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New Article – “A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative”

Each year, I publish a long-form FCPA Year in Review article. Given the realities of law review publishing, there is a delay in releasing the article from the end of the year.

I am pleased to share “A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative” recently published by the Michigan State International Law Review.  Full of useful charts and other information regarding FCPA enforcement, the abstract is as follows:

“This article, part of an annual series, weaves together Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related developments from 2013 into a coherent narrative of value to anyone who seeks an informed base of knowledge regarding the FCPA, its enforcement, and related legal and policy issues. Specifically, this article uses FCPA enforcement action data to highlight perennial issues associated with this new era of FCPA enforcement and otherwise discusses top FCPA or related developments from 2013.  Although this article focuses on one statute and its enforcement, reference is made throughout to other significant developments in 2013 relevant to the FCPA as such references best facilitate an appreciation for many of the controversial aspects of FCPA enforcement.

Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement statistics from 2013 and places the statistics in a proper and historical perspective.

Part II of this article uses certain statistics to highlight perennial issues associated with this new era of FCPA enforcement.  The following issues will be discussed: (i) the prominent role non-prosecution, deferred prosecution agreements, and administrative settlements have in corporate FCPA enforcement and how criticism of these resolution vehicles continues to mount; (ii) the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions and a relevant data point that helps explain the gap; and (iii) how the financial consequences of corporate FCPA scrutiny and FCPA enforcement continue to rise, how FCPA settlement amounts have come a long way in a short amount of time, and how certain excesses have come to define FCPA scrutiny.

Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related developments from 2013 and uses these developments to spotlight the following issues: (i) certain alarming enforcement actions and why anyone who values the rule of law should be concerned by these actions; (ii) actual judicial scrutiny of FCPA enforcement agency theories as well as how non-FCPA legal developments should cause pause as to certain FCPA enforcement theories; (iii) FCPA enforcement agency speeches and policy positions; and (iv) certain uncomfortable truths and double standards regarding the U.S. fight against bribery and corruption.”

Combine the above article with my other Year in Reviews and you will have an extensive collection of FCPA statistics, trends, and analysis over time.

For 2012, see here.

For 2011, see here.

For 2010, see here.

For 2009, see here.

Friday Roundup

Cisco’s discreet blog post, McDonald’s receives the “princeling” treatment, Avon update, further to the free-for-all, more candy, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday roundup.

Cisco’s Discreet Disclosure

There is not much that slips through the cracks when it comes to the FCPA space.

However, this December 23, 2013 Cisco blog post by a Vice President for Compliance Services under the discreet heading “The Importance of Ethics in Global Business” has not otherwise been reported.  The post states, after noting that “for the sixth time in as many years, the Ethisphere Institute honored Cisco by naming us to its list of the “World’s Most Ethical Companies,” as follows:

“Recently, at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Department of Justice, Cisco began an investigation into our business activities and discounting practices in Russia and other Commonwealth of Independent States in response to a communication those agencies had received. We are cooperating with the agencies and will fully share the results of our investigation with them. Despite the extensive investigation that we have undertaken thus far, we have found no basis to believe that Cisco’s activities are in violation of any law, and indeed the information we were provided does not allege wrongdoing by any of Cisco’s executive management. While this investigation is ongoing, we do not expect the outcome to have any material adverse effect on our business or operations.”

For a prior post concerning companies that have resolved FCPA enforcement actions or have otherwise been under FCPA scrutiny while at the same general time earning “world’s most ethical” company status see here.

McDonald’s

The word of the last six months would seem to be “princeling.”  In “princeling” updates:

This Wall Street Journal article “Vietnam Gets Its First McDonald’s” states:

“McDonald’s chose Henry Nguyen, a Vietnamese-American investor and the son-in-law of Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, as its main franchise partner in the country.”

This Quartz article “McDonald’s Partnered with a Vietnamese Princeling”  notes:

“Partnering up with a well-connected member of one of Vietnam’s most prominent political families has raised remarkably few eyebrows for McDonald’s—especially given the growing scandal in China over investment banks that have done much the same thing.”

Among other things, the article notes:

“Nguyen, who also heads Vietnam’s Pizza Hut franchise business, worked hard for a decade to convince McDonald’s he was the right person for the partnership, he told Reuters last year. A McDonald’s spokeswoman said then, “His marriage did not preclude him for participating in what was a very competitive selection process.”

As noted in this prior post “Regarding Princelings and Family Members” there is nothing inherently illegal about hiring family members of alleged “foreign officials” and various DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases have blessed such arrangements.  Even so, several FCPA enforcement actions have been based, at least in part, on the hiring of family members of alleged “foreign officials” – see here.
Speaking of princelings, this Bloomberg article asks “If JPMorgan Has to Shun China’s Princelings, Shouldn’t Harvard?”

Avon

Avon has been under FCPA scrutiny since 2008 and disclosed yesterday as follows.

“The Company recorded an aggregate accrual related to the previously disclosed government Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) investigations of $89 million, or $0.20 per diluted share, within operating profit, of which $12 million was recorded in the second quarter. Based on the status of the Company’s current settlement negotiations with the DOJ and the staff of the SEC, including the level of monetary penalties being discussed, an additional $77 million was recorded in the fourth quarter, and the Company estimates the aggregate amount of any potential settlements with the government could exceed this accrual by up to approximately $43 million. There can be no assurance that the Company’s efforts to reach settlements with the government will be successful or, if they are, what the timing or terms of such settlements will be.”
During yesterday’s earnings conference call, Avon’s CEO stated:
“As you saw in our press release this morning, we’ve continued our discussions with that SEC and DOJ and we’ve made significant progress. Based on the status of our recent discussions, we believe that a reasonable range for settlement with both agencies would be $89 million to $132 million. Our discussions with the government are ongoing and differences remain, but the team is working hard in an effort to bring these matters to a close.”

Free-For-All

In my recent article “Why You Should Be Alarmed by the ADM FCPA Enforcement Action,” I noted that with increasing frequency in this new era of FCPA enforcement, it appears that the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have
transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all in which any conduct the enforcement agencies find objectionable is fair game to extract a multimillion-dollar settlement from a risk-averse corporation.  In this post regarding the recent Alcoa enforcement action I noted that it was hard to square the enforcement action (the fourth largest FCPA enforcement action of all-time in terms of a settlement amount) when the alleged consultant at the center of the alleged bribery scheme was criminally charged by another law enforcement agency, put the law enforcement agency to its burden of proof at trial, and the law enforcement agency dismissed
the case because there was no ”realistic prospect of conviction.”

Further to the free-for-all, Wiley Rein attorneys Gregory Williams, Ralph Caccia and Richard Smith write here as follows.

“[I]t is remarkable that such a large monetary sanction was imposed when the criminal charges brought by the U.K. Serious Fraud Office against the consultant central to the alleged bribery scheme were dismissed on the grounds that there was no “realistic prospect of conviction.” Perhaps most striking, however, is the theory of parent corporate liability that the settlement reflects. Although there is no allegation that an Alcoa official participated in, or knew of, the improper payments made by its subsidiaries, the government held the parent corporation liable for FCPA anti-bribery violations under purported “agency” principles. Alcoa serves as an important marker in what appears to be a steady progression toward a strict liability FCPA regime.

[…]

Such an enforcement approach appears to abrogate basic tenets of corporate liability. A parent company is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary except when the companies disregard corporate formalities (alter ego theory) or when the subsidiary acts as the agent of the parent for a specific purpose.  For the latter, the parent is required to control the particular activity in question. The government’s new agency theory of enforcement represents an aggressive expansion of corporate liability, with significant the implications for parent companies both in terms of the compliance and potentially liability.”

For additional reading, see this recent post (“Dig into certain corporate Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement actions and it would appear that legal liability seems to hop, skip, and jump around a multinational company.  This of course would be inconceivable in other areas, such as contract liability, tort liability, etc. absent an “alter ego” / “piercing the veil” analysis for the simple reason that is what the black letter law commands”).

More Candy

Previous posts here and here have dispensed FCPA candy (that is year in reviews).  You can be tardy for the party, but still be included in the fun and set forth below are three additional worthwhile reads.

BakerHostetler 2013 Year-End Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Update

“This [recent] decrease [in corporate FCPA enforcement actions] appears to be the result of proactive internal investigations and remediation by U.S. companies that recognize the importance of retaining external resources to investigate FCPA issues in light of the substantial fines levied by the government over recent years.”

That’s a nice way to spin it, but the better answer by far is to have a proper perspective on FCPA statistics and to realize that 35% of all corporate FCPA enforcement actions in recent years and 55% of the settlement amounts were the direct result of just three unique events.

WilmerHale Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Alert

Kudos for the following statement regarding so-called “declinations.”

“[W]hile these corporate disclosures are frequently referred to generically as “declinations,” that term seems to encompass not only genuine declinations where the government exercises discretion to decline prosecution of an otherwise chargeable offense, but also cases where the government decides not to prosecute because it has found insufficient evidence of FCPA violations or faces insurmountable legal hurdles in bringing a case.”

For more on so-called “declinations” see prior posts here, here and here.

Miller & Chevalier FCPA Winter Review 2014 

Once again, be warned – the divergent enforcement statistics are likely to make you dizzy at times and as to certain issues.  [Given the increase in FCPA Inc. statistical information and the growing interest in empirical FCPA-related research, I again highlight the need for an FCPA lingua franca (see here for the prior post), including adoption of the “core” approach to FCPA enforcement statistics (see here for the prior post), an approach endorsed by even the DOJ (see here), as well as commonly used by others outside the FCPA context (see here)]

For the Reading Stack

From the Washington Post, a look at New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and the rise and controversy of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.

In this recent NY Times Dealbook article, “S.E.C.’s Losing Streak in Court Puts Agency in Spotlight,” Professor Peter Henning (a former SEC enforcement official) begins as follows.

“Every litigator says that trials are messy affairs because no one can predict how they will play out.  After a string of recent unfavorable verdicts in fraud cases, the Securities and Exchange Commission may, too, be concerned with that trend. The S.E.C. is a bit like the New York Yankees, because every defeat is magnified, so we should be careful not to read too much into the anecdotal evidence as garnered by the results of a few recent trials.  Most cases filed by the agency are settled, garnering only modest publicity, so the effectiveness of its enforcement program is not tied solely to its wins in the courtroom.”

For more on the SEC’s recent losses, see here from Marc Fagel and Mary Kay Dunning (Gibson Dunn).

“One likely consequence [of the SEC’s recent losses] may be an increase in the number of enforcement matters filed as administrative cease-and-desist proceedings rather than as federal district court actions.”

Spot-on observation, but again a sorry state of affairs in that a way for the SEC to avoid litigated losses when put to its burden of proof is to avoid the judicial system altogether.

A recent survey from AlixPartners conducted in November 2013.  (The survey group consisted of executives at companies based in North America, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia that have annual revenues of $150 million or more).  “The survey also found that although some companies have expanded the scope of their reviews of their foreign subsidiaries, one-third said they have not done that. Less than half (43%) of respondents said they regularly conduct due diligence on third-party agents.”  (See here for the prior post “It’s More Like Bronze Dust.”).

Friday Roundup

What others are saying, more candy, seriously out-of-whack, not first hand, and for the reading stack.  It’s all here in the Friday Roundup.

What Others Are Saying

Last week, I published this article “Why You Should Be Alarmed By The ADM FCPA Enforcement Action.”  I’ve received a higher than norm amount of feedback – all positive – about the article via e-mail and social media.  Below is what others are saying about the article.

“For many reasons this is a terrific article.  [You are] very brave to write this necessary and timely analysis.”

“Just wanted to say thank you for keeping me updated on your FCPA-related work.  It looks like your 2010 Facade article is still holding up pretty well, despite the DOJ’s “Guidance” from last year.  It will be interesting to see how long the agencies can continue with their relatively unconstrained enforcement practices.”

Thanks for sharing Mike. And don’t change: you are as good as ever!

“Excellent article, Mike!  Readable even by those of us who are not lawyers.  The conclusion about why ADM chose settlement is undoubtedly true of many others who are charged, but leads to a question of the [conduct] of those who are charged to extract “easy takings” rather than have to justify themselves to the SEC or DOJ.  On whose behalf are they acting?”

Also a thank you for the many positive and encouraging comments I’ve received since publishing two posts (here and here) concerning the recent departure of the DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief.

In other news on that front, White & Case recently announced here that Kathleen Hamann will join the firm as a partner “from the DOJ where she was an anticorruption policy counsel and trial lawyer assigned to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Team in the Criminal Division’s Fraud Section.”  The head of White & Case’s Global White Collar Practice stated: “Kathleen’s experience at the DOJ gives her a strong understanding of the complexities of the FCPA and the federal government’s anticorruption policies.  Kathleen is a wonderful addition to our global white collar team, and will further strengthen our ability to represent and defend clients around the world in all phases of investigations, and criminal and civil enforcement proceedings.”

More Candy

This previous post “Like a Kid In A Candy Store” highlighted the abundant offerings of FCPA year in reviews this time of year.

There is more candy to digest.

See here for the slick Global Bribery and Corruption Review 2013 from Hogan Lovells.

See here for Mayer Brown’s FCPA Update:  Year-End 2013.

But again, be warned – the divergent enforcement statistics are likely to make you dizzy at times and as to certain issues.  [Given the increase in FCPA Inc. statistical information and the growing interest in empirical FCPA-related research, I again highlight the need for an FCPA lingua franca (see here for the prior post), including adoption of the “core” approach to FCPA enforcement statistics (see here for the prior post), an approach endorsed by even the DOJ (see here), as well as commonly used by others outside the FCPA context (see here)]

Seriously Out-Of-Whack

One could have either of the following positions.

DOJ enforcement of criminal laws is more about leverage against public companies and risk aversion by corporate leaders rather than facts and law.  Therefore, even if a company settles various enforcement actions for approximately $20 billion in a year, it is not surprising that a company’s profits and stock price are up and that the company’s CEO is therefore given a substantial raise.

DOJ enforcement of criminal laws is about facts and law and if a company settles various enforcement actions for approximately $20 billion in a year, it is just not right that the company’s CEO is given a substantial raise.

Regardless of your position (I know where I fall), you would have to agree that things are seriously out-of-whack these days.

See here and here for articles regarding the compensation of James Dimon (CEO of JPMorgan).  As highlighted in the Wall Street Journal article.

“J.P. Morgan Chase’s board delivered a strong endorsement of Chief Executive James Dimon, boosting his pay 74% for a year in which the nation’s largest bank agreed to more than $20 billion in legal payouts …”  […] The raise reflects the view among the board that most shareholders believe Mr. Dimon is doing a good job protecting the bank’s earnings power and driving the stock price higher despite the high-profile legal settlements, according to people familiar with the board’s conversations. […] Many large shareholders seem comfortable with the bank’s leadership, too. The company’s stock price rose 33% during 2013, outpacing the 30% increase in the S&P 500 stock index. If not for its billions in legal expenses, J.P. Morgan likely would have earned record profits.  […]   Warren Buffett, the billionaire investor who personally owns an undisclosed number of shares in J.P. Morgan, described Mr. Dimon as a “bargain.” “If I owned J.P. Morgan Chase, he would be running it, and he would be making more money than the directors are paying him,” said Mr. Buffett, who has publicly defended the bank executive before.”

“Not First Hand”

JPMorgan of course is under FCPA scrutiny for its alleged hiring practices in China.  (See here among other posts).

In this video interview, Goldman Sach’s CEO Lloyd Blankfein talks about hiring issues at his company.  As noted in the related article, “asked whether he had seen any hiring that looked like a bribe, Mr. Blankfein paused for a moment” and said “not first hand.”

Reading Stack

From BalkanInsight, an in-depth piece regarding the Magyar Telecom enforcement action (see here for the prior post).

From the Economist regarding Brazil’s new FCPA-like law.

*****

A good weekend to all.

A Focus On SEC FCPA Individual Actions

Posts earlier this week (here and here) highlighted various facts and figures from 2013 and historically concerning DOJ FCPA individual prosecutions.  This post focuses on SEC FCPA individual actions in 2013 and historically.

Like the DOJ, the SEC frequently speaks in lofty rhetoric concerning its focus on holding individuals accountable under the FCPA.  For instance, in connection with the 2012 Garth Peterson enforcement action, the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated (here) that the case “illustrates the SEC’s commitment to holding individuals accountable for FCPA violations.”  Speaking generally, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White recently stated that a “core principle of any strong enforcement program is to pursue responsible individuals wherever possible … [and that] is something our enforcement division has always done and will continue to do.”

Since 2000, the SEC has charged 59 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.  The breakdown is as follows.

  • 2000 – 0 individuals
  • 2001 – 3 individuals
  • 2002 – 3 individuals
  • 2003 – 4 individuals
  • 2004 – 0 individuals
  • 2005 – 1 individual
  • 2006 – 8 individuals
  • 2007 – 7 individuals
  • 2008 – 5 individuals
  • 2009 – 5 individuals
  • 2010 – 7 individuals
  • 2011 – 12 individuals
  • 2012 – 4 individuals
  • 2013 – 0 individuals

Similar to the prior DOJ figures, most of the individuals charged – 33 (or  56%) were charged since 2008.  Thus, on one level the SEC is correct when it states that individual prosecutions are a focus of its FCPA enforcement program at least as measured against the historical average given that between 1978 and 1999 the SEC charged 22 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.

Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 and 1999, the SEC’s statements (like the prior DOJ statements about its focus on individuals) represent hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.

Of the 33 individuals charged with civil FCPA offenses by the SEC since 2008:

  • 7 individuals were in the Siemens case;
  • 4 individuals were in the Willbros Group case;
  • 4 individuals were in the Alliance One case;
  • 3 individuals were in the Maygar Telekom case; and
  • 3 individuals were in the Noble Corp. case.

In other words, 64% of the individuals charged by the SEC with FCPA civil offenses since 2008 have been in just five cases.

Considering that there has been 65 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather remarkable statistic.  Of the 65 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions, 53 (or 82%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges against company employees.  This figure is thus higher than the 73% figure highlighted earlier this week regarding the DOJ.  This is notable given that the SEC, as a civil law enforcement agency, has a lower burden of proof in an enforcement action.

The last SEC FCPA enforcement action against a company employee related to a corporate FCPA enforcement action occurred approximately two years ago in connection with the Noble Corporation matter (see here for the SEC’s enforcement action against Thomas O’Rourke, Mark Jackson and James Ruehlen – current or former employees of Noble Corporation).  Of note from this enforcement action, it is the only individual FCPA enforcement action (DOJ or SEC) in connection with the 2010 enforcement actions against Panalpina and six oil and gas companies concerning alleged conduct in Nigeria.

Once again, like with the DOJ figures, one can ask the “but nobody was charged” question given the gap between corporate SEC FCPA enforcement and related individual enforcement actions.

Yet, like with the DOJ figures and as highlighted in yesterday’s post, there is an equally plausible reason why so few individuals have been charged in connection with many corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.

With the SEC, the issue is not so much NPAs or DPAs (although the SEC has used such vehicles twice to resolve an FCPA enforcement action – a DPA with Tenaris in 2011 and a NPA with Ralph Lauren in 2013 – and there has been no individual enforcement actions related to these corporate enforcement action). Rather, the issue seems to be more the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy (notwithstanding its minor tweaks in 2013).  For more on this policy and its impact of SEC enforcement actions, see pgs. 946-955 of my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”  In the article, I discuss the affidavit of Professor Joseph Grundfest (Stanford Law School and a former SEC Commissioner) in SEC v. Bank of America and how SEC enforcement actions “typically omit mention of valid defenses and of countervailing facts or mitigating circumstances that, if proven at trial, could cause the Commission to lose it case.”  In the article, I also discuss the SEC’s frank admission in the Bank of America case that a settled SEC enforcement action “does not necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s position over the other.”

Individuals in an SEC FCPA enforcement, even if only a civil action, and even if frequently allowed to settle on similar neither admit nor deny terms, have their personal reputation at stake and are thus more likely than corporate entities to challenge the SEC and force it satisfy its burden of proof at trial as to all FCPA elements.

More recently, the SEC has been keen on resolving corporate FCPA enforcement actions in the absence of any judicial scrutiny.  As highlighted in this prior SEC Year in Review post, a notable statistic from 2013 is that 50% of SEC corporate enforcement actions were not subjected to one ounce of judicial scrutiny either because the action was resolved via a NPA or through an administrative order.

In other words, and like in the DOJ context, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” in connection with SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions, but rather – do SEC corporate FCPA settlements necessarily represent provable FCPA violations?

It is also interesting to analyze the 12 instances since 2008 where an SEC corporate FCPA enforcement action resulted in related charges against company employees.   With the exception of Siemens, KBR/Halliburton and Magyar Telekom, the corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions resulting in related charges against company employees occurred in what can only be described as relatively minor (at least from a settlement amount perspective) corporate enforcement actions.  These actions are:  Faro Technologies, Willbros Group, Nature’s Sunshine Products, United Industrial Corp., Pride Int’l., Noble Corp., Alliance One, Innospec, and Watts Water.

[Note – the above data was assembled using the “core” approach as well as the definition of an FCPA enforcement action described in this prior post]

DOJ Prosecution Of Individuals – Are Other Factors At Play?

Yesterday’s post (here) focused on DOJ FCPA individual prosecutions and highlighted the following facts and figures.

  • Since 2008, the DOJ has charged 89 individuals with FCPA criminal offenses.
  • 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just four cases and 75% of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 have been in just nine cases.
  • There have been 60 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008 and of these actions, 44 (or 73%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any DOJ charges against company employees.

These statistics should cause alarm, including at the DOJ as it has long recognized that a corporate-fine only enforcement program is not effective and does not adequately deter future FCPA violations.   For instance, in 1986 John Keeney (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, DOJ) submitted written responses in the context of Senate hearings concerning a bill to amend the FCPA. He stated as follows:

“If the risk of conduct in violation of the statute becomes merely monetary, the fine will simply become a cost of doing business, payable only upon being caught and in many instances, it will be only a fraction of the profit acquired from the corrupt activity. Absent the threat of incarceration, there may no longer be any compelling need to resist the urge to acquire business in any way possible.”

In 2010 Hank Walther (Deputy Chief Fraud Section) stated that a corporate fine-only FCPA enforcement program allows companies to calculate FCPA settlements as the cost of doing business.

Most recently, in 2013 Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy Chief of Staff, Criminal division) stated that “there is no greater deterrent to corporate crime that the prospect of prison time … if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be seen as merely the cost of doing business.”

In my 2010 Senate FCPA testimony (here), I noted that the absence of individual FCPA charges in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions causes one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct giving rise to the corporate enforcement action was engaged in by ghosts.  Others have rightly asked the “but nobody was charged” question, including James Stewart in a New York Times column highlighted in this previous post.

However, as I stated in my Senate testimony, there is an equally plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in connection with many corporate FCPA enforcement actions.  The reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement action in the first place.

Readers know well of the prevalence of non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements (NPA / DPA)  in the FCPA context and how these agreements, not subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny, are often agreed to by companies for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not necessarily because the conduct at issue violates the FCPA.  For more on this dynamic, see my article “The Facade of FCPA Enforcement.”  As highlighted in this recent post, since 2010, 93% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions have been resolved via NPAs or DPAs.

Individuals, on the other hand, face a deprivation of personal liberty, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high burden of proof as to all FCPA elements.  In other words, perhaps the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” but rather do NPA and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations?

I set out to test this with the following working hypothesis.

  • Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution that the corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA violations, represent a higher quality FCPA enforcement action (in the eyes of the DOJ) and is thus more likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees.
  • Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality FCPA enforcement action and is thus less likely to result in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its high burden of proof.

The below statistics provide a compelling datapoint concerning the quality and legitimacy of many corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

Since NPAs and DPAs were first introduced to the FCPA context in December 2004 (see here), there have been 76 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.

  • 12 of these corporate enforcement actions were the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations.  10 of these corporate enforcement actions – 83% – resulted in related criminal charges of company employees.
  • 51 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved solely with an NPA or DPA.  In only 5 instances – 9.8% – was there related criminal charges of company employees.
  • A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is what I will call a hybrid action in which the resolution includes a guilty plea by some entity in the corporate family – usually a foreign subsidiary – and an NPA or DPA against the parent company.  Since the introduction of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context, there have been 13 such corporate enforcement actions.  In 4 of these actions – 31% –  there was related criminal charges of company employees. This percentage is what one might expect compared to the two types of corporate FCPA enforcement actions discussed above, although it is interesting to note the following regarding 3 of these 4 instances.  The DOJ ended up dismissing the charges against Si Chan Wooh (Schnitzer Steel), John O’Shea (ABB) was not found not guilty, and Bobby Elkin (Alliance One) received a probation sentence after the sentencing judge questioned many aspects of the enforcement action (see here for the prior post).

If the above statistics do not cause you to question the quality and legitimacy of many corporate FCPA enforcement actions, no empirical data ever will.  For those who believe NPAs and DPAs always represent provable FCPA violations, the ball is now in your court to offer credible explanations for following datapoints.

If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is the result of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the corporate entity to FCPA violations, there is a 83% chance that related criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.  If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, there is a 9.8% chance that criminal charges will be brought against a company employee.

At a conference last May (and as highlighted in this post), I presented the above numbers and put the ball in the court of Denis McInerney (DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) and asked him to explain the gap.  He described two enforcement actions resolved via an NPA or DPA in which there were indeed related individual prosecutions, but otherwise said that he did not know where these numbers are coming from.  As I explained, it was really quite easy calculating the numbers.  One simply takes all DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2004, tracks how those enforcement actions were resolved, and then looks to see if there have been related individual actions against company employees.

[Note – the above data was assembled using the “core” approach as well as the definition of an FCPA enforcement action described in this prior post]

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