Lots of what FCPA Inc. churns out is fluff.
But sometimes, there is actual informed analysis and two articles recently caught my eye.
The first article discusses recent bribery-related money laundering judicial decisions and the second article provides a critical analysis of the recent so-called Monaco Memo.
In her recent speech in connection with release of a memo to DOJ personnel titled ““Further Revisions to Corporate Criminal Enforcement Policies Following Discussions with Corporate Crime Advisory Group” Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco stated:
“Voluntary self-disclosure programs, in various Department components, have already been successful. Take, for example, the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program, the Criminal Division’s voluntary disclosure program for FCPA violations, and the National Security Division’s program for export control and sanctions violations.”
However, if the DOJ’s FCPA voluntary disclosure program has been “successful,” why is it so unsuccessful as measured by the principal goal of the program as identified by the DOJ?
It is mid-September.
Thus, consistent with historical practices, DOJ officials are out giving speeches about DOJ policy. Previous posts here and here have focused on the recent release of the so-called Monaco Memo and this post highlights a recent speech by Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Polite.
In addition to discussing the recent Monaco Memo, Polite touched upon the following topics: deterrence and compliance certifications.
Deterrence
For at least 15 years the government has encouraged business organizations to voluntary disclosure conduct that violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
In more recent years, in 2012 the government sought in the FCPA Guidance to entice business organizations to voluntarily disclose by, among other things, highlighting six “anonymized examples of matters DOJ and SEC have declined to pursue” where a common thread was voluntary disclosure. In April 2016, it was the DOJ’s pilot program, an effort – in the words of the DOJ – to “encourage voluntary corporate self-disclosure.” Thereafter, it was the November 2017 DOJ FCPA Corporate Enforcement policy which – in the words of the DOJ – was intended to provide “guidance and greater certainty for companies struggling with the question of whether to make voluntary disclosures of wrongdoing…”.
But what do the numbers show? What percentage of DOJ and SEC enforcement actions are the result of a voluntary disclosure? The below post provides the answers.
Overheard, interesting and for the reading stack.
It’s all here in the Friday roundup.
Overheard
In connection with the ongoing saga of Ericsson (see here for a recent post) during a recent investor conference call, E. Borje Ekholm (President, CEO and Director) stated:
