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An In-Depth Look At The U.K. Prosecution Of Airbus

airbus

These pages have long asserted that if a country is to have a deferred prosecution regime that the regime in the United Kingdom (which requires meaningful judicial review and approval) is far more preferable than the U.S. regime.

This is apparent when reviewing the Statement of Facts,, Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Approved Judgment relevant to the U.K. Serious Fraud Office prosecution of Airbus. (See here for a collection of the U.K. documents and see here for the prior post regarding the U.S. enforcement action). The U.K. documents provided a substantially more thorough and transparent glimpse into the underlying conduct compared to the U.S. resolution documents.

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All About The Alstom Enforcement Action

Alstom

As mentioned in this previous post, last week the DOJ announced a $772 million FCPA enforcement action against Alstom and related entities.

While the Alstom enforcement action is the largest DOJ FCPA enforcement action of all-time, it is the second largest overall FCPA enforcement action of all-time behind the 2008 Siemens enforcement action ($450 million DOJ component and a $350 million SEC component).  To see the current FCPA top-ten settlement list, click here.

The Alstom resolution documents total approximately 400 pages and this post summarizes these documents.

At its core, the Alstom enforcement action involved alleged conduct in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Bahamas, and Taiwan. All of this conduct is alleged in the Alstom S.A. information as the basis for the company’s FCPA books and records and internal controls violations between 1998 and 2004.  The charges were resolved through a plea agreement.  (A future post will explore, among other issues, the irony of Alstom pleading guilty in 2014 to substantive legal provisions that last applied to the company in 2004 when it ceased to be an “issuer.”).  From there the conduct was apportioned to the following Alstom-related entities in related enforcement actions.

  • Alstom Network Schweiz AG (conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions based on the Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Bahamas conduct and resolved through a plea agreement);
  • Alstom Power Inc. (conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions based on the Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt conduct and resolved through a DPA);
  • Alstom Grid Inc. (conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions based on the Egypt conduct and resolved through a DPA)

Alstom S.A. Information

According to the information, during the relevant time period, Alstom employed approximately 110,000 employees in over 70 countries.  The information contains specific allegations as to 9 individuals associated with Alstom and 9 consultants associated with Alstom.  As highlighted below, at its core, the Alstom enforcement action involved inadequate controls concerning the engagement, monitoring and supervision of the consultants.

The information alleges that “Alstom had direct and indirect subsidiaries in various countries around the world through which it bid on projects to secure contracts to perform power-related, grid-related, and transportation-related services, including for state-owned entities.”  According to the information, “Alstom’s subsidiaries worked exclusively on behalf of Alstom and for its benefit” and that Alstom “maintained a department called International Network that supported its subsidiaries’ efforts to secure contracts around the world.”  In addition, the information alleges that “within Alstom’s power sector, the company also maintained a department called Global Power Sales (“GPS”), which performed functions similar to International Network, in that GPS assisted Alstom entities or businesses in their efforts to secure contracts.”

The information contains a section titled “Overview of the Unlawful Scheme” that has two substantive sections “False Books and Records” and “Internal Accounting Controls.”

Under the heading “False Books and Records,” the information states.

“Alstom, acting through executives, employees, and others, disguised on its books and records millions of dollars in payments and other things of value given to foreign officials in exchange for those officials’ assistance in securing projects, keeping projects, and otherwise gaining other improper advantages in various countries around the world for Alstom and its subsidiaries.

In a number of instances, Alstom hired consultants to conceal and disguise improper payments to foreign officials. Alstom paid the consultants purportedly for performing legitimate services in connection with bidding on and executing various projects.  In reality, the Alstom personnel knew that the consultants were not performing legitimate services and that all or a portion of the payments were to be used to bribe foreign officials.  Alstom executives and employees falsely recorded these payments in its books and records as “commissions” or “consultancy fees.”

Alstom also created, and caused to be created, false records to further conceal these improper payments.  Alstom created consultancy agreements that provided for legitimate services to be rendered by the consultant, and included a provision prohibiting unlawful payments, even though the Alstom executives and employees involved knew that at times the consultants were using all or a portion of their consultancy fees to bribe foreign officials.  Moreover certain Alstom employees instructed the consultants to submit false invoices and other back-up documentation reflecting purported legitimate services rendered that those employees knew were not actually performed, so that Alstom could justify the payments to the consultants.

In other instances, Alstom paid bribes directly to foreign officials by providing gifts and petty cash, by hiring their family members, and in one instance by paying over two million dollars to a charity associated with a foreign official, all in exchange for those officials’ assistance in obtaining or retaining business in connection with projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.  As with the consultant payments, Alstom knowingly and falsely recorded these payments in its books and records as consultant expenses, as “donations,” or other purportedly legitimate expenses.

Alstom employees, some of whom were located in Connecticut, knowingly falsified Alstom’s books and records in order to conceal the bribe payments that they knew were illegal and were contrary to Alstom’s written policy.  Alstom also submitted false certifications to USAID and other regulatory entities, falsely asserting that Alstom was not using consultants on particular projects when, in fact, consultants were being used, and asserting that no unlawful payments were being made in connection with projects when, in fact, they were.  Various other acts, including e-mail communications, passed through Connecticut.”

Under the heading “Internal Accounting Controls,” the information states:

 “Although Alstom had policies in place prohibiting unlawful payments to foreign officials, including through consultants, Alstom knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure compliance with those policies.

Alstom knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure meaningful due diligence for the retention of third-party consultants. A number of consultants that Alstom hired raised a number of “red flags” under Alstom’s own internal policies.  Certain consultants proposed for retention had no expertise or experience in the industry sector in which Alstom was attempting to secure or execute the project.  Other consultants were located in a country different than the project country.  At other times, the consultants asked to be paid in a currency or in a bank account located in a country different than where the consultant and the project were located.  In multiple instances, more than one consultant was retained on the same project, ostensibly to perform the very same services.  Despite, these “red flags,” the consultants were nevertheless retained without meaningful scrutiny.  To the contrary, those submitting consultants for possible retention at times did not make explicit the true reason for the consultants’ retention, as well as other relevant facts.  And certain executives who had the ability to ensure appropriate controls surrounding the due diligence process themselves know, or knowingly failed to take action that would have allowed them to discover, that the purpose of hiring the consultant was to conceal payments to foreign officials in connection with securing projects and other favorable treatment in various countries around the world for Alstom and its subsidiaries.

Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls for the approval of consultancy agreements.  During the relevant time period, Alstom’s consultancy agreements provided that payments to the consultants would only be made on a pro rata basis tied to project milestones or as Alstom was paid by the customer.  In certain instances, Alstom employees changed the amount and terms of payment for the consultants, in violation of the company’s own internal policies, so that Alstom could pay the consultants more money and make the payment sooner in order to generate cash available to bribe the foreign officials.  The Alstom executives and employees responsible for approving consultancy agreements did not adequately scrutinize these changes, and in certain instances were copied on e-mails in which the true purpose for the change was discussed.  During the relevant time period, Alstom also maintained an unwritten policy to discourage, where possible, consultancy agreements that would subject Alstom to the jurisdiction of the United States. To effectuate this policy, Alstom typically used consultants who were not based in the United States, and intentionally paid consultants in bank accounts outside of the United States and in currencies other than U.S. dollars.  The Alstom executives and employees responsible for approving consultancy agreements attempted to enforce this unwritten policy even when it meant that the consultant had to open an offshore bank account solely for the purpose of receiving payments from Alstom.

Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls for payments to consultants. In multiple instances, Alstom paid the consultants without adequate, or timely, documentation of the services they purported to perform.  At times, consultants sought help from Alstom to create false documentation necessary for payment approval.  In other instances, the consultants created false “proofs of service” long after the purported services were rendered.  In certain cases … a consultant sought assistance from an Alstom employee responsible for approving payment because, as the consultant explained to the Alstom employee, he did not want to include on his invoices the fact that his services included making unlawful payments.  During the relevant time period, Alstom did not engage in auditing or testing of consultant invoices or payments.  In many instances, requests for payments to consultants were approved without adequate review by Alstom knowing that the payments were being used, at least in part, to bribe foreign officials to obtain or retain business in connection with projects in various countries around the world for Alstom and its subsidiaries.”

Next, the information contains the following summary allegation.

“Alstom paid approximately $75 million in consultancy fees knowing that this money would be used, in whole or in part, to bribe or provide something of value to foreign officials to secure approximately $4 billion in projects in multiple countries, with a gain to Alstom of approximately $296 million.”

The information next contains specific allegations regarding Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Bahamas, and Taiwan.

Indonesia

As to Indonesia, the information concerns various power projects in Indonesia through Indonesia’s state-owned and state-controlled electricity company, Perusahann Listrik Negara (“PLN”).  One such project was the Tarahan Project, a project to provide power-related services to the citizens of Indonesia at approximately $118 million and another such project was the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project, a project to expand the existing Muara Tawar power plant and provide additional power-related services to the citizens of Indonesia at approximately $260 million.  According to the information, Alstom subsidiaries bid on but were not awarded contracts related to other expansions of the Muara Tawar power plant.  In summary fashion, the information alleges as follows.

“In connection with these projects, Alstom disguised on its books and records millions of dollars and other things of value provided to Indonesian officials in exchange for those officials’ assistance in securing the power projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.  Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure that no unlawful payments were being made through consultants to foreign officials in connection with these projects.”

The Indonesia allegations in the Alstom information are substantively similar to the allegations in the prior FCPA enforcement action against various individuals associated with Alstom Power.  (See here for the prior post and summary).

Saudi Arabia

As to Saudi Arabia, the information concerns bids for power projects with Saudi Electric Company (“SEC”), Saudi Arabia’s state-owned and state-controlled electricity company, and its predecessor entities.  According to the information, in connection with one project:

“Alstom disguised on its books and records tens of millions of dollars in payments and other things of value provided to Saudi officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the projects.  Alstom knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure that no unlawful payments were being made to these officials.  The arrangements for these consulting agreements originated with [a separate international power company with which Alstom operated as a joint venture in 1999 and acquired in 2000]. Subsequently, Alstom honored, continued, and in certain instances renewed these consulting agreements without adequate diligence on what services were ostensibly being provided by these consultants, whether the consultants were capable of providing such services, whether the agreed upon consultancy fees were commensurate with such legitimate services, and despite the lack of documentation regarding what legitimate services were provided.”

In one instance, the information alleges that a consultant “was the brother of a high-level official at the SEC who had the ability to influence the award” of a project, “which certain Alstom employees knew.”  According to the information, this consultant was paid “approximately $5 million, with no documentation of any legitimate services having been performed [by the Consultant] commensurate with a $5 million fee and with no documentation of any technical or other expertise to justify such a fee.”  In another instance, the information alleges that another consultant “was a close relative of another high-level official at SEC who had the ability to influence the aware” of a project” which certain Alstom employees knew.”  According to the information, this consultant was paid at least $4 million under similar circumstances to those referenced above.

The information states as follows.

“In addition to paying consultants as a means of bribing key decision makers at the SEC, Alstom and its subsidiaries paid $2.2 million to a U.S.-based Islamic education foundation associated with [an SEC official believed to have 70% of the decision-making responsibility for SEC matters].  The payments were made in three installments, and internal records at Alstom reflect that these payments were included as expenses related [to the projects] rather than as a separate and independent charitable contribution.”

Egypt

As to Egypt, the information concerns bidding on various projects with the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (“EEHC”), the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Egypt.  According to the information, “EEHC was not itself responsible for conducting the bidding [on projects], and instead relied on Power Generation Engineering & Services Co. (“PGESCo”), which was controlled by an acted on behalf of EEHC.”  According to the information, in connection with various projects, “Alstom disguised on its books and records millions of dollars and other things of value provided to Egyptian officials to obtain or retain business in connection with power projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.  Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure that no unlawful payments were being made to these officials.  According to the information, Alstom used a consultant whose primary purpose “was not to provide legitimate consulting services to Alstom and its subsidiaries but was instead to make payments to Egyptian officials, including Asem Elgawhary who oversaw the bidding process.”  (See here for the prior post regarding the Elgawhary enforcement action).

The information also contains allegations concerning bidding on various grid projects with EEHC and the Egyptian Electricity Transmission Company (“EETC”), the state-owned and state-controlled electricity transmission company in Egypt.  According to the information, certain of these projects were “funded, at least in part, by the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”).  According to the information:

“In connection with [these projects], Alstom disguised on its books and records payments and other things of value it provided to Egyptian officials in exchange for those officials’ assistance in securing and executing the transmission and distribution projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.  Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure that no unlawful payments were being made to these officials.”

According to the information, an Alstom entity “repeatedly submitted false certifications to USAID in connection with these projects, and did not disclose that consultants were being used, that commissions were being paid, or that unlawful payments were being made.”

According to the information, “in addition to falsifying records in connection with the retention of consultants and their commission payments,” Alstom employees also “paid for entertainment and travel for [a high-level official] and other key decision-makers at EETC and EEHC, and provided those officials with envelopes of cash and other gifts during such travel.”

Bahamas

As to the Bahamas, the information concerns power projects with the Bahamas Electricity Corporation (“BEC”), the state-owned and state-controlled power company.  According to the information, “Alstom disguised in its books and records payments to Bahamian officials to obtain or retain business in connection with power projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.  Alstom also knowingly failed to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure that no unlawful payments were being made to these officials.

According to the information, Alstom retained a consultant “who, as certain Alstom employees knew, was a close personal friend” of a board member of BEC and that the primary purpose of the consultant was not to provide legitimate consulting services but instead to pay bribes to the official who had the ability to influence the award of the power contracts.  According to the information, Alstom did not perform any due diligence on the consultant even though the consultant had no knowledge about, or experience in, the power industry.  Rather, the information alleges, the consultant “sold furniture and leather products, and exported chemical products and spare parts.”

Taiwan

As to Taiwan, the information alleges that between 2001 and 2008, Alstom and its subsidiaries “began bidding on transport-related projects with various entities responsible for the construction and operation of the metro-rail system in Taipei, Taiwan, including Taipei’s Department of Rapid Transit System, known as “DORTS.”  According to the information, an Alstom entity formally retained a consultant on a DORTS project even thought the consultant did not have the requisite expertise in the transport sector.  According to the information, the consultant’s expertise was as a “wholesaler of cigarettes, wines and pianos.”

According to the information, “Alstom’s system of internal controls was inadequate as they related to the Taiwan projects.  Despite numerous red flags, Alstom personnel knowingly failed to conduct further diligence to ensure that payments to its consultants in Taiwan could not be used to make improper payments to Taiwanese officials after the projects were secured.”

Based on the above allegations, Alstom was charged with one count of violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions from 1998 to 2004 and one count of violating the FCPA’s internal controls provisions from 1998 to 2004.

Alstom S.A. Plea Agreement

In the plea agreement, Alstom admitted that it was an “issuer” during the relevant time period and admitted, agreed, and stipulated that the factual allegations set forth in the information were true and correct.

In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the gross pecuniary gain resulting from the offense was $296 million.  The plea agreement sets forth an advisory sentencing guidelines range of $532.8 million to $1.065 billion.

Under the heading “failure to self-report,” the plea agreement states:

“The Defendant failed to voluntarily disclose the conduct even though it was aware of related misconduct at Alstom Power, Inc., a U.S. subsidiary, which entered into a resolution for corrupt conduct in connection with a power project in Italy several years prior to the Department reaching out to Alstom regarding its investigation.”

Under the heading “cooperation,” the plea agreement states:

“The Defendant initially failed to cooperate with the Department’s investigation, responding only to the Department’s subpoenas to the Defendant’s subsidiaries.  Approximately one year into the investigation, the Defendant provided limited cooperation, but still did not fully cooperate with the Department’s investigation.  The Defendant’s initial failure to cooperate impeded the Department’s investigation of individuals involved in the bribery scheme.  At a later stage in the investigation, the Defendant began providing thorough cooperation, including assisting in the Department’s investigation and prosecution of individuals and other companies that had partnered with the Defendant on certain projects.  The Defendant’s thorough cooperation did not occur until after the Department had publicly charged multiple Alstom executives and employees.”

Under the heading, “compliance and remediation,” the plea agreement states:

“The Defendant lacked an effective compliance and ethics program at the time of the offense.  Since that time, the Defendant has undertaken substantial efforts to enhance its compliance program and to remediate the prior inadequacies, including complying with undertakings contained in resolutions with the World Bank (including an ongoing monitorship) and the government of Switzerland, substantially increasing its compliance staff, improving its alert procedures, increasing training and auditing/testing, and cease the use of external success fee-based consultants.”

In the plea agreement, Alstom agreed to a so-called “muzzle clause” in which it agreed not, directly or indirectly through others, to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility set forth in the plea agreement.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Alstom agreed to a corporate compliance program with elements typically part of other FCPA settlements.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Alstom agreed to report to the DOJ, at no less than 12 month intervals, for a three-year term, regarding remediation and implementation of the compliance program and internal controls, policies, and procedures.  The plea agreement references that Alstom is already subject to monitoring requirements pursuant to a February 2012 World Bank Resolution but states that “in the event that the Integrity Compliance Office [of the World Bank] does not certify that the Company has satisfied the monitoring requirements contained in the World Bank Resolution, the Company shall be required to retain an Independent Compliance Monitor.”

Alstom Network Schweiz AG Information

The information against Alstom Network Schweiz AG (formerly known as Alstom Prom AG), a subsidiary of Alstom headquartered in Switzerland and responsible for overseeing compliance as it related to Alstom’s consultancy agreements for many of Alstom’s power sector subsidiaries, is based upon the same Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahamas conduct alleged in the Alstom information.

The Alstom entity is charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions under the dd-3 prong of the statute. According to the information, the “purpose of the conspiracy was to make corrupt payments to foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas in order to obtain and retain business related to power projects in those countries for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries.”

Alstom Network Schweiz AG Plea Agreement

In the plea agreement, the Alstom entity admitted, agreed, and stipulated that the factual allegations set forth in the information were true and correct.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, “the parties agree[d] that any monetary penalty in this case will be paid pursuant to the plea agreement between the DOJ and Alstom, S.A., the parent company of the Defendant, relating to the same conduct …”.

In the plea agreement, the Alstom entity agreed to a so-called “muzzle clause” in which it agreed not, directly or indirectly through others, to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility set forth in the plea agreement.

The plea agreement contains the same corporate compliance program, reporting obligations, and monitor conditions as described in the Alstom plea agreement above.

Alstom Power Inc. Information

The information against Alstom Power Inc., a subsidiary of Alstom headquartered in Connecticut in the business of providing power generation-related services around the world, is based upon the same Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt conduct alleged in the Alstom information.

Alstom Power is charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions under the dd-2 prong of the statute. According to the information, the “purpose of the conspiracy was to make corrupt payments to foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in order to obtain and retain business related to power projects in those countries for and on behalf of Alstom Power and its subsidiaries.”

Alstom Power Inc. DPA

In the DPA, Alstom Power admitted, accepted, and acknowledged that it was responsible for the conduct charged in the information.

The DPA has a term of three years and under the heading “relevant considerations” states as follows.

“The [DOJ] enters into this Agreement based on the individual facts and circumstances presented by this case and the Company.  Among the factors considered were the following:  (a) the company failed to voluntarily disclosed the conduct even though it had previously entered into a resolution for corrupt conduct in connection with a power project in Italy several years prior to the [DOJ] reaching out to Alstom regarding their investigation; (b) the Company and its parent initially failed to cooperate with the Department’s investigation, responding only to the Department’s subpoena.  Approximately one year into the investigation, the Company and its parent provided limited cooperation, but still did not fully cooperate with the Department’s investigation. The Company’s and its parent’s initial failure to cooperate impeded the Department’s investigation of individuals involved in the bribery scheme.  At a later stage in the investigation, the Company and its parent began providing thorough cooperation, including assisting in the Department’s investigation and prosecution of individuals and other companies that had partnered with the Company and its parent on certain projects.  The Company’s and its parent’s thorough cooperation did not occur until after the Department had publicly charged multiple current and former Alstom executives and employees; (c) the Company and its parent have undertaken substantial efforts to enhance its compliance program as part of the significant compliance and remediation improvements to Alstom S.A’s program, and has committed to continue to enhance their compliance program and internal controls, ensuring that its program satisfies the minimum elements set forth [in the DPA]; (d) General Electric Company, which intends to acquire the Company, has represented that it will implement its compliance program and internal controls at the Company within a reasonable time after the acquisition closes; and (e) the Company has agreed to continue to cooperate with the [DOJ] in any ongoing investigation …”.

In the DPA, the DOJ and the Company agreed that no monetary penalty will be paid by the Company because Alstom S.A., the parent company of the Company, has agreed to pay a fine of $772,290,000 related to the same underlying conduct.

In the DPA, Alstom Power agreed to a so-called “muzzle clause” in which it agreed not, directly or indirectly through others, to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility set forth in the plea agreement.

The DPA contains the same corporate compliance program, reporting obligations, and monitor conditions as described in the Alstom plea agreement above.

Alstom Grid Inc. Information

The information against Alstom Grid, Inc. (formerly known as Alstom T&D, Inc.), a subsidiary of Alstom headquartered in New Jersey in the business of providing power grid-related services around the world, is based upon the same Egypt conduct alleged in the Alstom information.

Alstom Grid is charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions under the dd-2 prong of the statute. According to the information, the “purpose of the conspiracy was to make corrupt payments to foreign officials in Egypt in order to obtain and retain business related to power grid projects for and on behalf of Alstom Grid and Alstom and its subsidiaries.”

Alstom Grid Inc. DPA

In the DPA, Alstom Grid admitted, accepted, and acknowledged that it was responsible for the conduct charged in the information.

The DPA has a term of three years and contains the same relevant considerations described in the Alstom Power DPA above.

In the DPA, the DOJ and the Company agreed that no monetary penalty will be paid by the Company because Alstom S.A., the parent company of the Company, has agreed to pay a fine of $772,290,000 related to the same underlying conduct.

In the DPA, Alstom Power agreed to a so-called “muzzle clause” in which it agreed not, directly or indirectly through others, to make any public statement contradicting the acceptance of responsibility set forth in the plea agreement.

The DPA contains the same corporate compliance program, reporting obligations, and monitor conditions as described in the Alstom plea agreement above.

In this DOJ release, Deputy Attorney General James Cole stated:

“Alstom’s corruption scheme was sustained over more than a decade and across several continents. It was astounding in its breadth, its brazenness and its worldwide consequences. And it is both my expectation – and my intention – that the comprehensive resolution we are announcing today will send an unmistakable message to other companies around the world: that this Department of Justice will be relentless in rooting out and punishing corruption to the fullest extent of the law, no matter how sweeping its scale or how daunting its prosecution.”

Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell stated:

“This case is emblematic of how the Department of Justice will investigate and prosecute FCPA cases – and other corporate crimes. We encourage companies to maintain robust compliance programs, to voluntarily disclose and eradicate misconduct when it is detected, and to cooperate in the government’s investigation. But we will not wait for companies to act responsibly. With cooperation or without it, the department will identify criminal activity at corporations and investigate the conduct ourselves, using all of our resources, employing every law enforcement tool, and considering all possible actions, including charges against both corporations and individuals.”

First Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael Gustafson of the District of Connecticut stated:

“Today’s historic resolution is an important reminder that our moral and legal mandate to stamp out corruption does not stop at any border, whether city, state or national. A significant part of this illicit work was unfortunately carried out from Alstom Power’s offices in Windsor, Connecticut. I am hopeful that this resolution, and in particular the deferred prosecution agreement with Alstom Power, will provide the company an opportunity to reshape its culture and restore its place as a respected corporate citizen.”

FBI Executive Assistant Director Robert Anderson Jr. stated:

“This investigation spanned years and crossed continents, as agents from the FBI Washington and New Haven field offices conducted interviews and collected evidence in every corner of the globe. The record dollar amount of the fine is a clear deterrent to companies who would engage in foreign bribery, but an even better deterrent is that we are sending executives who commit these crimes to prison.”

As noted in the DOJ release:

“To date, the department has announced charges against five individuals, including four corporate executives of Alstom and its subsidiaries, for alleged corrupt conduct involving Alstom. Frederic Pierucci, Alstom’s former vice president of global boiler sales, pleaded guilty on July 29, 2013, to conspiring to violate the FCPA and a charge of violating the FCPA for his role in the Indonesia bribery scheme. David Rothschild, Alstom Power’s former vice president of regional sales, pleaded guilty on Nov. 2, 2012, to conspiracy to violate the FCPA. William Pomponi, Alstom Power’s former vice president of regional sales, pleaded guilty on July 17, 2014, to conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Lawrence Hoskins, Alstom’s former senior vice president for the Asia region, was charged in a second superseding indictment on July 30, 2013, and is pending trial in the District of Connecticut in June 2015. The charges against Hoskins are merely allegations, and he is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. The high-ranking member of Indonesian Parliament was also convicted in Indonesia of accepting bribes from Alstom, and is currently serving a three-year term of imprisonment.

In connection with a corrupt scheme in Egypt, Asem Elgawhary, the general manager of an entity working on behalf of the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company, a state-owned electricity company, pleaded guilty on Dec. 4, 2014, in federal court in the District of Maryland to mail fraud, conspiring to launder money, and tax fraud for accepting kickbacks from Alstom and other companies. In his plea agreement, Elgawhary agreed to serve 42 months in prison and forfeit approximately $5.2 million in proceeds.”

In addition to the above DOJ press release, the DOJ also held a press conference, a rare event in connection with an FCPA enforcement action.  In this speech, Cole stated:

“We are here to announce a historic law enforcement action that marks the end of a decade-long transnational bribery scheme – a scheme that was both concocted and concealed by Alstom, a multinational French company, and its subsidiaries in Switzerland, Connecticut, and New Jersey.

Today, those companies admit that, from at least 2000 to 2011, they bribed government officials and falsified accounting records in connection with lucrative power and transportation projects for state-owned entities across the globe.  They used bribes to secure contracts in Indonesia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Bahamas.  Altogether, Alstom paid tens of millions of dollars in bribes to win $4 billion in projects – and to secure approximately $300 million in profit for themselves.

Such rampant and flagrant wrongdoing demands an appropriately strong law enforcement response.  Today, I can announce that the Justice Department has filed a two-count criminal information in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, charging Alstom with violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, or FCPA, by falsifying its books and records and failing to implement adequate internal controls.  Alstom has agreed to plead guilty to these charges, to admit its criminal conduct, and to pay a criminal penalty of more than $772 million.  If approved by the court next year, this will be the largest foreign bribery penalty in the history of the United States Department of Justice.

In addition, I can announce that Alstom’s Swiss subsidiary is pleading guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA.  And the company’s two American subsidiaries have entered into deferred prosecution agreements and admitted that they conspired to violate the FCPA.

Alstom’s corruption scheme was sustained over more than a decade and across several continents.  It was breathtaking in its breadth, its brazenness, and its worldwide consequences.  And it is both my expectation – and my intention – that the comprehensive resolution we are announcing today will send an unmistakable message to other companies around the world: that this Department of Justice will be relentless in rooting out and punishing corruption to the fullest extent of the law, no matter how sweeping its scale or how daunting its prosecution.  Let me be very clear: corruption has no place in the global marketplace.  And today’s resolution signals that the United States will continue to play a leading role in its eradication.

The investigation and prosecution of Alstom and its subsidiaries have been exceedingly complex – and they have required the utmost skill and tenacity on the part of a wide consortium of law enforcement officials throughout the country and across the globe.  I want to thank the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section and Office of International Affairs; the U.S. Attorney’s Offices in Connecticut, Maryland, and New Jersey; the FBI’s Washington Field Office and its Resident Agency in Meriden, Connecticut; the Corruption Eradication Commission in Indonesia; the Office of the Attorney General in Switzerland; the Serious Fraud Office in the United Kingdom; as well as authorities in Germany, Italy, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, and Taiwan, for their tireless efforts to advance this matter.  The remarkable cross-border collaboration that these agencies made possible has led directly to today’s historic resolution.  And this outcome demonstrates our unwavering commitment to ending corporate bribery and international corruption.  Our hope is that this announcement will serve as an inspiration – and a model – for future efforts.”

In this speech at the press conference, Caldwell stated:

“Today represents a significant milestone in the global fight against corruption.  It demonstrates the Department of Justice’s strong commitment to fighting foreign bribery and ensuring that both companies and individuals are held accountable when they violate the FCPA.  The guilty pleas and resolutions announced today also highlight what can happen when corporations refuse to disclose wrongdoing and refuse to cooperate with the department’s efforts to identify and prosecute culpable individuals.

Let me first explain how the scheme worked.  To conceal that it was the source of payments to government officials, Alstom funneled the bribes through third-party consultants who did little more than serve as conduits for corruption.  Alstom then dummied up its books and records to cover up the scheme.

Alstom’s corruption spanned the globe, and was its way of winning business.  For example, in Indonesia, Alstom and certain of its subsidiaries used consultants to bribe government officials – including high-ranking members of the Indonesian Parliament and the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company – to win several contracts to provide power-related services.  According to internal documents, when certain officials expressed displeasure that a particular consultant had provided only “pocket money,” Alstom retained a second consultant to ensure that the officials were satisfied.

In Saudi Arabia, Alstom retained at least six consultants, including two close family members of high-ranking government officials, to bribe officials at a state-owned and state-controlled electricity company to win two projects valued at approximately $3 billion.  As evidence that Alstom employees recognized that their conduct was criminal, internal company documents refer to the consultants only by code name.

Alstom similarly used consultants to bribe officials in Egypt and the Bahamas, and again Alstom employees clearly knew that the conduct violated the law.  In connection with a project in Egypt, a member of Alstom’s finance department sent an email questioning an invoice for consultant services and, in response, was advised that her inquiry could have “several people put in jail” and was further instructed to delete all prior emails regarding the consultant.

If approved by the court, Alstom’s criminal penalty of $772 million represents the largest penalty ever assessed by department in a FCPA case.  Through Alstom’s parent-level guilty plea and record-breaking criminal penalty, Alstom is paying a historic price for its criminal conduct — and for its efforts to insulate culpable corporate employees and other corporate entities.  Alstom did not voluntarily disclose the misconduct to law enforcement authorities, and Alstom refused to cooperate in a meaningful way during the first several years of the investigation.  Indeed, it was only after the department publicly charged several Alstom executives – three years after the investigation began – that the company finally cooperated.

One important message of this case is this:  While we hope that companies that find themselves in these situations will cooperate with the Department of Justice, we do not wait for or depend on that cooperation. When Alstom refused to cooperate with the investigation, we persisted with our own investigation.  We built cases against the various corporate entities and against culpable individuals.  To date, the department publicly has charged four Alstom corporate executives in connection with the corrupt scheme in Indonesia, which also chose not to cooperate, and another company’s executive in connection with the scheme in Egypt.  Four of these individuals already have pleaded guilty.  In addition, Marubeni Corporation, a Japanese trading company that partnered with Alstom in Indonesia, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and substantive violations of the FCPA, and paid an $88 million criminal penalty.

Another important message from this case is that the U.S. increasingly is not alone in the fight against transnational corruption.  Earlier this year, Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, the KPK, assisted the department in its investigation.  And, in turn, the department shared with the KPK information that federal investigators had obtained, which the KPK used in its prosecution of a former member of the Indonesian Parliament for accepting bribes from Alstom-funded consultants.  This past spring, that Indonesian official was found guilty and sentenced to three years in an Indonesian prison.  Our partnership with Indonesian law enforcement authorities in this case means that both the bribe payors and bribe takers have been prosecuted.  And our investigation is not over yet.

This case is emblematic of how the Department of Justice will investigate and prosecute FCPA cases – and other corporate crimes.  We encourage companies to maintain robust compliance programs, to voluntarily disclose and eradicate misconduct when it is detected, and to cooperate in the government’s investigation.  But we will not wait for companies to act responsibly.  With cooperation or without it, the department will identify criminal activity at corporations and investigate the conduct ourselves, using all of our resources, employing every law enforcement tool, and considering all possible actions, including charges against both corporations and individuals.”

See here for an additional DOJ statement at the press conference.

In this Alstom release, Alstom CEO Patrick Kron stated:

“There were a number of problems in the past and we deeply regret that. However, this resolution with the DOJ allows Alstom to put this issue behind us and to continue our efforts to ensure that business is conducted in a responsible way, consistent with the highest ethical standards.”

The release further states:

“Alstom has made significant progress in the area of compliance over the last several years. The conduct referred to in the agreement mainly arose from the use of external success fee based Sales Consultants hired by Alstom to support its commercial teams. In order to ensure that Alstom strives for the best compliance procedures, Alstom has discontinued the hiring of such Sales Consultants. Further, pursuant to a negotiated resolution agreement with the World Bank, Alstom committed in Feb 2012 to continue to improve its internal compliance programme, including by retaining a monitor to oversee its efforts in this regard. To date, the work of the Monitor has confirmed that Alstom has put in place a Corporate Compliance Programme that reflects the principles embedded in the WBG’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines.”

[…]

“The DOJ has also stipulated that no part of the fine can be passed on to General Electric as part of the projected sale of Alstom’s energy businesses.”

Robert Luskin and Jay Darden of Squire Patton Boggs represented the Alstom entities.

Checking In On The Carson Case

In April 2009, Stuart and Hong Carson (husband and wife) were criminally charged, along with other defendants who were also former employees of Control Components Inc. (CCI), in a criminal indictment (here) for engaging in “a conspiracy to secure contracts by paying bribes to officials of foreign state-owned companies as well as officers and employees of foreign and domestic private companies.”

The indictment alleged as follows.

“Company A’s state-owned customers included, but were not limited to, Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation (“JNPC”)  (China), Guohua Electric Power (China), China Petroleum Materials and Equipment Corporation (“CPMEC”), PetroChina, Dongfang  Electric Corporation (China), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”), Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (“KHNP”),  Petronas (Malaysia), and National Petroleum Construction Company (“NPCC”) (United Arab Emirates).  Each of these state-owned entities was a department, agency, and instrumentality of a  foreign government, within the meaning of the FCPA. The officers  and employees of these entities, including the Vice-Presidents, Engineering Managers, General Managers, Procurement Managers, and Purchasing Officers, were “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.”

As noted in the DOJ release (here), Stuart Carson was charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, and two counts of violating the FCPA.  Hong Carson was charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, five counts of violating the FCPA, and one count of destruction of records in connection with a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency of the United States.  This latter charge was ultimately dismissed by the DOJ.  As stated in the DOJ release, “in the period from 2003 through 2007, the defendants caused the valve company to pay approximately $4.9 million in bribes, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), to officials of foreign state-owned companies …”.

Shortly thereafter, Control Components Inc. resolved an FCPA enforcement action based on the same core set of conduct alleged in the above indictment.  (See here for the prior post).  I noted, then, as I had since launching this website in July 2009, that DOJ’s position that employees of state-owned companies, regardless of position, are “foreign officials” under the FCPA is an unchallenged and untested legal theory – and one I believe is ripe for challenge.

In February 2011 (as noted in this prior post), for the first time in FCPA history, a federal court judge, with the benefit of a detailed and complete overview of the FCPA’s extensive legislative history on the “foreign official” element, was asked to rule on the DOJ’s interpretation that employees of alleged state-owned or state-controlled enterprises are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.  My declaration on the FCPA’s legislative history relevant to “foreign official” (here) was used in the “foreign official” motion to dismiss.

In May 2011 (as noted in this prior post), Judge James Selna denied the “foreign official” motion to dismiss and concluded that “the question of whether state-owned companies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of fact.”  The “foreign official” issue thus moved to the jury instructions (as noted in this prior post).

In February 2012 (as noted in this prior post), Judge Selna issued certain jury instructions.  Not surprisingly, Judge Selna carried forward his previous “instrumentality” analysis into the “instrumentality” jury instruction.  Yet, in a significant development in terms of the future of the case, Judge Selna issued an instruction titled “knowledge of status of foreign official.”  In pertinent part, the instruction stated as follows.

[…..]

“(4) The defendant offered, paid, promised to pay, or authorized the payment of money, or offered, gave, promised to give, or authorized the giving of anything of value to a foreign official;

(5) The payment or gift at issue in element 4 was to (a) a person the defendant knew or believed was a foreign official or (b) any person and the defendant knew that all or a portion of such money or thing of value would be offered, given, or promised (directly or indirectly) to a person the defendant knew or believed to be a foreign official. Belief that an individual was a foreign official does not satisfy this element if the individual was not in fact a foreign official.”

In his order, Judge Selna stated as follows.

“The Government proposes to add the following paragraph to element 5:”

The government need not prove that the defendant knew the legal definition of “foreign official” under the FCPA or knew that the intended recipient of the payment or gift fell within the legal definition. The defendant need not know in what specific official capacity the intended recipient was acting, but the defendant must have known or believed that the intended recipient had authority to act in a certain manner as specified in element 6.”

The Court does not believe that this language is necessary, and it is potentially confusing.”

Earlier this week, the DOJ announced (here) that Stuart Carson and Hong Carson “each pleaded guilty … before U.S. District Judge James V. Selna in Santa Ana, Calif., to separate one-count superseding informations charging them with making a corrupt payment to a foreign government official in violation of the FCPA.”

Unlike the original indictment, the four page superseding information as to Stuart Carson (here) focuses solely on Turow Power Plant in Poland and states as follows.  “Turow was a department, agency, and instrumentality of a foreign government, within the meaning of the FCPA, […].  The officers and employees of Turow were “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.”  The superseding information states that on March 8, 2000, Stuart Carson “corruptly caused an e-mail to be sent authorizing the payment of approximately $16,000 to officials of Turow for the purpose of securing Turow’s business.”

Unlike the original indictment, the four page superseding information as to Hong Carson (here) focuses solely on Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant in Taiwan and states as follows.  “Kuoshen was a department, agency, and instrumentality of a foreign government, within the meaning of the FCPA, […].  The officers and employees of Kuosheng were “foreign officials” within the meaning of the FCPA.  The superseding information states that on August 14, 2002, Hong Carson “corruptly caused an e-mail to be sent authorizing the payment of $40,000 to officials of Kuosheng for the purposes of securing Kuosheng’s business.”

As noted in the DOJ’s release, “at sentencing (Oct. 15, 2012), Stuart Carson, 73, faces up to 10 months in prison.  Rose Carson, 48, faces a sentence of three years probation, which may include up to six months of home confinement.”

The conclusions are yours to reach.

Paul Cosgrove and David Edmonds remain defendants in the case and their trial is scheduled for June.

*****

Previous posts here and here discussed the motion to suppress filed by Cosgrove and Edmonds (joined by Hong Carson) to suppress certain statements made by the individuals to CCI and its counsel (Steptoe & Johnson) on the basis that its counsel were de facto public actors and that CCI’s actions in compelling their statements were “fairly attributable to the government” and ought to be suppressed.

Earlier this week, Judge Selna, whose practice is to issue tentative rulings, tentatively ruled (here), in connection with a subpoena to Steptoe & Johnson, that production must be made as to the following.  “All communications exchanged between Steptoe, IMI, and/or CCI on the one hand, and the United States Department of Justice, on the other hand during the period August 10 through August 25 2007 which relate to interviews of CCI employees, taken or to be taken, for the purpose of investigating actual or suspected violations of the [FCPA and Travel Act].  This includes but is not limited to all e-mails exchanged between Patrick Norton (Steptoe & Johnson) and Mark Mendelsohn (former DOJ FCPA unit chief).  Judge Selna noted that such information “could yield admissible evidence under the defendants’ Government-actor theory of agreements or understanding between Steptoe that would render Steptoe lawyers agents of the Government, specifically the Department of Justice, at the time the interviews of defendants were conducted.”

Judge Selna also issued another tentative ruling (here) regarding various aspects of the subpoena to Steptoe & Johnson that will be of interest to FCPA practitioners.

Analyzing Alcatel-Lucent

In 2006, Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel”) was formed when an Alcatel S.A. subsidiary merged with Lucent Technologies, Inc. Prior to the merger, Alcatel was a worldwide provider of a wide variety of telecommunications equipment and services and other technology products. The company operated in more than 130 countries directly and through certain wholly owned and indirect subsidiaries including in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia and Taiwan. From 1998 until late 2006, ADR shares of Alcatel were traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

In 2007, the right side of the hyphen – Lucent Technologies – settled an FCPA enforcement action (see here and here).

In 2010, in what was the last FCPA enforcement action of the year, the left side of the hyphen – Alcatel and certain of its subsidiaries – settled an FCPA enforcement.

This post analyzes the Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action. The enforcement action (all 360 pages) is a FCPA feast. Principally based on the lack of due diligence of third-party agents, the enforcement action serves up the following: lots of alleged state-owned or state-controlled telecommunication entities; consultants hired after contracts were secured; a purported telecommunications consultant with only perfume experience; payments to legislators and political parties; things of value including excessive travel and entertainment expenses and crystal for the secretary; joint ventures; and payments from New York and Miami bank accounts.

The Alcatel-Lucent enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $137.4 million ($92 million criminal fine via DOJ plea agreements and a deferred prosecution agreement; $45.4 million in disgorgement via a SEC settled complaint).

DOJ

The DOJ enforcement action involved a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel”) resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement and a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent France S.A. (“Alcatel CIT”), Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. (“Alcatel Standard”), and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. (“ACR”) resolved through plea agreements. See here for the DOJ release.

Alcatel-Lucent S.A. Criminal Information

The information (here) begins with a heading “Background Regarding Alcatel’s Business Practices and the State of Its Internal Controls.”

It states as follows. “Starting in the 1990s and continuing through at least last 2006, Alcatel pursued many of its business opportunities around the world through the use of third-party agents and consultants. This business model was shown to be prone to corruption, as consultants were repeatedly used as conduits for bribe payments to foreign officials (and business executives of private customers) to obtain or retain business in many countries.”

The information also highlights Alcatel’s “de-centralized business structure” which permitted different Alcatel employees around the world “to initially vet the the third-party consultants, and then rely on Executive 1 [a French citizen who served as Chief Executive Officer of Alcatel Standard in Basel, Switzerland] at Alcatel to perform due diligence on them.” According to the information, “this de-centralized structure and approval process permitted corruption to occur, as the local employees were more interested in obtaining business than ensuring that business was won ethically and legally.”

Further, the information alleges that “Executive 1 performed no due diligence of substance and remained, at best, deliberately ignorant of the true purpose behind the retention of and payment to many of the third-party consultants.” Specifically, the information alleges that “Executive 1 made no effort, or virtually no effort, to verify the information provided by the consultant in the Consultant Profile [a form the consultant was supposed to complete with information concerning its ownership, business activities, capabilities, banking arrangements, and professional references], apart from using Dun & Bradstreet reports to confirm the consultant’s existence and physical address.” According to the information, “if the paperwork was completed, regardless of any obvious issues (such as close relationships with foreign officials or a clear lack of skill, experience or telecommunications expertise), Executive 1 authorized hiring and paying the third-party consultant.”

As to payments to the consultants, the information alleges that “Alcatel Standard [a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in Switzerland and an entity “responsible for entering into most agreements with consultants worldwide on behalf of Alcatel and certain other entities] would contract with the third-party consultant and then Alcatel CIT [a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in France] would pay the consultant” including through a bank account at ABN Amro Bank in New York.

The information alleges as follows. “Often senior executives at Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR [a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcatel located and incorporated in Costa Rica], among others, knew bribes were being paid, or were aware of the high probability that many of these third-party consultants were paying bribes, to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. For example, in a significant number of instances, the consultant contracts were executed after Alcatel had already obtained the customer business, the consultant commissions were excessive, and lump sum payments were made to the consultants that did not appear to correspond to any one one contract.”

According to the information, “Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, ACR, and certain employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knew, or purposefully ignored” that much of the consultant documentation “did not accurately reflect the true nature and purpose of the agreements” and that “many of the invoices submitted by various third-party consultants falsely claimed that legitimate work had been completed, while the true purpose of the monies sought by the invoices was to funnel all or some of the money to foreign officials, directly and indirectly.”

The information alleges that “these transactions were designed to circumvent Alcatel’s internal controls system and were further undertaken knowing that they would not be accurately and fairly reflected in Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR’s books and records, which were included in the consolidated financial statements that Alcatel filed with the SEC.”

The information then contains ten separate sections: conduct in Costa Rica; conduct in Honduras; conduct in Malaysia; conduct in Taiwan; conduct in Kenya; conduct in Nigeria; conduct in Bangladesh; conduct in Ecuador; conduct in Nicaragua; and other consultancy agreements entered into without proper due diligence.

Costa Rica

The alleged conduct focuses on the actions of Christian Sapsizian and Edgar Valverde Acosta and consultancy agreements on behalf of Alcatel CIT with two Costa Rican consultants which were intended to make improper payments to Costa Rican government officials for telecommunications contracts. According to the indictment, Sapsizian (a French citizen) was a long-term employee of Alcatel and Alcatel CIT responsible for developing business in Latin America. Valverde (a Costa Rica citizen) served as the President of ACR and the Country Senior Officer of Costa Rica. See here for the prior enforcement actions against Sapsizian and Valverde.

According to the information, “both consultants had many personal contacts at ICE [Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad S.A. – a “wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Costa Rica responsible for awarding and administering public tenders for telecommunications contracts].

According to the information, Sapsizian’s supervisor, the President of Area 1 who worked in Miami, approved more than $18 million in payments to the consultants notwithstanding that the President of Area 1, according to Sapsizian, “told him on several occasions that he knew he was ‘risking jail time’ as a result of his approval of these payments, which he understood would, at least in part, ultimately wind up in the hands of public officials.”

The information alleges that various Alcatel entities “conducted insufficient due diligence” on the consultants and that “neither Alcatel nor any of its subsidiaries took sufficient steps to ensure that the consultants were complying with the FCPA or other relevant anti-corruption laws.”

According to the information, the above described payments were ultimately used to provide money to various ICE officials, a Costa Rica executive branch official, and a Costa Rica legislator, that ultimately assisted Alcatel CIT obtain a $44 million contract, a $149.5 million contract, a $109.5 million contract.

The information also alleges that Sapsizian “approved the payment of approximately $25,000 in travel, hotel, and other expenses incurred by ICE officials during a primarily pleasure trip to Paris” – a trip that “was partially intended to reward these government officials for providing Alcatel with lucrative contracts …”.

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and made inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC. As a result of the contracts won by Alcatel CIT in Costa Rica as a result of bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $23,661,000 in profits.”

Honduras

The information charges that “employees of ACR, along with Sapsizian, pursued business opportunities on behalf of Alcatel in Honduras with Hondutel [Empresa Hondurena de Telecomunicaciones – an alleged wholly state-owned telecommunications authority in Honduras responsible for providing telecommunications services in Honduras including evaluating and awarding telecommunications contracts on behalf of the government of Honduras] and Conatel [Comision Nacional de Telecouniciaciones – an alleged Honduran government agency that regulated the telecommunications sector in Honduras that issued licenses and concessions for fixed-line and wireless telephony, data transmission and internet services].”

According to the information, Alcatel CIT and Alcatel Mexico made large commission payments to at least one consultant, knowing that all or some of the money paid to that consultant would be paid to a close relative of a Honduran government official, with the high probability that some or all of the money would be passed on to the Honduran government official, in exchange for favorable treatment of Alcatel, Alcatel CIT, and Alcatel Mexico.”

According to the information, the consultant was retained at the request of a high-ranking government official in the Honduran executive branch; however, the consultant was an exclusive distributor of “brand name perfumes” and had no contacts in, or prior experience with, the telecommunications industry in Honduras or anywhere else.

The information alleges that in retaining the consultant, “Alcatel Standard knowingly failed to conduct appropriate due dligence” and “did not follow up on numerous, obvious red flags.”

The information alleges that by utilizing the services of the consultant, Hondutel awarded Alcatel a $1 million contract and four additional contracts for a combined value of approximately $47 million.

The information also alleges that “Alcatel CIT and ACR employees arranged for several other Honduran government officials to take primarily pleasure trips to France, which were paid by Alcatel CIT or ACR directly.” In addition, the information charges that a “high-ranking executive at Hondutel” also “received gifts and improper payments from Alcatel CIT and ACR employees” including $2,000 for an educational trip for the official’s daughter and a trip to Paris (along with the official’s spouse) that mostly consisted of “touring activities via a chauffeur-driven vehicle.” Further, the information alleges that “Alcatel CIT also made payments to a Hondutel attorney who worked” on a contract secured by Alcatel including paying for a trip by the attorney and the attorney’s daughter to Paris.

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “employees of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and caused inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel CIT, Alcatel Standard, and ACR, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC.” According to the information, “as a result of the bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $870,000 in profits.”

Malaysia

The information alleges that “in at least 17 instances in or around 2004 to in or around 2006, Alcatel Malaysia [a joint venture in which Alcatel owned a majority share of and exercised control of] employees, with the consent and approval of Alcatel Malaysia’s management, such as Executive 2 [Alcatel Malaysia’s Country Senior Officer] and Executive 3 [Alcatel Malaysia’s Chief Financial Officer], made improper payments to Telekcom Malaysia [an alleged state-owned and controlled telecommunications provider in Malaysia responsible for awarding telecommunications contracts 43% owned by the Malaysian Ministry of Finance] employees in exchange for nonpublic information relating to ongoing public tenders.” According to the information, “the documents purchased generally consisted of internal assessments by Celcom’s [Telekom Malaysia’s wholly owned subsidiary] tender committee of non-public pricing information.” According to the information, “eight of the 17 improper payments to Telekom Malaysia employees were made in connection with a single public tender that Alcatel Malaysia ultimately won …”. The information alleges that the payments were falsely characterized as “document fees” or accurately as “purchase of tender documents.”

The information further alleges that Alcatel Standard entered into a consulting agreement for more than $500,000 with a Malaysian consultant even though “Alcatel typically paid its agents and consultants commission rates based on the total value of a contract rather than pay a fixed fee for services.” According to the information, “at the time the payments were made to Malaysian Consultant 1, Alcatel Malaysia and Alcatel Standard were aware of a significant risk that Malaysian Consultant 1 would pass on all or a part of these payments to foreign officials.”

The information further alleges that Alcatel Standard entered into another consulting agreement with another consultant by which Alcatel Standard agreed to pay the consultant $500,000 for a “strategic intelligence report on Celcom’s positioning in the celluar industry in relation to its competitors.” According to the information, despite paying the consultant “half a million dollars for this report … there is no evidence that Malaysian Consultant 2 did any actual work for Alcatel Malaysia or ever produced the report.” The information states that “Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia were aware of a significant risk that Malaysian Consultant 2 was serving merely as a conduit for bribe payments to foreign officials.”

The information further alleges, in summary fashion, as follows. “Alcatel Malaysia lacked internal controls, such as formal policies covering expenditure for gifts, travel, and entertainment for customers, leading to Alcatel Malaysia employees giving lavish gifts to Telekom Malaysia officials.”

Based on this conduct, the information alleges that “Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia knowingly circumvented Alcatel’s internal controls system and caused inaccurate and false entries in the books and records of Alcatel Standard and Alcatel Malaysia, whose financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC.” The information states that “although Alcatel won the $85 million Celcom contract, Alcatel did not generate any profits from it.”

Taiwan

According to the information, Alcatel pursued business in Taiwan through its indirect subsidiary Alcatel SEL, a company located and incorporated in Germany. The information states that Executive 4 [a German citizen who served on Alcatel SEL’s director of international business ans sales] hired two third-party consultants to assist Alcatel SEL and Taisel, a joint venture 60% owned by an Alcatel subsidiary in obtaiing an axle counting contracts from the TRA [the Taiwan Railway Administration – an alleged wholly state-owned authority in Taiwan responsible for managing, maintaining, and running passenger freight services on Taiwan’s railroad lines].” According to the information, “both consultants claimed to have close ties to certain legislators in the Taiwanese government who were understood to have influence in awarding the contract due to their particular responsibilities in the legislature.”

The information alleges that the “purpose behind Alcatel’s hiring of Taiwanese Consultant 1 was so that Alcatel SEL could make improper payments to three Taiwanese legislators who had influence in the award of the TRA axle counting contract.” According to the information, after Taisel has been awarded the contract, “Alcatel SEL paid Taiwanese Consultant 1 a commission of approximately $921,413 by wire transfer from Alcatel SEL’s ABN Amro bank account in New York” and that Taiwanese Consultant 1, in turn, “made improper payments to two Taiwanese legislators: Legislator 2 and Legislator 3 – both members of the Legislative Yuan, the unicameral legislative assembly of the Republic of China. Among other things, the information alleges: that the the consultant promised approximately $180,000 in campaign funds for Legislator 3’s 2004 election campaign and then paid Legislator 3 approximately $90,000 after Alcatel SEL won the bid; that Executive 4 and the consultant “spent approximately $8,000 on trips to Germany” that were “primarly for personal, entertainment purposes, with only nominal business justification;” that Alcatel SEL paid the consultant “approximately $3,000 to reimburse it for a set of crystal given to the secretary of the Taiwan Transportation and Communications Minister.”

The information also alleges that Executive 4 also hired another consultant because “Taiwanese Consultant 2’s owner was the brother of Legislator 4, who had influence with respect to TRA matters.” The information alleges that “to bribe Legislator 4, Alcatel SEL arranged for a bogus consulting agreement between Taisel and Taiwanese Consultant 2.”

The information alleges as follows. “Neither Taiwanese Consultant 1 nor Taiwanese Consultant 2 provided legitimate services to Alcatel or Alcatel SEL. Their only function was to pass on improper payments to three Taiwanese legislators on behalf of Alcatel SEL and Taisel. On or about December 30, 2003 Taisel’s bid was accepted by the TRA, which granted Taisel a supply contract worth approximately $19.2 million …”.

According to the information, “Alcatel SEL’s financial results were included in the consolidated financial statements of Alcatel submitted to the SEC” and “as a result of contracts won by Alcatel in Taiwan as a result of bribe payments, Alcatel earned approximately $4,342,600 in profits.”

Kenya

The information describes a Kenyan joint venture (“Kenyan JV”) formed by a French telecommunications company (“French Telecom”) and a Kenyan company (“Kenyan Company”) to apply for a mobile telecommunications license that the Kenyan JV was awarded for approximately $55 million. Several companies, including Alcatel CIT, bid to provide approximately $87 million in infrastructure and services to the Kenyan JV. The information alleges that Alcatel CIT was informed by French Telecom that Alcatel CIT “would win the bid under one condition: an Alcatel entity had to make improper payments to an intermediary in the approximate amount of $20 million.”

The information then describes the intermediary and payments made to it and concludes with the following paragraph. “After entering into the various contracts, the intermediary provided monthly reports and economic intelligence on the telecommunications market in Africa, but never provided any information related to the 2nd GSM license or the Kenyan telecommunications market. In light of the huge amounts of the payments, the fact that the intermediary performed little legitimate work in connection with the 2nd GSM license, and the fact that Company Z [another company suggested by the intermediary] was an offshore holding of Kenyan Company, there is a high probability that all or a portion of the approximately $20 million in payments made by Alcatel CIT to the intermediary and the related entities was passed on to Kenyan Company, which in turn passed on the funds to Kenyan government officials who had played a role in awarding the original contract to French Telecom.”

Nigeria

The information states that between 1999 and 2007, Alcatel pursued business with various Nigerian customers and alleges as follows.

“Certain Alcatel subsidiaries made improper payments to government officials in Nigeria in the following contexts: (a) payments made to government officials for the purpose of reducing tax or other liabilities; (b) payments made to government officials to obtain security services from the Nigerian police; (c) a payment of approximately $75,000 to a former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations for the purpose of arranging meetings between Alcatel representatives and Nigerian Senior Government Official 1, a high-ranking official in the Nigerian executive branch; (d) payments made to government officials for the purpose of securing recovery of a debt totaling approximately $36.5 million owed by the government of Nigeria to ITT Nigeria [an Alcatel entity]; and (e) a payment to a People’s Democractic Party official. These payments were not described accurately and fairly on Alcatel’s books and records.”

The information also alleges as follows. “Alcatel personnel also made improper payments via a consultant to a Senior Executive at Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1” and “Alcatel also made large improper payments to two other consultants which were owned at least in part by a relative of the Senior Executive at Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1.” “These payments were not described accurately and fairly on Alcatel’s books and records.” There is nothing in the information to suggest that Nigerian Telecommunications Company 1 was a state-owned or controlled enterprise and the information refers to payments to the Senior Executive as “commercial bribe payments.”

Bangladesh

The information generally alleges that “Alcatel generated a significant portion of its revenue in Bangladesh from Bangladesh Telegraph and Telephone Board, the state-controlled telecommunications services provider” and that Alcatel used an agent in Bangladesh but “Alcatel Standard did not conduct adequate due diligence” on the consultant. In addition, the information alleges that Alcatel Standard retained the agent in connection with a submarine cable project connecting fourteen countries – Alcatel’s portion of the contract was approximately $258 million. According to the information, Alcatel CIT paid the consultant approximately $626,492 in compensation for services provided in connection with the project and approximately $2,524,939 in connection with various upgrades to a predecessor of the project “aware of a significant risk that Bangladsh Consultant would pass on all or a part of these payments to foreign officials.”

Ecuador

According to the information, “Alcatel conducted business in Ecuador with three major telecommunicatios customers, all of which were state-owned: Andinatel, Pacifictel, and Empresa Municipl de Telecomunicaciones, Aqua Potable, Alcantarillados y Saneamiento. The information alleges that Alcatel retained a consultant in Ecuador (“a wealthy businessman”), but that the consultant and the entities he controlled “did little legitimate work for Alcatel.” The information alleges as follows. “Instead, it was anticipated that Ecuadorian Consultant would funnel a portion of the funds Alcatel paid him to officials of the Ecuadorian state-owned telecommunications companies in order to secure business and other benefits for Alcatel. Improper payments were anticipated to be made or offered in connection with at least nine contracts with government-owned telecommunication companies.”

According to the information, at least some of Alcatel’s payments to the consultant wre made to bank accounts in Miami.

In addition, the information alleges as follows. “Alcatel also paid for trips taken by officials of the three telecommunications companies that were principally for pleasure. For example, both the Vice-President and the Chairman of the Board of Pacifictel received improper all-expenses paid trips to France.”

Nicaragua

According to the information, “Alcatel’s only customer in Nicaragua was Empresa Nicaraguense de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (“Enitel”) which was state-owned during the relevant time period.” The Ecuadorian consultant referenced above, also served as Alcatel’s consultant in Nicaragua. According to the information, “with the assistance of Ecuadorian Consultant, Alcatel CIT secured two contracts with Enitel” valued at approximately $1.6 million and $370,000. The information alleges that Alcatel CIT made payments totaling approximately $229,3822 to the Miami bank account of the consultant and that the consultant “likely used a portion of these payments to bribe certain key Enitel officials in order to influence Enitel to award the two contracts to Alcatel, to obtain confidential information about competing bids, and to secure favorable financial terms.” The information alleges that payments to the consultant were “identified in Alcatel’s books and records as consulting fees, and thus the description of those payments did not accurately and fairly reflect those transactions.”

The information further alleges that “Alcatel CIT also provided a trip to Paris and Madrid to two Enitel officials in late 2001 in order to encourage the execution of one of the two contracts” and that the “purpose of the trip was largley for pleasure, and it appears that Alcatel CIT covered all travel costs and a large portion of the expenses.”

The substantive portion of the information ends with a section titled “Other Consultancy Agreements Entered Into Without Proper Due Diligence.” The allegations concern consultants in Angola, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mali. The customers associated with the consultants were either allegedly state-owned or private companies.

Based on all of the above conduct, the information charges Alcatel with violations of the FCPA’s internal control provisions. The information alleges that Alcatel “knowingly: (a) failed to implement sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures; (b) failed to maintain a sufficient system for the selection and approval of consultants, which, in turn, permitted corrupt conduct to occur at certain subsidiaries; (c) entered into purported business consulting agreements with no apparent basis, and without performing any due diligence, sometimes after the cmpany had already won the relevant project; (d) failed to verify information provided by consultants, including failing to follow up in circumstances in which managers knew or were substantially certain illicit activity was taking place; (e) failed to prevent consultants from using multiple shell companies to receive commissions in excess of 10% knowing there was a substantial likelihood those consultants were acting as conduits for corrupt payments; (f) failed to conduct appropriate audits of payments to purported business consultants; (g) failed to prohibit lump sum payments being made to consultants that did not correspond to any contract; (h) failed to prohibit payments to consultants and public officials pursuant to an oral ‘gentlemen’s agreement’; (i) failed to appropriately investigate and respond to allegations of corrupt payments and discipline employees involved in making corrupt payments; (j) failed to establish a sufficiently empowered and competent Corporate Compliance Officer; (k) failed to exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct; (l) failed to take reasonable steps to ensure the company’s compliance and ethics program was followed, including monitoring and internal audits to detect criminal conduct; (m) failed to evaluate regularly the effectiveness of the company’s compliance and ethics program; and (n) failed to provide appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program.”

Based on the above conduct, the information also charges Alcatel with FCPA books and records violations for (a) drafting sham business consulting agreements to justify third party payments; (b) mis-characterizing bribes in the corporate books and records as consulting fees and other seemingly legitimate expenses; (c) justifying payments to purported business consultants based on false invoices; and (d) entering into purported business consulting agreements with no basis, sometimes after Alcatel had won the relevant project.

Alcatel-Lucent DPA

The DOJ’s charges against Alcatel were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (see here).

Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, agents, and those of Alcatel’s subsidiaries as described above.

The term of the DPA is three years and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement “based on the individual facts and circumstances” of the case and Alcatel-Lucent. Among the factors stated are the following.

(a) following press reports concerning bribery by Alcatel, S.A., in Costa Rica, the company investigated and disclosed over the course of several years to the Department and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission the misconduct described above;

(b) Alcatel-Lucent conducted a global internal investigation concerning bribery and related misconduct;

(c) Alcatel-Lucent reported its findings to the Department and the SEC;

(d) after limited and inadequate cooperation for a substantial period of time, Alcatel-Lucent substantially improved its cooperation with the Department’s investigation of this matter, as well as the SEC’s investigation;

(e) Alcatel-Lucent undertook remedial measures, including the implementation of an enhanced compliance program, and agreed to undertake further remedial measures as contemplated by the DPA;

(f) on its own initiative and at a substantial financial cost, Alcatel-Lucent determined as matter of company policy to no longer use third party sales and marketing agents in conducting its worldwide business; and

(g) Alcatel-Lucent agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of Alcatel-Lucent and its employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, and subsidiaries relating to violations of the FCPA.

As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above describe conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $86.58 – $173.16 million. Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay a monetary penalty of $92 million – a rather rare instance of an FCPA criminal fine actually being within the Guidelines range and not below even the minimum range suggested by the Guidelines. Also relevant is that Alcatel’s culpability score was reduced only by -1, reflecting that Alcatel did not receive cooperation credit as many FCPA corporate defendants do receive.

The DPA states that above fine is appropriate given, among other things, “penalties related to the same conduct in Costa Rica [see here], and the extraordinary remedial step of terminating use of third-party sales and marketing agents.”

Pursuant to the DPA, Alcatel agreed to a host of compliance undertakings including the retention of an independent compliance monitor “who is a French national” for a three year term. Corporate Monitors used to be common in FCPA enforcement actions (circa 2005-2008), but required use of corporate monitors has become less common over the past few years.

As is standard in FCPA DPAs, Alcatel agreed not to make any public statement “contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by Alcatel-Lucent as set forth” in the DPA and Alcatel-Lucent further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.

As to potential debarment issues, the DPA states as follows. “The Department agrees to bring to the attention of governmental and other debarment authorities the facts and circumstances relating to the nature of the conduct underlying this Agreement, including the nature and quality of Alcatel-Lucent’s cooperation and remediation. By agreeing to provide this information to debarment authorities, the Department is not agreeing to advocate on behalf of Alcatel-Lucent, but rather is providing facts to be evaluated independently by the debarment authorities.”

Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. Criminal Information

The criminal information against the above Alcatel subsidiaries is virtually identical to the above-described criminal information against Alcatel, albeit it is limited to Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan conduct. Based on this conduct, the information charges the entities with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions. According to the information, the purpose of the conspiracy was to “secure the assistance of officials of various governments, including those in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, and Taiwan, in obtaining and retaining lucrative telecommunications business through the offer, promise, and payment of bribes.”

Alcatel-Lucent France S.A., Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. and Alcatel CentroAmerica, S.A. Plea Agreements

The above described charges were resolved via separate plea agreements with Alcatel-Lucent France (here), Alcatel-Lucent Trade International (here) and Alcatel CentroAmercia (here). Each plea agreement states that in light of the overall dispositions with the other Alcatel-Lucent entities and “the interrelationship among the charges and conduct underlying those dispositions” the agreed upon fine is $500,000.

SEC

The SEC’s civil complaint (here) alleges in summary fashion as follows.

“From December 2001 through June 2006, Alcatel, S.A., now called Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. (“Alcatel” or the “company”), through its subsidiaries and agents, violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by paying more than $8 million in bribes to foreign government officials. Alcatel made these payments to influence acts and decisions by these foreign government officials to obtain or retain business, with the knowledge and approval of certain management level personnel of the relevant Alcatel subsidiaries. Alcatel lacked sufficient internal controls to prevent or detect such improper payments, and improperly recorded the payments in its books and records.”

“During this period, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to foreign government officials in several countries to obtain or retain business:

• From December 2001 to October 2004, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid at least $7 million in bribes to government officials of Costa Rica to obtain or retain three contracts to provide telephone services in Costa Rica totaling approximately $303 million.

• From December 2002 to June 2006, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Honduras to obtain or retain five telecommunications contracts totaling approximately $48 million.

• From October 2003 to May 2004, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Taiwan to obtain or retain a railway axle counting contract valued at approximately $27 million.

• From October 2004 to February 2006, Alcatel’s agents and/or subsidiaries paid bribes to government officials of Malaysia to obtain or retain a telecommunications contract valued at approximately $85 million.”

“All of these payments were undocumented or improperly recorded as consulting fees in the books of Alcatel’s subsidiaries, and then consolidated into Alcatel’s financial statements. A lax corporate control environment aided Alcatel’s improper conduct. Alcatel failed to detect or investigate numerous red flags suggesting that its business consultants were likely making illicit payments and gifts to government officials in these countries at the direction of certain Alcatel employees. The respective heads of several Alcatel subsidiaries and geographical regions, some of whom reported directly to Alcatel’s executive committee, authorized extremely high commission payments under circumstances in which they failed to determine whether such payments were, in part, to be funneled to government officials in violation of the FCPA. These high-level employees therefore knew, or were severely reckless in
not knowing, that Alcatel paid bribes to foreign government officials.”

The SEC complaint contains allegations about the same “Costa Rica Bribery Scheme,” “The Honduras Bribery Scheme,” “The Taiwan Bribery Scheme,” and “The Malaysia Bribery Scheme” referenced above. Typically, SEC complaints in FCPA matters are more broad than DOJ resolution documents, yet in this case the SEC complaint is more narrow than the DOJ resolution documents in that the SEC complaint does not contain any allegations as to conduct in Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mali – as does the DOJ information.

Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Alcatel with FCPA anti-bribery and books and records and internal control violations and knowingly failing to implement a system of internal controls and knowingly falsifying books and records.

As to books and records the complaint alleges as follows.

“Specifically, A1catel failed to keep accurate books and records by (1) entering into consulting agreements retroactively; (2) establishing and using a system of intermediaries to obscure the source and destination of funds; (3) making payments pursuant to business consulting agreements that inaccurately described the services provided; (4) generating false invoices and other false documents to justify payments; (5) disbursing funds in cash with inaccurate documentation authorizing or supporting the withdrawals; (6) recording illicit payments as legitimate consulting fees; and (7) recording bribes as payment for legitimate services.”

As to internal controls, the complaint alleges as follows.

“Alcatel failed to implement adequate internal controls to comply with the
company’s NYSE listing, including the detection and prevention of violations of the FCPA. First, Alcatel and/or its subsidiaries falsified books and records, entered into agreements retroactively, and obscured the purpose for, and ultimate recipient of, illicit payments. Alcatel used business consultants and intermediaries to funnel bribes in at least four countries. Alcatel created and used false invoices and payment documentation under business consulting agreements that described services that were never intended to be rendered. Illicit payments were falsely recorded as expenses for consulting fees.”

“Second, Alcatel also routinely circumvented the internal controls the company had in place. Although the company in theory had a policy of “checks and balances” to authorize the retention of business consultants, which required several signatures to approve the retention of, and payment to, business consultants, Alcatel employees often violated that policy. In numerous instances, Alcatel officials responsible for reviewing due diligence reports on consultants failed to conduct any review of the documents or could not read the language in which the documents were written. Alcatel employees also entered into agreements retroactively and obscured the amounts paid to business consultants by splitting the payments among separate
agreements (to conceal the high commissions Alcatel paid). Finally, Alcatel Standard’s due diligence on business consultants was inadequate, and Alcatel CIT often paid business consultants without adequate proof of services rendered. Alcatel CIT failed to establish robust controls over cash disbursements, allowed manual payments without documentation, and Alcatel’s FCPA compliance function was understaffed and lacked independence. Alcatel also failed to conduct thorough anti-bribery and corruption training.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Alcatel agreed to an injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay disgorgement of $45.372 million.

In a relese (here), Robert Khuzami (Director of the SEC’s enforcement division) stated as follows. ““Alcatel and its subsidiaries failed to detect or investigate numerous red flags suggesting their employees were directing sham consultants to provide gifts and payments to foreign government officials to illegally win business. Alcatel’s bribery scheme was the product of a lax corporate control environment at the company.” Glenn Gordon (Associate Director of Enforcement in the SEC’s Miami office) added, “the serious sanctions Alcatel has agreed to, including paying back all net profits made on the contracts Alcatel illegally obtained, should serve as a reminder that we are committed to enforcing the FCPA and a level playing field for companies seeking to obtain or retain business in other countries.”

In a company press release (here), Steve Reynolds, Alcatel-Lucent General Counsel, stated as follow. “We take responsibility for and regret what happened and have implemented policies and procedures to prevent these violations from happening again. The violations largely occurred prior to the merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies and involved improper activities in several countries. These settlements resolve the company’s FCPA liability with the DOJ and SEC. We are pleased to have reached these settlements and look forward to putting these matters behind us. Alcatel-Lucent, created as a result of the merger of Alcatel and Lucent Technologies at the end of 2006, is a radically different company today: It has different management, including a new CEO, a new executive committee and a different Board of Directors; It has a zero-tolerance policy regarding bribery and corruption and has a system in place with strong processes and Internet-based and live training designed to prevent these types of situations in all aspects of our business; and as the first in its industry to do so, Alcatel-Lucent announced in 2008 that it would terminate the use of sales agents and consultants — the primary means by which certain former employees made the improper payments involved in the violations described in the DOJ and SEC settlement papers.”

Martin Weinstein (here) of Willkie Farr & Gallagher represented the Alcatel entities.

This & That

A bit of catch up with today’s post which discusses the recent sentence of Juan Diaz in the continuing Haiti Teleco saga (including an interesting post-enforcement action twist) and a DOJ release that flew under the radar.

Juan Diaz

Juan Diaz was recently sentenced to 57 months in prison after previously pleading guilty to a one-count information charging him with conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and money laundering. (See here for the DOJ release). As noted in the release, Diaz was also ordered to: (i) serve three years of supervised release following his prison term; (ii) pay $73,824 in restitution; and (iii) forfeit $1,028,851.

In May 2009, (see here) Diaz pleaded guilty for his role in an improper payment scheme involving employees of Haiti Teleco, an alleged state-owned national telecommunications company. In the DOJ’s view, that would make the Director of International Relations and the General Director of Haiti Teleco, persons Diaz and others allegedly bribed, Haitian “foreign officials” under the FCPA.

The interesting twist is this.

If Diaz bribed these same employees today, he would be bribing (presumably in the DOJ’s view) not Haitian “foreign officials” but Vietnamese “foreign officials.”

Why?

Because in May, Viettel, a telecommunications company run by Vietnam’s military, purchased a 60% stake in Haiti Teleco. (See here).

The 57 month sentence Diaz received is similar to the 60 month FCPA sentence Charles Jumet received in April (see here). Jumet was sentenced to 87 months after pleading guilty to a two-count criminal information charging conspiracy to violate the FCPA and making false statements to federal agents. The false statements portion of the sentence was 20 months.

Civil Forfeiture Action Against Properties Owned by Former President of Taiwan

In July, the DOJ issued a release (see here) about a civil forfeiture complaint it filed against certain U.S. properties “that represent a portion of illegal bribes paid to the former president of Taiwan and his wife.”

With Attorney General Eric Holder’s recent announcement of the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative (see here), the release should be of interest to those who follow this initiative and the general issue of asset recovery.

Bribe recipients can not be prosecuted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, but U.S. based assets (or other assets that flow through U.S. financial institutions) of bribe recipients can be subject to U.S. legal proceedings under other laws.

As noted in this post from November 2009, Attorney General Holder has called asset recovery a “global imperative” and announced a “redoubled commitment on behalf of the United States Department of Justice to recover” funds obtained by foreign officials through bribery.

The prior post discussed the January 2009 civil forfeiture action the DOJ filed in the aftermath of the Siemens enforcement action against bank accounts located in Singapore in the names of Zulfikar Ali, Fazel Selim, and ZASZ Trading and Consulting Pte Ltd. (“ZASZ”) (see here). According to the DOJ’s complaint (see here), these accounts were used by Siemens and another company to bribe foreign officials in violation of the FCPA, specifically Arafat Rahman (“Koko”), the son of former Bangladeshi Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. The DOJ alleges that the illicit funds in these accounts flowed through U.S. financial institutions thereby subjecting them to U.S. jurisdiction.

Similarly, in January 2010, the DOJ unsealed a criminal indictment against Juthamas Siriwan and Jittisopa Siriwan, the foreign official bribe recipient of the Green’s improper payments and her daughter. See here. Among other things, the indictment seeks forfeiture of approximately $1.7 million.

Thus, the DOJ’s July announcement that it is pursuing U.S. based assets of the former president of Taiwan and his wife very much continues a trend.

According to the DOJ release:

“The former president and his wife were convicted in Taiwan on Sept. 11, 2009, for bribery, embezzlement and money laundering. They are currently sentenced to 20 years in prison. Their convictions were upheld on appeal and are now pending before the Supreme Court in Taiwan. […] The former president and his wife are also currently under indictment in Taiwan for additional alleged acts of graft and money laundering.”

Director John Morton of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) stated that the enforcement action “serves as a warning to those corrupt foreign officials who abuse their power for personal financial gain and then attempt to place those funds in the U.S. financial system” and that “ICE’s Homeland Security Investigations agents will continue to work with our law enforcement partners both here and abroad to investigate and prosecute those involved in such illicit activities and hold corrupt foreign officials accountable by denying them the enjoyment of their ill ?gotten gains.”

What appears to make this recent civil forfeiture action different than the previously filed Siemens-related forfeiture action and the previously filed Siriwan enforcement action is that the bribe payor may be beyond the reach of the FCPA.

According to the DOJ release, the entity paying the bribes to the president of Taiwan and his wife was Yuanta Securities Co. Ltd. (YSC). The release notes that YSC “was attempting to increase its ownership share of Fuhwa Financial Holding Company Limited” and that “YSC paid a bribe of 200 million New Taiwan dollars, or approximately $6 million U.S. dollars, […] to ensure that the authorities on Taiwan would not interfere with its acquisition of additional shares and to attempt to establish a relationship with the head of the authorities on Taiwan.”

Neither YSC (here), nor its parent company, Yuanta Financial Holdings, appear to be U.S. issuers. Under 78dd-3 of the FCPA, foreign companies can be subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction. However, this prong of the FCPA requires a U.S. nexus. A quick scan of the forfeiture complaint does not suggest a U.S. nexus in terms of making the bribe payments – although the complaint clearly does allege a U.S. nexus once the payments were received and used by the former president of Taiwan and his wife.

*****

Curious as to what happened in the above referenced Siemens-related enforcement action? In April 2010, U.S. District Court Judge John Bates granted the DOJ’s motion for default judgment and judgment of forfeiture against the subject properties.

What’s happening in the Siriwan enforcement action? According to the docket, nothing since the indictment was unsealed in January 2010.

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