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Unsealed Documents In Enforcement Acton Against Former BizJet Executives Reveal A Trove Of Information

Yesterday’s post (here) summarized the criminal indictments against former BizJet executives Bernd Kowalewski and Jald Jensen.  Today’s post discusses the related criminal informations, based on the same core set of conduct, against former BizJet executives Peter DuBois (former Vice President of Sales & Marketing) and Neal Uhl (former Controller, Vice President of Finance).  As noted in the prior post, DuBois and Uhl agreed to plead guilty and were sentenced last week.

Today’s post also highlights documents recently unsealed in the DuBois and Uhl action which reveal a trove of information of interest to anyone curious about the inner workings of an FCPA enforcement action and connecting the dots to other FCPA enforcement actions.

DuBois was charged via a criminal information (here) with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and one substantive FCPA anti-bribery violation.  The conduct at issue is the same core set of conduct at issue in 2012 BizJet corporation action, as well as the criminal indictments against Kowalewski and Jensen.  That is a scheme to “obtain aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (“MRO”) service contracts and other business [for BizJet] from foreign government customers, including the Mexican Federal Police, the Mexican President’s Fleet, Sinaloa and the Panama Aviation Authority, by paying bribes to government officials employed by the foreign government customers.”

The DuBois information was filed on December 27, 2011 and the related motion by the DOJ to seal the docket (since unsealed) reveals the following.

As part of his plea agreement, DuBois worked in an undercover capacity for the government.  The motion specifically states as follows.  “As part of his work in an undercover capacity, Mr. DuBois has recorded conversations with former BizJet executives and other subjects of the government’s ongoing investigation.”  Later, the motion to seal states that “public identification of Mr. DuBois as a defendant who likely is cooperating with the government may jeopardize the undercover aspect of the government’s investigation.”

In the plea agreement, DuBois agreed to pay a forfeiture amount of $98,950 “representing proceeds derived by defendant in connection with the conspiracy” and to pay an additional $61,000 as the amount DuBois “received … as a result of his participation in the conspiracy.”

The DOJ’s memo in support of a downward departure for sentencing states as follows.

DuBois “assisted in the investigation from the outset and cooperated fully with the government throughout its investigation.  DuBois submitted to multiple interviews by the government and has assisted in every way that the government has asked.  DuBois told the truth to the government from the outset and continued to do so up until this very day.  DuBois’ cooperation not only assisted the government in connection with its investigation into BizJet, but also led to the investigation of another maintenance, repair, and overhaul company engaged in a similar scheme to pay bribes to government officials overseas.”

This last portion of the DOJ’s memo makes clear that the 2012 FCPA enforcement action against NORDAM Group (see here for the prior post) had its origins in the BizJet enforcement action.  Both BizJet and NORDAM Group are Tulsa, OK based aircraft maintenance companies.  The link and information about DuBois’ undercover role also raises the issue of whether individual prosecutions related to the NORDAM Group corporate enforcement action are also forthcoming.

As noted in the DOJ release, DuBois was sentenced to 60 months probation and eight months home detention.

Uhl was charged via a criminal information (here – filed on December 28, 2011) with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.  The conduct at issue is the same core set of conduct as indicated above, that is a scheme to “obtain aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (“MRO”) service contracts and other business [for BizJet] from foreign government customers, including the Mexican Federal Police, the Mexican President’s Fleet, Sinaloa and the Panama Aviation Authority, by paying bribes to government officials employed by the foreign government customers.”  See here for the Uhl plea agreement.

In the Uhl matter, the DOJ’s motion for a downward departure states as follows.

 Uhl “agreed to a voluntary proffer session and, when confronted by the government, admitted to the illegal conduct.  Throughout the course of the investigation, Uhl was cooperative and provided truthful information that substantially assisted the government in confronting other co-conspirators and witnesses.  Uhl offered to assist in any way that he could.”

As noted in the DOJ release, Uhl was sentenced to 60 months probation, eight months home detention, and was ordered to pay a $10,000 fine.

The motions to seal in both the DuBois and Uhl actions further state as follows. “BizJet’s corrupt payments were not limited to Mexico.  BizJet employees bribed key decision makers in a number of countries, including Panama, Brazil, and Chile.”  This is notable in that the 2012 BizJet corporate enforcement action made no mention of conduct in Brazil or Chile.  This demonstrates that resolution documents in a corporate FCPA enforcement action are the result of negotiations and that final documents rarely offer the complete picture of the conduct that allegedly occurred.

Both the DuBois and Uhl plea agreements further indicate that BizJet’s bribery scheme was not just in foreign countries.  Both plea agreements state that the customers or potential customers BizJet bribed “included customers both in the United States and abroad.

Was The DOJ Duped Again?

There have been two known instances of recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions in which the Department of Justice has given the corporate defendant resolving the action a pass on paying potential fine and penalty amounts based on the company’s claimed inability to pay.

The first occurred in 2010 in the Innospec enforcement action.  As detailed in this prior post, in March 2010 Innospec agreed to resolve a DOJ and SEC enforcement action by paying $25.3 million in combined fines and penalties after pleading guilty to FCPA and other offenses based largely on conduct in Iraq and Indonesia.  The total amount of fines and penalties could have been much higher as the minimum U.S. Sentencing Guidelines amount was $101.5 million and the SEC ordered the company to pay approximately $60 million.

However, Innospec received a pass on approximately $135 million in fines and penalties based on its claimed inability to pay.  The DOJ’s sentencing memorandum (here) stated as follows.  “Innospec has represented that it is unable to pay, and, even with the use of a reasonable installment schedule, is not likely to be able to pay, a $101.5 million fine. Over the course of nearly a year, Innospec has provided the Department, the SEC [and other U.S. and non-U.S. authorities] with detailed presentations regarding its current financial condition and available assets. Those representations have been analyzed in detail by qualified accounting professionals within the SEC […]. Innospec has represented that, were the company to pay more than the amount agreed, the continued viability of the company would be threatened, as follows: (1) Innospec would breach the limits of its credit facilities; (2) Innospec would be unable to make up a deficit in funding its pension plan, resulting in an $85 million shortfall; (3) Innospec would be unable to remediate certain environmental damage caused by its manufacturing facility in the United Kingdom; (4) Innospec would be unable to invest sufficiently in research and development; and (5) Innospec would be forced to close facilities around the world, resulting in dozens of employees losing their jobs.”  I then highlighted in a series of posts (here, here, and here) that Innospec, despite receiving a substantial pass based on inability to pay, thereafter consistently reported positive financial results.  In addition, Innospec settled a civil case connected to the FCPA enforcement action by agreeing to make an immediate $25 million cash payment to the plaintiff, as well as a committment to pay an additional $15 million in installments.

Based on the above facts and figures, it appears that the DOJ was duped.

The second known instance of a recent FCPA enforcement action in which the Department of Justice has given the corporate defendant resolving the action a pass on paying potential fine and penalty amounts based on the company’s claimed inability to pay occurred in the July 2012 NORDAM Group enforcement action.

As detailed in this prior post, the Tulsa, Oklahoma based privately held provider of aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul services agreed to enter into a non-prosecution agreement and pay a $2 million penalty “to resolve violations of FCPA” concerning business conduct in China.

As noted in the prior post, the NPA “recognizes that a fine below the standard range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is appropriate because NORDAM fully demonstrated to the department, and an independent accounting expert retained by the department verified, that a fine exceeding $2 million would substantially jeopardize the company’s continued viability.”  As to the fine reduction, the NPA further states as follows.  “This discount recognizes that, over a period of months, the Company fully cooperated with the Department and with an independent accounting expert that the Department retained to review the Company’s financial condition.  Following that review, the Department and its independent expert both concluded that this discount was appropriate under the Sentencing Guidelines.”

Unlike Innospec, NORDAM Group is not publicly held, so it is difficult to assess the true nature of its financial condition.  However, NORDAM Group’s federal government contracts are in the public domain and a simple internet search indicates that in the 90 days after resolving its FCPA enforcement action (in which the company received a pass on larger fine and penalty amounts because such larger amounts could jeopardize the company’s continued viability), NORDAM group has racked in approximately $24.4 million in federal government contracts.

On August 9th, the company was awarded a $187,500 contract by the U.S. Army Contracting Command, Huntsville, AL.

On September 18th, the company was awarded a $90,200 contract by the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, VA.

On September 27th, the company was awarded a $82,000 contract by the Defense Supply Center, Richmond, VA.

On September 28th, the company was awarded a $19,274,726 contract by a Department of Logistics Agency in Ogden, UT.

On September 28th, the company was awarded a $4,761,726 contract by a Department of Logistics Agency in Ogden, UT.

Was the DOJ duped again?

NORDAM Group Resolves Enforcement Action Through A Non-Prosecution Agreement

Earlier this week, the DOJ announced (here) that NORDAM Group. Inc. (here) (a Tulsa, OK based privately held provider of aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) services that employs approximately 2,500 people) agreed to enter into a non-prosecution agreement (here) and pay a $2 million penalty “to resolve violations of FCPA.”

The DOJ has previously stated that its DPAs and NPAs benefit the public and industries by “providing guidance on what constitutes improper conduct” (see this GAO report (Appendix III) and that it provides “clear guidance to companies with respect to FCPA enforcement through a variety of means” including “charging documents, plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements, press releases, and relevant pleadings and orders” that “are lengthy and detailed.”

If the DOJ wants all to have full confidence in its FCPA enforcement program and if it is genuinely interested in providing transparent guidance through its enforcement actions, the DOJ can do much better than its effort in the NORDAM NPA.  It is not as bare-bones as the Lufthansa Technik NPA (see here for the prior post), but close.

The substantive statement of facts (here) (all two pages) state as follows.

“NORDAM’s customers in China include state-owned and -controlled entities, including airlines created, controlled, and exclusively owned by the People’s Republic of China.  […]  From 1999 until 2008, employees at NSPL [NORDAM Singapore Pte. Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary of NORDAM that provides MRO services to customers in the Asia Pacific region, including China]  and WAAPL [World Aviation Associates Pte. Ltd., an affiliate of NORDAM that performs marketing and sales services for both NORDAM and NPSL in the Asia Pacific region, including in China] paid bribes to employees of state-owned and -controlled entities in China in order to obtain or retain MRO business with those customers. Several NORDAM employees in the United States were made aware of and approved these bribes. The bribes were referred to internally as “commissions” or “facilitator fees.” The facilitator fees were paid to “facilitators” who, in fact, were employees of customers. These facilitators were also referred to internally as “internal guys,” “internal ghosts,” or “our friends inside.”  The facilitator fees either were paid directly to the customer’s employee by wire transferring money to the employee’s bank account or were paid indirectly by first depositing the money into the personal bank accounts of WAAPL employees, who would then withdraw all or a portion of these fees to pay the customer employees in cash.  In or about 2002, in an effort to further disguise the payments to customer employees, three WAAPL employees created fictitious entities and entered into sales representation agreements with those entities. The commissions that NORDAM paid to these fictitious entities were used, at least in part, to pay employees of customers to assist in securing contracts for NORDAM and NSPL.  Although many of the bribe payments were paid out of NORDAM’s and NSPL’s gross profits, in some instances NORDAM, NSPL, and WAAPL artificially inflated the customer invoice to offset the bribes paid to those customers’ employees. As a result, in these instances, NORDAM’s customers were unknowingly reimbursing NORDAM for the bribes that NORDAM paid to customer employees to secure the projects.  On or about April 22, 2004, a NORDAM employee sent an e-mail to two WAAPL employees, stating, “[d]o what you have to do to get the business. If that means using an agent, then let’s make sure we are discrete when communicating the information in trip reports. I agree . . . that we should not require an agent at every account, however, I also understand the reality of doing business in Asia. I trust your judgment, it is your call.”  On or about December 30, 2004, an agent of WAAPL sent an e-mail to a NORDAM employee and two WAAPL employees, stating, “[o]n this deal we also need to cover our friends inside.”  On or about December 30, 2004, the NORDAM employee responded to the email …  stating, “I don’t see where our friends have done anything to help us here. If our friends can help us, I will agree to split 50/50 with you any amount we get over $160K.”  In all, NORDAM, NSPL, and WAAPL paid as high as $1.5 million in bribes to secure roughly $2.48 million in profits from state-owned and controlled customers in China.”

Who were the state-owned and controlled entities in China?  What attributes of those entities made them state-owned or controlled?.  As to the employees at NSPL and WAAPL, what types of employees, what was their job function?  As to the NORDAM employees in the U.S. “made aware of and approved these bribes” what types of employees, what was their job function?  How did they become aware of the bribes?  How did they approve the bribes?

Is it asking/expecting too much for the DOJ to set forth such information in its resolution documents?

The NPA (which has a term of three years) states as follows.

“The Department enters into this [NPA] based, in part, on the following factors:  (a) the Company’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct; (b) the Company’s real-time cooperation with the Department, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making employees available for interviews, and collecting and analyzing voluminous documents and information for the Department; (c) the Company’s remedial efforts already undertaken, including enhancing its internal audit function, its compliance program, and its due diligence protocol for third-party agents, and to be undertaken, [pursuant to the NPA]; (d) the Company’s agreement to provide annual, written reports to the Department on its progress and experience in monitoring and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures [pursuant to the NPA]; and (e) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of the Company and its officers, directors, employees, agents, and consultants relating to violations of the FCPA.

As noted in the DOJ’s release, the NPA “recognizes that a fine below the standard range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines is appropriate because NORDAM fully demonstrated to the department, and an independent accounting expert retained by the department verified, that a fine exceeding $2 million would substantially jeopardize the company’s continued viability.”  As to the fine reduction, the NPA further states as follows.  “This discount recognizes that, over a period of months, the Company fully cooperated with the Department and with an independent accounting expert that the Department retained to review the Company’s financial condition.  Following that review, the Department and its independent expert both concluded that this discount was appropriate under the Sentencing Guidelines.”

What was the discount?  There is no information in the NPA or associated documents that shed light on this issue.

This Tulsa World article states as follows.

“NORDAM executives said all but three of the employees involved in the bribery schemes had left the company when the scandal was discovered in 2008. The three employees still with the company were fired, they said.  NORDAM officials said three employees of World Aviation Associates created fictitious companies and entered into agreements with the companies under which the companies would be paid commissions for sales of NORDAM products and services to customers. The arrangements made it difficult to trace the money, company executives said.”

The article further states as follows.

“NORDAM CEO Meredith Siegfried said it is “disheartening” for a company that has prided itself on its values and integrity to discover the violations of federal law. “At the same time, our determination and efforts to make sure no such event would ever occur again have given us a significantly higher level of alertness and much improved procedures and processes,” she said. “We are striving to have a robust compliance program which is considered to be an industry benchmark.” In a letter to NORDAM employees, Siegfried said everybody at NORDAM is receiving training to comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. “Every stakeholder has also signed a statement that the requirements are understood and agreed to, and this statement is required to be signed annually by all of us,” Siegfried said. “We have also revised our policies and procedures regarding our use of agents and conducted a comprehensive review of the agents we use in other countries. These agents have also received training regarding the FCPA. “We also brought in outside counsel to conduct a comprehensive investigation of all the issues connected to these violations. It is important for you to know that the investigation concluded that no individual associated with NORDAM’s leadership or governance since 2008 was ever involved in, or approved of, any of the illegal activities.

Carlos Ortiz (LeClairRyan – here) represented NORDAM.

NORDAM has an active military aircraft business (see here) and has received, including recently and during the time period relevant to the conduct at issue, numerous federal government contracts.

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