A Focus On SOEs
Trade barriers and distortions are often the root causes of “bribery” and a reduction in “bribery” will not be achieved without a reduction in trade barriers and distortions.
The recent 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers makes for an interesting read (or browse as it is 397 pages).
Among other things, the NTE report “classifies foreign trade barriers in 14 categories. These categories cover measures and policies that restrict, prevent, or impede the international exchange of goods and services, U.S. foreign direct investment, or U.S. electronic commerce.”
Potpourri
Scrutiny Alerts
CHS Inc., an agricultural cooperative, disclosed:
“In the fourth quarter of fiscal 2018, we contacted the U.S. Department of Justice and SEC to voluntarily self-disclose potential violations of the FCPA in connection with a small number of reimbursements the Company made to Mexican customs agents in the 2014-2015 time period for payments the customs agents made to Mexican customs officials in connection with inspections of grain crossing the U.S.-Mexican border by railcar. We are fully cooperating with the government, including with the assistance of legal counsel, which assistance includes investigating other areas of potential interest to the government. We are unable at this time to predict when our or the government agencies’ review of these matters will be completed or what regulatory or other outcomes may result.”
A Few Observations On The Anticorruption Chapter Of The United States – Mexico – Canada Agreement
Recently, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative released the text of the United States – Mexico – Canada agreement (USMCA). The extensive agreement has a specific chapter (chapter 27) titled anticorruption and this post offers a few observations regarding the agreement compared to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act specifically as it relates to “foreign official” issues and the express facilitation payments exception.
BellSouth Gets Hung Up In Latin America
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]
In 2002, the SEC announced the filing of a settled civil complaint against BellSouth Corporation charging the telecommunications company with violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions.
The conduct at issue focused on an indirect subsidiary in Venezuela (and BellSouth’s inability to “reconstruct the circumstances of purpose” of certain payments) and an indirect subsidiary in Nicaragua (which retained the wife of the chairman of a Nicaraguan legislative committee with oversight of telecommunications).
As frequently highlighted on these pages, the root cause of many FCPA enforcement actions are foreign trade barriers and restrictions and in this regard, as the complaint notes, Nicaraguan law prohibited foreign companies from acquiring a majority interest in Nicaraguan telecommunications companies.”
The Chiquita Enforcement Action – A Bunch Of Bananas With A Slippery Origin
[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]
If you think strict liability enforcement of the FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions is a recent invention, think again.
If you think off-the-rails FCPA enforcement (that is enforcement theories seemingly in conflict with actual legal authority) is a recent invention, think again.
A dubious FCPA enforcement action occurred in 2001 when the SEC announced this administrative cease and desist order finding that Chiquita Brands International Inc. violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.