Strict Liability For Subsidiary Conduct
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]
Issuer strict liability for subsidiary conduct is a dubious prong of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement. However, as highlighted in this post concerning a 2006 enforcement action against Oil States International, it has long been an aspect of FCPA enforcement.
In 2006, the SEC brought this administrative action against Oil States International (a specialty provider to oil and gas drilling companies). The conduct at issue was based entirely on the actions of employees of a branch office in Eastern Venezuela of Hydraulic Well Control LLC, a subsidiary of Oil States. According to the SEC, HWC Venezuela contributed approximately 1% of Oil States’ consolidated revenues during the relevant time period.
Eni Joins The Repeat Offender Club – This Time Resolves A $24.5 Million SEC FCPA Enforcement Action
As highlighted in this prior post, in 2010 ENI S.p.A (an Italy-based oil and gas company with American Depositary Shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange) along with its wholly-owned subsidiary Snamprogetti resolved a $125 million SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria.
On Friday, the SEC announced that ENI resolved another FCPA enforcement action – this one a $24.5 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Algeria by Saipem S.p.A. (a minority-owned and controlled subsidiary during the relevant time period). The conduct at issue in the enforcement action occurred 10 – 13 years ago.
A Look At The French Enforcement Action Against Airbus
Previous posts here and here looked at the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action against Airbus.
This previous post looked at the U.K. Bribery Act enforcement action against Airbus.
This post completes the enforcement trilogy, bylooking at the French enforcement action against Airbus.
Like the prior U.S. and U.K. bribery enforcement action, the French enforcement action against Airbus (see here for the Judicial Public Interest Agreement) focused on the use of business partners in connection with sales or attempted sales in various countries.
An In-Depth Look At The U.K. Prosecution Of Airbus
These pages have long asserted that if a country is to have a deferred prosecution regime that the regime in the United Kingdom (which requires meaningful judicial review and approval) is far more preferable than the U.S. regime.
This is apparent when reviewing the Statement of Facts,, Deferred Prosecution Agreement and Approved Judgment relevant to the U.K. Serious Fraud Office prosecution of Airbus. (See here for a collection of the U.K. documents and see here for the prior post regarding the U.S. enforcement action). The U.K. documents provided a substantially more thorough and transparent glimpse into the underlying conduct compared to the U.S. resolution documents.
Even Though The Jurisdictional Basis For The Action Was “Limited,” Airbus Resolves $294 Million FCPA Enforcement Action In Connection With Broader Global Enforcement Action
The DOJ recently announced that Airbus (a France-based global provider of civilian and military aircraft) agreed to pay $3.9 billion to resolve foreign bribery, as well as Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations, enforcement actions in the U.S., France, and the United Kingdom.
As the DOJ acknowledged, Airbus “is neither a U.S. issuer nor a domestic concern, and the territorial jurisdiction over the corrupt conduct is limited.” As the DOJ further acknowledged, both France and the United Kingdom have a “significantly stronger” jurisdictional basis for resolving related matters.
Nevertheless, a portion of the global settlement amount includes a $294 million Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action. This post summarizes the enforcement action in which the DOJ charged Airbus in this information with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.