Funny, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Funny
According to the FCPA Blog, there is “nothing too complicated or expensive” about FCPA compliance.
That’s funny because on a daily basis FCPA Blog content is flanked by approximately 20 blinking and flashing ads from FCPA Inc. participants.
Checking in on Wal-Mart’s professional fees and expenses, still pouting, scrutiny alerts and updates, and for the reading stack. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Wal-Mart’s Professional Fees and Expenses
In its recent 3Q FY2016 earnings call Wal-Mart stated:
“FCPA and compliance related costs were approximately $30 million, comprised of $22 million for ongoing inquiries and investigations, and $8 million for our global compliance program and organizational enhancements.”
Doing the math, Wal-Mart’s 3Q FCPA and compliance-related costs is approximately $470,000 per working day.
Over the past approximate four years, I have tracked Wal-Mart’s quarterly disclosed pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses. While some pundits have ridiculed me for doing so, such figures are notable because, as has been noted in prior posts and in my article “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Ripples,” settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement action are often only a relatively minor component of the overall financial consequences that can result from corporate FCPA scrutiny. Pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses are typically the largest (in many cases to a degree of 3, 5, 10 or higher than settlement amounts) financial hit to a company under FCPA scrutiny.
While $470,000 per working day remains eye-popping, Wal-Mart’s recent figure suggests that the company’s pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses have crested as the figures for the past eight quarters have been approximately $470,000, $516,000, $563,000, $640,000, $662,000, $855,000, $1.1 million and $1.3 million per working day.
In the aggregate, Wal-Mart’s disclosed pre-enforcement professional fees and expenses are as follows.
FY 2013 = $157 million.
FY 2014 = $282 million.
FY 2015 = $173 million.
FY 2016 = $93 million (through the first three quarters).
Still Pouting
This prior post discussed why SNC-Lavalin should be grateful about various aspects of Canada’s legal system (compared to the U.S.) and not pout. Namely, that Canada does not offer deferred prosecution agreements and enforcement authorities must actually prove cases to prevail.
As noted here, with a new government in Ottawa, SNC-Lavalin’s new CEO continues the pout.
“SNC-Lavalin Group Inc.’s CEO wants the new federal government to allow companies to settle corporate corruption cases — as what happens in the United States and United Kingdom — so that Canadian firms can remain competitive. In his first speech since taking control of Canada’s largest engineering company last month, Neil Bruce said federal corruption charges laid against a few of SNC-Lavalin’s legal entities unfairly point the finger at 40,000 employees who did nothing wrong. Instead, Canada should allow corporate settlements outside the court system so that SNC-Lavalin and other Canadian businesses are not at a disadvantage when competing against rival firms in other G7 countries, Bruce said.
[…]
The company has said it will plead not guilty to the charges but is willing to pay a fine for the alleged transgressions of former employees.”
Scrutiny Alerts and Updates
Affinia Group
As noted in this May 2015 post, Affinia Group (a North Carolina based company involved in design, manufacture, distribution and marketing of industrial grade products and services, including extensive offerings of aftermarket parts for automotive and heavy-duty vehicles) has been under FCPA scrutiny and the company disclosed:
“As previously disclosed, the Company conducted a review of certain allegations arising in connection with business operations involving its subsidiaries in Poland and Ukraine. The allegations raised issues involving potential improper payments in connection with governmental approvals, permits, or other regulatory areas and possible conflicts of interest. The Company’s review was supervised by the Audit Committee of Affinia’s Board of Directors and conducted with the assistance of outside professionals. Affinia voluntarily self-reported on these matters to the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and cooperated fully with the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of Justice has advised that it has decided to decline to prosecute the Company in this matter.”
Several companies have been under scrutiny based on alleged improper relationships with Petrobras. Three such companies: Ensco, Transocean, and Vantage Group recently made disclosures.
Ensco
The company recently disclosed:
“Pride International, Inc. (“Pride”), a company we acquired in 2011, commenced drilling operations in Brazil during 2001 and, in 2008, entered into a drilling contract with Petrobras for DS-5, a rig Pride had ordered from a shipyard in South Korea.
Beginning in 2006, Pride conducted periodic compliance reviews of its business with Petrobras, and, after the acquisition, Ensco conducted similar compliance reviews, the most recent of which commenced in early 2015 after media reports were released regarding ongoing investigations of various kickback and bribery schemes in Brazil involving Petrobras.
While conducting our compliance review, we became aware of an internal audit report by Petrobras alleging irregularities in relation to DS-5 – specifically, that Petrobras overpaid under the drilling contract. We believe this allegation is inaccurate, as publicly available data show that the contract’s compensation terms were in line with other contracts signed by Petrobras and other customers with our competitors during the same timeframe (late 2007 and early 2008). We provided this information to Petrobras in June 2015. We continue to operate DS-5 under its existing contract. In addition, all our other rigs contracted to Petrobras – ENSCO 6001, 6002, 6003 and 6004 – continue to work under their contracts.
Upon learning of the Petrobras internal audit report, our Audit Committee appointed independent counsel to lead an investigation into the alleged irregularities. Subsequently, the internal audit report and the alleged irregularities were referenced in Brazilian court documents connected to the prosecution of former Petrobras directors and employees as well as certain other third parties, including a former marketing consultant who provided services to Pride in connection with DS-5. The former marketing consultant entered into a plea agreement with the Brazil authorities. This plea agreement was referenced in a Brazilian court proceeding relating to a project for a competitor having no connection to us. This court proceeding document states that another court action would be made public in due course with respect to DS-5; to date no further proceedings relating to DS-5 have been released.
Independent counsel, under the direction of our Audit Committee, has substantially completed the investigation of these allegations by reviewing and analyzing available documents and correspondence and interviewing current and former employees involved in the contracting of DS-5 as well as the former marketing consultant.
To date, our Audit Committee has found no evidence that Pride or Ensco or any of their current or former employees were aware of or involved in any wrongdoing, and our Audit Committee has found no evidence linking Ensco or Pride to any illegal acts committed by our former marketing consultant. Although the investigation is substantially complete, we cannot predict whether any new or additional allegations will be made and what impact those allegations will have on the timing or conclusions of the investigation. Our Audit Committee will examine any new or additional allegations and the facts and circumstances surrounding them. To date, we have not been contacted by Brazil authorities, and no authority has alleged wrongdoing by Pride or Ensco or any of their current or former employees. In June and July 2015, we voluntarily contacted the SEC and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”), respectively, to advise them of this matter and our Audit Committee’s independent investigation, and we provided them an update on the investigation in September 2015. We cannot predict whether any governmental authority will seek to investigate this matter, or if a proceeding were opened, the scope or ultimate outcome of any such investigation. If the SEC or DOJ determines that violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”) have occurred, or if any governmental authority determines that we have violated applicable anti-bribery laws, they could seek civil and criminal sanctions, including monetary penalties, against us, as well as changes to our business practices and compliance programs, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”
As highlighted in this previous post, in 2010 Pride International resolved a $56 million FCPA enforcement action based on alleged conduct in Nigeria, India, Mexico, Venezuela and other countries.
Transocean
The company recently disclosed:
“We are currently investigating allegations made by a former Petrobras employee relating to the award of a drilling services contract to us. These allegations were made public through an investigation being conducted by Brazilian authorities in response to allegations of corrupt practices involving Petrobras business. To date, we have not identified any wrongdoing by any of our employees or agents in connection with our business in Brazil. We will continue to investigate these types of allegations and, if contacted, will cooperate with governmental authorities. Through the process of monitoring and proactive investigation, we strive to ensure no violation of our policies, code of integrity or law has, or will, occur; however, there can be no assurance as to the outcome of these matters.”
As highlighted in this previous post, in 2010 Transocean resolved a $20.7 million FCPA enforcement action based on alleged conduct in Nigeria.
Vantage Drilling
The company recently disclosed:
“In July 2015, we became aware of media reports that the Brazilian agent that we used in the contracting of the Titanium Explorer drillship, Mr. Padilha, had entered into a plea arrangement with the Brazilian authorities in connection with his role in obtaining bribes for former Petrobras executives. Mr. Padilha, who simultaneously has represented several international companies in their contracts with Petrobras, provided evidence to the Brazilian prosecutors of an alleged bribery scheme between former Petrobras executives and Mr. Su, a former member of our Board of Directors and a significant shareholder. Mr. Su was the sole owner of the company that owned the Titanium Explorer at the time the alleged bribe was paid. At the same time we learned of Mr. Padilha’s plea agreement, we voluntarily contacted the SEC and the DOJ to advise them of these recent developments. We subsequently terminated his advisory contract with us. Our internal and independent investigations, which are still ongoing, to date have found no evidence of wrongdoing by our employees or participation in any manner with the inappropriate acts alleged to have been conducted by Mr. Padilha.
We cannot predict whether any governmental authority will seek to investigate this matter, or if a proceeding were opened, the scope or ultimate outcome of any such investigation. If the SEC or DOJ determines that we have violated the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (the “FCPA”), or if any governmental authority determines that we have violated applicable anti-bribery laws, they could seek civil and criminal sanctions, including monetary penalties, against us, as well as changes to our business practices and compliance programs, any of which could have a material adverse effect on our business and financial condition.”
Reading Stack
“The (Unintended) Consequences of the Yates Memo” here from Kurt Wolfe (Allen & Overy).
“The Yates Memo’s Chilling Effect on FCPA Self-Disclosure” here from Alison Tanchyk and Melissa Coates (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius). “Ironically, the unintended consequence [of the Yates Memo] may be fewer companies opting to self-disclose FCPA concerns, leading to fewer individual corruption prosecutions.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
More on the Yates Memo, scrutiny alerts, survey says, and FCPA reform. It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
More on the Yates Memo
Once again a private company has marketed a public official to drive attendance to its paid event.
Earlier this week, Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell delivered this speech reiterating various aspects of the “Yates Memo.” Caldwell stated:
“[O]ur focus on individuals stems from the reality that corporations act through human beings, and that justice usually requires identifying those responsible for criminal conduct and holding them personally accountable. Prosecuting the corporate entity, and imposing a fine and other impersonal conditions, simply is not enough – in most instances – to fully punish and, more importantly, deter corporate misconduct.”
Regarding the cooperation credit aspects of the “Yates Memo,” Caldwell stated:
“We recognize, however, that a company cannot provide what it does not have. And we understand that some investigations – despite their thoroughness – will not bear fruit. Where a company truly is unable to identify the culpable individuals following an appropriately tailored and thorough investigation, but provides the government with the relevant facts and otherwise assists us in obtaining evidence, the company will be eligible for cooperation credit. We will make efforts to credit, not penalize, diligent investigations. On the flip side, we will carefully scrutinize and test a company’s claims that it could not identify or uncover evidence regarding the culpable individuals, particularly if we are able to do so ourselves.
As I have said before, it is not our intent to outsource our investigation of corporate wrongdoing to companies and their outside advisors. As in the past, we will not sit idle, waiting for a company to conduct or complete its investigation. Regardless of a company’s cooperation, federal agents and prosecutors will conduct thorough investigations. If, through this process, we are able to identify the culpable individuals when the company itself did not do so, as well as evidence that would support the charging and prosecution of those individuals, we will assess whether that evidence truly was unavailable to the company.
We, of course, recognize that we sometimes can obtain evidence that a company cannot. We often can obtain from third parties evidence that is not available to the company. Also, we know that a company may not be able to interview former employees who refuse to cooperate in a company investigation. Those same employees may provide information to us, whether voluntarily or through compulsory process. Likewise, there are times when, for strategic reasons, we may ask that the company stand down from pursing a particular line of inquiry. If so, the company will not be penalized for failing to identify facts subsequently discovered by government investigators.”
Caldwell also answered questions after the speech. It appears that this Q&A was recorded and the same private company put the Q&A behind its paywall.
It’s just plain wrong that a private company is selling the words of public officials. It ought to stop.
Scrutiny Alerts
Transocean
As highlighted here, in 2010 as part of the CustomsGate enforcement actions, Transocean resolved a $20.7 million FCPA enforcement action (involving a DOJ and SEC component) concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.
Bloomberg reports:
“Transocean Ltd., the world’s largest offshore rig contractor, is being linked for the first time to the corruption probe of Petroleo Brasileiro SA, the state-owned energy giant at the center of Brazil’s biggest corporate scandal. A former executive at Brazil’s state-run oil company has testified to receiving what he says were payments made by someone claiming to be a Transocean agent in exchange for a rig-operation contract from Petrobras.”
SNC-Lavalin
This CBCNews report goes in-depth regarding new allegations in a civil suit concerning SNC-Lavalin. According to the article:
“Top executives for years endorsed bribes and lavish gifts — including a yacht and even prostitutes — to win contracts from Libya’s Gadhafi regime.”
To cement ties, [the complaint] alleges specific SNC executives signed off on or approved numerous favours to help Gadhafi, including:
- providing SNC staff and hiring university professor as tutors;
- helping to obtain a Canadian visa;
- considering appointing Saadi Gadhafi an SNC vice-president;
- officially sponsoring his Italian Serie A professional soccer team.
One of the largest expenses included the purchase of a Palmer Johnson yacht worth $38 million for Saadi Gadhafi “organized and validated by CFO Laramée and approved by the then CEO Lamarre.” Saadi Gadhafi visited Canada in 2008, and SNC Lavalin picked up the bill — more than $2 million.”
Survey Says
KPMG recently conducted a worldwide online survey of corporate risk leaders to find out the strengths and weaknesses of their companies’ programs to combat bribery and corruption. According to the survey responses:
“There is a sharp increase in the proportion of respondents who say they are highly challenged by the issue of Anti-Bribery Compliance (ABC) compared with a survey KPMG conducted four years earlier.
As companies continue to globalize, management of third parties poses the greatest challenge in executing ABC programs.
Despite the difficulty of monitoring their business dealings with third parties, more than one third of the respondents do not formally identify high-risk third parties. More than half of those respondents with right to-audit clauses over third parties have not exercised the right.
ABC considerations are accorded too low a priority by companies preparing to acquire, or merge with, other corporations across borders.
Respondents complain they lack the resources to manage ABC risk.
A top-down risk assessment would help companies set priorities, but executives admit that an ABC risk assessment is one of their companies’ top challenges.
Data analytics is an increasingly important and cost-effective tool to assess ABC controls. Yet only a quarter of respondents use data analysis to identify violations and, of those that do so, less than half continuously monitor data to spot potential violations.”
FCPA Reform
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce recently released this document outlining its policy priorities. Included in the lengthy document was the following: “work to reform the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by supporting changes to enforcement practices.”
*****
A good weekend to all.
Next up in the analysis of CustomsGate enforcement actions is Transocean. This enforcement action involves more Nigerian TIPs and express courier services (yes, you read that right, an FCPA anti-bribery enforcement action involving express courier services).
See here for the prior post on the Tidewater enforcement action here for the prior post on the Noble enforcement action and here for the prior post on the GlobalSantaFe enforcement action.
The Transocean enforcement action involved both a DOJ and SEC component. Total settlement amount was approximately $20.7 million ($13.4 million criminal fine via a DOJ deferred prosecution agreement; $7.2 million in disgorgement and interest via a SEC complaint).
DOJ
The DOJ enforcement action included a criminal information (here) filed against Transocean Inc. (“Transocean”) which “was a Cayman Islands corporation with its principal executive offices in the Cayman Islands and in Houston, Texas.” Transocean’s securities were traded on the New York Stock Exchange. As set forth in the information, “in December 2008, Transocean completed a merger among Transocean Ltd., Transocean Inc., which was the former parent holding company, and Transocean Cayman Ltd. As a result of the merger, Transocean became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Transocean Ltd., a Swiss corporation with principal executive offices in Vernier, Switzerland.” (See here).
The criminal charges against Transocean were resolved via a deferred prosecution agreement (here) between the DOJ and Transocean and Transocean Ltd. “on behalf of its wholly-owned subsidiary Transocean.”
Criminal Information
Once again, the criminal information concerns Nigeria’s rules and regulations relating to temporarily importing vessels and the “temporary importation permit” (“TIP”). For more on the TIP process see here.
Relevant Transocean entities include Sedco Forex Nigeria Limited (“SFNL”), a Nigerian entity 60% owned by Transocean, and Transocean Support Services Nigeria Ltd. (“TSSNL”), a wholly-owned Nigerian subsidiary of Transocean.
According to the information, between February 2002 and January 2003, “on three occasions when a TIP (and related TIP extensions) expired for a rig Nigeria, Customs Agent 1 [a Nigerian entity that provided freight forwarding, customs clearing, haulage and general logistics services to companies doing business in Nigeria and SFNL’s customs agent in Nigeria between 2002 – July 2007] and Customs Agent 2 [a Nigerian entity that provided, among other things, customs clearing and freight forwarding and support services to oil and gas services companies operating in Nigeria and one of SFNL and TSSNL’s customs agents in Nigeria], with the knowledge of SFNL, engaged in a process of obtaining false paperwork on SFNL’s behalf to avoid the time, cost, and risks associated with exporting the rig and re-importing it into Nigerian waters.” The information alleges that “Customs Agent 1 and Customs Agent 2, with the knowledge of SFNL, obtained false documents that reflected that the rig had been physically exported and re-imported, when, in fact, the rig had remained in Nigeria.”
In addition, the information alleges that between May 2007 and June 2007, “Customs Agent 2, with the knowledge of TSSNL, engaged in a process of obtaining false paperwork on behalf of TSSNL for another rig.” According to the information, “Customs Agent 2, with the knowledge of TSSNL, obtained documents that reflected that the rig had been physically exported and re-imported, when, in fact, the rig had remained in Nigeria.”
The information alleges, that “SFNL and TSSNL’s employees knew or were aware of a high probability that certain bribe payments were made by Customs Agent 1 and Customs Agent 2 to Nigerian Customs Service (“NCS”) officials to resolve these issues.” The information alleges that “to secure reimbursement for the payments made on behalf of SFNL and TSSNL, these Custom Agents provided invoices to SFNL and TSSNL without supporting documentation” and that “Transocean Nigeria, in turn, reimbursed these Customs Agents for the expenses.”
According to the information, payments to Customs Agent 1 and Customs Agent 2 were mischaracterized as “freight and shipping/courier charges” or “crewboat, workboat, tug Hire” (in the case of Agent 1) and “miscellaneous operating expenses” (in the case of Customs Agent 2) in Transocean Nigeria’s books and records which then were incorporated into Transocean’s year-end financial statements filed with the SEC.
According to the information, “by corruptly circumventing the TIP requirements in 2002 and 2007, Transocean, through Transocean Nigeria, was able to continue its drilling operations using [certain rigs] that otherwise should have been temporarily removed from Nigerian waters.” The information states, “as a consequence, Transocean was able to corruptly gain a net profit of approximately $2,129,839 on its rig operations that […] otherwise would have been suspended because of the failure to comply with Nigerian TIP requirements.”
As to express courier services, the information states that “one of the services provided by [Panalpina] was an express door-to-door courier service that expedited the importation of goods and equipment into Nigeria.” According to the information, “the express service involved the payment of bribes by [Panalpina] to NCS officials to avoid the normal customs clearance process and the payment of official duties and taxes.”
The information alleges that various Transocean Nigeria employees were aware that the express courier service in Nigeria was not compliant with local law, but that despite this, “SFNL and TSSNL used the express courier service eleven times between August 2005 and September 23, 2005 when they knew or were aware of a high probability that the express courier service would make bribe payments to Nigerian officials to avoid applicable customs duties.” According to the information, “as a consequence, SFNL and TSSNL corruptly avoided paying $37,781.73 in applicable customs duties for these element shipments.” The information charges that SFNL and TSSNL “falsely recorded the payments to the express courier service as ‘air freight’ in their books and records” and that these transactions were then incorporated into Transocean’s SEC filings.
Based on the above conduct, the DOJ charged Transocean with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions, FCPA anti-bribery violations, and knowingly violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions.
According to the criminal information, “Transocean Nigeria employees knew or were aware of a high probability that the [Panalpina] was making bribe payments to Nigerian Customs Service officials on behalf of SFNL and TSSNL to cause such officials to disregard certain customs regulatory requirements relating to importing goods and materials into Nigeria for use on Transocean’s rigs in Nigeria, and sought reimbursement from SFNL and TSSNL for these payments.”
According to the information, certain unnamed co-conspirators committed various overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy including Employee C [manager of Transocean’s operations in Nigeria from August 2001 to January 2004 and an agent of an “issuer”], Executive B [a French citizen who was responsible for Transocean’s Africa Region, including offshore drilling operations in Nigeria, and an agent of an “issuer”], Senior Executive A [a permanent resident of the U.S. from 2005 until July 2007 and a “domestic concern” as well as agent of an “issuer”].
Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Pursuant to the DPA, Transocean admitted, accepted and acknowledged that it was responsible for the acts of its officers, employees, subsidiaries, and agents as set forth above.
The term of the DPA is three years and seven months and it states that the DOJ entered into the agreement “based on the individual facts and circumstances” of the case and Transocean. Among the factors stated are the following.
“Transocean and Transocean personnel in Nigeria promptly commenced an internal investigation into dealings between Transocean’s Nigeria operations and [Panalpina] after becoming aware of information indicating potential issues with [Panalpina]
“Transocean expanded its internal investigation to numerous operations and areas of the world outside Nigeria where no misconduct had been reported or suspected, and reported all relevant findings to thc Dcpartment;”
“A subsidiary of Transocean Ltd., Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling Inc., hired a new chief compliance officer with substantial experience in corporate ethics and anti-corrption compliance policies. The compliance officer, who is an officer of Transocean Ltd., is responsible for the oversight of compliance for Transocean Ltd. and all of its subsidiaries and affiliates, including Transocean;”
“Transocean Ltd. established a specific internal audit team of well-trained auditors to focus on fraud, FCPA compliance, and anti-bribery issues at Transocean Ltd.’s worldwide operations;”
“Transocean Ltd. issued a revised FCPA compliance policy and revised its code of conduct, instituted a worldwide FCP A training program for its companies’ employees, and implemented a well-defined due diligence process for retaining third party service providers and business partners that interact with government officials;”
“Transocean and Transocean Ltd. cooperated with the Department’s investigation, including sharing all relevant investigation findings and making available numerous current and former employees;”
“Transocean and Transocean Ltd. agreed to undertake further remedial
measures;”
“Transocean and Transocean Ltd. agreed to provide a written report to the Department on their progress and experience in maintaining and, as necessary and appropriate, enhancing their compliance policies and procedures;”
“Transocean and Transocean Ltd. agreed to continue to cooperate with the Department in any ongoing investigation of the conduct of Transocean and its directors, employees, agents, consultants, contractors, subcontractors, subsidiaries, and any affliates it controls relating to violations of the FCPA.”
As stated in the DPA, the fine range for the above describe conduct under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was $16.8 million to $33.6 million. Pursuant to the DPA, Transocean and Transocean agreed that Transocean shall pay a monetary penalty of $13.44 million – 20% below the minimum guideline amount.
As is standard in FCPA DPAs, Transocean and Transocean Ltd. agreed not to make any public statement “contradicting the acceptance of responsibility by Transocean and Transocean Ltd. as set forth” in the DPA and Transocean and Transocean Ltd. further agreed to only issue a press release in connection with the DPA if the DOJ does not object to the release.
SEC
The SEC’s complaint (here) concerns the same core set of facts as set forth in the DOJ’s DPA, plus a few additional allegations.
In summary fashion, the SEC alleged “from at least 2002 through 2007, Transocean made illicit payments through its customs agents to Nigerian government officials to extend the temporary importation status of its drilling rigs, to obtain false paperwork associated with its drilling rigs, and obtain inward clearance authorizations for its rigs and a bond registration.”
The SEC further alleged as follows. “Transocean made illicit payments through Panalpina World Transport Holding Ltd.’s Pancourier express courier service to Nigerian government officials to expedite the import of various goods, equipment and materials into Nigeria. In most instances, customs duties for these items were not paid by either Panalpina or Transocean. In addition, Transocean made illicit payments through Panalpina to Nigerian government officials to expedite the delivery of medicine and other materials into Nigeria. Transocean’s total gains from the conduct were approximately $5,981,693.”
According to the complaint, Pancourier, is “an express door to door courier service operated by Panalpina” and the complaint alleges that Transocean used Panalpina and Pancourier “to expedite the delivery of goods and to import goods into Nigeria without always paying applicable duties to the Nigerian government.”
As to the TIPs and movement of rigs, the complaint allegess that Transocean’s illicit payments through its customs agents to Nigerian government officials avoided “moving costs of approximately $1,088,985 and gain profits of approximately $3,172,378.”
The SEC complaint also alleges that “Transocean made illicit payments totaling $207,170 to Customs Agent 2 for what were described on invoices as “customs intervention” charges related to six rigs.” According to the complaint, the payments ensured that “Transocean could operate its rigs in Nigerian waters without proper paperwork and without compliance with local law requirements.”
As to Panalpina and Pancourier, the SEC complaint states that “from January 2002 to September 2005, Transocean used Pancourier 404 times to import various goods and materials into Nigeria without paying any customs duties to the Nigerian government.” According to the complaint, “the total customs duties that Transocean avoided through its use of Pancourier for the 404 shipments to Nigeria were approximately $1,480,419.”
Finally, the SEC complaint alleges that “aside from its use of Pancourier, Transocean also used Panalpina to expedite delivery of medicine and other goods into Nigeria.” The complaint states that “Transocean made illict payments through Panalpina to Nigerian government officials for the importation of these goods totaling $32,741.”
Based on the above conduct, the SEC charged Tidewater with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records and internal control provisions.
As to the company’s internal controls, the SEC complaint simply states as follows. “… [A]s evidenced by the extent and duration of the improper payments to Nigerian officials, the improper recording of these payments in Transocean’s books and records, the failure of Transocean’s management to detect these irregularities, and the actual involvement of certain members of senior management, Transocean failed to devise and maintain an effective system ofinternal controls to prevent or detect these violations.”
Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Transocean agreed to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of $7,265,080. .
Former DOJ fraud section attorney Richard Smith (here) (Fulbright & Jaworski LLP) represented Transocean.
The pipeline that contains pending FCPA enforcement actions burst yesterday as the DOJ and SEC announced enforcement actions against 13 separate entities.
In enforcement actions that have long been anticipated, Panalpina entities, as well as several others, settled DOJ and SEC enforcement actions principally focused on customs and related payments in Nigeria, but also including alleged improper conduct in Angola, Brazil, Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, India, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Congo, Libya, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Gabon and Equatorial Guinea.
The combined DOJ/SEC settlement amounts total $236.5 million.
Your FCPA scorecard thus shows that since June 28th, the U.S. government has brought FCPA enforcement actions totaling approximately $1.1 billion. With numbers like these, aggressive FCPA enforcement based on, often times, dubious legal theories (more on that later) seems like the most profitable government program ever conceived.
Set forth below is a basic overview of the settlements. A more thorough review of the hundreds of pages of relevant documents will be forthcoming.
The DOJ resolution documents can be found here, the SEC resolution documents here.
Panalpina Entities
DOJ
Entities: Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd. and Panalpina Inc.
Resolution Vehicles: Criminal information charging Panalpina World Transport(Holding) with conspiracy to violate and violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. Charges resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement. Criminal information charging Panalpina Inc. with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s books and records provisions and aiding and abetting certain customers in violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Charges resolved through a plea agreement.
Countries: Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkmenistan
Penalty: Combined $70.56 million
SEC
Entity: Panalpina, Inc.
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations, aiding and abetting FCPA anti-bribery violations, and FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.
Countries: Nigeria, Angola, Brazil, Russia, and Kazakhstan
Disgorgement: $11,329,369
Pride Entities
DOJ
Entities: Pride International Inc. and Pride Forasol S.A.S.
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information charging Pride International with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and books and records provisions; violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; and violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Charges resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement. Criminal information charging Pride Forasol with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; and aidng and abetting violations of the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Charges resolved through a plea agreement.
Countries: Venezuela, India and Mexico
Penalty: $32.625 million (combined)
SEC
Entity: Pride International Inc.
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations, FCPA books and records and internal controls violations.
Countries: Venezuela, India, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Congo, and Libya
Disgorgement and interest: $23,529,718
Tidewater Entities
DOJ
Entities: Tidewater Marine International Inc., Tidewater Inc.
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information charging Tidewater Marine with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Charges resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement with Tidewater that requires, among other things, Tidewater Marine to pay a $7.35 million criminal penalty.
Countries: Azerbaijan and Nigeria
Penalty: $7.35 million
SEC
Entity: Tidewater Inc.
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations, FCPA books and records and internal controls violations
Countries: Nigeria, Azerbaijan
Disgorgement: $8,104,362
Civil Penalty: $217,000
Transocean Entities
DOJ
Entities: Transocean Inc. and Transocean Ltd.
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information charging Transocean Inc. with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provision; violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions; and aiding and abetting the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Charges resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement with Transocean Ltd. that requires, among other things, Transocean Inc. to pay a $13.44 million criminal penalty.
Countries: Nigeria
Penalty: $13.44 million
SEC
Entity: Transocean Inc.
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations, FCPA books and records and internal controls violations
Countries: Nigeria
Disgorgement and interest: $7,265,080
GlobalSantaFe Corp.
SEC
Entity: GlobalSantaFe Corp.
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery provisions, FCPA books and records and internal controls violations
Countries: Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, Equatorial Guinea
Disgorgement: $3,758,165
Civil Penalty: $2.1 million
Noble Corporation
DOJ
Entity: Noble Corporation
Resolution Vehicle: Non-proseuction agreement in which Noble Corporation: (i) acknowledged that certain of its employees knew that payments would be passed on as bribes to Nigerian customs officials; and (ii) admitted that the company falsely recorded the bribe payments as legitimate business expenses.
Countries: Nigeria
Penalty: $2.59 million
SEC
Entity: Noble Corporation
Resolution Vehicle: Settled civil complaint charging FCPA anti-bribery violations, FCPA books and records and internal controls violations
Countries: Nigeria
Disgorgement and interest: $5,576,998
Royal Dutch Shell Entities
DOJ
Entities: Royal Dutch Shell plc and Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd. (“SNEPCO”)
Resolution Vehicle: Criminal information charging SNEPCO with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and with aiding and abetting the FCPA’s books and records provisions resolved through a deferred prosecution agreement with Royal Dutch Shell Plc requiring, among other things, SNEPCO to pay a $30 million criminal penalty
Countries: Nigeria
Penalty: $30 million
SEC
Entity: Royal Dutch Shell plc and Shell International Exploration and Production Inc (“SIEP”).
Resolution Vehicle: Administrative cease and desist order finding FCPA books and records and internal control violations by Royal Dutch Shell and FCPA anti-bribery violations by SIEP
Countries: Nigeria
Disgorgement: $18,149,459
*****
According to the SEC release (here), Cheryl Scarboro, Chief of the SEC’s FCPA Unit stated: “This investigation was the culmination of proactive work by the SEC and DOJ after detecting widespread corruption in the oil services industry. The FCPA Unit will continue to focus on industry-wide sweeps, and no industry is immune from investigation.”
The SEC release further states: [t]his is the first sweep of a particular industrial sector in order to crack down on public companies and third parties who are paying bribes abroad.”
