertainment for customers, leading to Alcatel Malaysia employees giving lavish gifts to Telekom Malaysia officials.”

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and caused inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC.” The information states that “although Alcatel won the $85 million Celcom contract, Alcatel did not generate any profits from it.”

Taiwan

According to the information, Alcatel pursued business in Taiwan through its indirect subsidiary Alcatel SEL, a company located and incorporated in Germany. The information states that Executive 4 [a German citizen who served on Alcatel SEL’s director of international business ans sales] hired two third-party consultants to assist Alcatel SEL and Taisel, a joint venture 60% owned by an Alcatel subsidiary in obtaiing an axle counting contracts from the TRA [the Taiwan Railway Administration – an alleged wholly state-owned authority in Taiwan responsible for managing, maintaining, and running passenger freight services on Taiwan’s railroad lines].” According to the information, “both consultants claimed to have close ties to certain legislators in the Taiwanese government who were understood to have influence in awarding the contract due to their particular responsibilities in the legislature.”

The information alleges that the “purpose behind Alcatel’s hiring of Taiwanese Consultant 1 was so that Alcatel SEL could make improper payments to three Taiwanese legislators who had influence in the award of the TRA axle counting contract.” According to the information, after Taisel has been awarded the contract, “Alcatel SEL paid Taiwanese Consultant 1 a commission of approximately $921,413 by wire transfer from Alcatel SEL’s ABN Amro bank account in New York” and that Taiwanese Consultant 1, in turn, “made improper payments to two Taiwanese legislators: Legislator 2 and Legislator 3 – both members of the Legislative Yuan, the unicameral legislative assembly of the Republic of China. Among other things, the information alleges: that the the consultant promised approximately $180,000 in campaign funds for Legislator 3’s 2004 election campaign and then paid Legislator 3 approximately $90,000 after Alcatel SEL won the bid; that Executive 4 and the consultant “spent approximately $8,000 on trips to Germany” that were “primarly for personal, entertainment purposes, with only nominal business justification;” that Alcatel SEL paid the consultant “approximately $3,000 to reimburse it for a set of crystal given to the secretary of the Taiwan Transportation and Communications Minister.”

The information also alleges that Executive 4 also hired another consultant because “Taiwanese Consultant 2’s owner was the brother of Legislator 4, who had influence with respect to TRA matters.” The information alleges that “to bribe Legislator 4, Alcatel SEL arranged for a bogus consulting agreement between Taisel and Taiwanese Consultant 2.”

The information alleges as follows. “Neither Taiwanese Consultant 1 nor Taiwanese Consultant 2 provided legitimate services to Alcatel or Alcatel SEL. Their only function was to pass on improper payments to three Taiwanese legislators on behalf of Alcatel SEL and Taisel. On or about December 30, 2003 Taisel’s bid was accepted by the TRA, which granted Taisel a supply contract worth approximately $19.2 million …”.

According to the information, “Alcatel SEL’s financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC” and “as a result of contracts won by Alcatel in Taiwan as a result of bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $4,342,600 in profits.”

Kenya

The information describes a Kenyan joint venture (“Kenyan JV”) formed by a French telecommunications company (“French Telecom”) and a Kenyan company (“Kenyan Company”) to apply for a mobile telecommunications license that the Kenyan JV was awarded for approximately $55 million. Several companies, including Alcatel CIT, bid to provide approximately $87 million in infrastructure and services to the Kenyan JV. The information alleges that Alcatel CIT was informed by French Telecom that Alcatel CIT “would win the bid under one condition: an Alcatel entity had to make improper payments to an intermediary in the approximate amount of $20 million.”

The information then describes the intermediary and payments made to it and concludes with the following paragraph. “After entering into the various contracts, the intermediary provided monthly reports and economic intelligence on the telecommunications market in Africa, but never provided any information related to the 2nd GSM license or the Kenyan telecommunications market. In light of the huge amounts of the payments, the fact that the intermediary performed little legitimate work in connection with the 2nd GSM license, and the fact that Company Z [another company suggested by the intermediary] was an offshore holding of Kenyan Company, there is a high probability that all or a portion of the approximately $20 million in payments made by Alcatel CIT to the intermediary and the related entities was passed on to Kenyan Company, which in turn passed on the funds to Kenyan government officials who had played a role in awarding the original contract to French Telecom.”

Nigeria

The information states that between 1999 and 2007, Alcatel pursued business with various Nigerian customers and alleges as follows.

“Certain Alcatel subsidiaries made improper payments to government officials in Nigeria in the following contexts: (a) payments made to government officials for the purpose of reducing tax or other liabilities; (b) payments made to government officials to obtain security services from the Nigerian police; (c) a payment of approximately $75,000 to a former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations for the purpose of arranging meetings between Alcatel representatives and Nigerian Senior Government Official 1, a high-ranking official in the Nigerian executive branch; (d) payments made to government officials for the purpose of securing recovery of a debt totaling approximately $36.5 million owed by the government of Nigeria to ITT Nigeria [an Alcatel entity]; and (e) a payment to a People’s Democractic Party official. These payments were not described accurately and fairly on Alcatel’s books and records.”

The information also alleges as follows. “Alcatel personnel also made improper payments via a consultant to a Senior Executive at Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1” and “Alcatel also made large improper payments to two other consultants which were owned at least in part by a relative of the Senior Executive at Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1.” “These payments were not described accurately and fairly on Alcatel’s books and records.” There is nothing in the information to suggest that Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1 was a state-owned or controlled enterprise and the information refers to payments to the Senior Executive as “commercial bribe payments.”

Bangladesh

The information generally alleges that “Alcatel generated a significant portion of its revenue in Bangladesh from Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board, the state-controlled telecommunications services provider” and that Alcatel used an agent in Bangladesh but “Alcatel Standard did not conduct adequate due diligence” on the consultant. In addition, the information alleges that Alcatel Standard retained the agent in connection with a submarine cable project connecting fourteen countries – Alcatel’s portion of the contract was approximately $258 million. According to the information, Alcatel CIT paid the consultant approximately $626,492 in compensation for services provided in connection with the project and approximately $2,524,939 in connection with various upgrades to a predecessor of the project “aware of a significant risk that Bangladsh Consultant would pass on all or a part of these payments to foreign officials.”

Ecuador

According to the information, “Alcatel conducted business in Ecuador with three major telecommunicatios customers, all of which were state-owned: Andinatel, Pacifictel, and Empresa Municipl de Telecomunicaciones, Aqua Potable, Alcantarillados y Saneamiento. The information alleges that Alcatel retained a consultant in Ecuador (“a wealthy businessman”), but that the consultant and the entities he controlled “did little legitimate work for Alcatel.” The information alleges as follows. “Instead, it was anticipated that Ecuadorian Consultant would funnel a portion of the funds Alcatel paid him to officials of the Ecuadorian state-owned telecommunications companies in order to secure business and other benefits for Alcatel. Improper payments were anticipated to be made or offered in connection with at least nine contracts with government-owned telecommunication companies.”

According to the information, at least some of Alcatel’s payments to the consultant wre made to bank accounts in Miami.

In addition, the information alleges as follows. “Alcatel also paid for trips taken by officials of the three telecommunications companies that were principally for pleasure. For example, both the Vice-President and the Chairman of the Board of Pacifictel received improper all-expenses paid trips to France.”

Nicaragua

According to the information, “Alcatel’s only customer in Nicaragua was Empresa Nicaraguense de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (“Enitel”) which was state-owned during the relevant time period.” The Ecuadorian consultant referenced above, also served as Alcatel’s consultant in Nicaragua. According to the information, “with the assistance of Ecuadorian Consultant, Alcatel CIT secured two contracts with Enitel” valued at approximately $1.6 million and $370,000. The information alleges that Alcatel CIT made payments totaling approximately $229,3822 to the Miami bank account of the consultant and that the consultant “likely used a portion of these payments to bribe certain key Enitel officials in order to influence Enitel to award the two contracts to Alcatel, to obtain confidential information about competing bids, and to secure favorable financial terms.” The information alleges that payments to the consultant were “identified in Alcatel’s books and records as consulting fees, and thus the description of those payments did not accurately and fairly reflect those transactions.”

The information further alleges that “Alcatel CIT also provided a trip to Paris and Madrid to two Enitel officials in late 2001 in order to encourage the execution of one of the two contracts” and that the “purpose of the trip was largley for pleasure, and it appears that Alcatel CIT covered all travel costs and a large portion of the expenses.”

The substantive portion of the information ends with a section titled “Other Consultancy Agreements Entered Into Without Proper Due Diligence.” The allegations concern consultants in Angola, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mali. The customers associated with the consultants were either allegedly state-owned or private companies.

Based on all of the above conduct, the information charges Alcatel with violations of the FCPA’s internal control provisions. The information alleges that Alcatel “knowingly: (a) failed to implement sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures; (b) failed to maintain a sufficient system for the selection and approval of consultants, which, in turn, permitted corrupt conduct to occur at certain subsidiaries; (c) entered into purported business consulting agreements with no apparent basis, and without performing any due diligence, sometimes after the cmpany had already won the relevant project; (d) failed to verify information provided by consultants, including failing to follow up in circumstances in which managers knew or were substantially certain illicit activity was taking place; (e) failed to prevent consultants from using multiple shell companies to receive commissions in excess of 10% knowing there was a substantial likelihood those consultants were acting as conduits for corrupt payments; (f) failed to conduct appropriate audits of payments to purported business consultants; (g) failed to prohibit lump sum payments being made to consultants that did not correspond to any contract; (h) failed to prohibit payments to consultants and public officials pursuant to an oral ‘gentlemen’s agreement’; (i) failed to appropriately investigate and respond to allegations of corrupt payments and discipline employees involved in making corrupt payments; (j) failed to establish a sufficiently empowered and competent Corporate Compliance Officer; (k) failed to exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; (l) failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the company’s compliance and ethics program was followed, including monitoring and internal audits to detect criminal conduct; (m) failed to evaluate regularly the effectiveness of the company’s compliance and ethics program; and (n) failed to provide appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program.”

Based on the above conduct, the information also charges Alcatel with FCPA books and records violations for (a) drafting sham business consulting agreements to justify third party payments; (b) mis-characterizing bribes in the corporate books and records as consulting fees and other seemingly legitimate expenses; (c) justifying payments to purported business consultants based on false invoices; and (d) entering into purported business consulting agreements with no basis, sometimes after Alcatel had won the relevant project.

Alcatel-Lucent DPA

The DOJ’s charges against Alcatel were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (see here).

Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, agents, and those of Alcatel’s subsidiaries as described above.

The term of the DPA is three years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement “based on the individual facts and circumstances” of the case and Alcatel-Lucent. Among the factors stated are the following.

(a) following press reports concerning bribery by Alcatel, S.A., in Costa Rica, the company investigated and disclosed over the course of several years to the Department and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission the misconduct described above;

(b) Alcatel-Lucent conducted a global internal investigation concerning bribery and related misconduct;

(c) Alcatel-Lucent reported its findings to the Department and the SEC;

(d) after limited and inadequate cooperation for a substantial period of time, Alcatel-Lucent substantially improved its cooperation with the Department’s investigation of this matter, as well as the SEC’s investigation;

(e) Alcatel-Lucent undertook remedial measures, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, and agreed to undertake further remedial measures as contemplated by the DPA;

(f) on its own initiative and at a substantial financial cost, Alcatel-Lucent determined as matter of company policy to no longer use third party sales and marketing agents in conducting its worldwide business; and

(g) Alcatel-Lucent agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of Alcatel-Lucent and its employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, and subsidiaries relating to violations of the FCPA.

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above describe conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $86.58 – $173.16 million. Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $92 million – a rather rare instance of an FCPA criminal fine actually being within the Guidelines range and not below even the minimum range suggested by the Guidelines. Also relevant is that Alcatel’s culpability score was reduced only by -1, reflecting that Alcatel did not receive cooperation credit as many FCPA corporate defendants do receive.

The DPA states that above fine is appropriate given, among other things, “penalties related to the same conduct in Costa Rica [see here], and the extraordinary remedial step of terminating use of third-party sales and marketing agents.”

Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel agreed to a host of compliance undertakings including the retention of an independent compliance monitor “who is a French national” for a three year term. Corporate Monitors used to be common in FCPA enforcement actions (circa 2005-2008), but required use of corporate monitors has become less common over the past few years.

As is standard in FCPA DPAs, Alcatel agreed not to make any public statement “contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by Alcatel-Lucent as set forth” in the DPA and Alcatel-Lucent further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.

As to potential debarment issues, the DPA states as follows. “The Department agrees to bring to the attention of governmental and other debarment authorities the facts and circumstances relating to the nature of the conduct underlying this Agreement, including the nature and quality of Alcatel-Lucent’s cooperation and remediation. By agreeing to provide this information to debarment authorities, the Department is not agreeing to advocate on behalf of Alcatel-Lucent, but rather is providing facts to be evaluated independently by the debarment authorities.”

Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. Criminal Information

The criminal information against the above Alcatel subsidiaries is virtually identical to the above-described criminal information against Alcatel, albeit it is limited to Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan conduct. Based on this conduct, the information charges the entities with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions. According to the information, the purpose of the conspiracy was to “secure the assistance of officials of various governments, including those in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan, in obtaining and retaining lucrative telecommunications business through the offer, promise, and payment of bribes.”

Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. Plea Agreements

The above described charges were resolved via separate plea agreements with Alcatel-Lucent France (here), Alcatel-Lucent Trade International (here) and Alcatel CentroAmercia (here). Each plea agreement states that in light of the overall dispositions with the other Alcatel-Lucent entities and “the interrelationship among the charges and conduct underlying those dispositions” the agreed upon fine is $500,000.

SEC

The SEC’s civil complaint (here) alleges in summary fashion as follows.

“From December 2001 through June 2006, Alcatel, S.A., now called Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel” or the “company”), through its subsidiaries and agents, violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by paying more than $8 million in bribes to foreign government officials. Alcatel made these payments to influence acts and decisions by these foreign government officials to obtain or retain business, with the knowledge and approval of certain management level personnel of the relevant Alcatel subsidiaries. Alcatel lacked sufficient internal controls to prevent or detect such improper payments, and improperly recorded the payments in its books and records.”

“During this period, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to foreign government officials in several countries to obtain or retain business:

• From December 2001 to October 2004, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid at least $7 million in bribes to government officials of Costa Rica to obtain or retain three contracts to provide telephone services in Costa Rica totaling approximately $303 million.

• From December 2002 to June 2006, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Honduras to obtain or retain five telecommunications contracts totaling approximately $48 million.

• From October 2003 to May 2004, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Taiwan to obtain or retain a railway axle counting contract valued at approximately $27 million.

• From October 2004 to February 2006, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Malaysia to obtain or retain a telecommunications contract valued at approximately $85 million.”

“All of these payments were undocumented or improperly recorded as consulting fees in the books of Alcatel’s subsidiaries, and then consolidated into Alcatel’s financial statements. A lax corporate control environment aided Alcatel’s improper conduct. Alcatel failed to detect or investigate numerous red flags suggesting that its business consultants were likely making illicit payments and gifts to government officials in these countries at the direction of certain Alcatel employees. The respective heads of several Alcatel subsidiaries and geographical regions, some of whom reported directly to Alcatel’s executive committee, authorized extremely high commission payments under circumstances in which they failed to determine whether such payments were, in part, to be funneled to government officials in violation of the FCPA. These high-level employees therefore knew, or were severely reckless in
not knowing, that Alcatel paid bribes to foreign government officials.”

The SEC complaint contains allegations about the same “Costa Rica Bribery Scheme,” “The Honduras Bribery Scheme,” “The Taiwan Bribery Scheme,” and “The Malaysia Bribery Scheme” referenced above. Typically, SEC complaints in FCPA matters are more broad than DOJ resolution documents, yet in this case the SEC complaint is more narrow than the DOJ resolution documents in that the SEC complaint does not contain any allegations as to conduct in Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mali – as does the DOJ information.

Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Alcatel with FCPA anti-bribery and books and records and internal control violations and knowingly failing to implement a system of internal controls and knowingly falsifying books and records.

As to books and records the complaint alleges as follows.

“Specifically, A1catel failed to keep accurate books and records by (1) entering into consulting agreements retroactively; (2) establishing and using a system of intermediaries to obscure the source and destination of funds; (3) making payments pursuant to business consulting agreements that inaccurately described the services provided; (4) generating false invoices and other false documents to justify payments; (5) disbursing funds in cash with inaccurate documentation authorizing or supporting the withdrawals; (6) recording illicit payments as legitimate consulting fees; and (7) recording bribes as payment for legitimate services.”

As to internal controls, the complaint alleges as follows.

“Alcatel failed to implement adequate internal controls to comply with the
company’s NYSE listing, including the detection and prevention of violations of the FCPA. First, Alcatel and/or its subsidiaries falsified books and records, entered into agreements retroactively, and obscured the purpose for, and ultimate recipient of, illicit payments. Alcatel used business consultants and intermediaries to funnel bribes in at least four countries. Alcatel created and used false invoices and payment documentation under business consulting agreements that described services that were never intended to be rendered. Illicit payments were falsely recorded as expenses for consulting fees.”

“Second, Alcatel also routinely circumvented the internal controls the company had in place. Although the company in theory had a policy of “checks and balances” to authorize the retention of business consultants, which required several signatures to approve the retention of, and payment to, business consultants, Alcatel employees often violated that policy. In numerous instances, Alcatel officials responsible for reviewing due diligence reports on consultants failed to conduct any review of the documents or could not read the language in which the documents were written. Alcatel employees also entered into agreements retroactively and obscured the amounts paid to business consultants by splitting the payments among separate
agreements (to conceal the high commissions Alcatel paid). Finally, Alcatel Standard’s due diligence on business consultants was inadequate, and Alcatel CIT often paid business consultants without adequate proof of services rendered. Alcatel CIT failed to establish robust controls over cash disbursements, allowed manual payments without documentation, and Alcatel’s FCPA compliance function was understaffed and lacked independence. Alcatel also failed to conduct thorough anti-bribery and corruption training.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Alcatel agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay disgorgement of $45.372 million.

In a relese (here), Robert Khuzami (Director of the SEC’s enforcement division) stated as follows. ““Alcatel and its subsidiaries failed to detect or investigate numerous red flags suggesting their employees were directing sham consultants to provide gifts and payments to foreign government officials to illegally win business. Alcatel’s bribery scheme was the product of a lax corporate control environment at the company.” Glenn Gordon (Associate Director of Enforcement in the SEC’s Miami office) added, “the serious sanctions Alcatel has agreed to, including paying back all net profits made on the contracts Alcatel illegally obtained, should serve as a reminder that we are committed to enforcing the FCPA and a level playing field for companies seeking to obtain or retain business in other countries.”

In a company press release (here), Steve Reynolds, Alcatel-Lucent General Counsel, stated as follow. “We take responsibility for and regret what happened and have implemented policies and procedures to prevent these violations from happening again. The violations largely occurred prior to the merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies and involved improper activities in several countries. These settlements resolve the company’s FCPA liability with the DOJ and SEC. We are pleased to have reached these settlements and look forward to putting these matters behind us. Alcatel-Lucent, created as a result of the merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies at the end of 2006, is a radically different company today: It has different management, including a new CEO, a new executive committee and a different Board of Directors; It has a zero-tolerance policy regarding bribery and corruption and has a system in place with strong processes and Internet-based and live training designed to prevent these types of situations in all aspects of our business; and as the first in its industry to do so, Alcatel-Lucent announced in 2008 that it would terminate the use of sales agents and consultants — the primary means by which certain former employees made the improper payments involved in the violations described in the DOJ and SEC settlement papers.”

Martin Weinstein (here) of Willkie Farr & Gallagher represented the Alcatel entities.

FCPA Goes Main Street

Growing up in a village of 1,054 in central Wisconsin, I was not exposed to oil and gas companies, defense contractors, or other companies that tend to have a high FCPA risk profile.

Yet one person I did have contact with on a near daily basis, because she lived around the corner, was the “Avon Lady.”

Thus, a bit of my youthful innocence was taken away upon learning last week that Avon Products Inc. (here) of all companies “suspended four executives amid an internal investigation into alleged bribery that began with the company’s China operation” and “now involves a dozen or more countries” according to the Wall Street Journal. According to the WSJ, the executives suspended include the president, chief financial officer and top government affairs executive of Avon’s China unit as well as a senior executive in New York who was Avon’s head of internal audit until the middle of last year.

According to the WSJ, Avon’s chief exectuive, Andrea Jung is a “corporate celebrity” in China and she has met frequently with “senior government officials.”

The conduct at issue involves alleged “purchase of trips to France, New York, Canada, and Hawaii for Chinese government officials with ties to Avon’s business.” However, according to the WSJ, “the scope of the investigation has since widened to regions including Latin America, where the company garners the bulk of its sales and profits.”

According to the WSJ, what sparked the investigation was “an employee who wrote a letter to Ms. Jung alleging improper spending related to travel with Chinese government officials.”

Here is what the company had to say in its 2009 Annual Report (filed in March 2010):

“As previously reported, we have engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation and compliance reviews focused on compliance with the FCPA and related U.S. and foreign laws in China and additional countries. The internal investigation and compliance reviews, which are being conducted under the oversight of our Audit Committee, began in June 2008. We voluntarily contacted the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice to advise both agencies of our internal investigation and compliance reviews and we are, as we have done from the beginning of the internal investigation, continuing to cooperate with both agencies and have signed tolling agreements with them.

The internal investigation and compliance reviews, which started in China, are focused on reviewing certain expenses and books and records processes, including, but not limited to, travel, entertainment, gifts, and payments to third-party agents and others, in connection with our business dealings, directly or indirectly,
with foreign governments and their employees. The internal investigation and compliance reviews of these matters are ongoing. At this point we are unable to predict the duration, scope or results of the internal investigation and compliance reviews.”

Based on information that is publicly available, this potential FCPA enforcement action fits the mold of Lucent Technologies and UTStarcom (here), in that it appears focused on excessive travel and entertainment benefits to Chinese “foreign officials.”

However, looking to the prior “on-point” Lucent and UTStarcom enforcement actions may not provide much useful guidance. But you probably already knew that, this is FCPA enforcement after all, where predictabilty and transparency are not distinguishing features.

If ever two FCPA enforcement actions were carbon-copies of each other, it would be the December 2007 enforcement action against Lucent and the December 2009 enforcement action against UTStarcom (“UTS”) Both enforcement actions involved telecommunications companies, both enforcement actions principally concerned business conduct in China, both enforcement actions involved payment of excessive travel and entertainment expenses, and both enforcement actions were resolved through a DOJ NPA and an SEC settled civil complaint and consent decree. Despite these similarities the end results were significantly different.

UTS settled its matter by agreeing to pay $3 million in total fines and penalties for FCPA antibribery, books and records and internal control violations. However, Lucent settled its matter by agreeing to pay $2.5 million in total fines and penalties for merely FCPA books and records and internal controls violations – in other words no antibribery violations. This despite the fact that, per the government’s statement of facts and allegations, Lucent sponsored more trips than UTS (315 compared to 225) and spent more money on the problematic trips than UTS ($10 million compared to $7 million) to influence more foreign officials in the hopes of winning billion dollar and multi-million contracts. Also relevant is that UTS was charged with antibribery violations and paid a higher combined fine/penalty amount compared to Lucent (based on less severe allegations) despite the fact that UTS, per the DOJ’s release, voluntarily disclosed the conduct at issue – a factor noticeably absent in the DOJ’s Lucent release.

Friday Roundup

Some FCPA news to pass along on this Friday.

SFO Defends BAE Settlement

Richard Alderman, the Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) recently defended the SFO settlement with BAE (see here).

Among other things, Alderman argued that any suggestion BAE “got off lightly” ignores “London’s contribution in enabling the U.S. to impose a $400 million fine.”

Point taken.

Alderman then says that the DOJ “would not have achieved what they achieved without [the SFO] and [the SFO] would not have achieved what [the SFO] achieved without [the DOJ].”

Point not taken.

What actually did the DOJ and SFO achieve in the BAE matter? What is achieved when a company settles a case invovling allegations of worldwide bribery, per the allegations in the public documents, WITHOUT being held accountable bribery?

What is achieved when you charge BAE’s agent (presumably based on evidence that the following did occur) for “conspiracy to corrupt” and for “conspiring with others to give or agree to give corrupt payments […] to unknown officials and other agents of certain Eastern and Central European governments, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure, or as rewards for having secured, contracts from those governments for the supply of goods to them, namely SAAB/Gripen fighter jets, by BAE Systems Plc” and then a few days later withdraw the charges and state “[t]his decision brings to an end the SFO’s investigations into BAE’s defence contracts.”

As to this issue, Alderman stated that “the public interet lay in drawing a line under the whole investigation.”

The article notes that “two campaigning groups said they would launch a legal challenge to Mr. Alderman’s decision, saying it failed to reflect the scale and scope of the bribery allegations relating to BAE’s network of hundreds of agents on four continents.” If anyone knows who these groups are, or the legal framework (including standing) under U.K. law to allow such a challenge, please do share.

For prior posts on BAE, includng the DOJ’s non-bribery, bribery allegations see here.

Alderman did also suggest that additional joints DOJ/SEC settlements are being negotiated.

The Pipes May Soon Burst

Ocassionaly, I have covered “cases” reportedly in the FCPA pipeline (see here). Set forth below is some “pre-news” about some coming attractions.

Given the above, it seems fitting to start with KBR, Inc.

KBR, Inc.

Here’s what Halliburton had to say earlier this week regarding its exposure via M.W. Kellogg / KBR for the SFO piece of the investigation into Bonney Island (Nigeria)(pgs. 35-36, 63-64). For a prior post see here.

Pride International Inc.

Earlier this week, Pride disclosed (here) that:

“it has accrued $56.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2009 in anticipation of a possible resolution with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of potential liability under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. {…] The accrual in the fourth quarter 2009 represents the company’s best estimate of potential fines, penalties and disgorgement related to settlement of the matter with the DOJ and SEC. The monetary sanctions ultimately paid by the company to resolve these issues, whether imposed on the company or agreed to by settlement, may exceed the amount of the accrual.”

For prior posts about Pride see here.

Innospec, Inc.

Here is what Innospec had to say about its on-going FCPA matter:

“”We have made substantial progress, but not yet completed, negotiations of final settlements of the Oil for Food Program and FCPA investigations, in either the U.S. or United Kingdom. However, we have charged a further $21.9 million in the quarter, based on the status of ongoing discussions, to bring the total amount accrued to $40.2 million. The Company will make no further comments on the ongoing proceedings.”

Alcatel-Lucent

Alcatel-Lucent recently provided (here) details (see pg. 112) on its FCPA (and other) exposure concerning conduct in Costa Rica and other places. In pertinent part the company stated:

“As previously disclosed in its public filings, Alcatel-Lucent has engaged in settlement discussions with the DOJ and the SEC with regard to the ongoing FCPA investigations. These discussions have resulted in December 2009 in agreements in principle with the staffs of each of the agencies. There can be no assurances, however, that final agreements will be reached with the agencies or accepted in court. If finalized, the agreements would relate to alleged violations of the FCPA involving several countries, including Costa Rica, Taiwan, and Kenya. Under the agreement in principle with the SEC, Alcatel-Lucent would enter into a consent decree under which Alcatel-Lucent would neither admit nor deny violations of the antibribery, internal controls and books and records provisions of the FCPA and would be enjoined from future violations of U.S. securities laws, pay U.S.
$45.4 million in disgorgement of profits and prejudgment interest and agree to a three-year French anticorruption compliance monitor to evaluate in accordance with the provisions of the consent decree (unless any specific provision therein is expressly determined by the French Ministry of Justice to violate French law)
the effectiveness of Alcatel-Lucent’s internal controls, record-keeping and financial reporting policies and procedures. Under the agreement in principle with the DOJ, Alcatel-Lucent would enter into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), charging Alcatel-Lucent with violations of the internal controls and
books and records provisions of the FCPA, and Alcatel-Lucent would pay a total criminal fine of U.S. $ 92 million—payable in four installments over the course of three years. In addition, three Alcatel-Lucent subsidiaries—Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel-Lucent Trade and Alcatel Centroamerica—would each plead guilty to
violations of the FCPA’s antibribery, books and records and internal accounting controls provisions. The agreement with the DOJ would also contain provisions relating to a three-year French anticorruption compliance monitor. If Alcatel-Lucent fully complies with the terms of the DPA, the DOJ would dismiss the charges upon
conclusion of the three-year term.”

For the trials and tribulations on both sides of this corporate hyphen see here and here.

Thirsty for more? OK, here is the last one.

Maxwell Technologies Inc.

Here is what the company’s CEO had to say about its $9.3 million accural for a potential FCPA settlement:

“Unfortunately, all this good news is tempered by the GAAP required $9.3 million accrual we recorded in Q4 for the potential settlement of FCPA violations in connection with the sale of high-voltage capacitor products in China by our Swiss subsidiary. As we reported previously, after we became aware of questionable payments made to an independent sales agent in China, we disclosed that discovery and initiated an internal review and we have been voluntarily sharing information with the SEC and the Justice Department.”

See also here.

*****

A good weekend to all.

Friday Roundup

Some FCPA news to pass along on this Friday.

SFO Defends BAE Settlement

Richard Alderman, the Director of the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) recently defended the SFO settlement with BAE (see here).

Among other things, Alderman argued that any suggestion BAE “got off lightly” ignores “London’s contribution in enabling the U.S. to impose a $400 million fine.”

Point taken.

Alderman then says that the DOJ “would not have achieved what they achieved without [the SFO] and [the SFO] would not have achieved what [the SFO] achieved without [the DOJ].”

Point not taken.

What actually did the DOJ and SFO achieve in the BAE matter? What is achieved when a company settles a case invovling allegations of worldwide bribery, per the allegations in the public documents, WITHOUT being held accountable bribery?

What is achieved when you charge BAE’s agent (presumably based on evidence that the following did occur) for “conspiracy to corrupt” and for “conspiring with others to give or agree to give corrupt payments […] to unknown officials and other agents of certain Eastern and Central European governments, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure, or as rewards for having secured, contracts from those governments for the supply of goods to them, namely SAAB/Gripen fighter jets, by BAE Systems Plc” and then a few days later withdraw the charges and state “[t]his decision brings to an end the SFO’s investigations into BAE’s defence contracts.”

As to this issue, Alderman stated that “the public interet lay in drawing a line under the whole investigation.”

The article notes that “two campaigning groups said they would launch a legal challenge to Mr. Alderman’s decision, saying it failed to reflect the scale and scope of the bribery allegations relating to BAE’s network of hundreds of agents on four continents.” If anyone knows who these groups are, or the legal framework (including standing) under U.K. law to allow such a challenge, please do share.

For prior posts on BAE, includng the DOJ’s non-bribery, bribery allegations see here.

Alderman did also suggest that additional joints DOJ/SEC settlements are being negotiated.

The Pipes May Soon Burst

Ocassionaly, I have covered “cases” reportedly in the FCPA pipeline (see here). Set forth below is some “pre-news” about some coming attractions.

Given the above, it seems fitting to start with KBR, Inc.

KBR, Inc.

Here’s what Halliburton had to say earlier this week regarding its exposure via M.W. Kellogg / KBR for the SFO piece of the investigation into Bonney Island (Nigeria)(pgs. 35-36, 63-64). For a prior post see here.

Pride International Inc.

Earlier this week, Pride disclosed (here) that:

“it has accrued $56.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2009 in anticipation of a possible resolution with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of potential liability under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. {…] The accrual in the fourth quarter 2009 represents the company’s best estimate of potential fines, penalties and disgorgement related to settlement of the matter with the DOJ and SEC. The monetary sanctions ultimately paid by the company to resolve these issues, whether imposed on the company or agreed to by settlement, may exceed the amount of the accrual.”

For prior posts about Pride see here.

Innospec, Inc.

Here is what Innospec had to say about its on-going FCPA matter:

“”We have made substantial progress, but not yet completed, negotiations of final settlements of the Oil for Food Program and FCPA investigations, in either the U.S. or United Kingdom. However, we have charged a further $21.9 million in the quarter, based on the status of ongoing discussions, to bring the total amount accrued to $40.2 million. The Company will make no further comments on the ongoing proceedings.”

Alcatel-Lucent

Alcatel-Lucent recently provided (here) details (see pg. 112) on its FCPA (and other) exposure concerning conduct in Costa Rica and other places. In pertinent part the company stated:

“As previously disclosed in its public filings, Alcatel-Lucent has engaged in settlement discussions with the DOJ and the SEC with regard to the ongoing FCPA investigations. These discussions have resulted in December 2009 in agreements in principle with the staffs of each of the agencies. There can be no assurances, however, that final agreements will be reached with the agencies or accepted in court. If finalized, the agreements would relate to alleged violations of the FCPA involving several countries, including Costa Rica, Taiwan, and Kenya. Under the agreement in principle with the SEC, Alcatel-Lucent would enter into a consent decree under which Alcatel-Lucent would neither admit nor deny violations of the antibribery, internal controls and books and records provisions of the FCPA and would be enjoined from future violations of U.S. securities laws, pay U.S.
$45.4 million in disgorgement of profits and prejudgment interest and agree to a three-year French anticorruption compliance monitor to evaluate in accordance with the provisions of the consent decree (unless any specific provision therein is expressly determined by the French Ministry of Justice to violate French law)
the effectiveness of Alcatel-Lucent’s internal controls, record-keeping and financial reporting policies and procedures. Under the agreement in principle with the DOJ, Alcatel-Lucent would enter into a three-year deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), charging Alcatel-Lucent with violations of the internal controls and
books and records provisions of the FCPA, and Alcatel-Lucent would pay a total criminal fine of U.S. $ 92 million—payable in four installments over the course of three years. In addition, three Alcatel-Lucent subsidiaries—Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel-Lucent Trade and Alcatel Centroamerica—would each plead guilty to
violations of the FCPA’s antibribery, books and records and internal accounting controls provisions. The agreement with the DOJ would also contain provisions relating to a three-year French anticorruption compliance monitor. If Alcatel-Lucent fully complies with the terms of the DPA, the DOJ would dismiss the charges upon
conclusion of the three-year term.”

For the trials and tribulations on both sides of this corporate hyphen see here and here.

Thirsty for more? OK, here is the last one.

Maxwell Technologies Inc.

Here is what the company’s CEO had to say about its $9.3 million accural for a potential FCPA settlement:

“Unfortunately, all this good news is tempered by the GAAP required $9.3 million accrual we recorded in Q4 for the potential settlement of FCPA violations in connection with the sale of high-voltage capacitor products in China by our Swiss subsidiary. As we reported previously, after we became aware of questionable payments made to an independent sales agent in China, we disclosed that discovery and initiated an internal review and we have been voluntarily sharing information with the SEC and the Justice Department.”

See also here.

*****

A good weekend to all.

Potpourri

A Friday roundup of recent FCPA events.

An FCPA Sentencing Trend?

As noted in yesterday’s DOJ release (here), two former executives of Willbros International Inc. (a subsidiary of Houston-based Willbros Group Inc.) were sentenced for their roles in a conspiracy to make improper payments to “foreign officials” in Nigeria and Ecuador.

Jason Edward Steph was sentenced to 15 months in prison and Jim Bob Brown was sentenced to 366 days in prison.

For more on the Willbros matter, see here and here.

The DOJ’s sentencing recommendations appear to be sealed, but one can assume, given the “light” sentences, that perhaps the DOJ likely sought sentences greater than those issued by District Court Judge Simeon Lake.

If so, this would appear to continue a trend of judges sentencing FCPA defendants to prison sentences less than those recommended by DOJ.

For instance, in Frederic Bourke case, a case which involved a “massive bribery scheme” according to DOJ, Judge Shira Scheindin rejected the 10-year prison sentence proposed by DOJ and sentenced Bourke to 366 days in prison. (see here). In sentencing Bourke, Judge Scheindin is reported to have said “after years of supervising this case, it’s still not entirely clear to me whether Mr. Bourke is a victim or a crok or a little bit of both.”

With several FCPA sentencing dates on the horizon, this apparent trend will be an issue to watch.

See here for local media coverage regarding the sentences.

Kozeny’s Tan Not in Jeopardy

While Bourke (see here) prepares his appeal, Viktor Kozeny, the alleged master-mind of the scheme to bribe officials in Azerbaijan in connection with privatization of the state-owned oil company, will be staying put in The Bahamas as an appellate court again rejected DOJ’s extradition attempts.

As noted in the recent Bahamian Court of Appeals decision (here), Kozeny, a Czech national, has been living in The Bahamas since 1995 and has not departed the country since 1999.

The opinion notes that there is no dispute “that there was a conspiracy to corrupt the Azeri officials and that such officials were paid money, given gifts and provided shares in certain companies under the control of [Kozeny] without payment; and had certain medical procedures paid for them by [Kozeny].

Even so, the court concluded that while The Bahamas did indeed have a bribery/corruption statute, it applied only to bribes within The Bahamas or given to a Bahamian public officer. Thus, because Kozeny’s conduct would not violate Bahamian law, the appellate court upheld the lower court’s denial of the extradition request.

For additional coverage (see here and here and here).

According to these reports, the decision may be appealed to London’s Privy Council pursuant to Bahamian legal procedure. Kozeny’s U.S. lawyer is quoted as saying “enough is enough” and U.S. prosecutors should finally accept the fact that Kozney, a non-U.S. citizen, could not violate the FCPA as it existed in 1998 – the year in which the bribe scheme perhaps ended – although, as noted in the opinion, the U.S. alleges that the bribe scheme continued into 1999.

Why is this relevant?

Because the FCPA was amended in 1998 to include, among other provisions, 78dd-3 which applies the antibribery provisions to “any person” (i.e. foreigners) “while in the territory of the U.S.” from making use of the mails or any other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of an improper payment.

The SFO Continues to “Step-It-Up”

Today, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (the functional equivalent of the DOJ) issued a release (here) indicating that a former BAE agent has been charged with “conspiracy to corrupt” for “conspiring with others to give or agree to give corrupt payments […] to unknown officials and other agents of certain Eastern and Central European governments, including the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria as inducements to secure, or as rewards for having secured, contracts from those governments for the supply of goods to them, namely SAAB/Gripen fighter jets, by BAE Systems Plc.”

For local media coverage of the charges (see here).

With a new Bribery Bill expected in the U.K. by years end, the SFO continues to “step-it-up” (see here for more on the SFO).

Disclosing FCPA Compliance

Public companies dislose FCPA issues all the time. Rarely though do the disclosures concern issues other than internal investigations and potential enforcement actions.

Accordingly, two recent SEC filings caught my eye.

China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc. (a Delaware company) recently disclosed (here) that it:

“[e]ntered into a securities purchase agreement with Starr Investments Cayman II, Inc. Under this agreement, Starr will, subject to various terms and conditions, purchase from the Company 1,000,000 shares of Series A Convertible Preferred Stock and warrants to purchase 1,545,455 shares of the Common Stock of the Company for an aggregate purchase price of US$30,000,000.”

One of the conditions was that the company “shall have adopted a program with respect to compliance with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” and a post-closing covenant obligates the company to “implement a program regarding compliance with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act not later than April 30, 2010.”

Cardtronics Inc. (an operator of ATM networks around the world) (here) recently disclosed (here) that:

“On January 25, 2010, the Board of Directors by unanimous vote approved three management proposed modifications to the Company’s Code of Business Conduct and Ethics. The modifications as approved by the Board include: (i) adding a section that addressed compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.”

Costa Rica Joins the Club

Last, but certainly not least, Costa Rica recently announced a first … the first time a foreign corporation has paid the government damages for corruption.

As noted here, telecom company Alcatel-Lucent recently disclosed a $10 million payment to settle a corruption case in Costa Rica in which it was accused of paying kicbacks to former Costa Rican President Miguel Angel Rodriguez (and others government officials) in return for a 2001 contract worth $149 million.

There has been FCPA/corruption issues on both sides “of the hyphen” as noted here in this recent Main Justice article.

And with that, have a nice weekend.

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