Friday Roundup
Briefing complete, an isn’t it ironic follow-up, and going for the gold. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Briefing Complete In Historic “Foreign Official” Challenge
This previous post highlighted the appeal of Carlos Rodriguez and Joel Esquenazi to the 11th Circuit on a host of issues, including whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in its jury instruction regarding what constitutes an “instrumentality” of a foreign government – and thus who are “foreign officials” under the FCPA. As noted in the post, this is a historic appeal, the first time in the FCPA’s history that “foreign official” will be squarely before an appellate court. This previous post highlighted the DOJ’s response brief.
Yesterday lawyers for Rodriguez and Esquenazi filed reply briefs here and here.
Among other things, Rodriguez’s brief argues as follows. “This Court should reject the Government’s assertion that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention requires that this Court affirm the jury instruction incorporating the government function interpretation. […] Before the United States adopted the OECD 1997 Convention on Combating Bribery in 1998, the United States had no obligation to prohibit foreign bribery. Thus, the law of nations sheds no light on what Congress intended when it adopted the relevant definition of foreign official in 1977. In 1998, when Congress amended the FCPA in light of the OECD’s Convention, Congress did not add “public enterprise” to the definition of foreign official. This Court should not apply terms from the Convention that Congress chose not to adopt into the FCPA.”
Among other things, Esquenazi’s brief argues that the “government’s untethered definition of instrumentality cannot stand,” “the government engages in a selective and misleading reading of the FCPA’s legislative history,” and that the “government’s vehemence proves too much.” As to the later point, the brief states as follows. “The Government spends a significant part of its brief arguing that its broad (and fatally flawed) definition of “instrumentality” is crystal clear. First, few statutory terms have received such extensive governmental resuscitation efforts. Second, there is a difficult-to-ignore, growing consensus among observers (including two former United States Attorneys General) that the Government is misreading “instrumentality.”
Regarding my “foreign official” declaration (here) that the DOJ is seeking to exclude from the record, the brief states as follows. “The Government protests Esquenazi’s citation to Professor Michael J. Koehler’s declaration addressing the legislative history of the FCPA, which was filed in United States v. Carson. Aside from the analysis contained in the Koehler declaration, the substance of the declaration is the legislative history of the FCPA. The Court can surely take notice of legislative history, and evaluate the utility and accuracy of Professor Koehler’s declaration for itself. But the Government’s claim that the declaration of a professor filed in another criminal proceeding and under penalty of perjury is somehow of lower status than a law review article reviewed by law students strains credulity.”
David Simon (Foley & Lardner – here) leads the appellate team for Rodriguez. Markus Funk (Perkins Coie – here) leads the appellate team for Esquenazi.
Isn’t It Ironic Follow-Up
In this prior post, I asked isn’t it ironic, don’t you think, that while the U.S. is bringing enforcement actions against companies for conduct that includes providing $600 bottles of wine, Cartier watches, cameras, kitchen appliances, business suits, and executive education classes to individuals deemed “foreign officials,” the U.S. has legitimized corporate influence over government in this country? I noted that this uncomfortable truth will be clear on display as the elections unfold.
Sure enough, earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal had a page one article “Movie Mogul’s Starring Role in Raising Funds for Obama” (here) detailing Jeffrey Katzenberg’s extensive political contributions and close ties to President Obama. Hosting a dinner that raised $15 million for President Obama. Check. Writing a $2 million check to jump start a super PAC supporting President Obama. Check. A planned $40,000 per person dinner with President Obama. Check.
The WSJ article notes that “Mr. Katzenberg’s fundraising prowess has earned him access and a role as the informal liaison between Hollywood and the White House, as the industry continues seeking government help against online piracy” among other issues.
If President Obama was a foreign official and expensive wine was served at the dinner, such allegations might very well find their way into an FCPA enforcement action … and have already. If the super PAC was a charitable donation and President Obama a foreign official, such allegations might very well find their way into an FCPA enforcement action … and have already.
Isn’t it ironic don’t you think?
But the irony does not stop there.
As noted in the article, among the access that Katzenberg had was attending a State Department lunch during the recent U.S. visit of China’s presumed future leader Xi Jinping. The lunch occurred in the context of Hollywood’s eagerness to tap into the lucrative Chinese market.
As noted in this previous post, it was widely reported this past spring that the SEC has sent letters of inquiry to several Hollywood studios, including Katzenberg’s DreamWorks Animation, seeking information about potential inappropriate payments and how the companies interact with certain government officials in China.
Isn’t it ironic don’t you think?
Going for the Gold
It’s interesting to witness the lengths FCPA Inc. will go to market its compliance services. After dozens of London Olympic, Bribery Act, FCPA, are you prepared type pieces, up next is the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, and with that a marketing opportunity. This recent law firm piece states as follows. “With the conclusion of the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, the world’s eyes will soon turn to Sochi, the Black Sea resort city in Russia, which will host the 2014 Winter Olympics. In addition to serving as the backdrop for the usual feats of athletic prowess and national pride, the Sochi games may also be fertile ground for prosecutions under the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The U.S. government’s actions in this setting will serve as a signal to any company doing business abroad that it must be proactive in ensuring compliance with the FCPA.”
As Above the Law recently observed here, the FCPA “freak-out session is entertaining to watch.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
Next Up – Pfizer
First it was Johnson & Johnson (see here – $70 million in combined fines and penalties in April 2011). Then it was Smith & Nephew (see here – $22 million in combined fines and penalties in February 2012). Then it was Biomet (see here – $22.8 million in combined fines and penalties in March 2012). The latest Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement based on the enforcement theory that various foreign health care providers are “foreign officials” is Pfizer / Wyeth (an entity acquired by Pfizer in 2009).
Total fines and penalties in the Pfizer / Wyeth enforcement action are approximately $60 million ($15 million via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement, and $45 million via separate settled SEC civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth). This post goes long and deep as to the DOJ’s and SEC’s allegations and resolution documents (approximately 100 pages in total).
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information (here) against Pfizer H.C.P. Corp. (an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer Inc.) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement (here).
Criminal Information
The criminal information begins with a description of Pfizer HCP and notes that during the relevant time period it “operated in several international markets through representative officers, including offices in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Kazakhstan, as well as through contracts with Russian distributors and employees of a representative officer of Pfizer HCP’s parent company in Moscow (‘Pfizer Russia’).” According to the information, “books and records of Pfizer HCP … were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer for purposes of preparing Pfizer’s year-end financial statements” filed with the SEC.
The information alleges, in summary fashion, as follows.
“The manufacture, registration, distribution, sale, and prescription of pharmaceuticals were highly-regulated activities throughout the world. While there were multinational regulatory schemes, it was typical that each country established its own regulatory structure at a local, regional, and/or national level. These regulatory structures generally required the registration of pharmaceuticals and regulated labeling and advertising. Additionally, in certain countries, the government established lists of pharmaceuticals. that were approved for government reimbursement or otherwise determined those pharmaceuticals that might be purchased by government institutions. Moreover, countries often regulated the interactions between pharmaceutical companies and hospitals, pharmacies, and healthcare professionals. In those countries with national healthcare system, hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies were generally agencies or instrumentalities of foreign governments, and, thus, many of the healthcare professionals employed by these agencies and instrumentalities were foreign officials within the meaning of the FCPA. During the relevant period, for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance, employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia made and authorized the making of payments of cash and the provision of other things of value both directly and through third parties. Funds for these payments were often generated by employees of Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia through the use of collusive vendors to create fraudulent invoices.”
The information charges two counts: (i) conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and (ii) substantive FCPA anti-bribery violations. The conduct at issue took place between 1997 and 2006 and focuses on payments to alleged “foreign officials” as listed below “in exchange for improper business advantages for Pfizer HCP, including the approval of pharmaceutical products and increased sales of pharmaceutical products.”
Croatian Official (a citizen of the Republic of Croatia who held official positions on government committees in Croatia and had influence over decisions concerning the registration and reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 1 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a medical doctor employed by a public hospital who had influence over the Russian government’s purchase and prescription of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 2 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who was a high-ranking government official who held official positions on government committees in Russia and had influence over decisions concerning the reimbursement of Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
Russian Official 3 (a citizen of the Russian Federation who had influence over decisions concerning the treatment algorithms involving Pfizer products marketed and sold in the country).
In addition to the above alleged “foreign officials” the information describes “other foreign officials in various countries, including Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia.”
Under the heading “Manners and Means of the Conspiracy” the information alleges as follows.
“Pfizer HCP through its employees and agents agreed to make improper payments and provide benefits (including kickbacks, cash payments, gifts, entertainment and support for domestic and international travel) to numerous government officials, including physicians, pharmacologists and senior government officials, who were employed by foreign governments or instrumentalities of foreign governments, including in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. During the relevant time period, Pfizer HCP, through its employees and agents, corruptly authorized the payment, directly or indirectly, of at least $2,000,000 to intermediary companies, government officials, and others, to corruptly induce the prescription and purchase of Pfizer products and to obtain regulatory approvals for Pfizer products. Pfizer HCP through its employees falsely recorded the improper transactions by booking them in a variety of ways, including as educational or charitable support, “Travel and Entertainment,” “Convention and Trade Meetings and Conferences,” “Distribution Freight,” “Clinical Grants/Clinical Trials,” “Gifts,” and “Professional Services —Non Consultant,” in order to conceal the improper nature of the transactions in the books and records of Pfizer HCP.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Bulgaria” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about January 24, 2003, a District Manager in Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Bulgaria (“Pfizer HCP Bulgaria”) sent an email to his subordinates that discussed marketing programs and “various possibilities to stimulate the prescribers” and instructed them to give individual doctors employed in Bulgarian public hospitals “a specific target as to how many packs (or new patients) per month he should achieve” and then provide support for international travel on the basis of the promises to prescribe made by the doctors. On or about October 14, 2003, a Pfizer HCP Bulgaria sales department manager sent an electronic message to multiple sales representatives containing instructions for submitting sponsorship requests. The manager wrote, “[e]ach representative wanting to sponsor someone …must very precisely state the grounds for recommending the sponsorship, and also what the doctor in question is expected to do or has already done (which is the better option).”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Croatia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about July 9, 2003, employees of Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Croatia (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”) caused a wire transfer of $1,200 to be made from a bank account in Belgium to an account in Austria controlled by Croatian Official, which wire transfer was part of more than $85,000 paid to Croatian Official between 1997 and 2003, and which was for a purpose described by the country manager as follows: “as [Croatian Official] is a member of the Registration Committee regarding pharmaceuticals, I do expect that all products which are to be registered, will pass the regular procedure by his assistance. On or about February 18, 2004, a Pfizer HCP Croatia sales representative drafted a memorandum reporting on her discussions with doctors at Croatian public hospitals regarding bonus agreements for purchases of a Pfizer product, which reflected an agreement with the chief doctor who promised purchases of the product in exchange for Pfizer HCP providing various things of value, including travel benefits and bonuses based on a percentage of sales.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Kazakhstan” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about May 5, 2000, Pfizer HCP entered into an exclusive distribution contract for a Pfizer product with Kazakh Company [a Kazakh company that contracted with Pfizer HCP to provide distribution services and related services in the Republic of Kazakhstan] that was valued at a minimum of $500,000 believing that all or part of the value of the contract would be provided to a high-level Kazakh government official. On or about September 23, 2003, a regional supervisor responsible for Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Kazakhstan sent a memorandum to his supervisor memorializing a conversation held in Kazakhstan, in which he indicated that the controller of Kazakh Company was “very close to government officials,” and that Kazakh Company was likely responsible for Pfizer HCP’s past problems with the registration of a Pfizer product in Kazakhstan.”
As to “Corrupt Payments in Russia” the information alleges as follows.
“On or about September 8, -2003, a Pfizer Russia. employee emailed colleagues that a Russian government doctor, Russian Official 1, requested funds to attend a conference and, in return, “has pledged to prescribe at least 20 packs of [a Pfizer product] per month, and 20 [] packs [of another Pfizer product]. On or about November 19, 2003 in an invoice cover letter, a Pfizer Russia employee requested “payment for the (motivational) trip of [Russian Official 2] for the inclusion of [a Pfizer product] into the list … of medications refundable by the state” in order to influence Russian Official 2 to add the product to the regional formulary list. On or about April 7, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested that a payment be made to a Russian government official “who took an active part in getting [a Pfizer product] into the bidding.” On or about July 26, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to his supervisors stating that Russia Company 1 [a Russian company that bid on tenders issued by Russian healthcare institutions and worked with Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia to fill tenders using Pfizer products] had won a tender for the use of a Pfizer product, and that Russian Company 1’s costs included “10% – Motivation of Officials.” On or about December 2, 2004, a Pfizer Russia employee requested sponsorship for a local department of health employee who was assisting the chief pharmacologist of a regional pediatric hospital, Russian Official 3, who was compiling algarithms for antibiotic therapy and wanted “to be financially compensated” for this work. The Pfizer Russia employee noted that, “in return for this,” the pharmacologist “will include our product’s in the treatment algorithms” to be used in government hospitals. On or about June 9, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee sent an email to her supervisor stating that a cash payment had been made to an individual government doctor, which represented 5% of the value of the purchases of a Pfizer product made by a certain government hospital during the month of March 2005. On or about June 27, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that a government doctor “should be assigned the task of stretching the amount of the purchases … to US $100 thousand” as an “obligation” in exchange for a trip to a conference in the Netherlands or Germany. On or about September 14, 2005, a Pfizer Russia employee emailed that an”agreement on cooperation” had been reached with a government doctor, and that Pfizer Russia’s requirements were the “purchase quantities,” and the government doctor’s requirement was “a trip to a conference.” In or around October 2005 through on or about December 8, 2005, Pfizer Russia caused payments totaling at least $69,000 to be made to Russian Company 2 [a Russian company that provided certain services to Pfizer HCP and Pfizer Russia, including making improper payments to Russian government officials and other companies on Pfizer HCP’s behalf, in order to conceal the payments] with the understanding that the payments would be provided to individual Russian doctors employed in public hospitals, and that the payments represented 5% of the value of the purchases of Pfizer products in the doctors’ respective government hospitals. In or around October 2005, Pfizer Russia employees discussed how a regional distributor would provide Pfizer Russia with companies that have “neutral names,” to which Pfizer Russia could make improper payments that would be booked as conferences to provide benefits to government doctors.”
DPA
The DOJ’s charges against Pfizer HCP were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement. Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer HCP admitted, accepted and acknowledged “that it is responsible for the acts of its officers, employees and agents” as set forth in the information. As is customary in DOJ FCPA corporate enforcement actions, Pfizer HCP agreed not to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility for the conduct set forth in the resolution documents.
The term of the DPA is two years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement based on the following factors: “(a) the extraordinary cooperation of Pfizer HCP’s parent company, Pfizer Inc., (“Pfizer”}, with the Department and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), including thorough and responsive reporting of potential violations, including the conduct of other companies and individuals; (b) Pfizer’s initial voluntary disclosure of potential improper payments and the timely and complete disclosure of the facts [described in the DPA] as well as facts relating to potential improper payments in various countries that had been identified by its compliance program, internal audit function and global internal investigations concealing bribery and related misconduct; (c) the early and extensive remedial efforts undertaken by Pfizer, including the substantial and continuing improvements Pfizer has made to its global anticorruption compliance procedures; (d) Pfizer’s agreement to maintain an anti-corruption compliance program for all of its subsidiaries worldwide, including Pfizer HCP, to continue in its efforts to implement enhanced compliance measures [as required by the DPA] and to provide to the Department written reports on its progress and experience in maintaining and enhancing its compliance policies and procedures [as described in the DPA].”
Pursuant to the DPA, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range for the conduct at issue was $22.8 – $45.6 million. The DPA specifically states that a downward departure “is warranted for substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.” The DPA then states as follows. “The Government and Pfizer HCP agree that $15 million is the appropriate monetary penalty, which is a 34% reduction off the bottom of the recommended Guidelines fine range. Pfizer HCP and the Department agree that this fine is appropriate given the nature and extent of Pfizer’s voluntary, prompt and thorough disclosure of the misconduct at issue, the nature and extent of Pfizer’s extensive cooperation in this matter, Pfizer’s cooperation … in the Department’s investigation into other misconduct in the industry, and Pfizer’s extraordinary and ongoing remediation.”
Pursuant to the DPA, Pfizer’s HCP’s parent company, Pfizer, agreed that it will report to the DOJ during the term of the DPA regarding remediation and implementation of certain compliance measures required under the agreement.
The DPA contains a section titled “Origin of the Investigation and Cooperation with the authorities” and states as follows.
“In May 2004, Pfizer’s Corporate Compliance Division learned of potentially improper payments by the Croatian representative office of Pfizer HCP (“Pfizer HCP Croatia”). After conducting a preliminary investigation using external counsel, Pfizer made a voluntary disclosure to the Department and to the Commission. At the time, neither agency was aware of the allegations of improper payments or had any open investigation involving the overseas operations of Pfizer or any of its subsidiaries. From 2004 to the present, Pfizer, using external counsel and forensic accountants, internal Legal, Compliance, and Corporate Audit personnel, conducted an extensive, global review of its operations regarding allegations of improper payments to government officials and government doctors, including in Pfizer HCP markets and those of other Pfizer subsidiaries. This included a review of allegations that were identified by Pfizer’s own internal investigations and compliance controls, including its system of proactive FCPA reviews and enhanced audits. Pfizer reported to the Department and the Commission on the results of these investigations on a regular basis. At the request of the Department and the Commission, Pfizer agreed to periodically toll the statute of limitations on its own behalf and on behalf of its subsidiaries. In addition, starting immediately in 2004, Pfizer launched extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive review of its compliance program, implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis, developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures, adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits, performing proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately ten markets annually, and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization. Pfizer regularly reported to the Department and the Commission on these activities and sought their input concerning the scope and focus of these remedial activities.”
In a release (here) DOJ representatives stated as follows. “Pfizer took short cuts to boost its business in several Eurasian countries, bribing government officials in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia to the tune of millions of dollars.” “Corrupt pay-offs to foreign officials in order to secure lucrative contracts creates an inherently uneven marketplace and puts honest companies at a disadvantage. Those that attempt to make these illegal backroom deals to influence contract procurement can expect to be investigated by the FBI and appropriately held responsible for their actions.”
SEC
The SEC enforcement action includes separate settled civil complaints against Pfizer and Wyeth.
Pfizer Complaint
The settled civil complaint (here) against Pfizer alleges, in summary, as follows.
“This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [FCPA by Pfizer] relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Pfizer’s subsidiaries in order to assist Pfizer in obtaining or retaining business. At various times from at least 2001 through 2007, employees and agents of subsidiaries of Pfizer, conducting business in Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Italy, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. These improper payments were variously made to influence regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and to clear customs. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples included falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, clinical trials, freight, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, but the inaccurate books and records of Pfizer’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer, and Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls.”
The SEC’s allegations concerning conduct in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan and Russia are substantively similar to the DOJ’s allegations described above.
As to Russia, the SEC complaint contains the following additional allegations concerning customs related payments. “During the relevant period, Russian Federation customs officials would not clear pharmaceutical products for importation unless the importer provided an official certification indicating that the products conformed to the specific terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed by the manufacturer with the Ministry of Health. The Russian government licensed a private certification company (the “Certification Center”) to perform this governmental function, which performed inspections and furnished the necessary certificates. In the spring of 2005, Pfizer Russia began to experience increasing difficulty in obtaining the necessary certificates because the Pfizer products did not conform to the precise terms of the product registration and packaging requirements filed with the Ministry of Health. On or about September or October 2005, a Certification Center employee proposed that the Certification Center would overlook the non-compliance of Pfizer Russia’s products in exchange for monthly payments of approximately $3,000. With the approval of the then-Pfizer Russia Country Manager, between October and December 2005 Pfizer Russia made payments of over $13,000 through an intermediary company, which then forwarded the payments to a company Pfizer Russia employees believed to be controlled by the Certification Center’s employees. The customs clearing problems ceased after Pfizer Russia started making payments, but they resumed when Pfizer Russia stopped the payments in 2006 after Pfizer began a Corporate Compliance review in Russia.”
As to conduct in China, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Investment Co. Ltd. (Pfizer China). “From at least 2003 through 2007, Pfizer China, through its employees and agents, provided cash payments, hospitality, gifts, and support for international travel to doctors employed by Chinese government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products, provide hospital formulary listing, and otherwise use their influence to grant Pfizer China an unfair advantage.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the cash payments, gifts, and travel support made to Chinese government doctors by failing to accurately record the transactions.”
As to conduct in the Czech Republic, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer spol. s.r.o. (Pfizer Czech). “From at least 2003 and through 2004, Pfizer Czech, through its employees and agents, provided support for international travel and recreational opportunities to doctors employed by the Czech government with the intent to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Czech employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions, and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Conventions and Trade Meeting,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Italy, the SEC alleges as follows as to Pfizer subsidiary Pfizer Italia S.r.l (Pfizer Italy). “From at least 2001 and continuing through early 2004, Pfizer Italy provided, directly or through vendors, cash payments, gifts, support for domestic and international travel, and other benefits to doctors employed by Italian government healthcare institutions. The payments of cash and other things of value were intended to influence these government officials to prescribe Pfizer products.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Pfizer Italy employees took steps to conceal the true nature of these transactions and failed to accurately record these transactions by falsely booking them as “Marketing Expenses,” “Professional Training,” and “Advertising in Scientific Journals,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to conduct in Serbia, the SEC alleges as follows as to a representative office of Pfizer HCP (Pfizer HCP Serbia). “Pfizer HCP Serbia, through one of its sales representatives, paid for a government employed doctor to attend a conference in Chile in exchange for the doctor’s agreement to increase his department’s purchases of Pfizer products. Although Pfizer HCP Serbia management discovered the improper agreement and terminated the responsible sales representative, it still provided the support after the doctor threatened to spread negative information about Pfizer’s reputation as a company.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls” the SEC alleged as follows. “[F]our Pfizer subsidiaries engaged in transactions in eight countries which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials in connection with regulatory and formulary approvals, purchase decisions, prescription decisions, and customs clearance. Through the four subsidiaries, Pfizer earned aggregate profits of $16,032,676 as a result of these improper transactions. [D]uring the relevant period the Pfizer subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. The false entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Pfizer, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. [D]uring the relevant period Pfizer failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.”
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Pfizer with violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint further notes as follows. “Pfizer made an initial voluntary disclosure of certain of these issues to the Commission and Department of Justice in October 2004, and thereafter diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of its operations in no less than 19 countries, which identified additional potential violations, and regularly reported on the results of these investigations and fully cooperated with the staff of the Commission. Pfizer also undertook a comprehensive compliance review of its operations, enhanced its internal controls and compliance functions, engaged in significant disciplinary measures, and developed and implemented global FCPA compliance procedures, including the development and implementation of innovative proactive procedures, and sophisticated supporting systems.”
In addition, the SEC complaint contains a separate section titled “remedial efforts” that states as follows.
“Pfizer has taken extensive remedial actions including: undertaking a comprehensive worldwide review of its compliance program; implementing enhanced anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures on a worldwide basis; developing global systems to support employee compliance with the enhanced procedures; adding FCPA-specific reviews to its internal audits; performing innovative and proactive anti-corruption compliance reviews in approximately 10 markets annually; and conducting comprehensive anti-corruption training throughout the organization.”
Wyeth Complaint
The SEC also brought a settled civil complaint (here) against Wyeth LLC. According to the complaint, Wyeth was an issuer but in connection with its acquisition by Pfizer in October 2009, Wyeth delisted and became a wholly-owned subsidary of Pfizer.
The complaint alleges, in summary fashion, as follows. “This action arises from violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the [by Wyeth], while an issuer, relating to improper payments made to foreign officials in numerous countries by the employees and agents of Wyeth’s subsidiaries in order to assist Wyeth in obtaining or retaining business. During the time relevant to this Complaint, Wyeth was a pharmaceutical company engaged in business throughout the world, and an issuer as that term is used under the FCPA. At various times from at least 2005 through 2010, subsidiaries of Defendant Wyeth conducting business in several countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, engaged in transactions for the purpose of improperly influencing foreign officials, including doctors and other healthcare professionals employed by foreign governments. Employees in each of the involved subsidiaries attempted to conceal the true nature of the transactions by improperly recording the transactions on the books and records of the respective subsidiaries. Examples include falsely recording the payments as legitimate expenses for promotional activities, marketing, training, travel and entertainment, conferences and advertising. These improper payments were made without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Wyeth, but the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries were consolidated in the financial reports of Wyeth, and Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an appropriate system of internal accounting controls. Certain of these payments were made following the acquisition of Wyeth by Pfizer Inc. (“Pfizer”) without the knowledge or approval of officers or employees of Pfizer, and the inaccurate books and records of Wyeth’s subsidiaries regarding those payments were consolidated in the financial reports of Pfizer.”
As to Indonesia, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 until 2010, Wyeth Indonesia [an Indonesian company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments and nutritional products to employees of Indonesian government-owned hospitals, including doctors employed by the Indonesian government. The cash payments and products were intended to influence the doctors’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia employees also took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Miscellaneous Expenses – Joint Promotions,” “Medical Education – Promo,” “Trade Allowances,” and “Miscellaneous Selling Expenses,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to Pakistan, the complaint alleges as follows. “Starting at least in 2005 and continuing into 2009, Wyeth Pakistan [a Pakistani company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth] employees provided improper benefits to doctors who were employed by healthcare institutions owned or controlled by the Pakistani government. These improper benefits included cash payments, travel, office equipment and renovations, and were intended to influence the doctors to recommend Wyeth products to new mothers.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth Pakistan employees and local management took steps to conceal the true nature of the transactions by inaccurately recording them as “Advertising and Sales Promotion,” “Film Show,” “Entertainment,” “Product Meetings,” and “Give Aways and Gifts,” among other false and misleading descriptions.”
As to China, the complaint alleges as follows. “From at least 2005 through 2010 and until the conduct was stopped by Pfizer, Wyeth China [a Chinese company that was an indirect majority-owned subsidiary of Wyeth], through its employees and agents, provided cash payments to Chinese state-owned hospitals and healthcare providers (including doctors, nurses, and midwives) employed by the Chinese government that were intended to influence the healthcare providers’ recommendation of Wyeth nutritional products to their patients, to ensure that Wyeth products were made available to new mothers at the hospitals, and to obtain information about new births that could be used for marketing purposes.” The SEC further alleged as follows. “Wyeth China employees took steps to conceal the true nature of the payments by falsifying expense reimbursement requests and, in concert with local travel agencies, by submitting false or inflated invoices and other supporting documentation for large-scale consumer education events, resulting in those transactions being falsely recorded in Wyeth China’s books and records.
As to Saudi Arabia, the complaint alleges as follows. “In June 2007, the local distributor, at the direction of Wyeth Saudi Arabia [a Delaware corporation that operated a representative office in Saudi Arabia], made a cash payment to a Saudi Arabian customs official to secure the release of a shipment of promotional items that were to be used in connection with the marketing and sale of Wyeth’s nutritional products. These promotional items were held in port because Wyeth Saudi Arabia had failed to secure a required Saudi Arabian Standards Organization Certificate of Conformity. In July 2007, Wyeth Saudi Arabia reimbursed the distributor for this cash payment and improperly recorded it as a “facilitation expense” in its books and records.”
Under the heading “accounting and internal controls,” the SEC alleged as follows. “Wyeth Indonesia, Wyeth Pakistan, and Wyeth China engaged in transactions which were intended to improperly influence foreign government officials. Through these three subsidiaries Wyeth earned aggregate profits of approximately $17,217,831 as a result of these improper transactions. […] During the relevant period, the Wyeth subsidiaries recorded transactions associated with the improper payments in a manner that did not accurately reflect their true nature and purpose. False entries in the subsidiaries’ books and records were consolidated into the books and records of Wyeth, which reported the results of its subsidiaries’ operations in its consolidated financial statements. […] During the relevant period, Wyeth failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above-described conduct.
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Wyeth with violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
The SEC complaint notes as follows. “Following Pfizer’s acquisition of Wyeth, which was finalized on or about October 15, 2009, Pfizer undertook a risk-based FCPA due diligence review of Wyeth’s global operations and reported the results of that diligence review to the Commission staff within 180 days of the closing. Pfizer’s post-acquisition review identified potential improper payments, and it diligently and thoroughly undertook a global internal investigation of Wyeth’s operations and voluntarily disclosed the results to the Commission staff, which included identifying improper payments made by Wyeth’s Nutritional Products Division in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia, as well as additional improper payments made by other Wyeth subsidiaries. Following the acquisition, Pfizer diligently and promptly integrated Wyeth’s legacy operations into its compliance program and cooperated fully with the Commission staff.”
In this SEC release, Kara Brockmeyer (Chief of the SEC’s FCPA Unit) states as follows. “Pfizer subsidiaries in several countries had bribery so entwined in their sales culture that they offered points and bonus programs to improperly reward foreign officials who proved to be their best customers. These charges illustrate the pitfalls that exist for companies that fail to appropriately monitor potential risks in their global operations.”
As noted in the SEC release, in settling the charges Pfizer and Wyeth neither admitted nor denied the allegations. The release states as follows. “Pfizer consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $16,032,676 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $10,307,268 for a total of $26,339,944. [Pfizer] also is required to report to the SEC on the status of its remediation and implementation of compliance measures over a two-year period, and is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions. “Wyeth consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering it to pay disgorgement of $17,217,831 in net profits and prejudgment interest of $1,658,793, for a total of $18,876,624. As a Pfizer subsidiary, the status of Wyeth’s remediation and implementation of compliance measures will be subsumed in Pfizer’s two-year self-reporting period. Wyeth also is permanently enjoined from further violations” of the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions.
Brett Campbell and Peter Clark (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft – here and here) represented Pfizer. Clark is a former head of the DOJ’s FCPA enforcement program.
See here for Pfizer’s press release.
240 Certifications and Inspections
Why do FCPA violations occur?
Do companies subject to the FCPA do business in foreign markets: (i) intent on engaging in bribery as a business strategy and without a committment to FCPA compliance; or (ii) with a committment to FCPA compliance, yet subject to difficult business conditions in foreign markets.
In this prior guest post, Joseph Covington (a former DOJ FCPA Unit Chief who favors an FCPA compliance defense) said that he has “rarely seen American companies affirmatively offering bribes in the first instance.” Rather, Covington observed that companies doing business in international markets are “reacting to a world not of their making” and that “as the world shrinks companies who seek to do the right thing can’t help but confront corrupt officials – as customers, regulator and adjudicators – and confront them often.”
Covington’s observation is included in my article “Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense” (here) in which I highlight specific reasons warranting an FCPA compliance defense including various barriers and other conditions that serve as breeding grounds for harassment bribes to flourish in foreign countries.
Barriers include arcane and complex licensing, certification and inspection requirements which often funnel companies seeking to do business in a foreign country into an arbitrary world of low-paying civil servants who frequently supplement their meager salaries through payments condoned in the host country.
I was reminded on this dynamic by this recent NPR’s story “From Iowa To Russia, Tractors Build Economic Bridge.” The story begins by noting that “Russia is one of the 10 biggest economies in the world, but it isn’t even among the U.S.’s top 30 trading partners.” The story then profiles a new John Deere factory near Moscow. According to general director of John Deere Russia, the company had “more than 240 certifications and inspections that we had to go through to build” the factory.
Think about it.
This is 240 separate and distinct points of contact with Russian “foreign officials” that the current enforcement agencies view (notwithstanding Congressional intent that payments seeking to induce foreign officials to do ministerial and clerical acts are exempted from the law) as implicating the FCPA. Not because the company is seeking to obtain or retain business with any foreign government, but just because the company is seeking to do business in the general sense in Russia.
Indeed, the article then states as follows. “Many Russians might say officials here are most effective at padding meager state salaries with bribes. John Deere is the subject of an SEC investigation for allegedly violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Russia and neighboring countries.”
Friday Roundup
Shining a light on monitor reports, the Wal-Mart effect, when the dust settles, and Alberto Gonzalez joins the club, it’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Shining A Light on Monitor Reports
As Willkie Farr & Gallagher notes in this recent client alert, although the imposition of compliance monitors in FCPA enforcement actions is less frequent than it used to be, “companies that do receive monitors must now be concerned that their reports may be publicly disclosed.” This is due to a recent decision (here) in SEC v. American International Group. Inc. (D.D.C.) in which Judge Gladys Kessler granted journalist Sue Reisigner’s Motion for Leave to Intervene and for Access to Monitor’s Reports.
In 2004, the SEC filed a complaint against AIG alleging violations of the federal securities laws. Under the terms of the settlement consent order, AIG, among other things, agreed to retain an independent consultant, selected by the Fraud Section of the DOJ and acceptable to the SEC to review various AIG transactions. At the conclusion of the consultant’s review, the consultant was required to provide copies of reports of his or her findings to the SEC and DOJ. Thereafter, the SEC and AIG filed a joint motion for clarification stating that it was not the intent of the parties that information provided by AIG to the independent consultant be disseminated or available to anyone outside of the entities identified in the consent order. The court granted the motion.
Enter Sue Reisinger who filed Freedom of Information Act requests requesting disclosure of the consultant reports. Her requests were denied citing the court’s order restricting dissemination of the reports. Thereafter, Reisinger filed a Motion to Intervene and for Access to Monitor’s Reports. The SEC and AIG filed a joint opposition. Reisinger argued that “the Court should order the SEC to make the IC Reports publicly available on two grounds: (1) a First Amendment right to access to judicial proceedings and (2) a common law right of access to judicial records.
As to the second issue, the key issues were whether the IC reports are a “judicial record” and if so, competing interests in publicity and secrecy. Judge Kessler concluded that the IC reports “are relevant to the judicial function and therefore are properly considered judicial records.” Judge Kessler stated as follows. “The Reports may provide information leading the SEC to return to this Court to secure further relief. In other words, the Consent Order empowers the Court to retain jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the Consent Order, including compliance with the IC Reports.” In addition, Judge Kessler concluded that “the central role the IC Reports play in the operation of the Consent Order makes them precisely the kind of documents that must be open to the public in order for the federal courts ‘to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of justice.'” As to the balancing of interests, Judge Kessler stated that the public’s interest in favor of disclosure of the IC Reports “is overwhelming” and that “there is no question that the public interest far outweighs AIG’s or the SEC’s interest in confidentiality …”.
As to the first issue, Judge Kessler concluded that there is no First Amendment right of access to the IC Reports because the SEC “brought a civil, not criminal, action against AIG” and “Reisinger has not even attempted to make the requisite showing that ‘such access has historically been available.” As the Willkie client alert notes however, given that Judge Kessler’s analysis as to this first issue focused on the civil nature of the proceedings, it leaves “the door open for an additional argument that the First Amendment would mandate public disclosure of corporate monitor reports in the context of a criminal settlement.”
As to monitors, Professor Brandon Garrett (University of Virginia Law School) and the Corporate Crime Reporter are seeking information on certain corporate monitors in the FCPA context and otherwise – see here.
The Wal-Mart Effect
Wal-Mart is clearly not the only company subject to the FCPA that needs licenses, permits and the like when doing business in Mexico. It is likely that Wal-Mart’s potential FCPA exposure has caused sleepless nights for many company executives doing business in Mexico and the general region.
The FCPA is also on the minds of investors of other companies doing business in Mexico – such as Kimco Realty Corporation (here).
In a recent earnings call, a UBS analyst asked the following question. “I hate to even ask this question. But I’m wondering if you have any comments on the Wal-Mart allegations down in Mexico and if Kimco had conducted any reviews, maybe not so much of your local Mexico employees. Maybe my concern is more toward JV partners to make sure that they’re operating to the same high ethical standards that Kimco has already operated toward.”
David Henry (Kimco Realty Corporation – Vice Chairman, President, CEO) answered as follows. “Obviously, we anticipated this question, so permit me to be very, very specific in a response, and I’d like to make the following points. One, the extent of what we know about the Wal-Mart actions is what we read in the New York Times article, the same way you did. We are not aware of any Wal-Mart improprieties with respect to any of our Mexican properties or any of our Mexican operating partners. The acquisitions and development of the Wal-Mart projects in our portfolio occurred in 2005 or later, and this is a year after the activities that were described in the article occurred. With respect to all of our Wal-Mart projects, the developer obtained the building permit, not Wal-Mart. We employ a third-party consultant to oversee the construction process. There’s a construction manager in many cases right on site that reviews and approves every payment we make on these development projects. We also have our own Kimco employees provide asset management and oversee the project construction and approve the individual payments. As part of our normal operating procedures, all of our local Mexican development partners execute letters certifying to us they are not aware of any kind of improper payments. We have a very comprehensive FCPA policy, foreign corrupt practices act policy, at Kimco that includes extensive training for all of our employees that are directly or indirectly involved with any international projects. The training includes members of senior management and our Board are taken through this training on an annual basis. And then I just have to zoom up to the highest level. From the very beginning, when we went to both Canada and Mexico and then South America, we really tried to set the right tone because we’ve always emphasized that we are a public company and as a public company we adhere to the highest ethical standards and we expect that all of our local operating partners to also meet those standards. So that gives you the highest level of flavor I can give you at this point.”
When the Dust Settles
In 2010, Daimler (and certain of its subsidiaries) resolved a wide-ranging FCPA enforcement – see here for the prior post.
As to conduct in Russia, the DOJ also filed a two count criminal information against DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO (“DCAR”), a “Moscow-based, wholly-owned subsidiary of Daimler” that “sold Daimler spare parts, assisted with the sale of vehicles from various Daimler divisions in Germany, including in particular its overseas sales division (“DCOS”), to government customers in [Russia], and also imported Daimler passenger and commercial vehicles into Russia for sale to customers and distributors.”
The charged conduct focused on Daimler’s, DCAR’s and DCOS’s relationships with: “the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (“MVD”) a department and agency of the Russian government principally responsible for police, militia, immigration and other functions” including supervising the “Russian traffic police; “the Special Purpose Garage (“SPG”) an ‘instrumenality’ of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA; “Machinoimport a Russian government-owned and controlled purchasing agent for the City of Moscow,” an “instrumentality of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA; and “Dorinvest a Russian government-owned and controlled purchasing agent for the City of Moscow,” an “instrumentality of the Russian government” whose employees were “foreign officials” under the FCPA.
The information charged that “Daimler, through DCAR, made improper payments at the request of Russian government officials or their designess in order to secure business from Russian government customers.” Among other things, the information charges that: “between 2000 and 2005″ Daimler’s sale of vehicles to Russian government customers was approximately “€64,660,000″ and that “in connection with these vehicle sales, DCAR and Daimler made over €3 million in improper payments to Russian government officials employed at their Russian governmental customers, their designess, or to third-party shell companies that provided no legitimate services to Daimler or DCAR with the understanding that the funds would be passed on, in whole or in part, to Russian government officials.”
In this recent article, The Moscow Times reports that Russian “investigators have reportedly dropped inquiries against military officials and employees of four companies implicated in a 2010 corruption case involving kickbacks for state purchases of Mercedes automobiles.”
For more on the dynamic of what I’ve called “when the dust settles” – see this prior post.
Alberto Gonzalez Joins the Club
What club you ask?
The former Attorney General who has taken a great interest in the FCPA club. Former Attorney General Michael Mukasey’s FCPA reform activities are well known, this prior post discussed a recent FCPA speech by former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and in this recent article in Corporate Counsel, Gonzalez and his co-authors forecast the future of FCPA enforcement.
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A good weekend to all.
Bribery Perceptions
Last week Transparency International (“TI”) released its Bribe Payers Index (see here). The index “ranks 28 of the world’s largest economies according to perceived likelihood of companies from these countries to pay bribe’s abroad.” TI’s data is derived from a survey of approximately 3,000 business executives worldwide. The executives were asked for each of the 28 countries with which they have a business relationship with (for example as supplier, client, partner or competitor) “how often do firms headquartered in that country engage in bribery in this country.”
Among the key findings in the index are that “companies from China and Russia were viewed as the most likely to pay bribes” and that “perceptions of the frequency of foreign bribery by country and business sector have on average seen no improvement since the last Bribe Payers Index published in 2008.”
As to China and Russia, the TI report states “it is of particular concern that China and Russia are at the bottom of the index.” The report states as follows. “Given the increasing global presence of businesses from these countries, bribery and corruption are likely to have a substantial impact on the societies in which they operate and on the ability of companies to compete fairly in these markets.”
As noted in this prior post, China recently passed an “FCPA-like” law, as did Russia as noted in this post.
In terms of perception of bribery by companies, the U.S. ranked a rather dismal 10th, behind Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Australia, Canada, Singapore and the United Kingdom. Even though the U.S. clearly leads the world in enforcement of its anti-bribery law, the survey seems to suggest that ad hoc enforcement action of the FCPA is not having – at least in the minds of the survey participants – a meaningful deterrent effect in reducing instances of improper payments.