Alcoa Agent Charged in the U.K.
As detailed in Alcoa Inc’s most recent quarterly SEC filing (here):
In 2008, Aluminium Bahrain BSC (“Alba”) (see here) filed a civil lawsuit against Alcoa Inc. and others in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged that certain Alcoa entities and their agents, including Victor Phillip Dahdaleh, engaged in a conspiracy over a period of 15 years to defraud Alba. The complaint further alleged that Alcoa and its employees or agents (1) illegally bribed officials of the government of Bahrain and (or) officers of Alba in order to force Alba to purchase alumina at excessively high prices, (2) illegally bribed officials of the government of Bahrain and (or) officers of Alba and issued threats in order to pressure Alba to enter into an agreement by which Alcoa would purchase an equity interest in Alba, and (3) assigned portions of existing supply contracts between Alcoa and Alba for the sole purpose of facilitating alleged bribes and unlawful commissions. The complaint alleged that Alcoa and others violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and committed fraud.
Soon thereafter in 2008, Alcoa advised the DOJ and SEC that it became aware of these claims, had already begun an internal investigation, and that it intended to cooperate in any DOJ and SEC investigation. In March 2008, the DOJ notified Alcoa that it had opened a formal investigation, the DOJ intervened in the civil lawsuit, and a court ordered the Alba lawsuit stayed so that the DOJ could fully conduct its investigation without the interference and distraction of the civil litigation.
In a related development yesterday on the other side of Atlantic, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) announced (here) that Dahdaleh (a British and Canadian national) has been arrested and charged “with corruption offences relating to contracts for the supply of aluminium to Bahrain.” According to the SFO release, Dahdaleh is alleged to have made bribe payments to Alba.
Dahdaleh was charged under the U.K.’s “old” bribery statutes, not the new U.K. Bribery Act.
For more on Alba, see this prior post.
Not America’s Finest Export
I concluded my “Facade of FCPA Enforcement” article (here) by discussing several reasons why the facade of FCPA enforcement matters. One reason is what I called “modeling” – the increasing frequency by which other nations are modeling enforcement of their own bribery laws on U.S. enforcement methods. I stated that unless these methods are addressed and corrected here in this country, they will continue to be replicated elsewhere, perhaps leading to a global facade of enforcement. The section focused mostly on the United Kingdom and how the Serious Fraud Office has not been shy in stating its intention to model its enforcement of U.K. bribery laws on the DOJ’s enforcement of the FCPA, including use of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements. See here for a 2009 document titled “Approach of the Serious Fraud Office to Dealing with Overseas Corruption” and here for my extensive Q&A with SFO Director Richard Alderman.
Against this backdrop, the Financial Times recently reported (here) that the U.K. “plans to introduce U.S.-style corporate plea bargains.” Edward Garnier, the U.K. Solicitor General, is quoted as saying, “You have to have a cost-benefit analysis. If I can produce a system which has all the benefits [of the U.S.] and can do justice, as well as making money for this country, it seems to me that there’s something to be thought about. This provides for a way of dealing with criminality without causing collateral damage.”
As the OECD observed last year in its U.S. Phase 3 Report, “it seems quite clear that the use of these agreements [NPAs and DPAs] is one of the reasons for the impressive FCPA enforcement record in the U.S.” (See here for the prior post). As noted in several previous posts, former DOJ FCPA unit chief Mark Mendelsohn was asked “if you did not have the choice of deferred or non prosecution agreements, what would happen to the number of FCPA settlements every year” and he stated as follows “if the Department only had the option of bringing a criminal charge or declining to bring a case, you would certainly bring fewer cases.” (See Mark Mendelsohn on the Rise of FCPA Enforcement, 24 Corporate Crime Reporter 35, September 10, 2010).
NPAs and DPAs clearly yield a high quantity of enforcement activity, but the quality of that enforcement activity is open to question. NPAs and DPAs are not America’s finest law enforcement product and I previously wrote in this essay that they ought to be abolished in the FCPA context. In short, the U.K. ought to pause before importing these resolution vehicles.
For an excellent commentary on the above U.K. issues, see this recent piece from Monty Raphael (here) who states, among other things, “if the driver for the criminal regulation of business is how big a return a country can derive from its investigations, such regulation will be bereft of integrity and, most importantly, predictability.”
London readers will be interested in this October 17th event with Edward Garnier and Richard Alderman at Pinset Masons’ London office concerning the issues discussed above.
Mr. Alderman Goes to Washington
[I am pleased to share that FCPA Professor is one of the nominated blogs for the Top 25 Business Law Blogs of 2011 contest sponsored by LexisNexis. LexisNexis invites comments on the nominated blogs so that the field can be narrowed to the Top 25. The link to submit comments is here. To submit a comment, you must register, but registration is free and does not result in any sales contacts. The comment box is at the very bottom of the page and the comment period ends on October 25th.
Since launching FCPA Professor in July 2009, and continuing with the upgrade of the site in July 2001, my mission has remained the same: to inject a much needed scholarly voice into FCPA and related issues; to explore the more analytical “why” questions increasingly present in this current era of aggressive enforcement; and to foster a forum for critical analysis and discussion of the FCPA and related topics among FCPA practitioners, business and compliance professionals, scholars and students, and other interested persons. I hope you value the content and resources found on FCPA Professor and I thank you for your consideration.]
Richard Alderman is the Director of United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office, an agency (here) similar to the U.S. Department of Justice and the primary U.K. enforcer of the Bribery Act (as well as the country’s prior bribery laws). Last week, Alderman gave three speeches in Washington and this post contains excerpts from those speeches. In his remarks Alderman touched upon the following topics: SFO resources, current workload and enforcement priorities; differences between how the UK and US investigate and prosecute bribery actions; WikiLeaks and the Arab Spring; the demand side of bribery; individual prosecutions under the Bribery Act; adequate procedures under the Bribery Act (“let me emphasize this is a complete defense, it is not a matter of mitigation”) and the SFO’s active engagement approach; and merger and acquisition issues (“society benefits if an ethical corporation takes over and sorts out a corporation that has corruption problems”).
Trace Forum 2011 (here)
“I shall talk a little later about the Bribery Act but let me tell you first a little more about what the SFO has been doing in order to justify the recognition of the UK as an active enforcer. We are a comparatively small office and we devote a considerable amount of that resource to dealing with anti-corruption. We have about 80 frontline staff dealing with anti-corruption with a resource for this of some $7.5 million. Our resource in the SFO is also a flexible one and we can move additional resource into anti-corruption from other areas depending upon workload. Currently, our anti-corruption workload is dominated by pre-Bribery Act cases. That is likely to remain for some time. We have about 50 corruption cases (whether involving the public sector or private sector) under formal investigation or prosecution and, of course, a number of additional ones that we are looking at to see whether we should open an investigation. Although these figures may look low in terms of the figures of some other authorities, it is important to understand quite what they mean. All of these cases are actually large complex anti-corruption investigations reaching across many countries and many individuals and companies. Under our system, we have to conduct every investigation to the standards required by our Criminal Justice System and with the possibility of a contested trial before Judge and Jury very much in mind. This means that each case is very resource intensive because we have to ensure that all evidence is obtained in the appropriate way and is admissible in court. The resource that goes into these cases is very great and is the source of great concern to me. “
*****
“Another feature of our cases that you do not have [in the U.S.] is the ability of those under investigation and indeed other parties such as non-governmental organisations to challenge anything that the SFO does. We saw that, for instance, in the BAE case where the decision to terminate the Saudi investigation was challenged by two non-governmental organisations. Any interested party (and that is construed very widely) can go to court and require the SFO to give an explanation to the satisfaction of the court about what we are doing. We need to show that our actions are lawful and proportionate. It is a very important discipline in my jurisdiction and we are at all times very conscious of this.”
*****
“There are some particularly important issues under [the Bribery Act] for an audience based in the US. Let me talk first about the extended reach of the Bribery Act to foreign corporations that carry on business in the UK. We have received lots of questions about this and about the meaning of those very simple words “carrying on business in the UK. I know that there is the potential for much litigation on this issue. Nevertheless, I tell corporations that it will be very unwise of them to try to rely upon a very technical interpretation of the Bribery Act in order to persuade themselves that it is safe to carry on using bribery. I have said that they might be in for a very unpleasant surprise in a number of years time when our Supreme Court gives its views on this test. I say to corporations that the only safe way of doing business is not to use bribery.”
*****
The Bribery Act has a new offence aimed at senior officers of corporations who consent to or connive in bribery. I know that there are many who are worried about this offence, particularly if they happen to be Directors or Non-Executive Directors based in the UK and where their companies are high risk. You may find, for example, that some London executive or non-executive directors may be worried about their exposure if US corporations are found to have been involved in corruption. We are actively looking for cases where we can apply this provision. Society expects senior members of a corporation to be responsible for ensuring that there is a true ethical culture. They have a key responsibility here. My view is that if they find that their efforts to do this meet with resistance or no success then they should consider resigning and telling us about their concerns. Expressing doubts about the company’s culture but remaining a highly paid officer would not be sensible because this would seem to be a model case of conniving in bribery for the purposes of the legislation.”
*****
“Some cases may involve corruption under the old law. You will not be surprised, for example, to hear that we looking through Wikileaks and the other information becoming available as a result of the Arab Spring in order to see what corporations have been doing over a period of years. We are going to be very interested in the sorts of deals that are going to come to light and I am sure that this will be a fruitful source of work for us. The message from me is that if corporations are worrying about this, then they ought to come and talk to us now rather than wait for the dawn raid.”
Anti-Corruption Summit 2011 (here)
“What we have been doing is to encourage corporations to work together and with us and other authorities in order to try to work on the underlying problem. I have been very impressed by what a number of corporations have been doing. They come to me to tell me what they are doing because they are slightly nervous that the SFO will pick this up and may even start making enquiries or investigate. This is not what we want to do. If there is a genuine attempt being made to solve the problem of corruption then I want to let the corporations get on with that so far as possible and indeed to provide any help that I can in the SFO. We have had a number of discussions of this nature. I do not underestimate the difficulties here and the constraints. It appears to me though to be absolutely the right thing to do. This is because in my view one of the likely issues in the coming years is not going to be what we do about the supply side of bribery, but what happens about the demand side of bribery. It is an issue that I am concerned about in the SFO and one where I want us to contribute.”
*****
“The Bribery Act creates a new offence at the corporate level of failing to prevent bribery. The defence to this is that there are adequate procedures to prevent that bribery. Let me emphasise that this is a complete defence. It is not a matter of mitigation. If an act of bribery occurs somewhere in your worldwide corporation and you had adequate procedures, then no criminal offence has been committed. This is something that has been reassuring to corporations. Of course what this means is that there has been great interest in the meaning of adequate procedures. The guidance from our Ministry of Justice sets out the UK Government’s approach to this in considerable and to my mind, helpful detail. Let me though give you a flavour of what you might expect if you came to us to talk about your adequate procedures. I should add here that many corporations do that. You may find this surprising but we do have a regular succession of corporations coming to the SFO to seek our views on their procedures and what they are doing. We stress that we can give no guarantee and certainly no certificate to the effect that their procedures are adequate but we are able to give them helpful advice. The feedback we get is that these are positive and pragmatic discussions. Some of the themes you will hear from us will be these. First, what is the approach of the most senior management in the corporation? They set the lead. Employees of corporations are very shrewd. They know what really matters to top management. They will know if something matters or does not matter. We will want to know therefore what top management is doing in order to ensure that the importance of good ethical business is known to every member of that company. We hear for example of contracts that corporations do not enter into because they could be secured only by corruption. This is a good practical example of the importance placed upon anti-corruption. There are others as well. We also want to know about risk assessment. This is something that corporations ought to be doing anyway but my own perception is that this has been intensified because of the Bribery Act. How do you assess the risks in your corporation? Is this simply a paper and routine exercise or is it genuine? It certainly ought to be genuine because this could bring down your corporation if you get it wrong and overlook some key risk. We will want therefore to talk through your risk assessment process. We shall of course be particularly interested if you find you have a considerable problem about something that was not flagged up in the risk assessment. This may or may not mean that the risk assessment process was flawed. We want to know what you are doing about this and indeed how you are developing the risk assessment process in future. We will offer any thoughts we have about any risks you should be thinking about but are not. What we will also want to be sure about is this. Please take it from me that simply handing us a large pile of documents with lots of boxes ticked on checklists will not be enough to satisfy us that you have adequate procedures. That is a paper exercise. It is part of what is needed but only part. We shall want to know what lies behind this and what the real issues are. Personally, I believe we are not alone in wanting to know this. When we are talking about corruption with all the reputational issues that are involved here, senior management should actually be asking exactly the same questions that the SFO will be asking in this respect. I have mentioned that corporations come and talk to us about all of these issues. Please feel free to contact us if you would find this helpful in order to talk through what you are doing. It is not a threatening process and please do not worry that if you came to us and expressed a few doubts about whether your procedures are adequate that you would find yourself on the wrong end of a prosecution before you left the SFO building. This simply does not happen. The object of these discussions is to be constructive and supportive. I hope you will find that if you approach us.”
*****
“I want finally in this overview of what is happening, to talk about mergers and acquisitions. I know how important this subject is. Some time ago we said publicly in the SFO that we were prepared to assist corporations that were in the process of carrying out a merger or acquisition and discovered problems during the course of due diligence. We made this willingness clear about two years ago although I have to say that there was little take up at that stage. That seems to be changing now. I have been struck in recent months by the fact that a number of corporations have been to see us about some sensitive potential acquisitions where they are identifying some real issues about corruption during the course of due diligence. Ultimately, the decision about an acquisition is a commercial one and will involve an analysis of risk and reputation as well as many other issues. The corporation and its advisors though want to try to manage the regulatory risk so far as possible by seeking views from the SFO. We have been ready to engage in this. What we do is to talk to the corporation and its advisors about what they are finding and what they propose to do about it if the acquisition takes place. It is quite clear to me as a result of the discussions that a negative response from the SFO is sufficiently important to put the acquisition in jeopardy. On the other hand, a positive view from us on the basis of what the corporation intends to do could enable the acquisition to go ahead. My view on this, simply stated, is that society benefits if an ethical corporation takes over and sorts out a corporation that has corruption problems. It is something I am keen for the SFO to promote, so far as we legitimately can.
Risk Advisory Dinner (here)
“What we are trying to do with private sector corporations is to work on some real initiatives in particular countries and even particular areas such as ports in order to try to find ways of curbing the demand for these payments. This is not just a question of simply saying “no”; it is also a question of seeing what is the underlying problem (for example, public officials are not paid by the state and so are forced to demand bribes) and what can be done about these underlying causes. It is also a question of how we deal with governments and other authorities about these issues.”
*****
“I have said publicly that a high priority for us will be to find a foreign corporation with a UK business presence that has got involved in corruption in another country and has undermined a good ethical UK corporation. Those corporations have been within the SFO’s reach since July 1st as a result of the new Bribery Act. An English jury will take the view that there is a very clear UK public interest in bringing such corporations to a criminal court. It is a high priority for us.”
Foreign Enforcement Action Roundup
The U.S., of course, is not the only country with an FCPA-like law. Canada’s version is the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”). Australia’s version is part of its general Criminal Code.
For years, Canada and Australia have been hammered by various civil society organizations for its general lack of enforcement. For instance, Transparency International’s recent Annual Progress Report of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (here) noted that “Canada is the only G7 country in the little or no enforcement category, and [it] has been in this category since the first edition of [TI’s] report in 2005.” Australia likewise was in the little to no enforcement category and TI stated as follows. “The continued absence of prosecution for the past decade under the Criminal Code, as well as the absence of cases reported under the taxation law for this type of bribery offence, makes it difficult to demonstrate that successful prosecution is feasible under the present system.”
Against this backdrop, it was noteworthy that Canada and Australia authorities recently brought enforcement actions. This post summarizes the enforcement actions as well as recent developments in the U.K.
Canada
Niko Resources
On June 24th, it was announced that Niko Resources (an oil and natural gas exploration and production company headquartered in Calgary) agreed to resolve a CFPOA enforcement action.
The Agreed Statement of Facts (here) states that Niko “did, in order to obtain or retain an advantage in the course of business provide goods and services to a person for the benefit of Foreign Public Officials to induce the officials to use their position to influence any acts or decisions of the foreign state for which the official performs duties or functions, contrary” to the CFPOA.
The conduct at issue focused on Bangladesh and Niko Resources (Bangladesh) Limited (an indirectly wholly owned subsidiary) and specifically how Niko Bangladesh “provided the use of a vehicle [a Toyota Land Cruiser] costing [$190,984 Canadian dollars] to AKM Mosharraf Hossain, the Bangladeshi State Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources in order to influence the Minister in dealings with Niko Bangladesh within the context of ongoing business dealings.” In addition, the Statement of Facts states that “Niko paid the travel and accommodation expenses for Minister AKM Mosharraf Hossain to travel from Bangladesh to Calgary to attend GO EXPO oil and gas exploration, and onward to New York and Chicago, so that the Minister could visit his family who lived there, the cost being approximately $5000.”
According to the Statement of Facts, Canada’s investigation began after news stories surfaced concerning a possible violation of the CFPOA by Niko.
The total fine imposed on Niko was $8,260,000 plus a 15% Victim Fine Surcharge for a total of $9,499,000 (all Canadian dollars). This would seem to be a very aggressive fine amount for providing a Toyota Land Cruiser to a Bangladeshi Minister and paying $5,000 of non-business travel expenses to the official. The Statement of Facts states that the “fine reflects that Niko made these payments in order to persuade the Bangladeshi Energy Minister to exercise his influence to ensure that Niko was able to secure a gas purchase and sales agreement acceptable to Niko, as well as to ensure the company was dealt with fairly in relation to claims for compensation for the blowouts, which represented potentially very large amounts of money.” The Statement of Facts further state that Canadian authorities were “unable to prove that any influence was obtained as a result of providing the benefits to the Minister.”
The Probation Order (here) in the case reads very much like a U.S. style plea agreement or NPA/DPA in the FCPA context. Among other things, Niko agreed to continue its cooperation in the investigation, to implement a series of compliance undertakings, and to report to relevant Canadian authorities concerning its compliance and remediation.
In this Bulletin, Mark Morrision and Michael Dixon of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP noted that “a particularly significant aspect of this case is the amount and nature of the penalty imposed upon Niko” given that the only prior conviction under the CFPOA – in 2005 against Hydro Kleen – resulted in a $25,000 fine. The Bulletin notes that “the sentencing precedents submitted by the Prosecutor were U.S.Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases and the authors state that “the court’s willingness to accept these precedents and impose a fine of this amount now sets the benchmark for CFPOA fines in Canada.”
For additional coverage of the Niko enforcement action, see here from The Globe and Mail. For a related development connected to the Niko enforcement action involving a former member of Canada’s Parliament, see here from The Globe and Mail.
In a press release (here), Niko Chairman and CEO Ed Sampson stated as follows. “What happened was wrong. We acknowledge this. We accept responsibility, and we appreciate the seriousness of the actions. As a result of these events we have taken extensive steps in all aspects of our organization. One such step is the creation of the position of Chief Compliance Officer who reports directly to our Board, to ensure that something like this doesn’t happen again.” Niko’s release notes that since 2009 it has “adopted a full anti-corruption compliance program, training program and processes for risk assessment due diligence and compliance monitoring and reporting around the world.”
Australia
Securency International, et al
For years there has been news of an investigation of Securency International and certain of its executives for alleged breaches of Australia’s criminal code which prohibit payments to foreign government officials to obtain a business advantage. See here and here for the prior posts.
On July 1st, the Australian Federal Police commenced prosecutions against Securency International (“Securency”), Note Printing Australia Ltd (“NPA”) and a number of senior executives of those companies for criminal offences concerning the bribery and corrupting of various foreign public officials. Criminal charging documents are not publicly available in Australia, but Robert Wyld of Johnson Winter & Slattery (see here) provides this overview based on press reports.
“The event generated considerable publicity and banner headlines in Victoria where The Age has been prominent in investigating and following the story. The Federal Police commander, Chris McDevitt was quoted by The Age as saying that the case should send “a very clear message to corporate Australia” about avoiding bribery overseas.
The Securency allegations might be summarised as follows, taken from the news coverage of the events, noting that all corporations and individuals charged are innocent until proven guilty.
Securency and NPA have each been charged with criminal offences. The CEO (Myles Curtis), the CFO (Mitchell Anderson) and a Sales Executive (Ron Marchant) of Securency together with the CEO (John Leckenby), the CFO (Peter Hutchinson) and a Sales Executive (Barry Brady) of NPA and each been charged with bribery offences contrary to sections11.5(1) and 70.2 of the Criminal Code. The offences are alleged to have taken place between 1999 and 2005 and involved payments totalling nearly $10 million. The conduct in question involved activity in Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam concerning the payment of moneys to consultants or others characterised as public officials in circumstances which resulted in the award of contracts to Securency and NPA for the printing of foreign currency polymer banknotes. Specifically, in Malaysia, Securency and NPA secured a contract to print the 5 ringgit polymer banknotes through the services of an arms broker and a United Malays National Organisation MP and official and a former Malay central bank assistant governor has been charged with bribery by Malaysian authorities. In Indonesia, Securency and NPA secured a contract to print 500 million 100,000 rupiah polymer banknotes through the services of a consultant, Radius Christanto who received nearly US$4.9 million in commissions. In Vietnam, Securency secured a contract to print all Vietnamese currency on polymer banknotes, through the services of a local agent Anh Ngoc Luong (said to be a colonel in the Vietnam internal spy agency) and his company CFTD (whose directors were said to be relatives of Communist Party officials). In addition, in Nigeria, investigations are ongoing concerning up to $20 million that may have been paid to intermediaries to secure contracts. Further investigations are ongoing in Europe, the UK and in the US involving the identified conduct and potentially, conduct in other countries.
To the extent that any offences result in convictions, the applicable penalties will be determined under the old Criminal Code regime which existed (and was heavily criticised by the OECD and by Transparency International) before the penalties were substantially amended in February 2010.”
U.K.
Macmillan Publishers
On July 22nd, the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) announced (here) that an Order was made under the Proceeds of Crime Act for Macmillan Publishers Limited (“MPL”) “to pay in excess of £11 million in recognition of sums it received which were generated through unlawful conduct related to its Education Division in East and West Africa. ” As noted in the SFO release, “the initial enquiry commenced following a report from the World Bank” (see here for a prior post discussing the World Bank debarment proceeding of the MPL.) The SFO release goes into detail regarding the ” procedure based on the guidance contained within [the SFO’s] published protocol document” that the SFO required MPL to follow and the release also sets forth “a number of relevant features, which have informed the resolution” of the matter. This SFO guidance will be of interest to those following SFO expectations in this Bribery Act era. For more on the MPL enforcement action see here from Field Fisher Waterhouse.
Willis Limited
On July 21st, the U.K. Financial Services Authority announced (here) a £6.895 million fine against Willis Limited for “failings in its anti-bribery and corruption systems and controls.” The FSA release states as follows. “Between January 2005 and December 2009, Willis Limited made payments to overseas third parties who assisted it in winning and retaining business from overseas clients, particularly in high risk jurisdictions. These payments totalled £27 million. The FSA investigation found that, up until August 2008, Willis Limited failed to: ensure that it established and recorded an adequate commercial rationale to support its payments to overseas third parties; ensure that adequate due diligence was carried out on overseas third parties to evaluate the risk involved in doing business with them; and adequately review its relationships on a regular basis to confirm whether it was still necessary and appropriate for Willis Limited to continue with the relationship. These failures contributed to a weak control environment surrounding payments to overseas third parties and gave rise to an unacceptable risk that these payments could be used for corrupt purposes, including paying bribes. In addition, between January 2005 and May 2009, Willis Limited failed to adequately monitor its staff to ensure that each time it engaged an overseas third party, an adequate commercial rationale had been recorded and that sufficient due diligence had been carried out. Although Willis Limited improved its policies in August 2008, it failed to ensure that its staff were adequately implementing them. Lastly, throughout the period, Willis Limited’s senior management did not receive sufficient information about the performance of Willis Limited’s relevant policies to allow them to assess whether bribery and corruption risks were being mitigated effectively. During the FSA investigation, Willis Limited identified as suspicious a number of payments totalling $227,000 which it made to two overseas third parties in respect of business carried out in Egypt and Russia.”
According to the FSA, Willis’s “failings created an unacceptable risk that payments made by Willis Limited to overseas third parties could be used for corrupt purposes.” The FSA release states that the fine is the largest “in relation to financial crime systems and controls to date.” For more on the Willis Limited enforcement action see here from Adam Greaves of McGuireWoods. The FSA’s Willis Limited enforcement action is similar to a January 2009 enforcement action against Aon Limited (see here).
News Corp And The FCPA
On July 7th the U.K. Guardian reported (here) that “up to five [U.K. police] officers were paid between them a total of at least £100,000 in cash from the News of the World.” The next day, Dominic Rushe and Jill Treanor of the U.K. Guardian made the link (see here) between these payments and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
What followed over the next 10 days was the most intense worldwide media coverage of the FCPA in its nearly 35 year history.
Last Wednesday, in a development seldom – if ever – seen in the FCPA context, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) and John Rockefeller (D-WV) wrote Attorney General Eric Holder and SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro (see here) requesting “that the U.S. Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission investigate whether News Corporation, a U.S.-based corporation, has violated United States law – specifically the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.” Separately, Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) wrote Holder and Schapiro (see here). Senator Lautenberg stated as follows. “The limited information already reported in this case raises serious questions about the legality of the conduct of News Corporation and its subsidiaries under the FCPA. Further investigation may reveal that current reports only scratch the surface of the problem at News Corporation. Accordingly, I am requesting that DOJ and the SEC examine these circumstances and determine whether U.S. laws have been violated.”
Public interest groups (see here for one example) also began demanding an FCPA inquiry into the News of the World scandal.
Soon thereafter, it was reported that the FBI (an agency that investigates allegations of criminal violations of the FCPA under the supervision of the Fraud Section of the DOJ Criminal Division) opened an investigation of News Corp. Among others, Congressmen John Conyers “applaud[ed] Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement that the Justice Department has opened a formal investigation into allegations that News Corp. may have violated both federal wiretapping statutes and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” (See here).
The News Corp. scandal is wide in scope potentially implicating several laws both here in the U.S. and the U.K. This post focuses on News Corp.’s potential FCPA exposure.
Can the FCPA apply to News Corp. even if the improper conduct took place outside of the U.S.?
Yes. News Corp. is a U.S. company and as such the FCPA has extraterritorial application meaning it can face FCPA liability even if the conduct at issue takes places entirely outside of the U.S. Indeed, in most FCPA enforcement actions the conduct at issue takes place outside of the U.S. Further, it is very common in FCPA enforcement actions for parent companies to be held legally responsible for the acts of subsidiary employees on the theory that such employees acted as “agents” of the parent company and that the parent company ultimately derived the financial benefit from the improper conduct at issue.
Indeed, even News Corp.’s FCPA policies and procedures (here) states as follows. “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a U.S. law that forbids bribery of foreign (meaning non-U.S.) government officials, whether elected or appointed, even if the bribe takes place outside the United States. Because News Corporation is a U.S. corporation, the FCPA may apply to all Company employees everywhere in the world, regardless of their nationality or where they reside or do business.”
Why do the London police payments implicate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions?
As a general matter, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions prohibit the payment of money or anything of value to a “foreign official” to “obtain or retain business.” London police officers are “foreign officials” under the FCPA. For instance, in this 2006 FCPA enforcement action the DOJ asserted that an Iraqi police officer was a “foreign official” under the FCPA.
As to “obtain or retain business,” for most of its history FCPA enforcement actions focused on payments to “foreign officials” to “obtain or retain business” with a foreign government. However, during the past decade, the DOJ has brought numerous FCPA enforcement actions premised on payments to customs officials, tax officials, immigration officials and the like where the payments have nothing to do with “obtaining or retaining business” with a foreign government. Rather, the payments were alleged to have assisted the payor in “obtaining or retaining” business in the general sense.
The leading court decision on this issue is U.S. v. Kay. 359 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 2004). As further explained in this piece (pages 917-921), in Kay, a U.S. circuit court (one step below the U.S. Supreme Court) concluded that payments to a “foreign official” to lower taxes and custom duties in a foreign country can provide an unfair advantage to the payer over competitors and thereby assist the payer in obtaining and retaining business. The court concluded that there was “little difference” between these type of payments and traditional FCPA violations in which a company makes payments to a “foreign official” to influence or induce the official to award a government contract. Even so, the court stated that not all such payments to a “foreign official” outside the context of directly securing a foreign government contract violate the FCPA; it merely held that such payments “could” violate the FCPA. The court recognized that “there are bound to be circumstances” in which a custom or tax reduction merely increases the profitability of an existing profitable company and thus, presumably, does not assist the payer in obtaining or retaining business.
Despite Kay’s equivocal holding, there has been a significant increase in FCPA enforcement actions since the decision concerning payments to “foreign officials” that better position the payor to “obtain or retain business” in the general sense. (See for instance the “CustomsGate” category under the Search page of this site).
Thus, payments to London police officers that allowed News of the World to obtain non-public information to write sensational news stories – and thus sell more newspapers – would seem to fit the type of FCPA enforcement common post-Kay. Given that News Corp. is a media company and its product is information, such payments are similar to an oil and gas company making payments to a “foreign official” to obtain non-public information concerning the location of oil and gas deposits.
What about the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions?
In addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA also contains books and records and internal control provisions applicable to U.S. listed companies such as News Corp. The books and records provision requires that “issuers” (the statutory term for U.S. listed companies) “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” The internal controls provision require that “issuers” “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that:” among other things, “transactions are executed in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;” “access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management’s general or specific authorization;” and “transactions are recorded as necessary to permit a preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles … and to maintain accountability for assets.”
These provisions, despite being part of the FCPA, are generic in scope. Thus, if other payments part of News Corp.’s wide-ranging scandal – such as “hush” settlement payments to phone hacking victims are misrecorded on the company’s books and records, such entries would provide the basis for independent FCPA books and records violations – even if such conduct does not directly implicate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. As to the London police payments, such payments, if not recorded accurately on the company’s books and records, would of course also give rise to an independent FCPA books and records violation. Both the DOJ and the SEC (which also has FCPA jurisdiction over U.S. listed companies) frequently hold parent companies liable for the books and records violations of subsidiaries on the theory that subsidiary books and records are consolidated with the parent company’s books and records for purposes of financial reporting.
As to the FCPA’s internal control provisions, the enforcement agencies often take the rather simplistic position that because the payments were made or because corporate expenses were not accurately recorded, the company did not have effective internal controls.
If News Corp. faces FCPA liability does that mean that executive officers will as well?
Not necessarily. Under U.S. legal principles, a corporate entity such as News Corp. can face legal liability based on the conduct of any employee or agent to the extent the employee or agent was acting within the scope of their authority and the conduct was intended to benefit, at least in part, the organization. Many FCPA enforcement actions against corporate entities result from the improper conduct of low to mid-ranking employees in the absence of any allegation that executive officers or board members knew about the conduct at issue or participated in the conduct at issue. Thus, just because News Corp. may face FCPA liability under these principles does not necessarily mean that executive officers will as well.
As to individuals (whether high-ranking executives or otherwise) there needs to be some evidence of culpable conduct – which in the FCPA criminal context – often means participating in the improper conduct, authorizing the improper conduct, or knowing of the improper conduct but failing to put a stop to it.
Will U.S. authorities defer to British authorities in investigating the London police payments?
Some have suggested that U.S. authorities are unlikely to bring an enforcement action because the U.K. has strong anti-corruption laws and is capable of handling this matter domestically. I disagree. The U.K. Bribery Act went live on July 1st, but it only covers conduct that occurs after that date. Prior to the Bribery Act, the U.K. had a hodgepodge of antiquated bribery and corruption statutes. However, the problem with those statutes is they required a “controlling mind” of the corporate to be involved in the conduct at issue in order to prosecute the entity. The weakness of these pre-Bribery Act laws was clearly evident in the U.K. BAE enforcement action from 2010. As the Serious Fraud Office stated in court papers “a serious evidential difficulty had been identified in respect of potential corruption charges, namely the difficulty of proving the involvement of a ‘controlling mind’ in the offending.” Thus, if there is no evidence of “controlling minds” being involved in the London police payments, pre-Bribery Act laws will be insufficient to bring bribery charges as occurred in the BAE matter. This evidentiary difficulty is one of the reasons the U.K. passed the Bribery Act.
U.S. enforcement agencies have a good relationship with their U.K. counterparts and cooperation between the agencies is likely to occur, but there is little reason to believe that the U.S. will stand down and not bring an enforcement action if that is what the evidence warrants. In fact, there have been several FCPA enforcement actions concerning U.K. business entities, based on conduct occurring in the U.K.,and/or involving U.K. citizens. See here for the 2010 FCPA enforcement action relating to Innospec, here for the FCPA enforcement action concerning employees of Pacific Consolidated Industries and here for the FCPA enforcement action against U.K. citizen Jeffrey Tesler.
What is likely to happen next?
There are multiple reasons why News Corp. will cooperate, if it is not already, in the DOJ’s FCPA investigation. The DOJ has substantial discretion (some would argue too much) in resolving corporate criminal matters. Under the DOJ’s Principles of Prosecution of Business Organizations (see here), one of the factors DOJ will consider in deciding how to resolve any potential action is the company’s cooperation. Cooperation in the FCPA context often means conducting an internal, independent review of the conduct at issue and sharing the results, witness statements, key documents, etc. with the enforcement agencies on a near real-time basis. Cooperation is also a mitigating factor under the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines which provide a monetary penalty range for all FCPA criminal actions.
How long is this FCPA gray cloud likely to hang over News Corp?
Likely for a few years. It is typical for an FCPA enforcement inquiry to begin based on a certain set of limited and discrete facts – here the London police payments. However, before the enforcement agencies (DOJ or SEC) will agree to resolve an FCPA matter, it is typical for the agencies to ask the “where else” question. In other words, the question will be – if News Corp. employees (broadly speaking) made the London police payments, did other News Corp. employees around the world make similar payments to “foreign officials” to “obtain or retain business.” To answer this question, and because News Corp. is likely in cooperation mode and because the company has an incentive to learn this information itself, News Corp. will likely conduct a targeted world-wide review of its operations. Such a review takes time and often costs tens of millions of dollars in professional fees and expenses. Because of these dynamics, it is typical for FCPA scrutiny – from the point of investigation to the point of enforcement action – to last between 2-4 years.