This recent post highlighted SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement against issuers in 2021.
Today’s post focuses on the other FCPA enforcement agency – the Department of Justice – and highlights various facts and figures relevant to DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2021 against business organizations. (See here for a similar post from 2020; here for a similar post from 2019; here for a similar post from 2018; here from 2017, here from 2016, here from 2015, here from 2014, here from 2013, here from 2012, here from 2011, and here from 2010).
Compared to prior years, certain of the year in review statistics below (like many from 2021) are less than enlightening given the small number of corporate enforcement actions in 2021.
Settlement Amounts and Specifics
In 2021, the DOJ brought 2 corporate enforcement actions.
- in 2020 the DOJ brought 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2019 the DOJ brought 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2018 the DOJ brought 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2017 the DOJ brought 9 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2016 the DOJ brought 13 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2015 the DOJ brought 2 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2014 the DOJ brought 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2013 the DOJ brought 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2012 the DOJ brought 9 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2011 the DOJ brought 11 corporate FCPA enforcement actions;
- in 2010 the DOJ brought 17 corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
(Note: these figures use the “core” approach to FCPA statistics – see here for the prior post – an approach also endorsed by the DOJ – see here).
In the 2 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2021, the DOJ collected approximately $87.2 million.
(Note: this figure represents net FCPA settlement amounts after accounting for various credits or deductions in certain enforcement actions for related law enforcement actions).
By way of comparison:
- in the 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2020, the DOJ collected approximately $2.10 billion;
- in the 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2019, the DOJ collected approximately $1.62 billion;
- in the 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2018, the DOJ collected approximately $618 million;
- in the 8 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2017, the DOJ collected approximately $845 million;
- in the 13 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2016, the DOJ collected approximately $1.17 billion;
- in the 2 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2015, the DOJ collected approximately $24.2 million;
- in the 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2014, the DOJ collected approximately $1.25 billion;
- in the 7 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2013, the DOJ collected approximately $420 million;
- in the 9 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2012, the DOJ collected approximately $142 million;
- in the 11 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2011, the DOJ collected approximately $355 million;
- in the 17 corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2010, the DOJ collected approximately $870 million;
Corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2021 ranged from $79.6 million (Deutsche Bank) to $7.6 million (Amec Foster Wheeler).
Corporate v. Individual Prosecutions
In the 2 corporate DOJ enforcement actions in 2021, 0 (0%) have resulted, at present, in any related DOJ FCPA charges.
Stay tuned for future posts specifically about DOJ individual FCPA enforcement actions in 2021 and historically.
Resolution Vehicles
In the 2 corporate FCPA enforcement actions by the DOJ in 2021, the DOJ used deferred prosecution agreements. Thus, 100% of DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement in 2021 involved, in whole or in part, an alternative resolution vehicle (NPA, DPA or declination with disgorgement).
By way of comparison:
- in 2020, 75% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles.
- in 2019, 100% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2018, 100% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2017, 100% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2016 92% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2015 100% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2014 71% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2013, 100% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2012 100% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2011 82% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles;
- in 2010 94% of corporate DOJ enforcement actions involved alternative resolution vehicles.
Voluntary Disclosures
Of 2 DOJ corporate enforcement actions in 2021, 0 (0%) were the result of a voluntary disclosure.
By way of comparison:
- in 2020, 13% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2019, 37% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2018 25% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2017 33% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2016 38% of DOJ corporate enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2015, 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure;
- in 2014, 29% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosures;
- in 2013, 57% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure or the direct result of a related voluntary disclosure;
- in 2012, 78% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of a voluntary disclosure or casually related to previous voluntary disclosures;
- in 2011, 73% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were the result of corporate voluntary disclosures.
Monitors
Of the 2 corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2021, 0 (0%) resulted in a formal corporate monitor imposed by the DOJ.
By way of comparison:
- in 2020 0% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2019 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2018 12% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2017 33% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2016 54% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2015 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2014 14% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2013 57% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2012 33% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor;
- in 2011 9% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor; and
- in 2010 41% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions resulted in a formal corporate monitor.
(Note: in certain enforcement actions the DOJ concluded that a formal monitor was unnecessary because the company already had monitoring requirements imposed upon it as a result of a related foreign law enforcement action).
This remainder of this post provides an overview of corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement in 2021.
Deutsche Bank (Jan. 8th)
See here and here for prior posts.
Charges: Conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions
Resolution Vehicle: Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Guidelines Range: $70.7 million to $141.4 million
Settlement: $79.6 million
Origin: Requests for information from the DOJ/SEC
Monitor: No
Individuals Charged: No
Amec Foster Wheeler (June 25)
See here and here for prior posts.
Charges: Conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions
Resolution Vehicle: Deferred Prosecution Agreement
Guidelines Range: $24.5 – $49 million
Settlement: Net $7.6 million (after credits for related foreign law enforcement actions)
Origin: Requests for information from the DOJ/SEC
Monitor: No
Individuals Charged: No
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