Top Menu

FCPA Risks On Campus

University of Maryland College Park Campus

It’s hard not to read this recent Wall Street Journal article titled “American Colleges Pay Agents to Woo Foreigners Despite Fraud Risk” without thinking about the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

According to the article:

“Like many U.S. colleges, Wichita State University wants more foreign students but isn’t a brand name abroad. So the school, whose mascot is a muscle-bound wheat bundle, in late 2013 started paying agents to recruit in places like China and India. The independent agents assemble candidates’ documents and urge them to apply to the Kansas school, which pays the agents $1,000 to $1,600 per enrolled student. Overseas applications “shot up precipitously,” says Vince Altum, Wichita State’s executive director for international education. But there is a down side: Wichita State rejected several Chinese applications this year from an agency it suspected of falsifying transcripts, Mr. Altum says, adding that it terminates ties with agencies found to violate its code of conduct by faking documents. Paying agents a per-student commission is illegal under U.S. law when recruiting students eligible for federal aid—that is, most domestic applicants. But paying commissioned agents isn’t illegal when recruiting foreigners who can’t get federal aid. So more schools like Wichita State are relying on such agents, saying the intermediaries are the most practical way to woo overseas youths without the cost of sending staff around the world. No one officially counts how many U.S. campuses pay such agents, most of whom operate abroad, but experts estimate at least a quarter do so.”

The above use of agents is not the only FCPA risk that colleges and universities face.

In recent years, several schools have opened foreign campuses (either directly or through affiliates) in places such as China, India, and the Middle East. In short, the government approvals, licenses, permits, and certifications in doing so are no different than a company needing government approvals to establish a manufacturing presence in a foreign country.

No doubt in recognition of the above risks, I’ve noticed in recent years more and more schools adopting FCPA policies.  See here and here for examples.

That educational institutions (or those that purport to be as highlighted by the below enforcement action) can face FCPA risk is not merely an academic hypothetical.

The remainder of this post summarizes an unusual 2006 FCPA enforcement against Richard Novak.

Novak and others owned and operated several internet businesses using the names “Saint Regis University,” “Robertstown University” and “James Monroe University.” According to the superseding information “they were diploma mills in that these ‘universities’ had no legitimate faculty members; offered no legitimate academic curriculum or services; required no course work or class work; and were not recognized by the United States Department of Education.”

According to the superseding information, Novak made a bribe payment to the “Consult and First Secretary at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. in order to assist Saint Regis University and its owners in fraudulently selling diplomas through their internet businesses.”

Elsewhere, the superseding information states that “various foreign government officials who received the bribes held various positions at the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Liberian Embassy in Accra, Ghana, and at the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Liberia in Monrovia, Liberia” and that these individuals, among other things, “were in a position to: issue certificates of accreditation and recognition; issue notarial certificates; issue letters claiming that Saint Regis University was fully accredited and recognized by the Ministry of Education in the Republic of Liberia; and cause staff at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. to answer the telephone calls in a positive way when inquiries regarding the legitimacy [of the Universities] were made.”

Although not specifically mentioned in the superseding information, a component of the original indictment (here) against Novak and several others was that U.S. Secret Service agents posed as high school dropouts seeking degrees.

Novak was charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA and FCPA violations.  He pleaded guilty (see here) and was sentenced to three years probation.

Non-Profits And The FCPA

Non-Profits

A reader recently asked:

“Do you have any information specific to non-profits and NGO’s in regard to FCPA and anti-bribery and corruption statistics?”

To my knowledge, there has never been a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against a non-profit or NGO.

That is not to say that non-profits can not be subject to the FCPA.

In terms of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions, those are only applicable to issuers (generally speaking companies with shares traded on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to file certain reports with the SEC) , so that is easy, such provisions do not apply to non-profits.

However, it would be wise for non-profits to otherwise act consistent with such provisions for the simple reason that they represent good governance and adherence to such provisions can reduce the risk of FCPA anti-bribery violations (to which non-profits and those associated with non-profits can be subject to) as well as reduce the risk of other legal violations.

In terms of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, they apply to “issuers,” “domestic concerns,” and “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns.”

The FCPA defines “domestic concern” as follows:

“(A) any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and (B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.”  (“emphasis added).

Not only could a non-profit itself qualify as a “domestic concern,” but U.S. citizens or nationals working for or acting on behalf of a non-profit would independently qualify as a “domestic concern” under the FCPA.

The FCPA defines “person” under the dd-3 prong of the statute applicable to “persons other than issuers or domestic concerns” as follows.

The term “person,” when referring to an offender, means any natural person other than a. national of the United States or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the law of a foreign nation or a political subdivision thereof.” (emphasis added).

Here again, not only could a non-profit itself qualify as a “person,” but any natural person working for or acting on behalf of a non-profit would independently qualify as a “person” under the FCPA and could be subject to liability to the extent a bribery scheme involves a U.S. nexus, as stated in the jurisdictional prong of dd-3.

Just because there has not, to my knowledge, been an FCPA enforcement action against a non-profit, there could be.  For instance, this prior post highlighted an instance in which FCPA anti-bribery charges might perhaps have fit.

Indeed, non-profits have in the past raised concerns about potential FCPA liability in the form of FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases.

As highlighted in this prior post, Release 12-02 involved “19 non-profit adoption agencies headquartered in the U.S.” who sought an opinion “related to their proposal to host 18 government officials from a foreign country during visits to the United States.”  The DOJ did provide clearance as to the proposed conduct, but did find that the requestors were indeed “domestic concerns” and thus subject to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

Release 12-02 was a near carbon-copy of Release 11-01, which as highlighted in this prior post, also involved  a “U.S. adoption service provider” request regarding a proposal “to pay certain expenses for a trip to the United States by one official from each of two foreign government agencies.”

Any FCPA enforcement action against a non-profit would present an interesting question given the FCPA’s required “obtain or retain business” element.  While the 5th Circuit in U.S. v. Kay did conclude that this element could be more broad than just obtaining contracts, it did nevertheless state as follows.

“There are bound to be circumstances in which such a cost reduction does nothing other than increase the profitability of an already-profitable venture or ensure profitability of some start-up venture. Indeed, if the government is correct that anytime operating costs are reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that expresses the necessary element of assisting is obtaining or retaining business would be unnecessary, and thus surplusage—a conclusion that we are forbidden to reach.”

Post-Kay there have been numerous FCPA enforcement actions (none subjected to judicial scrutiny) outside the context of procurement involving taxes, customs duties, licenses, permits, certifications and the like.  Yet, all those enforcement actions concerned profit seeking corporations or other business organizations.

That the “obtain or retain business” element might not apply to non-profits was the focus of this interesting press release from Paul Weiss titled “Paul, Weiss Achieves Favorable Resolution in Unique FCPA Investigation of Nonprofit Organization.”  The release stated in full.

“Paul, Weiss recently secured a complete victory for a large nonprofit organization that provides humanitarian relief and assistance overseas. The organization was being investigated by the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) for potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in one of the first FCPA investigations by the DOJ of a nonprofit entity. The investigation had significant implications not only for the organization, but also for other nonprofit entities whose overseas activities could potentially come under scrutiny if the DOJ determined that the FCPA applied to charitable activities in addition to commercial activities.

After a five-month review analyzing conduct in multiple countries, Paul, Weiss presented its findings and legal analysis to the DOJ at the beginning of June, specifically requesting that the DOJ formally close its investigation. The DOJ recently issued an official declination letter, stating that the DOJ was satisfied that the business nexus element of the statute was not met.  Receiving a formal closure letter from the DOJ is unusual and is a significant victory. The organization has not issued a public statement.

The Paul, Weiss team included litigation partner Mark Mendelsohn and counsel Kevin Loftus.”

Mark Mendelsohn is a former head of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit.

Even though there there has never been an FCPA enforcement action against a non-profit, there have been several FCPA enforcement actions against individuals employed by arguably non-corporate entities.

In 2002, Richard Pitchford (the Vice President and Country Manager in Turkmenistan of The Central Asia American Enterprise Fund (“CAAEF”) was criminally charged and pleaded guilty to, among other charges FCPA violations for making improper payments to a United Kingdom “foreign official” with responsibilities for promoting business opportunities for British companies in the Central Asian region. In the DOJ’s criminal information, CAAEF is described as being incorporated under Delaware law and wholly funded by an appropriation of $150 million from the Congress of the United States pursuant to the Support for Eastern European Democracy Act of 1989 (the “SEED Act”) and the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Market Support Act of 1992 (“FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT”).  In the information, CAAEF is alleged to be a “domestic concern” and Pitchford is alleged to be an officer and agent of a “domestic concern,” as well as a “domestic concern” himself as a U.S. citizen.

Also in 2002, Ramendra Basu (an individual employed in the World Bank’s Consultant Trust Funds Office) and Gautam Sengupta (an individual employed at The World Bank as a Task Manager responsible for The World Bank’s Africa Region) were criminally charged and pleaded guilty to, among other charges FCPA violations for conspiring to assist a contractor in bribing a Kenyan “foreign official.”  In the DOJ criminal informations (here and here), Basu and Sengupta are alleged to be “persons” other than an issuer or domestic concern under the dd-3 prong of the FCPA.

In 2005, Richard Novak was criminally charged and pleaded guilty to, among other charges, FCPA violations for making improper payments to various foreign government officials who “held various positions at the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Liberian Embassy in Accra, Ghana, and at the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Liberia in Monrovia, Liberia.”  According to the DOJ superseding information, Novak was employed by two individuals  “who owned and operated several internet businesses from their principal places of business in the States of Washington and Idaho and from mail forwarding boxes located in Washington, D.C., and Wilmington, Delaware. These 11 internet businesses used the names “Saint Regis University,” “Robertstown University,” and “James Monroe University.” They were diploma mills in that these “universities” had no legitimate faculty members; offered no legitimate academic curriculum or services; required no course or class work; and were not recognized by the United States Department of Education.”

The Stings Before The Sting

A post that will increase your chance of capturing the office FCPA Jeopardy title.

As frequently reported, the Africa Sting case was the first time in the FCPA’s history that undercover investigative techniques were used.   As detailed in this prior post, not true, undercover investigative techniques have been used in several other FCPA enforcement actions.

As frequently reported, the Africa Sting case was the first time in the FCPA’s history that a full-blown sting operation was used in connection with an enforcement action.  This too is not true as detailed in this post which provides an overview of prior DOJ FCPA sting operations.

Hebert Tannenbaum

In 1996 an FBI spent agent received information from a confidential informant that Tannenbaum (the principal of Long Island based Tanner Management Corporation – a garbage incinerator manufacturer) “had previously made payments to foreign government officials to induce them to purchase garbage incinerators from the defendant.” (See here for the complaint). The informant further advised the FBI that Tannenbaum “had offered to make payments to government officials of various foreign countries in order to sell garbage incinerators in those countries” and during a recorded meeting with the informant Tannenbaum confirmed that he “had previously made a $75,000 cash payment to an official of the Government of Barbados, as an inducement for the purchase by his government of a garbage incinerator.” Thereafter, the informant, acting at the FBI’s direction, recorded a call with Tannenbaum during which Tannenbaum “admitted that he was willing to make payments to sell his garbage incinerators” and the complaint references specific payments in Taiwan and Argentina. During a meeting at the Park Lane Hotel in New York, the informant introduced Tannenbaum to the FBI special agent who was posing “as an Argentine government procurement official who wanted to purchase a garbage incinerator.” During the meeting, Tannenbaum offered to sell the Argentine “procurement official” an incinerator and stated “that he was willing to make a payment to facilitate the deal.” According to the complaint, Tannenbaum, on the way to a bank to open an account to faciliate the deal, told the undercover FBI agent posing as the “procurement official” that “for all he knew [“procurement official”] could have been an FBI agent” and that Tannenbaum was “in his seventies, and did not want to get in trouble.”

Well, Tannebaum did get in trouble.

Based on the above information, Tannenbaum was charged in 1998 via a one count criminal information (here) with conspiracy to violate the FCPA. The information is signed by then U.S. Attorney for the S.D. of New York Mary Jo White currently a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton (here).

Tannenbaum pleaded guilty (see here and here for the DOJ release) and was sentenced to 366 days plus three years of supervised release.

Richard Novak

In 2006, Richard Novak was charged (here) with, among other counts, violating the FCPA. It remains one of the more unusual FCPA enforcement actions ever. Novak and others owned and operated several internet businesses using the names “Saint Regis University,” “Robertstown University” and “James Monroe University.” According to the superseding information “they were diploma mills in that these ‘universities’ had no legitimate faculty members; offered no legitimate academic curriculum or services; required no course work or class work; and were not recognized by the United States Department of Education.” According to the superseding information, Novak made a bribe payment to the “Consult and First Secretary at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. in order to assist Saint Regis University and its owners in fraudulently selling diplomas through their internet businesses.” Elsewhere, the superseding information states that “various foreign government officials who received the bribes held various positions at the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the Liberian Embassy in Accra, Ghana, and at the Ministry of Education for the Republic of Liberia in Monrovia, Liberia” and that these individuals, among other things, “were in a position to: issue certificates of accreditation and recognition; issue notarial certificates; issue letters claiming that Saint Regis University was fully accredited and recognized by the Ministry of Education in the Republic of Liberia; and cause staff at the Liberian Embassy in Washington D.C. to answer the telephone calls in a positive way when inquiries regarding the legitimacy [of the Universities] were made.”

Although not specifically mentioned in the superseding information, a component of the original indictment (here) against Novak and several others was U.S. Secret Service agents posing as high school dropouts seeking degrees.

Novak pleaded guilty (see here) and was sentenced to three years probation.

Powered by WordPress. Designed by WooThemes