A post of this nature has appeared on these pages approximately fifteen times.
Even though the current Supreme Court is often ideologically divided, the Court has shown remarkable consistency in recent years in rejecting (often times unanimously) overly expansive interpretations of a criminal statute by the Department of Justice.
Recently, there were two additional instances on the same day: Ciminelli v. United States and Percoco v. United States.
A post of this nature has appeared on these pages approximately fifteen times.
Even though the current Supreme Court is often ideologically divided, the Court has shown remarkable consistency in recent years in rejecting (often times unanimously) overly expansive interpretations of a criminal statute by the Department of Justice.
The latest example occurred earlier this week in Ruan v. U.S. – a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court (as to outcome) authored by Justice Breyer.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alabama Association of Realtors v. Department of Health and Human Services was not a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act case.
Nor was the issue presented even remotely related to the FCPA.
Nevertheless, the case was FCPA relevant because once again the Supreme Court rejected an expansive statutory interpretation by an administrative agency and reminded the legal community of the following basic points: a law means what it says and what Congress intended it to mean – not what an administrative agency wishes a law said – and that if an administrative agency doesn’t like this the remedy is for Congress to take action.
This is approximately the tenth time a post of this nature has appeared on these pages.
Even though the current Supreme Court is often ideologically divided, the Court has shown remarkable consistency in recent years in rejecting (often times unanimously) overly expansive interpretations of a criminal statute by the Department of Justice.
The latest example occurred last week in Van Buren v. U.S. in which the court rejected the DOJ’s expansive interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The decision was authored by Justice Barrett and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh.
Yesterday’s post highlighted the Supreme Court’s decision in Liu v. SEC in which the court held that for purposes of 15 USC 78u(d)(5) (concerning SEC actions in federal court) that “a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible” under 78u(d)(5).
The decision was 8-1 as Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.
As discussed below, in his dissent Justice Thomas provided a disgorgement history lesson and asked an important question with Foreign Corrupt Practices Act implications.
