Azeri Tax Officials and More On Nigeria TIPs
Next up in the analysis of CustomsGate enforcement actions is Tidewater.
See here for the prior post on the Noble Corporation enforcement action and here for the prior post on the GlobalSantaFe enforcement action.
The Tidewater enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $15.7 million ($7.35 million criminal fine via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement; $8.3 million in disgorgement and a civil penalty via a SEC complaint).
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action included a criminal information (here) filed against Tidewater Marine International Inc. (“TMII), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Tidewater Inc. (“TDW”) and the primary international operating entity for TDW.
TDW (see here) operates offshore service and supply vessels designed to support all phases of offshore energy exploration, development and production throughout the world. TDW is headquartered in New Orleans and has publicly traded shares on the New York Stock Exchange.
The criminal charges against TMII were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (here) between the DOJ and TMII and TDW “on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary TMII.”
Criminal Information
According to the criminal information, TMII “had managerial and administrative operations in the United States, and it exercised contractual rights and control over Tidewater’s vessel operations in Nigeria and Azerbaijan, among other areas.”
The criminal information concerns: (1) “bribes paid to Azeri tax inspectors”, and (2) “payment of bribes to Nigerian customs officials through the freight fowarding agent [Panalpina].”
Azerbaijan
According to the information, “in 2001, 2003, and 2005, the Azeri Tax Authority [a government entity responsible for administering and collecting tax assessments and duties for the Republic of Azerbaijan] initiated tax audits of TMII’s business operations in Azerbaijan.”
The information states that TMII employed the “Consulting Firm” [a U.S. consulting company incorporated in Texas and headquartered in Baku, Azerbaijan to provide a broad range of services including accounting services and tax advice and assistance] including the “Azerbaijan Agent” [the Managing Director of the Consulting Firm] to assit with the audits.
The information charges that “in 2001, 2003, and 2005, TMII, through its employees and agents, paid bribes to Azeri tax inspectors to improperly secure favorable tax assessments.”
According to the information, TMII “caused approximately $160,000 to be paid to the Dubai Entity [an entity associated with the Consulting Firm], while knowing that some or all of the money would be paid, with the assistance of the Azerbaijan Agent to Azeri tax inspectors.”
The information states that “the benefit received and the potential tax liability avoided by TMII as a result of the payment of the bribes was approximately $820,000.”
Nigeria
According to the information, between January 2002 through March 2007, Tidex Nigeria Limited (“Tidex”) [a Nigerian company 60% majority owned by Tidewater Marine” that “provided agency and operational support, at the direction of TMII, for all vessels that Tidewater operated in Nigeria during the relevant period”], through its employees, affiliates, and agents, authorized the payment of approximately $1.6 million to [Panalpina] as reimbursements for bribes paid by [Panalpina], made on Tidex’s behalf, to Nigeria Customs Service (“NCS”) employees to induce the officials to disregard certain regulatory requirements in Nigeria relating to the temporary importation of Tidewater vessles into Nigerian waters.” The information charges that by August 2004, “TMII managers and employees were aware of and condoned the payments.”
The regulatory requirements set forth in the information concern Nigeria’s rules and regulations relating to temporarily importing vessels and the “temporary importation permit” (“TIP”). For more on the TIP process see here.
According to the information, between August 2004 and 2007, TMII employees and other Tidewater employees authorized the payment of approximately $1,089,000 to [Panalpina], on Tidex’s behalf, knowing that some or all of the monies had been paid by [Panalpina] to NCS officials to induce them to disregard Nigerian regulations, to not impose fines and penalties, and to allow Tidewater vessels to operate in Nigerian waters without a valid TIP.”
The information states that the “total benefit in avoided costs, duties, and penalties received by TMII in exchange for these payments was approximately $5,800,000.”
Based on the above information, the information charges TMII with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and to knowingly falsify books and records (in connection with both the Azeri and Nigeria payments) and knowing falsification of books, records, and accounts in connection with “129 payments totaling approximately $1,089,00, as [Panalpina] costs when, in fact, the payments were, in whole or in part, paid to NCS officials.”
According to the information, the following individuals “authorized the payment of bribes” or “know, or were aware of a high probability” that bribes were being paid:
Director of Tax [a U.S. citizen located in New Orleans], the Dubai Area Controller[a U.S. citizen], the Regional Finance Director [a British citizen, but described as a “employee and agent of a domestic concern], the Azerbaijan General Manager A [a U.S. citizen] and the Azerbaijan General Manager B [a U.S. citizen] (as to Azeri payments); and
the Vice President of Operations [an Australian citizen who supervised, at various times, both Azerbaijan and Nigerian operations and described as an employee an agent of a domestic concern] and the Nigeria Area Manager [a British citizen] (as to Nigeria payments).
In addition, the information charges that certain money in furtherance of the bribe payments were wired from accounts located in the U.S.
Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Pursuant to the DPA, TMII admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, subsidiaries, and agents as set forth above.
The term of the DPA is three years and seven months and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement “based on the individual facts and circumstances” of the case and TMII. Among the factors stated are the following.
“TMII and TDW promptly commenced an internal investigation into its dealings with [Panalpina] after becoming aware of information indicating potential issues with [Panalpina];”
“promptly after commencing its internal investigation, TMII and TDW voluntarily disclosed the conduct described in the Information to the Deparment;”
“TMII and TDW voluntarily expanded their internal investigation to numerous operations and areas of the world outside Nigeria where no misconduct had been reported or suspected, and reported all relevant findings to the Department;”
“TMII and TDW hired a General Counsel with substantial international compliance experience, appointed him the Chief Compliance Offcer, and established a Corporate Compliance Committee;”
“TMII and TDW issued an enhanced, stand-alone FCPA compliance policy, substantially revised its Code of Conduct, as well as additional relevant policies and procedures, including a vetting and approval process for third part service providers and business parners upon implementation of that policy, and instituted a worldwide training program for employees;”
“TMII and TDW expanded their internal investigation to cover additional countries and business activities;”
“TMII and TDW cooperated with the Department’s investigation, including sharing all relevant investigation findings and making available numerous current and former employees;”
“TMII and TDW exhibited leadership in the oil and gas industry by leading an oil and gas industry initiative, both in the United States and abroad, to address the [Nigeria TIPs conduct];”
“TMII and TDW implemented an enhanced compliance program and have agreed to undertake further remedial measures as contemplated by this Agreement …;”
“TDW, on behalf of TMII, agreed to provide a written report to the Deparment on its progress and experience in maintaining and, as appropriate, enhancing its compliance policies and procedures …;” and
“TMII and TDW agreed to continue to cooperate with the Deparment in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of TMI and its directors, employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates,
and others relating to violations of the FCPA.”
As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above describe conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $10.5 million – $21 million. Pursuant to the DPA, TMII and TDW agreed that TMII shall pay a monetary penalty of $7.35 million – 30% below the minimum guideline amount.
As is standard in FCPA DPAs, TMII and TDW agreed not to make any public statement “contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by TMII as set forth” in the DPA and TMII and TDW further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.
SEC
The SEC’s complaint (here) concerns the same core set of facts as set forth in the DOJ’s DPA.
In summary fashion, the SEC alleges as to Azerbaijan conduct that “between August 2001 and November 2005, Tidewater Inc. […] directly or through its subsidiaries, affiliates, employees and agents, violated [the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions] by paying $160,000 in bribes to foreign government officials in Azerbaijan through a third party disguised as legitimate services to influence acts and decisions by these officials to resolve local Azeri tax audits in a Company subsidiary’s favor.”
According to the SEC, “these improper payments were authorized by senior employees at Tidewater and its subsidiaries while knowing, or ignoring red flags which indicated a high probability, such payments would be passed to government officials, inaccurately recorded in the Company’s or its affiliates’ books and records, and Tidewater failed to maintain sufficient internal controls to prevent such payments.”
The SEC complaint alleges that the payments included: (i) “on or about August 14, 2001, Tidewater authorized and paid $50,000 to a third party that it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, would be passed to government officials in Azerbaijan; (ii) “in July 2003, Tidewater authorized and paid $40,000 to a third party in two installments that it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, would be passed to government officials in Azerbaijan; and (iii) “on or about November 11, 2005, a Tidewater subsidiary authorized and paid $70,000 to a third party that it knew, or was reckless in not knowing, would be passed to government officials in Azerbaijan.”
The SEC’s complaint provides additional detail regarding the Azeri tax audits than the DOJ’s criminal information. The SEC’s allegations seem to suggest that the payments to the Azeri tax officials were the result of extortionate demands communicated to Tidewater entities through the Azerbaijan Agent. For instance, in connection with the 2001 tax audit, the complaint states that “Executive A [Tidewater’s CFO during the relevant period] believed that the 2001 Audit was sort of a ‘shakedown’ that the Azerbaijan Agent created in order to collect a fee.” As to this audit, the complaint further alleges that “Executive A and [another company employee] learned that the Azeri tax auditors threatened to use an accounting method that would result in a higher tax assessment because the tax auditors did not feel ‘respected.'” In connection with the 2002 tax audit, the complaint alleges that the Azerbaijan Agent informed Tidewater personnel “that the Azeri tax auditors had verbally identified a potential figure of up to $600,000 to resolve the 2003 audit” but that this “amount bore no relation to any actual tax assessment or penalty.”
As to Nigeria conduct, the SEC complaint alleges, in summary fashion, that “from in or about January 2002 through March 2007, Tidewater, through its subsidiaries and agents, also authorized the reimbursement of approximately $1.6 million to its customs broker in Nigeria used, in whole or in part, to make improper payments to Nigerian Customs Services (“NCS”) employees to induce them to disregard certain regulatory requirements in Nigeria relating to the temporary importation of the Company’s vessels into Nigerian waters.”
According to the SEC, both the Azeri and Nigerian payments:
“[W]ere improperly recorded as legitimate expenses in the Company’s books and records and all of them, with the exception of the 2003 Azerbaijan payments, were consolidated into Tidewater’s financial statements. Tidewater’s internal controls, including at least two internal audits, failed to detect numerous red flags which should have alerted its management that the Azerbaijan agent and Nigerian customs broker were likely using funds provided by Tidewater, in whole or in part, to make improper payments to government officials.”
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Tidewater with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions.
As to the company’s internal controls, the SEC specifically alleged as follows.
“Tidewater’s controls over the engagement and activities of agents operating in high-risk jurisdictions outside of the marketing and sales area were inadequate. For example, the Company’s compliance program, including training provided to its employees, did not adequately address the applicability of the FCPA to customs, tax, and similar regulatory issues in its foreign subsidiary operations until March 2007. Moreover, employees in Azerbaijan easily circumvented the Company’s internal controls by setting up small cash reserves for contingencies, dividing the improper payments into increments below their discretional financial authority and processing a payment through a Company affiliate. Some of the payments for invoices that the Nigerian Agent submitted to Tidex were authorized, processed and funded without the work order or supporting documentation necessary to verify that the service was requested and rendered. Tidewater also conducted internal audits in 2001 and 2003 of its Nigerian operations that failed to detect the improper payments even though weaknesses with invoices from, and payments to, agents and consultants were identified.”
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Tidewater agreed to an injunction and the payment of $8,104,362 in disgorgement and a $217,000 penalty.
Lucinda Low (here) (Steptoe & Johnson) represented Tidewater.
“The Payments … Would Not Constitute Facilitation Payments for Routine Governmental Actions Within the Meaning of the FCPA”
The above words are from the DOJ’s non-prosecution agreement with Noble Corporation (“Noble”). The DOJ used this phrase twice in the NPA and one can reasonably conclude that if the DOJ felt the need to express such a statement twice, that the FCPA’s facilitating payment exception is probably on the minds of many in connection with the CustomsGate enforcement actions.
Next up in the analysis of CustomsGate enforcement actions is Noble Corporation (see here). See this prior post for analysis of the GlobalSantaFe enforcement action.
The Noble enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $8.2 million ($2.6 million criminal fine via a non-prosecution agreement; $5.6 million in disgorgement and interest via a SEC complaint).
During the time period relevant to the enforcement action, Noble was a Cayman Islands company. In March 2009, a new Swiss parent company, also called Noble Corporation, was created and Noble Corporation, the Cayman Islands company, became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Swiss parent company.
DOJ
As set forth in the NPA (see here), the DOJ agreed “not to criminally prosecute Noble […] or any of subsidiaries […] related to the making of improper payments by employees and agents of Noble and/or its subsidiaries to officials of the Nigerian Customs Service in connection with Noble’s and/or its subsidiaries’ import and export of goods and items relating to its operations in Nigeria from January 2003 to July 2007, and the accounting and record-keeping associated with these improper payments.”
According to the Statement of Facts in the NPA, a “Nigerian Customs Agent” provided a variety of logistics and customs services for Noble Drilling (Nigeria) Ltd. (“Noble Nigeria”) a wholly-owned subsidiary of Noble and the primary Noble operating company in Nigeria. The Nigerian Customs Agent submitted false documents to Nigerian customs officials on behalf of Noble Nigeria “relating to the temporary importation of rigs owned or operated by Noble Nigeria into Nigerian waters” and the Nigerian Customs Agent invoiced Noble Nigeria and was paid for its services.
The Statement of Facts describes “The Nigerian Temporary Import Process.” As described, if Noble were to “permanently import a rig into Nigerian waters” the customs duties were significant, between 10-20% of the total value of the rig. Alternatively, Noble could import rigs and other items on a temporary basis in which case no customs duties would be assessed. However, as described in the Statement of Facts, “a rig, or other item, could be imported on a temporary basis only if the item: (a) was considered a high valued piece of special equipment, (b) was not available for sale in Nigeria, and (c) was being imported temporarily and was intended to be exported.” If these requirements were met, “a company, through a local customs agent, could apply for a temporary import permit.” (“TIP”).
According to the Statement of Facts, “items imported under a TIP (and TIP extension) could not remain in Nigeria longer than the period allowed for by the TIP and/or TIP extensions. When the TIP (or TIP extension) expired, the owner “could either choose to permanently import the rig … or export the rig and re-import it and obtain a new initial TIP.” According to the Statement of Facts, “the failure to export the rig after the TIP expired could result in the assessment of Nigerian penalties of up to six times its cost.”
The Statement of Facts indicate that Noble Nigeria chose to temporarily import rigs into Nigeria and that Noble Nigeria employed the Nigeria Customs Agent to apply for and secure its TIPs and TIP extension.
According to the Statement of Facts, “whenever a TIP (and related TIP extensions) expired for a rig in Nigeria, the Nigerian Customs Agent, with the knowledge of Noble Nigeria, engaged in a process of submitting false paperwork on Noble Nigeria’s behalf to avoid the time, cost, and risk associated with exporting the rig and reimporting it into Nigerian waters” – the so called “paper process” or a “paper move.” The Statement of Facts further assert that the “Nigeria Customs Agent, with the knowledge of Noble Nigeria, created and caused to be presented to the [Nigeria Customs Service] NCS documents that reflected that the rig had been physically exported and reimported, when, in fact, the rig had remained in Nigeria.”
According to the Statement of Facts, the Nigeria Customs Agent included a line item in its invoices for “special handling charges” and “Noble Nigeria personnel were informed by the Nigerian Customs Agent that all or part of the ‘special handling charges’ would be paid by the Nigeria Customs Agents to NCS officials.” Further, the Statement of Facts assert that “Noble Nigeria personnel approved the payments to the Nigerian Customs Agent with the knowledge that some or all of the payments would be paid to NCS officials.”
The Statement of Facts assert that “certain Noble and Noble Nigeria managers and employees authorized paper moves on five occasions.” In a separate section of the NPA titled, “Corporate Knowledge of the TIP Paper Process” the following statements are made.
“Manager A” (a U.S. citizen and a former manager in Noble’s Internal Audit Department) “interviewed several Noble-Nigeria employees who explained that false paperwork had been created and submitted to NCS officials through the Nigeria Customs Agent in connection with the process of securing TIPs” and that Manager A “also learned that the Nigeria Customs Agent in the past had charged a fee of approximately $75,000 per TIP to secure the TIPS.”
Manager A provided a written summary to Executive A (a U.S. citizen, an officer of Noble, and Head of Internal Audit).
Executive A discussed Manager A’s findings with Executive B (a U.S. citizen, an officer of Noble, and the Vice President-Eastern Hemisphere with management responsibility for Nigerian operations). Executive A then informed the Senior Executive (a U.S. citizen, an officer of Noble, and the former Chief Financial Officer).
The Audit Committee was advised of the “paper process” as was “members of Noble’s senior management.”
Executive B was tasked with “ensuring the Company’s compliance with all applicable rules and regulations related to the importation and exportation of assets in Nigeria…”.
Corrective action was contemplated, such as permanently importing rigs or moving them to a free trade zone, but Manager A and Executive B “decided that due to the time, cost, and risk of permanently importing or moving the rigs, the paper process would be used for three rigs for which TIPs had expired.”
“The Audit Committee was not advised of the decision to resume the paper process.”
Without any elaboration, the Statement of Facts states that the above described payments “would not constitute facilitation payments for routine governmental actions within the meaning of the FCPA.”
The Statement of Facts continue – between May 2005 and March 2006 “a total of five (5) TIPs were obtained through the submission of false documents via the paper process, and each included the payment of ‘special handling fees’ to the Nigeria Customs Agent. The ‘special handling fees’ ranged from approximately $13,800 to $17,000.”
According to the Statement of Facts:
“By their approval of the payments and the process, the Senior Executive, and Executive B caused Noble to inaccurately record in its books, records, and accounts the five (5) “special handling fee” payments paid to the Nigeria Customs Agent in a “facilitation payments” account totaling approximately $74,000, when the Senior Executive, Executive A, and Executive B knew that some or all of these payments would be passed on to NCS officials to obtain TIPs. Thus, such payments could not be facilitation payments for the performance of a “routine governmental action” within the meaning of the FCPA.”
The remainder of the Statement of Facts describes how Executive A failed to advise the Audit Committee and/or concealed from the Audit Committee that the paper process had resumed.
According to the Statement of Facts, “the total benefit received by Noble Nigeria for these payments in avoided costs, duties, and penalties was approximately $2,973,000.”
As noted in the NPA, the DOJ agreed to enter into the NPA based, in part, on the following factors:
“The Department enters into this Non-Prosecution Agreement based, in part, on the following factors: (a) Noble’s discovery of the violations through its own internal investigation; (b) Noble’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the facts described in [the Statement of Facts]; (c) Noble’s extensive, thorough, real-time cooperation with the Department and the SEC …; (d) Noble’s voluntary investigation of the Company’s business operations throughout the world; (e) the existence of Noble’s pre-existing compliance program and steps taken by Noble’s Audit Committee to detect and prevent improper conduct from occurring; (f) Noble’s remedial efforts to enhance its compliance program and oversight that have already been undertaken; (g) Noble’s agreement to continue to implement enhanced compliance measures …; and (h) Noble’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in maintaining and, as appropriate, enhancing its compliance policies and procedures …”.
As is standard process in an NPA, Noble admitted, accepted, and acknowledged its responsibility for the conduct of its employees, agents, and subsidiaries as set forth in a Statement of Facts, and further agreed “not to make any public statement contradicting” the Statement of Facts.
SEC
The SEC’s complaint (here) concerns the same core set of facts as set forth in the DOJ’s NPA.
In summary fashion, the SEC alleges that “through the TIPs obtained using the paper process, Noble obtained profits from continued operations of rigs in Nigeria and avoided the costs of moving rigs out of and back into Nigerian waters.” According to the SEC, “Noble’s total gains from this conduct were at least $4,294,933.”
The SEC charged Noble with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, as well as the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
As to the FCPA’s books and records charge, the SEC alleges that “Noble Nigeria recorded the portion of the payments it made to its customs agent that certain Noble personnel believed were being passed on to Nigerian government officials in Noble’s ‘facilitating payment’ account and in some cases to other operating expense accounts…” However, without elaborating the SEC states, “because these payments were not qualifying facilitating payments under the FCPA or otherwise legitimate expenses, Noble created false books and records by recording the payments as such.”
As to the internal controls charges, the SEC alleges that “although Noble had an FCPA policy in place, Noble lacked sufficient FCPA procedures, training, and internal controls to prevent the use of the paper process and making of payments to Nigerian government officials to obtain TIPs and TIP extensions.”
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Noble agreed to agreed to an injunction and will pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $5,576,998.
Neither the DOJ nor the SEC resolution require the company to engage a compliance monitor.
Both the DOJ’s NPA and the SEC’s complaint specifically mention that Noble conducted a worldwide review of its operations. That no other conduct was mentioned in either the DOJ’s NPA or the SEC’s complaint, suggests that Noble’s Nigerian import/export issues were an isolated incident, not indicative of systemic issues throughout the company’s other operations.
In a press release (here) Noble’s CEO stated that “ethical business conduct and strict compliance with the law remain central to Noble’s operating philosophy,” that the company “is pleased that these investigations have been concluded and a resolution has been reached,” and that the company “is moving forward with a continuing commitment to ethical business practices and a dedication to compliance, ideas that are reflected in our core values, our policies, our training and our expectations for ethical behavior.” The release notes as follows: “In May 2007, the Company self-reported to the DOJ and the SEC possible improper payments by a customs agent in connection with securing temporary import permits and extensions for the operations of Noble’s rigs in Nigeria. An internal investigation was promptly conducted by independent outside counsel, and the Company has cooperated thoroughly with the independent investigator’s review and the government’s investigation.”
In a 10-K filing yesterday, Noble stated as follows:
“We are currently operating three jackup rigs offshore Nigeria. The temporary import permits covering two of these rigs expired in November 2008 and we have pending applications to renew these permits. We have received notice that we will be allowed to obtain a new temporary import permit for one of the two rigs and are in the process of clarifying this approval. However, as of October 31, 2010, the Nigerian customs office had not acted on our application for the second unpermitted rig, but we are discussing undertaking the same process as for the first rig. We did obtain a new temporary import permit for the third rig in 2009 that had previously been operating with an expired temporary import permit, while the application was pending, by exporting and re−importing the rig. We continue to seek to avoid material disruption to our Nigerian operations; however, there can be no assurance that we will be able to obtain new permits or further extensions of permits necessary to continue the operation of our rigs in Nigeria. If we cannot obtain a new permit or an extension necessary to continue operations of any rig, we may need to cease operations under the drilling contract for such rig and relocate such rig from Nigerian waters. In any case, we also could be subject to actions by Nigerian customs for import duties and fines for these two rigs, as well as other drilling rigs that operated in Nigeria in the past. We cannot predict what impact these events may have on any such contract or our business in Nigeria. Furthermore, we cannot predict what changes, if any, relating to temporary import permit policies and procedures may be established or implemented in Nigeria in the future, or how any such changes may impact our business there.
Mary Spearing, a former DOJ attorney (here), represented Noble.
Failure to Move Rigs Costs GlobalStantaFe
When an FCPA enforcement action involving 13 separate entities, comprising both DOJ and SEC components, is announced on the same day, there is a natural tendency to look at the forest, without spending much time on the trees.
Today’s post, and those that will follow in the near future, will focus on the separate enforcement actions (see here) announced by the DOJ/SEC on November 4th, in what I’ll call “CustomsGate.”
First up, GlobalSantaFe Corp. (“GSF”), the only enforcement action without a DOJ component.
GSF provided offshore oil and gas drilling services for oil and gas exploration companies. (GSF is a former issuer that completed a merger with a subsidiary of Transocean Inc. and became known as Transocean Worldwide, Inc. which is a subsidary of Transocean Ltd., an issuer).
In order to import equipment necessary to do such work in Nigeria, GSF needed to obtain a temporary importation permit (“TIP”) from the Nigerian government through the Nigerian Customs Service (“NCS”). Obtaining a TIP required mounds of paperwork. TIPS were initially issued for one year and were allowed to be extended twice for a period of six months each. Rarely, and only in the discretion of NCS officials, could a third six-month extension be granted.
Prior to or after a TIP expired, GSF was required to move its rigs out of Nigerian waters and to begin again the paper heavy TIP application process. Failure to export a rig after the expiration of a TIP, and all permissible extensions, would render a rig subject to potential forfeiture or seizure.
Moving a rig is no small task, it requires tug boats and money.
So begins the SEC’s complaint (here) against GSF.
According to the SEC, “instead of moving its oil drilling rigs out of Nigerian waters when GSF’s permit to temporarily import the rigs into Nigeria had expired, GSF, through its customs brokers, made payments to NCS officials in order to obtain documentation reflecting that the rigs had moved out of Nigerian waters, when in fact, the rigs had not moved at all.”
According to the SEC, there were four such instances.
The Adriatic VIII should have left Nigerian waters on or before October 15, 2004. However, in September 2004, the SEC alleges that “GSF, through its customs broker, took steps to obtain false documentation from NCS reflecting that the Adriatic VIII left Nigeria on September 29, 2004.” According to the SEC, “GSF paid its customs broker $87,500 (wired through a bank account in the name of GSF located in the U.S.) to obtain the new TIP, including a payment of $3,500 identified on the customs broker’s invoice as ‘additional charges for export.” According to the SEC, GSF managers in Nigeria “knew that the Adriatic VIII had never actually left Nigerian waters and knew, or knew that there was a high probability, that the explanation on the invoice as ‘additional charges for export’ was for purposes of disguising a bribe.” According to the SEC, a fews years later, GSF, through its customs-broker, again obtained false documentation from NCS reflecting that the Adriatic VIII had left Nigerian waters when, in fact, it had not.”
The Adriatic I should have left Nigerian waters on or before January 31, 2004. However, before this date, the SEC alleges that “GSF, through its customs broker, obtained documentation from NCS, reflecting that the Adriatic I left Nigeria on January 31, 2004 when, in fact, it had not.”
The Baltic I should have left Nigerian waters on or before June 3, 2004. However, before this date, the SEC alleges that “GSF, through its customs broker, took steps to obtain documentation from NCS, reflecting that the Baltic I left Nigeria on June 25, 2004. According to the SEC, the GSF managers “authorized and submitted for payment invoices containing charges described as ‘additional charges for export’ when the same GSF managers knew that the GSF rig had not been exported from Nigeria.” Thus, the SEC alleges, the “GSF managers either knew that the ‘additional charges for export’ were bribes, or knew that there was a high probability that they were bribes.
By engaging in the above referenced conduct, the SEC alleged that GSF: (1) avoided costs of approximately $1.5 million from not physicially moving the rigs; and (2) gained revenues of approximately $619,000 from not interrupting operations to move the rigs.”
The SEC charged GSF, on the above facts, with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
Because none of the above-described payments were “accurately reflected in GSF’s books and records,” the SEC also charged GSF with violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions in connection with the above payments.
There is more to the SEC’s complaint.
It is common for an enforcement agency (whether DOJ or SEC) to ask the “where else question.” In other words, if the company was making the above-described payments in country x, where else was the company also making similar payments?
This frequent question causes the company to do a worldwide review of its operations and report back the results to the enforcement agency.
This is why an SEC complaint or DOJ resolution vehicle often contains a laundry list of related allegations towards the end of the resolution vehicle.
Case in point, the SEC’s complaint against GSF.
The SEC alleges that “GSF, through its customs brokers, made a number of additional payments to government officials in Nigeria totaling approximately $82,000.” The complaint gives sparse detail as to these alleged “other suspicious payments.”
Further, the SEC alleges that “GSF, through its customs brokers, also made a number of other payments […] totaling approximately $300,000 to government officials in Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea.”
These “other suspicious payments” in Nigeria and the Gabon, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea payments were not accurately reflected in GSF’s books and records and GSF failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls to prevent or detect them, thus giving rise to FCPA books and records and internal charges. (These other payments were not included in the FCPA anti-bribery charges).
Based on the entire above-described conduct, and without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, GSF agreed to pay $5.85 million (approximately 3.75 million in disgorgement and a 2.1 million penalty).
Thinking About The FCPA’s Facilitating Payment Exception?
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act specifically states that its anti-bribery provisions “shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official […] the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign official …”.
The term “routine governmental action” means an action “which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official in,” among other things, “obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country.”
The 1988 Conference Report (here), which ironed out the differences between House and Senate bills creating the exception, states:
“The Conferees wish to make clear that ‘ordinarily and commonly performed’ actions with respect to permits or licenses would not include those governmental approvals involving an exercise of discretion by a government official where the actions are the functional equivalent of obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person.”
This is what the FCPA says and the DOJ acknowledges, at least on paper (see here), that “there is an exception to the anti-bribery prohibition for payments to facilitate or expedite performance of a ‘routine governmental action.'”
However, corporations tend to be risk averse.
Thus, against the backdrop of enforcement agencies seemingly incapable of recognizing that the FCPA does indeed contain a “facilitating payment” exception, a risk averse corporation may just say the heck with it, why risk making a payment exempted from the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions if enforcement agencies are likely to nevertheless conclude that the payment violates the FCPA.
It is against this backdrop that the recent SEC filing (see here) of Transocean, the world’s largest offshore drilling contractor, caught my eye.
It states, in relevant part, as follows:
“We are currently involved in several investigations by the DOJ and the SEC involving our operations and whether or not we or any of our
employees have violated the FCPA.”
“Our current investigations include a review of amounts paid to and by customs brokers in connection with the obtaining of permits for the temporary importation of vessels and the clearance of goods and materials. These permits and clearances are necessary in order for us to operate our vessels in certain jurisdictions. There is a risk that we may not be able to obtain import permits or renew temporary importation permits in West African countries, including Nigeria, in a manner that complies with the FCPA. As a result, we may not have the means to renew temporary importation permits for rigs located in the relevant jurisdictions as they expire or to send goods and equipment into those jurisdictions, in which event we may be forced to terminate the pending drilling contracts and relocate the rigs or leave the rigs in these countries and risk permanent importation issues, either of which could have an adverse effect on our financial results. In addition, termination of drilling contracts could result in damage claims by customers.”
Based on the above disclosure, it is difficult to analyze whether Transocean is legitimately entitled to the permits and clearances it is seeking.
Let’s assume this is the case, but that a low-level government bureaucrat with a hand out is demanding a payment to do what he otherwise has a legal obligation to do – and that is grant licenses and permits pursuant to the applicable governing rules and regulations.
If this is the case, it is unfortunate that a company feels no other option than to breach contracts and materially restructure its operations because the enforcement agencies are seemingly incapable of recognizing that Congress specifically authorized companies subject to the FCPA to make facilitating payments such as those that perhaps Transocean would have to make in order to secure the permits and clearances at issue.
While some find facilitating payments to be a corrupt payment under a different name (see here) and while the soon-to-be implemented U.K. Bribery Act contains no such exemption, the fact remains that the FCPA contains an express exception for facilitating payments and it is this statute that the enforcement agencies are obligated to enforce.
Bonny Island Bribery Club Statistics
Bonny Island.
It is located at the southern edge of the Niger delta of Nigeria. (see here).
It is the location featured in several corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions – actions that have thus far resulted in approximately $1.3 billion in fines, penalties and disgorgement.
This number is sure to grow as one member of the joint venture at the center of bribery scheme – JGC of Japan – has yet to resolve its exposure although (as noted in this post from the FCPA Blog) it has confirmed that it is discussions with the DOJ.
In addition, the DOJ, in its indictments of Jeffrey Tesler and Wojciech Chodan, is seeking forfeiture of $132 million.
Further, as noted in this prior post, Halliburton has disclosed that it faces exposure in the U.K. in connection with a Serious Fraud Office investigation of M.W. Kellogg Company (“MWKL”), a United Kingdom joint venture 55% owned by KBR. In its most recent 10-Q (here) Halliburton stated:
“MWKL is cooperating with the SFO’s investigation. Whether the SFO pursues civil or criminal claims, and the amount of any fines, restitution, confiscation of revenues or other penalties that could be assessed would depend on, among other factors, the SFO’s findings regarding the amount, timing, nature and scope of any improper payments or other activities, whether any such payments or other activities were authorized by or made with knowledge of MWKL, the amount of revenue involved, and the level of cooperation provided to the SFO during the investigations. MWKL has informed the SFO that it intends to self-report corporate liability for corruption-related offenses arising out of the Bonny Island project. MWKL has received confirmation that it has been admitted into the plea negotiation process under the Guidelines on Plea Discussions in Cases of Complex or Serious Fraud, which have been issued by the Attorney General for England and Wales.”
While the Bonny Island Bribery Club statistics are not yet final, this post provides a detailed breakdown of the current statistics.
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC / Halliburton Company / KBR Inc. (Feb. 2009)
Attorneys: Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP
DOJ
Entity: Kellogg Brown & Root LLC
Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation (4 Counts)
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal Information and Plea Agreement
Benefit Received From Improper Payments: $235.5 Million
Sentencing Guidelines Range: $376.8 Million – $753.6 Million
Amount of Fine: $402 Million
Monitor: Yes – Three Years
SEC
Entity: Halliburton Company, KBR Inc.
Charges: FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Violation (Halliburton Company), Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation, Aiding and Abetting Halliburton’s FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Violation, Knowingly Falsifying Books and Records and Knowingly Circumventing Internal Controls (KBR Inc.),
Disgorgement Amount: $177 Million
Technip S.A. (June 2010)
Attorneys: Patton Boggs LLP; Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz
DOJ
Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation (1 Count)
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal Information and Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Term – 2 Years, 7 Months)
Value of Benefit Received From Improper Payments: $199 Million
Sentencing Guidelines Range: $318.4 Million – $636.8 Million
Amount of Fine: $240 Million (25% Below Minimum Guidelines Range)
Monitor: Yes – Two Years
SEC
Charges: Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation, FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Violation
Disgorgement Amount: $98 Million
Snamprogetti Netherlands BV, ENI S.p.A (July 2010)
Attorneys: Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
DOJ
Entity: Snamprogetti Netherlands BV
Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Aiding and Abetting FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation (1 Count)
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal Information and Deferred Prosecution Agreement (Term 2 Years)
Value of Benefit Received From Improper Payments: $214.3 Million
Sentencing Guidelines Range: $300 Million – $600 Million
Amount of Fine: $240 Million (20% Below Minimum Guidelines Range)
Monitor: No
SEC
Entity: Snamprogetti Netherlands BV, ENI S.p.A.
Charges: Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation, Knowingly Falsifying Books and Records and Knowingly Circumventing Internal Controls (Snamprogetti Netherlands BV), FCPA Books and Records and Internal Controls Violation (ENI S.p.A.)
Disgorgement Amount: $125 Million
[Note in all three of the above corporate actions, the entity received a -2 reduction in the culpability score for cooperation. Snamprogetti’s total culpability score (and thus base fine multiplier) was below that of Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC, and Technip given that the company has fewer employees].
Albert Jackson Stanley (August 2008)
Attorney: Larry Veselka (Smyser, Kaplan & Veselka LLP)
DOJ
Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Conspiracy to Commit Mail and Wire Fraud (1 Count)
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal Information and Plea Agreement
Plea Agreement Contemplates an $10.8 Million Restitution Order (the amount Stanley agreed the victim – his former employer – incurred as a monetary loss because of his conduct)
Plea Agreement Contemplates a Sentence of 84 months (subject to a downward departure for cooperation)
SEC
Charges: Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation, Knowingly Falsifying Books and Records and Knowingly Circumventing Internal Controls
Permanent Injunction
Jeffrey Tesler (March 2009)
Indictment Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violations (10 Counts)
Indictment Seeks Forfeiture $132 Million
Wojciech Chodan (March 2009)
Indictment Charges: Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (1 Count), Substantive FCPA Anti-Bribery Violations (10 Counts)
Indictment Seeks Forfeiture $132 Million