This previous post highlighted various facts and figures from 2017 SEC FCPA enforcement actions against issuers.
As highlighted in the prior post, of the 7 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions in 2017, just 1 (14%) has involved, at present, related SEC charges or findings against company employees.
In 2017, the SEC charged or found that 3 individuals violated the FCPA: Michael Cohen and Vanja Baros (associated with Och-Ziff) and Jeannot Lorenz (associated with Halliburton)
This post focuses on SEC FCPA individual actions historically.
Like the DOJ, the SEC frequently speaks in lofty rhetoric concerning its focus on holding individuals accountable under the FCPA.
As highlighted here, in November 2017 the SEC’s Co-Director of Enforcement stated:
“Of course, companies cannot engage in bribery without the actions of culpable individuals. The Enforcement Division is broadly committed to holding individuals accountable when the facts and the law support doing so. […] Individual accountability drives behavior more than corporate accountability, a point which is supported by both logic and experience. The Division of Enforcement considers individual liability in every case it investigates; it is a core principle of our enforcement program.”
Likewise, in November 2016 the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated that “pursuing individual accountability [in FCPA enforcement actions] is a critical part of deterrence.” Likewise, in November 2015 the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated:
“Holding individuals accountable for their wrongdoing is critical to effective deterrence and, therefore, the Division considers individual liability in every case. […] The Commission is committed to holding individuals accountable and I expect you will continue to see more FCPA cases against individuals.”
Likewise, in November 2014 the SEC’s Director of Enforcement stated:
“I always have said that actions against individuals have the largest deterrent impact. Individual accountability is a powerful deterrent because people pay attention and alter their conduct when they personally face potential punishment. And so in the FCPA arena as well as all other areas of our enforcement efforts, we are very focused on attempting to bring cases against individuals. […] [I]ndividual accountability is critical to FCPA enforcement — and imposing personal consequences on bad actors, including through bars and monetary sanctions, will continue to be a high priority for us.”
Since 2000, the SEC has charged 74 individuals with FCPA civil offenses. The breakdown is as follows.
- 2000 – 0 individuals
- 2001 – 3 individuals
- 2002 – 3 individuals
- 2003 – 4 individuals
- 2004 – 0 individuals
- 2005 – 1 individual
- 2006 – 8 individuals
- 2007 – 7 individuals
- 2008 – 5 individuals
- 2009 – 5 individuals
- 2010 – 7 individuals
- 2011 – 12 individuals
- 2012 – 4 individuals
- 2013 – 0 individuals
- 2014 – 2 individuals
- 2015 – 2 individuals
- 2016 – 8 individuals
- 2017 – 3 individuals
As highlighted by the above statistics, most of the individuals charged – 63 (or 85%) were charged since 2006. Thus, on one level the SEC is correct when it states that individual prosecutions are a focus of its FCPA enforcement program at least as measured against the historical average given that between 1977 and 1999 the SEC charged 22 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.
Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1977 and 1999, the SEC’s statements represent hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.
Of the 63 individuals charged with civil FCPA offenses by the SEC since 2006:
- 7 individuals were in the Siemens case;
- 4 individuals were in the ABB case;
- 4 individuals were in the Willbros Group case;
- 4 individuals were in the Alliance One case;
- 4 individuals were in the Och-Ziff case;
- 3 individuals were in the Maygar Telekom case; and
- 3 individuals were in the Noble Corp. case.
In other words, 45% of the individuals charged by the SEC with FCPA civil offenses since 2006 have been in just seven core actions.
Considering that there has been 129 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions since 2006, this is a rather remarkable statistic. Of the 129 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions, 103 (or 80%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any related SEC charges against company employees.
This is an interesting figure given that between 1977 and 2004 61% of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions did indeed result in related charges against company employees.
In other words, for most of the FCPA’s history the majority of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement resulted in related individual accountability, but in the SEC’s modern FCPA enforcement program, the vast majority of corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions have not resulted in related individual accountability despite the SEC’s rhetoric.
It is also interesting to analyze the 26 instances since 2006 where an SEC corporate FCPA enforcement action resulted in related charges against company employees. With the exception of Baker Hughes, Siemens, KBR/Halliburton, Magyar Telekom, Och-Ziff, and General Cable, the corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions resulting in related charges against company employees occurred in what can only be described as relatively minor (at least from a settlement amount perspective) corporate enforcement actions. These actions are: Schnitzer Steel, Immucor, Electronic Data Systems, Faro Technologies, Willbros Group, Nature’s Sunshine Products, United Industrial Corp., Pride Int’l., Noble Corp., Alliance One, Innospec, Watts Water, PBSJ and FLIR Systems, SAP, PTC, Nordion, Analogic, and LAN Airlines, and Halliburton.
Free 90 Minute 2017 FCPA Year In Review Video
A summary of every corporate enforcement action; notable statistics and issues to consider; compliance take-away points; and enforcement agency and related developments. Click below to view the engaging video tutorial.
ViewSet forth below is a complete list of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions since 2006 and whether the corporate enforcement action resulted in any related individual charges. Beginning in October 2014, I publicly invited the SEC to refute these numbers and support its individual accountability rhetoric after the SEC’s then FCPA Unit chief publicly stated that my numbers were false, wrong, deeply flawed, etc. (see here). The SEC has not responded and the invitation still stands.
2006 | Schnitzer Steel | Yes |
2006 | Statoil | No |
2006 | Oil States Int’l | No |
2006 | Tyco | No |
2007 | Lucent Tech. | No |
2007 | Akzo Nobel | No |
2007 | Chevron | No |
2007 | Ingersoll-Rand | No |
2007 | York | No |
2007 | Immucor | Yes |
2007 | Bristow Group | No |
2007 | Electronic Data Systems | Yes |
2007 | Textron | No |
2007 | Delta & Pine | No |
2007 | Baker Hughes | Yes |
2007 | Dow Chemical | No |
2007 | El Paso | No |
2008 | Fiat | No |
2008 | Siemens | Yes |
2008 | Con-Way | No |
2008 | Faro | Yes |
2008 | Willbros | Yes |
2008 | AB Volvo | No |
2008 | Flowserve | No |
2008 | Westinghouse Air Brake | No |
2009 | UTStarcom | No |
2009 | AGCO | No |
2009 | Nature’s Sunshine | Yes |
2009 | Helmerich & Payne | No |
2009 | Avery Dennison | No |
2009 | United Industrial Corp. | Yes |
2009 | Novo Nordisk | No |
2009 | ITT Corp. | No |
2009 | KBR/Halliburton | Yes |
2010 | Alcate-Lucent | No |
2010 | RAE Systems | No |
2010 | Panalpina | No |
2010 | Pride Int’l | Yes |
2010 | Tidewater | No |
2010 | Transocean | No |
2010 | GlobalSantaFe | No |
2010 | Noble Corp. | Yes |
2010 | Royal Dutch Shell | No |
2010 | ABB | No |
2010 | Alliance One | Yes |
2010 | Universal | No |
2010 | GE/Ionics | No |
2010 | Eni/Snamprogetti | No |
2010 | Veraz Networks | No |
2010 | Technip | No |
2010 | Daimler | No |
2010 | Innospec | Yes |
2010 | Natco | No |
2011 | Magyar Telekom | Yes |
2011 | Aon | No |
2011 | Watts Water | Yes |
2011 | Diageo | No |
2011 | Armor Holdings | No |
2011 | Tenaris | No |
2011 | Rockwell | No |
2011 | Johnson & Johnson | No |
2011 | Comverse | No |
2011 | Ball Corp. | No |
2011 | IBM | No |
2011 | Tyson | No |
2011 | Maxwell Tech. | No |
2012 | Eli Lilly | No |
2012 | Allianz | No |
2012 | Tyco | No |
2012 | Oracle | No |
2012 | Pfizer | No |
2012 | Orthofix | No |
2012 | Biomet | No |
2012 | Smith & Nephew | No |
2013 | Philips | No |
2013 | Parker Drilling | No |
2013 | Ralph Lauren | No |
2013 | Total | No |
2013 | Diebold | No |
2013 | Stryker | No |
2013 | Weatherford Int’l | No |
2013 | ADM | No |
2014 | Alcoa | No |
2014 | HP | No |
2014 | Smith & Wesson | No |
2014 | Layne Christensen | No |
2014 | Bio-Rad | No |
2014 | Bruker | No |
2014 | Avon | No |
2015 | PBSJ | Yes |
2015 | Goodyear | No |
2015 | FLIR Sytems | Yes |
2015 | BHP Billiton | No |
2015 | Mead Johnson | No |
2015 | BNY Mellon | No |
2015 | Hitachi | No |
2015 | Hyperdynamics | No |
2015 | Bristol-Myers Squibb | No |
2016 | SAP | Yes |
2016 | SciClone | No |
2016 | PTC | Yes |
2016 | VimpelCom | No |
2016 | Qualcomm | No |
2016 | Nordion | Yes |
2016 | Novartis | No |
2016 | Las Vegas Sands | No |
2016 | Nortek | No |
2016 | Akamai Technologies | No |
2016 | Analogic | Yes |
2016 | LAN Airlines | Yes |
2016 | Johnson Controls | No |
2016 | AstraZeneca | No |
2016 | Key Energy | No |
2016 | Nu Skin | No |
2016 | AbInBev | No |
2016 | Och-Ziff | Yes |
2016 | GlaxoSmithKline | No |
2016 | Embraer | No |
2016 | JPMorgan | No |
2016 | Braskem | No |
2016 | Teva Pharma | No |
2016 | General Cable | Yes |
2017 | Mondelez Int’l | No |
2017 | Biomet | No |
2017 | SQM | No |
2017 | Orthofix | No |
2017 | Halliburton | Yes |
2017 | Telia | No |
2017 | Alere | No |
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