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Bribery At The Racetrack

[This post is part of a periodic series regarding “old” FCPA enforcement actions]

The FCPA enforcement action against Sam Wallace Company Inc. (“Wallace”) was a first in several regards.  It was the first FCPA enforcement action involving both a DOJ and SEC component (all prior enforcement actions were either SEC only or DOJ only) and it was the first FCPA enforcement action involving criminal FCPA books and records charges.

In 1981, the SEC filed a complaint against Wallace (a Texas based construction company), Robert Buckner (Chairman of the Board of Wallace, CEO of Wallace, and a Director of Wallace) and Alfonso Rodriguez (Executive Vice President of Wallace, Regional Manager of various Wallace subsidiaries, and a Director of Wallace).  The conduct at issue focused on “payments from Wallace bank accounts totaling at least $1.391 million to a certain foreign official to aid Wallace in procuring and maintaining certain contracts and billings with a certain foreign government.”  According to the SEC complaint, the defendants “disguised and concealed such payments on Wallace’s books and records by utilizing, or causing to be utilized, certain false accounting entries which did not reflect the true nature and purpose of, and falsely described the expenditures used in the making of these payments to a certain foreign official.”  The SEC complaint for permanent injunction and certain ancillary relief charged FCPA anti-bribery violations as well as a variety of other securities law violations such as Section 10b-5 and filing false reports and proxy statements with the SEC.  Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Wallace agreed to establish a Special Committee of its Board to investigate the matters alleged in the SEC’s complaint and to file the report with the Court and the SEC.

In 1983, the DOJ filed a criminal information against Wallace containing more detail than the SEC’s complaint.  According to the DOJ, the recipient of the bribe payments was “John H. O’Halloran, then chairman of the Trinidad and Tobago Racing authority” and the payments were made “in order to obtain and retain a contract to construct the grandstand and receiving building portion of the Caroni Racetrack Project in Trinidad.”  The information charges that Wallace, aided and abetted by certain of its officers and employees, caused the Sam P. Wallace & Co. of P.R. Inc. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Wallace whose earnings were consolidated with the financial reports of Wallace) to “create fictitious purchase orders to purported suppliers for the purpose of concealing the withdrawal of corporate funds in order” to pay bribes to O’Halloran.  Among other charges, the information charges violations of the FCPA’s books and records provisions.  Wallace pleaded guilty and was ordered to pay a criminal fine of $530,000.

In 1983, the DOJ also filed a criminal information against Rodriguez.  In the information, the DOJ alleged that the “Trinidad and Tobago Racing Authority was an agency of the government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and was an instrumentality of the Trinidad and Tobago government.”  The information charged FCPA anti-bribery violations and Rodriguez pleaded guilty.  His sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation for two years and ordered to pay a $10,000 fine.

See here for original source documents from the SEC’s and DOJ’s enforcement action.

For more on the “foreign official” – Johnny O – see here; for recent news regarding the Caroni racetrack, see here.

Friday Roundup

The former DOJ top cop speaks, Senator Feingold joins the debarment discussion, anything is possible, and a House Resolution focused on BP … it’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Mendelsohn Interview

During the period of the FCPA’s resurgence, Mark Mendelsohn was the public face and voice on FCPA issues at the Department of Justice. In April, he announced his departure and now maintains an FCPA private practice at Paul Weiss. (See here and here for more).

See here for Mendeloshn’s recent interview with The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel as he reflects back on his DOJ tenure and other issues.

Senator Feingold Joins The Debarment Discussion

Earlier this week Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) testified before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts (see here). The hearing was on the topic of “Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of Agency Capture.” He began his testimony by stating that a better job needs to be done to ensure that there are no significant conflicts of interest or other inappropriate ties between regulators and the corporations they purport to regulate.”

He then stated:

“I want to raise a concern that a new, more subtle type of agency capture is beginning to emerge as a result of our increasing reliance on government contractors. The Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency recently reported that the total number of suspensions and debarments in FY 2008 was half the total from five years ago, and that suspensions and debarments had been steadily decreasing over the last five years. This is a disturbing statistic, especially when you consider that the number of contract fraud, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and other corruption investigations involving contractors is on the rise.”

For more on debarment issues, including an FCPA debarment bill pending in the House see here and here and here.

Is It Possible?

Is it possible to spend $3.2 million on “professional costs” associated with an internal investigation “limited in size and scope” to a branch office that represents approximately one-half of one percent of the company’s annual consolidated revenues?

Apparently it is.

In January I ran this post about Team Inc. and its voluntary disclosure of less than $50,000 in potentially improper payments in its Trinidad branch.

Earlier this week, when disclosing its financial results, the company stated as follows:

“The results of the FCPA investigation were communicated to the SEC and Department of Justice in May 2010 and the Company is awaiting their response. The results of the independent investigation support management’s belief that any possible violations of the FCPA were limited in size and scope. The total professional costs associated with the investigation were approximately $3.2 million.” (emphasis added).

Exhibit A for how even isolated instances of improper conduct under the FCPA in a branch office can be very expensive or Exhibit A for just how out of whack professional costs associated with an FCPA internal investigation and disclosure have become?

It’s your conclusion to make.

BP House Resolution

This recent post discussed Senator Charles Schumer’s (D-NY) request that the Department of Justice investigate BP for FCPA violations.

On July 30, House Resolution 1597 was introduced. Sponsored by Representative Daniel Maffei (D-NY) and co-sponsored by Representatives Christopher Lee (R-NY) and Michael McMahon (D-NY) the resolution (see here) encourages the United Kingdom to “investigate British Petroleum (BP) for foreign corrupt practices.”

The reason?

The same as offered by Senator Schumer – that BP attempted to influence the August 2009 release of Abdel Baset al-Megrahi, the Libyan terrorist convicted of the 1988 bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 that killed 270 people, including 189 Americans.

The resolution states, in part:

“Whereas the Scottish courts released al-Megrahi from prison on August 20, 2009, under the understanding that he was suffering from terminal prostate cancer;

Whereas the Scottish authorities have never clarified why al-Megrahi could not receive humane treatment while still in captivity;

Whereas al-Megrahi seems to have well outlived his original diagnosis;

Whereas it is very troubling that al-Megrahi received a hero’s welcome to his home country of Libya;

Whereas British Petroleum (BP) admitted on July 15, 2010, that a delayed prisoner-transfer between Britain and Libya ‘could have a negative impact’ on BP’s oil negotiations;

Whereas there are allegations that BP inappropriately attempted to affect the Scottish Government’s decision and possibly even the doctor’s diagnosis; and

Whereas al-Megrahi’s release sends an incredibly offensive message to the families that lost loved ones on Pan Am Flight 103: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives encourages the United Kingdom to investigate British Petroleum (BP) for foreign corrupt practices.”

As I asked in my original post – following Schumer’s (and now Maffei’s) lead will a British politician request that the U.K. Serious Fraud Office or the U.S. government investigate a U.S. company because it lobbied its own government officials in connection with a business purpose?

*****

A good weekend to all.

Team of Plenty

Voluntary disclosure (i.e. picking up the phone and calling the DOJ and/or SEC (if applicable) to schedule a meeting, during which a company’s lawyers disclose conduct that could potentially implicate the FCPA, even though the enforcement agencies, in many cases, would never find out about the conduct) is a tough issue.

In a November 2009 speech to an FCPA audience (see here), Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer acknowledged that the decision of whether to make a voluntary disclosure is “sometimes a difficult question” […] a question I grappled with as a defense lawyer.”

The Gibson Dunn Year End FCPA Report (the subject of yesterday’s post see here) has this to say about voluntary disclosure:

“To be sure, a company that voluntary discloses a potential FCPA violation to DOJ and the SEC will be better situated than one that otherwise finds itself across the table from the government having not disclosed the conduct.”

[…]

“On the other hand, there is substantial debate about just how “tangible” the benefits of voluntary disclosure truly are.”

[…]

“Although some corporate defendants that self-reported misconduct have certainly received relatively lenient treatment, it is not clear that voluntary disclosure was the reason for any particular settlement term.”

[…]

“Although it is certain that companies do receive some benefit for self-reporting FCPA violations, the real question is whether the company considering a voluntary disclosure is better off for having made the disclosure, which is not necessary one-and-the-same. Because voluntary disclosure makes the government aware of alleged improper conduct that it otherwise may have never discovered on its own, the likelihood of the government uncovering the misconduct through other means, such as a whistleblower, foreign government investigation, tip from a competitor or business partner, or industry-wide investigation, is a critical factor in determining whether to make a voluntary disclosure.”

[…]

“Given the multitude of factors to consider when making a voluntary disclosure decision, it is often challenging to make such a significant decision with any degree of confidence that a particular course of action is the right one. This task is made even more difficult by the uncertainty of obtaining any particular benefits for disclosing.”

As raised in a prior post (see here), a company’s decision in deciding whether or not to voluntarily disclose conduct to the enforcement agencies that could potentially implicate the FCPA is made even more difficult given the potential conflict of interest FCPA counsel has in advising the company as to the important disclosure issue – particularly where the disclosure only involves a potential FCPA violation?

I raised this lurking “elephant in the room” question in connection with Dyncorp International’s recent disclosure of potential FCPA issues.

One could raise the same question in connection with Team Inc.

In August 2009, Team (a Texas-based provider of specialty industrial services) disclosed (here) that an internal investigation conducted by FCPA counsel “found evidence suggesting that payments, which may violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), were made to employees of foreign government owned enterprises.”

The release further noted that “[b]ased upon the evidence obtained to date, we believe that the total of these improper payments over the past five years did not exceed $50,000. The total annual revenues from the impacted Trinidad branch represent approximately one-half of one percent of our annual consolidated revenues. We have voluntary disclosed information relating to the initial allegations, the investigation and the initial findings to the U.S. Department of Justice and to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and we will cooperate with the DOJ and SEC in connection with their review of this matter.”

In the prior post, I noted that a voluntary disclosure often sets into motion a series of events and the next thing the company knows it is paying for a team of lawyers (accompanied by forensic accountants and other specialists) even though the voluntary disclosure that got the whole process started involved conduct that may not actually violate the FCPA.

Fast forward to yesterday as Team disclosed (here) as follows:

“As previously reported, the Audit Committee is conducting an independent investigation regarding possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission. While the investigation is ongoing, management continues to believe that any possible violations of the FCPA are limited in size and scope. The investigation is now expected to be completed during the first calendar quarter of 2010. The total professional costs associated with the investigation are now projected to be about $3.0 million.”

A $3 million dollar internal investigation concerning non-material payments made by a branch office that represents less than one-half of one percent of the company’s annual consolidated revenues?

Wow!

Double-wow because the payments may not even violate the FCPA because they were made to “employees of foreign government owned enterprises” (see here for several prior posts on the enforcement agenices untested and unchallenged interpretation of the “foreign official” element)!

Others have scratched their heads about this as well (see here and here).

Of course, the FCPA does not contain a de minimis exception and of course the FCPA contains books and records and internal control provisions applicable to issuers like Team. Thus, even if the payments were not material in terms of the company’s overall financial condition, there still could be FCPA books and records and internal control exposure if they were misrecorded in the company’s books and records or made in the absence of any internal controls.

But then again, the FCPA books and records and internal control provisions would be implicated if a Team employee took his Cousin Randy to the company’s corporate suite for the ballgame but recorded the costs as “marketing expenses” on his reimbursement request causing the company to misrecord the payment. Yet, no one would suggest disclosing this potential FCPA violation!

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