In February 2026 Charles Hunter Hobson (who served in a variety of roles at Corsa Coal from 2013 to 2018) was found guilty by a jury for various Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and related offenses in connection with an Egyptian bribery scheme.
With a separate motion for a judgement of acquittal pending, recently Hobson filed a motion to dismiss based on the court’s supervisory powers.
The motion began:
“When confronted with coercive prosecutorial tactics . . . , the [Supreme] Court has often condoned those practices or let them pass in silence.” Hunter v. United States, 146 S. Ct. 1702, 1715 (2026) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). This Term, it “begins to correct course.” Id.
This case is directly in Hunter’s cross hairs. The government improperly used a five-year-old proffer to deprive a United States citizen of his constitutional right to a fair trial. Its threats disabled the adversarial process throughout the trial. The government then cashed in on this unlawful effort, calling its proof “overwhelming and uncontradicted.” The government never sought a ruling that the proffer waiver was knowing, voluntary, triggered, or enforceable. Even if it had, Hunter confirms that a valid waiver does not compel enforcement. On a lesser record, where the court did rule and no proffer statement was ever admitted, the Second Circuit vacated and ordered a new trial. United States v. Oluwanisola, 605 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2010).
At a minimum, Hobson is entitled to a new, fair trial—one in which he can confront the government’s witnesses, test its evidence, and present a defense without one hand tied behind his back. But the government’s deliberate actions warrant more. Hobson asks this Court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice under its supervisory power, protect the integrity of the federal courts, and prevent them from “making . . . themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law.”
Yesterday, the DOJ responded. It’s response brief begins:
Defendant falls far short of his burden, and the Motion should therefore be denied, but to the extent the Court wishes to resolve the substance of Defendant’s claims, the government respectfully requests 60 days to respond more fully.
Inflammatory, impertinent, and sensationally false accusations aside, Defendant Hobson’s latest Motion to Dismiss is procedurally improper and does not meet the governing legal standard. Defendant’s prior counsel submitted a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 29, which was fully briefed four months ago and is now pending ruling. ECF Nos. 197, 200. The government has also already opposed Defendant’s other untimely and improper efforts, through new counsel, to raise novel post-conviction arguments by means of a late-filed “reply.” Rather than await a ruling, Defendant now submits his instant Motion, marking his second attempt at raising his novel post-conviction arguments and adding to them. Defendant Hobson is not entitled to another bite at the apple by citing “supervisory powers,” nor does he meet the Third Circuit’s demanding requirement of “outrageous” and “willful” prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant’s Motion should be denied, and Defendant should proceed with his appeal after sentencing.”
